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R E S U M E 
The r i g n t t o l i f e and p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y a s cjuaran'ct.-o-
by / a r t i c l e 21 o£ our C o n s t i t u t i o n n a s been a c c e p t e d a s 
t h e ' m o s t p r e c i o u s r i g h t ' . I t i s t h e ' m o s t c h e r i s h e d ' ' 
nuiuan r i g n t . i n e l i f e and l i b e r t y i n J u s t i c e id i i shna 
I y e r ' s l a n g u a g e i s t h e ' d e a r v a l u e of nunian h e a r t ' , 
x'he C o n s t i t u e n t / issenibly i n i t s wisdom had repldcr . 'a 
t h e iune r i can p h r a s e ' d u e p r o c e s s ' by t h e J a p a n e s e _,hrase 
' p r o c e d u r e e s t a b l i s h e d by l a w ' , and added t h e a d j e c t i v e 
' p e r s o n a l ' b e f o r e t h e word ' l i b e r t y * . 
r a f t e r t h e commencement of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , t n e 
Supreme C o u r t i n i t s new j u d i c i a l r o l e unde r t h e C o n s t i -
t u t i o n a l p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy began w i t h t h e i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n of rt.rticle 21 i n G o p a l a n . The Supreme C o u r t had , 
i n i t s m a j o r i t y , g i v e n a v e r y n a r r o w , p e d a n t i c and c o n s e r -
v a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o t h e words and p h r a s e s , used i n 
rt.rticle 2 1 , naniely ' l i f i e ' , ' p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y ' and ' p r o -
c e d u r e e s t a b l i s h e d by l a v ; ' . 
i n w Op a I an t n e c o u r t c o n s t r u e d che vvoru ' l i f e ' a;; 
n o t h i n g more t h a n t h e a n i m a l e x i s t e n c e . x'ne p n r a s e 
' p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y ' h a s been a c c e p t e d a s a l i b e r t y from 
wrongfu l r e s t r a i n t and c o n f i n e m e n t . The meaning and con -
t e n t of t n e ^^hrase ' p r o c e d u r e e s t a b l i s h by l a w ' ineans 
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nothing more .than the procedure enacted or prescribed 
oy the l e g i s l a t u r e in the law so as to be ^followea by tiie 
detaining au thor i ty . In the same way the word law' has 
also been explained as a 'S t a t e made law' or ' s t a t e enactea 
law' . Therefore law does not and can not mean and ' include 
the abs t r ac t thing as 'Hule of law' or p r i n c i p l e s of natural 
Justice. 
In Gopalan tne Supreme Jour t nas held noteably 
i-iahdjan J . tha t each Ar t i c l e in r a r t I I I i s a 'Se l t -code ' 
in i t s e l f . The court had ^.ropounaed tne ' t h e o r y of exclu-
s i v i t y ' meaning thereby the freedoms guaranteed in ^vrticLe.-; 
19,21,22 are mutually exclus ive . But the minority o^.ini ou 
of K,. 3ubba i^ ao J . expressed in Kiiarak Singh n^laing tii:;t 
'both are independent fundamental r ignt i i , though there is 
overlapj-.'inv^' became a base for the Supreme Court in A . C. 
Cooper and i-ianeka Gandhi to over ru le the 'doct r ine of ex-
c l u s i v i t y ' and held t h a t the pe r son ' s deprivat ion or 
j_.ersonal l i b e r t y has to be s a t i s f i e d under Ar t i c l e s 14,1:^ 
and 21 of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
In Gopalans.R. f>as J, held tha t Ar t i c l e 19 p ro t ec t s 
some of the important a t t r i b u t e s of personal l i b e r t y as 
independent r i g h t s and the expression "personal l i be r ty" 
nas been used /^rt. 21 as a compendious term including within 
i t s meaning a l l the v a r i e t i e s of r i g h t s which go to make up 
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t h e p e r s o n a l l i b e r t i e s of men. In K.K» Kochuni 
t h e Supreme C o u r t p o i n t e d o u t t h a t p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y in 
rtrt. 21 i s a more c o m p r e h e n s i v e concef^t and h a s a 
much w i d e r c o n n o t a t i o n t h a n t h e r i g h t g u a r a n t e e d i n 
^ t . 1 9 ( 1 ) . 
In Kharak Singh ^ y y a n q a r J . c o n s t r u e d t h e 
e x p r e s s i o n ' p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y ' u s e d i n /^.rt. 21 a s a 
compend ious t e rm t o i n c l u a e w i t n i n i t s e l t a l l t h e v a r i e -
t i e s of r i g h t s - w h i c h go t o make up t h e p e r s o n a l l i b e r -
t i e s of man o t h e r t h a n t h o s e d e a l t w i t h i n t h e s e v e r a l 
c l a u s e s of A r t . 1 9 ( 1 ) , I n o t h e r words w h i l e A r t . 19(1} 
d e a l s w i t h p a r t i c u l a r s p e c i e s o r a t t r i b u t e s of t h a t 
f reedom, ' p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y ' i n /ur t . 21 t a k e s i n and 
c o m p r i s e s t h e r e s i d u e ' . 
The m i n o r i t y o p i n i o n of trie C o u r t e x p r e s s e d by s\Xr:hi 
Rao J . i n Kliarak S ingh d i d n o t a g r e e w i t h t he M a j o r i t y 
v iew of t h e ' t h e o r y of c u r v i n g o u t ' one r i g h t from a n o c n e r . 
The l e a r n e d j u d g e o b s e r v e d t h a t u n d o u b t e d l y t h e e x p r e s s i o n 
' p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y ' i s a c o m p r e h e n s i v e one and i n c l u d e ; . 
i n i t s e l f t h o s e f r eedoms g u a r a n t e e d i n a r t i c l e 1 9 ( 1 ) . 
r i o l d i n g i t a s a c o r r e c t j u d i c i a l apj-^roacn i.^.. 
l i hagwa t i J . •Accepted i t a s a law of t h e Supreme C o u r t i n 
Maneka G a n d n i . Hav ing r e l i e d on s h a h ' s o p i n i o n in A.V^. 
Coope r , o.Isi. S a r k a r and Haradhan Saba , J u s t i c e bnagwat i 
gave a j ^ l a i n n a t u r a l mean ing t o t h e e x p r e s s i o n ' p e r s o n a l 
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l i b e r t y ' a s u s e d i n a r t i c l e 21 and hd.ii categorically 
r e f u s e d t o r e a u i t i n a na r row and r e s t r i c t e a s ense . 
so a s t o exclucle t h o s e a t t r i b u t e s of i ^ e r sona l l i b e r t y 
which s p e c i f i c a l l y d e a l t w i t h i n a r t i c l e 2 1 . 
Finally, Shah J . i n li. , Cooper has done away 
wi th t h e c o n c e p t of ' i n d e p e n d e n t ' , s ^ e c i r i c ' ' u i s t i u c t ' 
o r any d i s t i n g u i s h i n g d i f f e r e n c e be tween t h e r i g h t s c o n -
f e r r e d unde r / u r t i c l e s 14 , 19 and 21 of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
B e c a u s e t h e y c o n s t i t u t e and form p a r t s of t h e same c o n s -
t i t u t i o n a l scheme of t h e Fundamenta l R i g h t s . 
In i-ianeka Gandhi Bhagwat i J . d e s c r i b e d tine term 
' p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y ' u s e d i n ^ r t . 21 a s t h e ' w i d e s t a m p l i t u d e ' 
and t h u s c o v e r s a v a r i e t y of r i g h t s which go tb c o n s t i t u t e 
t h e p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y of man. ' L i f e ' a s d e f i n e d and i n t e i p r e t e 
means s o m e t h i n ^ ^ n o r e t h a n t h e a n i m a l e x i s t e n c e i n Maneka 
Gandhi . 
The ' p r o c e d u r e e s t a b l i s h e d by l a w ' u s e a i n ^vrt. 21 
i s noti-iing more t h a n t h e p r o c e d u r e ^ j f e s c r i b e d i n law. 
T h i s v iew of t h e c o u r t l a i d down i n Gppa lan was n o t 
a c c e p t e d by the Court in Maneka <Jandhir Because t h e 
C o u r t became more v i g i l a n t , o v e r z e a l o u s a b o u t t h e p e r s o n a l 
l i b e r t y of t h e c i t i z e n s on a c c o u n t of i t s a r b i t r a r y v i o -
l a t i o n by t h e d e t a i n i n g a u t h o r i t i e s d u r i n g t h e 19th months 
o t emergency i n t h e c o u n t r y . In _CnivQ Kant ohukla t h e 
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majority o^ ..i(iion or the Supreme Court helo .-.rt. 21 as the 
'sole repository' of personal liberty wnich could be einasciu 
lated by the otate during emergency. Keeping this fact 
in view and the public opinion the Court speaking through 
bhagwati J. held that the procedure established as used in 
Art. 21 must be 'right and just and fair" and not arbi-
trary, fanciful or oppressive otherv,'ise it would be no 
procedure at all and the requirement of ^^rticle 21 would 
not be satisfied. 
It is this Justice Bhagwati's opinion has been aes-
cribed and accepted as the reading of American clause of 
'due process of law' used in the 5th and 14th Arnendment 
rejected by the Constituent assembly into the phrase 'pro-
cedure established by law* as used in ^rt. 21. It is 
therefore nothing but thd 'back door' entry of the American 
phrase ' due process of law' with a view to preventing the 
arbitrary and unreasonable infringement of personal liberty 
enshrined in article 21 of the Constitution, 
The concept and content of the word 'law' used in 
Article 21 as held in Gopalan has also been overruled in 
Maneka Gandhi . it is now well established that law does 
not only mean and include 'state-made law' or 'otate-
enacted law' but it does also mean and include rule of law 
and the 'principles of natural justice'. Tne rule of law 
and the principles of natural justice together ensure 'fair 
play in action'. 
6 
In jyianeka Gandhi the Supreme Court has there-
fore very rightly extended the applicability of the 
rule of law and the doctrine of natural justice to the 
area of personal liberty. 
In i'laneka Gandhi the court has also carefully 
discussed tne issue of the test to be a^ --plied for deter-
ininin., t.ie inrringement of runaamental rignt. In Gopaicin 
i<.ariia C.J. observed that the 'directness of the legis-
lation' and not what will be the result is tne true 
approach to locate the infringement of a fundamental 
right. In dam Singh patanjali 5astri J, had quoted 
Kania's view with approval. Thus Gopalan and i^ am Singh 
j;.ropounded the 'theory of object and forrn of State action' 
for tne protection of the p^ersonal liberty. This theory 
held sw^y for a considerable time and was a^ p^lied in 
Naresh s. x-liralkar. 
However the theory of object and form of State 
action as laid down in Gopalan and approved and applied 
in r^ am Singh and Naresh S. Mirajkar was deveated and 
Justice N.H. Bhagwati in Express News Papers >^ 1958) struck 
a different note and laid down 'the direct and inevitable' 
test for determining the infringement of ^.ersonal liberty. 
Therefore the 'doctrine of direct and inevitable effect' 
described as the 'doctrine of intended , ana re«l effect' 
had also been applied by the Court in Sakal Papers(P) Lta. 
as the 'doctrine of direct and iminediate effect*. 
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However the 'theory of object and form of 5tate 
action' laid down by Kania C.J, in oopalan and approved 
by Sastri J. in Ram ^inqh was finally rejected by ohah 
J. in .<.G. Cooper wno held that "the extent of protection 
against impairment of a fundamental right is determined 
not by the object of the legislation nor by the form oi 
action, but by its direct operation upon the individual's 
rights". Thus Shah J. without using the v/ords ' direct 
and inevitable or immediate effect' has in fact used the 
pnrase 'direct operation' upon the individual's right 
which is undeniable inference that he has without any 
hesitation or doubt supported tne 'doctrine of direct 
and enevitable effect'. 
i'-iathew J, in Bennett Coleman u Co. has quote a 
tne taeory of pith and substance with the doctrine of 
direct and inevitable effect'. But tne majority opinion 
celivered by Kay J. in Bennett Coleman u Co. has recog-
nised the 'direct and inevitable effect' test as a sole 
determining factor to determine the extent of protection 
of the individual's rights. It is therefore now well 
established that the extent of protection of the funda-
mental rights can be determined not by the 'object, and 
form of State action but, by the 'direct and inevitable' 
effect' or 'intended and real effect' or, the 'direct and 
immediate effect test. 
8 
The burden of proof regarding the intringement 
of personal liberty falls squarely upon the state to 
justify it. 
In re dantaram known as tout's case the Supreme 
Court held that 'life' in article 21 does not include 
livelihood. The court has further held that the question 
of livelihood nas not in terms been dealt with by 
article 21 of the Constitution. 
However the question whether the word 'life'used 
in /article 21 means and includes in its ambit 'livelihood'. 
The question was raised in ulga tellis in 1986. The 
Jourt before dealing with the issue has aefined the 
concept of the right to life. In Francis Coralie i-'mllin 
the Court observed; "The right to life enshrined in 
Article 21 can not be restricted to mere animal existence. 
It means something much more than just physical survival. 
The right to life includes the right to live with human 
dignity and all that goes along with it..." 
Strangely enough the Supreme Court reiterating Santa 
Ham* s ruling held that employees cannot claim a right to 
have a settlement for payment of bonus as life does not 
include livelinood in Nachane 1982. In Chandrabhan Tale 
1983 the Court held the "Subsistence allowance as a part 
of livelihood and struck down a law providing ,..;ne rupee .er 
month as subsistence allowance as violative of Art.21 as 
it amounted to deprivation of life. 
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In rt.p. Land Reforms ^ Ceiling of .ngricultural 
.iolding) i^Ct the petition:i challenged its constitu-
tionality on the grounu that it deprivea the livelihood 
of landnolders. Ihe Court rejected the contention th>jt 
'life' in article 21 means livelihood. In UeeraJ a 
Chowdhary 1984 the oupreine Court confronted with the 
problems of the rehabilitation of the released bonded 
labour. The Court therefore held that rehabilitation 
of bondeu labour is .spelt out as providing livelihood 
to the freed bonded labour. Thus livelihood had become 
part of 'life' guaranteed by Article 21. 
In T. Venkata Reddi 1985 the dupreme court rejectee 
the contention that the abolition of post of part time 
village Ofricer amounted to deprivation of their right 
to life and liberty. In i^ 'ertilizer Goo,.)eration Kamagar 
Union,1981 the court held that a retrenchment is not 
violative of their right to carry on their occuj^ation. 
Therefore tne Court held that a right to work and earn 
livelihood is not a fundamental right. 
In Olga tellis "ultimately the Court held that the right 
to life includes the right to livelihood. The sweep of 
right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far 
reaching". 
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Thus life can not between away except according 
to just/ fair and reasonable procedure established by 
law. Expanding the contents of the right to life the 
court neld that the right to life includes the right 
to livelinood "because no person can live without the 
means of living, that;:is the means of livelihood. If 
the right to livelihood is not treated as the part of the 
constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving 
a person of nis right to life would be to deprive of his 
means of livelihood to the point of abrogation". 
In Sodan oingn the Court rejected the contention 
that the hawkers have a right to carry on their trade on 
the footpath. 
while holding the right to livelihood as included 
in the right to life under Art. 21 tne court has rejected 
the plea that the right to life includes the ;t-'etitioners' 
job employment or trade imder firt. 21. ii^ xcept tne case 
of the freed bonded labour in Neeraja Chowdhury, the Court 
did not agree with the petitioners plea. 
The reason given by the court is that if the occu-
pation of the petitioner is disrespected/Ciisgraced and 
nefarious, it can not be included in the right to life and 
if it is not opprobrious it can "be included in the right 
to life as life without means of livelihood can not become 
living life. 
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If this 'distinguishing Yardstick 'test' 
can be accepted as reasonable then why did the Court 
rejected the pleas of T. Venkat Kedi, j'er-cilizer Kaniaqar 
union, i.achane. Because the occupation in question in 
all these cases was not opprobrious and nefarious. Of 
course in Santa Ram 'Isoutism' was an opprobrious 
occupation which has rightly not been included in the 
right to life. 
It is not well established that the 'right to 
life' includes in its meaning, and content the 'right to 
livelihood.But this does nat mean, that imposes-a consti-
tutional obligation upon the State to proviae adequate 
means of livelihood to every person by an affirmative 
action. Despite this the State can not arbitrarily, 
recklessly and callously deprive ^ citizen of his life 
and liberty by depriving him of his means of livelihood, 
therefore a person can be deprived oi his life either by 
way of death sentence or by way of depriving hiin of his 
means of livelihood only in accordance with the 'Just', 
fair and reasonable procedure prescribed by law. 
In Satwant Singh, the question was whether the 
right to travel abroad is part and parcel of the right 
to personal liberty under /-^ rt. 21. 
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There was a conflict of opinion ajuong the High Court, 
relating to the 'right to travel abroad*. In Francis .-ian.] ooran, 
a full bench of the Kerala High Court held the 'right to 
travel abroad' within the ambit of the expression 'personal 
liberty' as used in Article 21. In Choitira:ri, tne Bombay 
nigh Court held that the compendious ex^^ression "personal 
liberty" used in Article 21 included in its ambit the right 
to go abroad. Further a division bench of the Bombay High 
Court in C.V. Jethwani held that the expression "personal 
liberty" occuring in Article 21 includes right to travel 
abroad and to return to India. n division bench of the i'^ yyore 
nigh Court in oauashiva dao held that the right to travel 
abroad and to come back to India are included in Article 21. 
In Kabindra Nath Malik, a full bench of the Delhi 
High Court did not agree with the view that personal liberty 
guaranteed by /urticle 21 included in its anibit the liberty 
oi going out of and coming back to India. 
In aatwanc Singh/ Supreme Court held that unuer 
article 21 of the Constitution no person can be deprived OL 
his right to travel except: according to j-^ rocedure establisned 
by law. The Supreme Court has finally settled the issue 
once and for all by holding the right to travel abroad as an 
essential part of personal liberty under article 21 in 
i''laneka Gandhi. The personal liberty, therefore, includes in 
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its ambit right to travel abroad: the right to return 
to India, right to passport and right to have reasonable, 
sufficient foreign exchange. 
For the first time, the rignt to ^ .^ rivacy was raiseu 
In Kharak oingn. The Supreme Court in its judicial wisdom 
has categorically and candidly refused to read 'right to 
privacy as a part of personal liberty under article 21. in 
Govinda, once again the 'right to privacy was raided. The 
Court has refused to accept the right to privacy as an 
absolute right and has suggested that the right to privacy 
should be developed from case to case and can be restricted 
on the basis ox the compelling state interest. In Madhukar 
Karain the court held that the 'right to privacy' is avai-
lable even to a woman of easy virtue and no A\e can invade 
her privacy as and when he likes. 
Public interest litigation has become a new found 
judicial technique to develop the everwidening scope of 
'personal liberty* under Article 21. The Court has, for 
compelling reasons or interest, side-tracked the tradi-
tional concept of locus standi. The doors of justice can 
be knocked by a person who has suffered a legal wrong or a 
legal injury or whose legal right or legally protected 
interest is violated. If a person on account of his poverty. 
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illiteracy/ and lack of resources can not go to the 
Court for judicial relief then his cause may be brought 
before the court by any person under the public interest 
litigation. ^nd the court will not refuse the judicial 
reliefs merely because the person has no locus standi. 
Now, it has become part and i-^ arcel of personal 
liberty under Article 21. 'The Supreme Court has given 
a new dimension to law and Article 21 ot the Constitution 
in the decade of the Eighties. In the third world nations 
neither the Constitution nor the statutory law prescribe 
a ,^rovision for the account ability of the public servants 
tor their fo.llies * who recklessly, carelessly and callously 
played with the life and property of the ^eople. The 
victims of the public servants of our representative 
government left with no effective alternative remedy except 
to resort Article 300A for the tortious liability of the 
government. 
The thick skined insensitive public servants 
do not know sensitivity and respect to the human dignity. 
In Khatri the police, the so-called guardi ans of the law 
were found to have taken the law into their hands and 
olinded the ^ -spected under trial prisoners. In Hus-ainara 
Khatoon the Court found that the xinder-trial prisoners 
were languishing in jail for years together without any 
legal justification. 
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In Bhim Singh the police abducted Bhirn Singh, 
leader of the ^-anther party and member of the J.K. 
Assembly at the behest of the J,u K. Chief Minister. 
Justice 0. Chinnappa Reddy speaking for the court con-
demned the authoritarian acts of the police; without 
declaring the 'right to compensation' under .^rt. 21 of 
our Constitution*. O. Chinnappa Reddy,J. directea the 
State of J,£t K.to pay Bhim Singh a sum of Rs. 50,000/-
Similarly In Rudul Qah the Supreme Court fixed monetary 
liability on the State for a gross violacion of the peti-
tioner's fundamental right to life and personal liberty 
under Article 21. 
rtf ter acquittal Rudul Sah was detained illegally 
without legal justification for a ^eriod of 14 years which 
amounts a gross errormous and fl .grant deprivation of his 
right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. 
In Sebastian Hongray the Court directed the 
Government of India to pay .L. One lakh eacn to the two 
wives as examplary costs in view of the torture, agony 
and mental Oppression through which the two women had to 
pass. The Court observed that the Government of India can 
not dis own the responsibility for the unnatural deaths of 
iJanial and Paul while in its custody. 
In People's Union for Democratic Rights the Court 
directed the government to pay i<s. 75/000/- as compensation 
to the family of the deceased. In Saheli tne supreme 
Court" directed the Delhi Administration to pay Rs. 75000/-
as compensation to the mother of a 9 years of ola child 
wno died in the police custody. In Karikant S.Fatil the 
oupreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Bombay High 
Court which directed the governraent to pay ic. 100000 by 
way of compeesation as hand-cuffing and parading of the 
petitioner was done in violation of Art. 21. 
Thus the Supreme Court has, in its judicial acti-
vist role, adopted two ways to sensitise and conscientise 
the insensitive State instrximentalities and agencies 
through which it operates one to proyide "some palliative' 
to the victims of the state bywayof'right of compensation' 
and on the other hand to penalise the State. The new 
dimension of the_ right to life and .^^ ersonal liberty 
under .^t. 21 devised by the Court is to do away with ill-
established official practice i.e. to protect the guilty 
and to deny redress to the sufferers. There are many 
hard' . headed and woo'cisn ijeaded officers who give bad 
name to the government by undoing all good work. The 
government officers do not pay even scant regard and 
concern to the rights of the people because they know tnat 
the affected persons due to their poverty, illeteracy and 
the time involved in the litigation would not .nuriiiur and 
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would tolerate. 
The 'right to compensation ' included in two 
right to life and personal liberty under article 21 is a 
judicially devised restitutive justice* with a view to 
strengthen the roots of human rights and to discourage 
the governments officers from the infringement of the 
rignts. iTurther the right to compensation would create 
awareness in the minds of the government to respect the 
dignity and the right to life and personal liberty of an 
individual. 
The custodial deaths and rape are increasing in 
the country without any check. Recently, Vishamber in 
Haryana lost his male genital on account of its casteration 
by the police. No amount of compensation can make up one's 
loss of life or liberty. 
Holding the 'right to live with numan dignity' in 
Francis Coralie Hullin, the Supreme Court has made it a 
basis for the socio economic development of working class, 
the backbone of modern India, In /^ siad Construction case, 
right to wage has been accepted as a ^ art of personal liberty 
In Banana Mukti Horcha and Neerja ChaudJ-iary, the Court has 
declared 'begar' or 'forced labour' and 'bonded labour' as 
antithesis of personal liberty. In rviational Textile Corpo-
ration, the Court held that the winding up of a company or 
corporation without workers' right to say is the violation 
of article 21. 
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In r. oareetha/ the u^idhra High Court has declared 
the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights as barbarous, 
inhuman and violative of personal liberty under -^^ rticle 21 
of the Constitution, 
In Harvinder Kaur Delhi High Court expressing its 
disagreement with the /uidhra High Court held remedy to 
conjugal rights as not violative of article 21. 
In Sarol Rani, The Supreme Court has expressed 
its willingness to accept the Delhi High Court's view on 
the point and declared the restitution of conjugal rignts 
as constitutional. The Court has detestated and abhorred 
the introduction of cold constitutional principles into 
domestic life. 
The entire multi-dimensional development oi. the 
right to personal liberty under Art. 21 is due to the 
prisoners and ^^risoners alone. 
After the land-mark decision in Maneka Gandhi ,the 
Court has/with the device of the Public interest litigation, 
dealt with the petitions of the prisoners and benefitted^  
them by expanding the meaning and scope of Personal liberty 
under Article 21. In M H Hagkot the Supreme Court held 
legal aid, and the first ap^ .eal as rights under >^ rticle 21. 
In three cases of Husainara Khatoon the Court has declared 
the right to legal aid and the speedy trial as essential 
ingredient of personal liberty under <^rt. 21. In dunil 
.y 
Satra I and Sunil Batra II the solitary confinement/ 
torturing, bar fettering and hand cuffing without proper 
reasons are hela violative of rirt. 21. In Francis Coorlie 
.iUllin the 'right to life with human dignity' which 
includes meeting with friends, relatives, legal counsels, 
and moving among the fellow Jail inmates held as part 
of Art, 21, In Bachan Singh the death penalty has been 
declared constitutional,Hflxig'ijig- by rope has also been 
declared profectly valid. In Babu Singh the Supreme -uurt 
has admittea the right to bail as an essential part of 
•- personal liberty under Article 21. In Kishori 
Singh the Supreme Court held the use of tnird degree rnetnou 
as violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. 
In spite of all the beneficial and liberal inter-
j^ retation of Article 21 the prisoners are still ill-treated 
condemned, and neglected. Though tne fundamental rights 
are allowed inside the jail, yet the prison authorities 
are habitual of treating prisoners as Bub - humans. Still 
the Police -lawyers conflict of Delhi is living testimony 
to this fact . Still custodial death, rape and the use of 
third method are on increasing trend in India. uue to the 
terrorism and insurgency in Punjab, Kashmir, «ssam and in 
other ixorth-iiast States Life u Personal liberty guaranteed 
in Art. 21 is facing a new State onslaughts. 
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In i'lOhini Jain the supreme Court has held the 
right to education as an essential and inseparable part 
of pers-^ nal liberty guaranteed by art. 21. Though the right 
to education requires to be studied in all its ramifica-
tions yet it should be accepted as Constitutional tool to 
enable an individual to protect and maintain his dignity 
wichout whicn it would defeat the very ^^ ur^ ose or the 
Constitution for which it is aaopted, enacted by tne people 
of India, 
While ending the resume of the present doctoral 
tnesis it appears to be necessary to reiterate categorically 
that the Court's-P^ ^^ ow restricted, textual, pedantic and 
conservative approach regarding the meaning of the words 
'life', 'personal liberty', 'procedure established' and 'law' 
adopted in Gopalan had been given a 'broad, 'liberal' and 
'progressive' meaning in r4aneka Gandhi. The court has in 
its judicial wisdom and as a catalyst raised and elevated 
tlie right to life and liberty under Article 21 which has 
otherwise remained insipid, dormant and moribund to the 
great constitutional pedestal. Therefore, Article 21 has 
assumed a 'pride place' in our constitutional set-up by 
holding the right to ^ e^rsonal liberty as the'•essence or all 
rights. 
2 I 
The change in the judicial attitude regarding Gopalan, 
rignt to life and personal liberty started its reflection in 
Khardk aingh and datwant Singh had been buried in i< C Cooper 
and its burial service was done in O,L\, sarkar, Haradhan jaha 
and Khudi Kam Das. ^nd its funeral oration was delivered in 
t-ianeka Gandhi, Therefore the decade 1975-85 under review 
commences with the funeral oration of Gopalan in iManeka Gandhi 
which is a land-mark decision treating personal liberty in its 
widest amplitude as a multi-coloured, multi-facets^multi-
dimensional right. The right to life and personal liberty 
as construed by the apex court after Maneka Ganahi is so wiue 
that it has left no aspect of human life untouched. The court 
has therefore rightly been over-25ealously safe-guaraing and 
protecting the right to life and personal liberty againat 
legislative encroachments and executive onslaughts. .v'ith its 
shar^ teeth ana claws^an individual can effectively and fully 
exercise and enjoy the other guaranteed civil liberties. 
Our Supreme Court along with article 32 has opened 
its doors to public interest litigation which is undoubtedly 
a unique, laudable and a whole new dimension. with the help 
of puclic interest litigationjthe supreme court has devised new 
comj^ensatory way to protect and safeguard the individual's 
life and liberty from the arbitrary infringement by the 
executive. 
II 
In this decade the decisional work of the 
Supreme Court reflects its great concern and anxiety 
how and in what way individual life and personal 
liberty cai:i be protected from the clutches of the 
in 
government. Keeping this thinc^ view and as the Consti-
tutional sentinal and custodian of the i'undamental 
rights of the individual the oupreme Court has given an 
entirely new dimension to article 21 without which 
^Fraternity'among the Indians based on individual 'dignity' 
and a viable,strong,united and integrated India would 
remain unfulfilled dreams of Gandhi - iN.ehru - /^ zad. 
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a C K N O W L E D G £ H E N T 
"The greatest prayer is Patience and Tolercince" 
Our Motto is: "To wipe every tear from every eye". 
To feed ill-fed, half-fed and the hungary; 
To clothe ill-clad,half-clad and the naked; 
To shelter ill-sheltered,half-sheltered and 
the un-sheltered,• 
To eaucate illiterate and the ignorant. 
These lofty sentiments expressed by me in the 
preface of my book, '^Supreme Court: Fundamental Rights 
and Directive Principles are inspired by the Gandhian 
philosophy and the Noble and Grand vision of the Fathers 
of the Constitution sonorously recited in the preamble 
of the Constitution. These sentiments revolved around 
the basic necessities of man,namely,Fooding, Clothing and 
lodging. The oupreme Court by upholding the right 
to live witj-i dignity as part of personal liberty under 
.^ u:ticle 21 has tried to help the needy to live with dignity. 
At the outset, I am indebted to Allah who is the 
most beneficient and the most merciful without whose 
blessings this present fruition would not have been 
possible, 
I am thankful to Prof, 5.M. Hasan and Prof, M,K. 
Zafar for their moral and intellectual encouragement during 
their stay at Aligarh, I am highly obliged to Prof, G,A.Khan 
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PLAGE: ALIGARH ( SHARIFUL HASAh FAROOQUI 
INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
preamble of the Indian Constitution promises 'justice', 
•equality', 'liberty' ahd 'fraternity' which have become 
the four firmly embedded pillars on which the constitu-
tional democratic culture of new India is erected. The 
word 'Justice' is not of but the three words 'equality', 
•liberty' and 'fraternity' are the symbols of French 
Revolution, 
The preambular purposes as stated above have together 
intended to create "brotherhood among all Indians by 
assuring the dignity of the individual. If we read the 
dignity of the individual along with other preambular 
purposes, it is hoped that liberty appears to be the first 
pre-requisite. 
Like other 'isms', the concept of liberty has also 
been imported and implanted into Indian soils through 
and with the help of the constitution. This constitution 
of India is itself the product of the British elite and 
English knowing people. The middle class rich people having 
had the opportunity to get education in England and to 
intermingle with the English people have developed English 
e t i q u e t t e s , s o c i o - c u l t u r a l ethos and l i b e r t a r i a n 
a t t i t u d e s . Therefore these v^estern educated lawyers, 
j u r i s t s , acaderaicians, p o l i t i c i a n s and e l i t e s were 
responsible for the grovrfth and development of demo-
c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l cul ture which has now fundamental 
r i g h t s for the c i t i z e n s . They, however, did not r ea l i ze 
whether the Indian socio-econom.ic and p o l i t i c a l condit ions 
along v/ith the people tem.pereiriient were at a l l conducive 
enough to the growth and developm.ent of the cons t i tu t ion 
i t s e l f . Further they did not make any ser ious e f f o r t s 
to create harmonious and favourable condi t ions hy i n c u l -
ca t ing the need and importance of l i b e r t y in the minds 
of the people of t h i s country. I t was also the m.agnanim.ity, 
generosi ty and sagaci ty of these English knowing people 
e lec ted on the lim.ited e l e c t o r a l process took a l l the 
decis ions including the adoption, enactm.ent of the cons t i -
tu t ion i t s e l f and on behalf of the people of t h i s country 
v;ith the r e s u l t , the cons t i tu t ion and the Fundaro.ental Rights 
have together becom.e the 'paper parchment' and the people 
being i l l i t e r a t e , poor and indigenous have not shown even 
s l i g h t e s t i nc l ina t ion towards the Fundam.ental Rights . 
Fur ther , the cons t i tuen t Assem.bly was conscious enough 
about the surroundings and the global change t h a t had taken 
0 
place around the world after the ending of Second 
World Viar. The old system, of colonialism., im.perialism. 
and the feudalism was on the retreating process whereas 
the nev; dawn of dem.ocratic system, was on the process 
of heralding. 
In order to translate the prom.ises m.ade by the Indian 
National Congress during the Freedom. Movem.ent, particularly, 
the resolution on econom.ic swarajya passed by the AICC 
at its annual session at Karachi in 1931 into reality, the 
Constituent Assem.bly had to accord them, constitutional 
status by incorporating them, in the new dem.ocratic 
constitution of India. Moreover, the U.M, Universal 
^declaration on Huraan Rights, 1940 and the constitutional 
Rights incorporated in the Constitutions of the various 
nations notably the U.S. have heavily influenced the m.inds 
of the m.akers of the Indian Constitution, These rights 
are therefore the result of the freedom, struggle and the 
public policy of the governm.ent. 
Conventionally, the tone, tenor and spirit of the 
Indian constitution is totally, on the iCnglish constitutional 
/'* 
p a t t e r n . Yet, the lav/yers and the judges engaged in the 
court room, legal p r ac t i ce Yiave been heavilv influenced bv 
U.S. 
the dec is ional v/ork of the ; Supreme Court in the f ie ld of 
cons t i t u t i ona l law. 
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I t may be due to the wri t ten c o n s t i t u t i o n , Fundaro.enta^. 
Rights and t}-ie d iv is ion of powers, the supremacy of the 
Courts has assumed grea te r s ignif icance and im.portance. 
This , in f ac t , has created a kind of perpetual t u s s l e 
between the l i b e r t a r i a n s and the a u t h o r i t a r i a n s , India 
has caught in a dichotom.ic dileniraa in the sense tha t i t 
professes to be a dem.ocratic country comjv.itted to guaran-
tee the Fundaraental Rights and at the sarp.e tim.e the Br i t i sh 
t r a ined adm.inistrative m.achinary wanted to exercise as 
usual au thor i t a r i an power v/ithout having even scant regard 
to the l i b e r t y or the d igni ty of the individual - the only 
focal point of the prearpjDle of the Indian Const i tu t ion. 
Liber ty-as we know,the most precious pr ized and valuable 
among a l l human va lues . I t i s the m.ost fundamental of the 
m.en's Fundam.ental Rights . Liber ty , i s a m.ust for a m.an 
to shape his des t iny . Liberty enables a m.an to develop his 
persona l i ty in his own way. Therefore, the man without 
l i b e r t y i s devoid of hum.an va lues . As the great l i b e r -
t a r i a n John Stuart Mill sa idj 
"Each indiv idual i s the bes t judge of his own in te res t ! ' 
Therefore, l i b e r t y stands for individual ism and 
independent decis ions as opposed to co l l ec t iv i sm. Sim.ulta-
neously, in order to p ro tec t and safeguard the l i b e r t y 
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of a l l a g a i n s t t h e s t r o n g and t h e r i c h , t h e s o c i a l 
c o n t r o l and r e g u l a t i o n on l i b e r t y h a s a l l a l o n g been 
'^n t h e s o c i e t y . T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e h a s Qlv;ays been a 
p e r p e t u a l t u s s l e , c o n f l i c t and t e n s i o n be tween t h e l i b e r t y 
and s o c i a l c o n t r o l s . I n d i v i d u a l s by n a t u r e a r e a p t t o 
have more and more l i b e r t y w i t h o u t t h e l e a s t i n t e f e r e n c e . 
. . h e r e a s t h e s o c i e t y i n t h e narr:e of ' s e c i i r i t v * nnd r: n i n t e -
nance of ' l av / and o r d e r ' h a s a lways a t t e m p t e d t o r e g u l a t e 
end r e s t r i c t t h e i n v i d i d u a l l i i ^ e r t y . 
Of C o u r s e , l i k e a l l r i g h t s - r i c i n t . t o person-.^! l i b e r t y 
i s n o t an a b s o l u t e o n e . The r e g u l a t e d and r e s t r a i n e d 
cxnd n o t a r b i t r a r i l y c u r v e d l i b e r t y i s in t h e i n t e r e s t 
of a l l . T h i s p o s e s g r e a t g i g a n t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n i j e 
f o r t h e c o u r t s t o m.a in ta in a b a l a n c e betv/een t h e l i b e r t y 
and t h e s e c u r i t y . The p a r a m e t e r s of t h e j u d i c i a l s c r u t i n y 
i s : " L i b e r t y w i t h o u t l aw i s a l i c e n c e and law w i t h o u t 
l i b e r t y i s a t y r a n n y " . I t , t h e r e f o r e , means law i s hur.ianised 
wit;-; t h e t i n g e of l i b e r t y and law p r u n e s t h e u n r u l y 
grov/ th of l i b e r t y . 
To g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e prearrJaular aim, of l i b e r t y so 
a s t o e n a b l e t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o have h i s d i g n i t y , t h e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n m.akers have v / i s e l y and p r o u d l y i n c o r p o r a t e d 
t h e r i g h t t o l i f e and p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y i n A r t i c l e 21 of t h e 
C o n s t i t u t i o n of I n d i a , 
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Soon a f t e r the comrfencement of the cons t i tu t ion in 
January 26, 1950 A. K, Gopalan knocked the door of the 
Supreme Court under Ar t ic le 3 2 by way of a writ of habeas 
corpus against h is detent ion under the Preventive Detention 
Act, 1950. Suprem.e Court for the f i r s t time confronted 
with the problem, of adjust ing the l i b e r t y and the 'law and 
order! 'While deal ing with t h i s the Suprem.e Court had 
shown a verv cold and inspide atr.itude towards the personal 
rue, 
l i b e r t y guaranteed under Art ic le 21«3uorem.e Court adopted 
a conserva t ive , pedant ic and too narrow l e g a l i s t i c approach 
towards the m.eaning and concept of personal liberty./i^-Court 
had also refused t o go beyond what i s comj.;only known as 
^state-m.ade ' or enacted 'concept of law. The Court had also 
disagreed to read the 'due proce^ss c l ause ' in to the 
'procedure es tab l i shed by l aw ' . Accordingly, the deprivation 
of personal l i o e r t y in accordance with the procedure 
e s t ab l i shed by law was allowed to opera te . The operat ional 
personal l i b e r t y was therefore confined within the 1 im.its of 
'procedure e s t ab l i shed by lav/ ' . This l ine of Jud ic i a l 
approach displayed in Gopalan had been the rule of law upto 
Gobinda, (1975). Until Maneka Gandhi(l978) the r igh t to t r ave l 
abroad along v;ith the r igh t to passport hecarc.e the offshoot 
of the personal l i b e r t y as i t s j u d i c i a l l y emanated p a r t . 
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The 'right to privacy' has achieved partial recognition 
as an integral part of personal liberty in lOiarak Singh 
(1963) and Satv/ant Singh (1967). 
The right to life and personal liberty entered into 
the dark days of em.ergency imposed in June 197 5. The 
Suprem.e Court had shov/n its pusillanim.ous judicial atti-
tude towards personal liberty in A.D.M, Jabalpur v, 
Shivakant Shukla (1976), The right to life and personal 
liberty was allowed to be sacrificed and trar.ipled under 
the boot of the em.ergency. The free people of free India 
were made to suffocate and lead >• painful life in an 
atm.osphere of fear and suspiciotis. The days of em.ergencv 
were rem.inicent of Pastor Miem.oller said: '".'Jhen they 
arrested m.y neighbour, I did not protest. .«hen they 
arrested the man and woman in the opposite house, I did 
not protest. And when they finally cam.e for me, there was 
nobody left to protest." The followers and the inheritors 
of Gandhi and his legacy m.ade the free and brave Indian 
m.asses to live as meek, weak and tim.id. 
Ultimiately, India achieved a second freedom, from, her 
own authoritarian rulers and entered into a golden libertarian 
era with the landmark judgem.ent of the Suprem.e Court in 
8 
Maneka Gandhi in 1978. Supreme Court has infused entirely 
a nev/ 'multi dimensional spirit into otherwise a lifeless 
'right to life and personal liberty 1 
The concept of personal liberty has been widened ./ith 
its widest amplitude and has been accepted as the most 
cherished value of m.ankind. It is therefore the most funda-
mental'or the Fundaro.ental Rights. It has acquired, now a 
wide protective urfibre 11 a to cover all aspects of hum.an life. 
It is this multi-dim.ensional dynam.ic aspect of personal 
liberty as has been widely .liberally and broadly interprete;i 
by the Suprem.e Court has m.acle m.e to analytically study the 
decisional v/ork of the Supreme Court done in its new found 
role of Judicial Activism.. The problem, is to assess and 
appreciate the jurisprudential value of the Courts volu-
m.inous v/ork done in the area of personal liberty. It is nlso 
intended to evaluate the various socio,legal and economic 
ram.ifications of the v/idening aspect of personal liberty in 
our socio econom.ic miilleau. 
The entire research m.ethodology of the study is textual 
and based on the decisional work of the Suprem.e Court. 
Therefore, the study is intended to cover the cases decided 
between 197 5 and 1985, However an attem.pt has been m.ade to 
cover and deal with all the decisions falling under Article 21 
decided by the Supreme Court and reported upto January 199 2. 
The role of the Supreme Court in dealing with meaning 
and concept of personal liberty and its scope and ambit is 
the main them.e of this study. Keeping this in view, the study 
has been m.ade in various chapters. Chapter -I deals with 
the conceptual understanding of the words and phrases used 
in Article 21 of the Constitution and as has been construed 
and interpreted by the Suprem.e Court. The historical evolu-
tion of personal liberty and its traditional m.etaphysical, 
discussion on personal liberty has been deliberately avoided. 
Chapter -II deals with the decisions from, which the 'right 
to livelihood' has sprung out as an offshoot of the right 
to life and personal liberty. 
Chapter -III touches the 'right to travel abroad' with 
its all conconvviittants as a judicially em.anated part of 
personal liberty. 
Chapter -IV deals with 'right to privacy' as an essential 
part of personal libeirty, 
Chapter-V covers the problem, of 'locus standi' or ^ access 
to courts The Judicial activism, of the Suprem.e Court has 
displayed public interest litigation as an integral part of 
personal liberty. 
J.) 
Chapter VI,'right to compensation' has been 
accepted as an effective judicial device to prevent the 
aroitrarily ana unnecessarily invasion of personal 
lijjt-i ty. 
Chapter VII, 'workers' right to participation' in 
tne industrial management has come to stay as a part of 
j_.ersonal liberty. 
Chapter VIII, deals with the 'restitution of con-
jugal rights' as a penumbra of personal liberty. 
Chapter ly^  contains the constitutional development 
conferring certain rights Upon the prisoners-.-undertrial or 
convicted ^ -to enjoy the fruits of personal liberty inside 
the jail even after their incarceration. In fact, the 
offshoots of personal liberty under Article 21 of our 
constitution recognised as judicially emanated rights owe 
their existence to the criminals. Some of the destin-
guishing rights conferred upon the prisoners are right 
to legal aia a.na speedy trial, bail and liberty from soli-
tary confinement, handcufring and bar fettering, 
I'ne last Chapter is the last judicial declaration 
Holding 'rcight to Education' as ^art and parcel of life 
and personal liberty under Article 21. 
In the ultimate analysis^this doctoral thesis has 
reached its final destiny after 1ong^arduous and tiresome 
journey with its cuLaination into conclusive part. 
CILIPTER I 
MEANING and CONCEPT- PERSONAL LIBER IT 
(i) LIBER'I Y, PERSONAL UBERTY, LIFE 
(ii) PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY LAW 
(iii) DOCTRINE OF EXCLUSIVITY 
(iv) I l ow 1 0 LOCATE IIS INFRINGEMEN T 
(V) I .AW- n S MEANING, RULE OF LAW AND NA 1 URAL JUSIK h 
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In a democratic country, the democratic s p i r i t gives 
a great iaportance to the ind iv idual . There must be constant 
readiness to permit everyone to experiment with h is own l i f e 
and to work bis own way of sa lva t ion . Every man wants to 
tbink his own thoughts, dream his own dreams and do his own 
deeds. The main function of the democratic government i s to 
2 
safeguard l i b e r t y , which should not be control led unless i t s 
exercise becomes an t i - soc ia l or undermines the securi ty of the 
s t a t e . In f a c t , the g rea tes t heritage of democracy to mankind 
i s the r igh t to personal l i b e r t y . 
The focul point of the Indian Consti tution is the 
4- 5 
individual whose l ibe r ty and digni ty has been assured. The 
dignity of the individual can not be assured if there is no 
l i b e r t y . Both l i be r t y and dignity have to go together , -'•f 
t h i s i s achieved, th i s would ensure the l i b e r t y and dignity 
of a l l . Because i t is the individuals who co l lec t ive ly 
cons t i tu te the soc ie ty . If the l i be r ty of an individual i s 
sac r i f i ced , the majority can not remain unaffected. Bverytime 
there is t respass upon the citdad of freedom, i t s foundation 
i s weakened and more and more such trespasses are to lera ted , 
weaker becomes the whole ed i f i ce , t i l l one day i t collapses 
1. Setalvad, M.C., War and Civi l L iber t ies , p.4 
2 . Id . a t p . 16 • 
3 . Id. a t p . 18. 
4 . Preamble of the Consti tution of India. 
5 . Ibid. 
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giving place to d ic ta torsh ip or fascism and democracy l i n s 
in r u i n s . 
Both democracy and individual l i be r ty are coexistance 
and coterminus. Where there is a democracy there is an 
individual l i b e r t y , 'rfhere there is no democracy there can 
never be an individual l i b e r t y . The most :1 ist inguishing 
fea ture of democracy which d i s t ingu i sbes i t from d ic ta to r sh ips , 
au thor i ta r ian ism and to ta l i t a r i an i sm is the individual 
l i b e r t y . Democracy therefore , provides an opportunity to 
the individual to shape in his destiny in his own way. 
The whole concept of l iber ty i s e s sen t i a l ly rooted in 
the philosophy of individualism. Accordingly, the s ta te 
e x i s t s mainly, if not so le ly , for the purpose of affording 
the individual freedom and assis tance for the attainment of 
his growth and perfec t ion . The s ta te e x i s t s for the benefi t 
of the individual . But t h i s individualism has given r i s e to 
the au thor i t a r i an , t o t a l i t a r i a n , f a sc i s t or d i c t a t o r i a l s ta te 
in which the individual l i be r ty has got no importance, 
^ v e r t h e l e s s , the p o l i t i c a l philosophy of individualism 
i n s i s t s on the individual l i b e r t y . For an individual can 
not a t t a i n the highest in him unless he possesses l i b e r t y . 
According to Jus t ice Holmes, these l i b e r t i e s are the indespen-
sable conditions of a free socie ty . Therefore, the j u s t i f i ca t i on 
of the existence of such a s ta te can only be the advancement of 
the i n t e r e s t s of the individuals who compose i t and who are 
6. Supra n. 4 at p . 5 . 
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i t s members. Therefore, in a properly const i tuted democratic 
s t a t e , there can not be a confl ict between the in t e r e s t s of 
the c i t i zens and those of the s t a t e . The h a r m o n i c adijustment 
of the i n t e r e s t s of the s t a t e and the individual ia the basic 
and firm base of a democratic s t a t e . 
Therefore, the s ta te regulates the indiv idual ' s l iber ty 
by prescr ib ing ce r ta in reasonable r e s t r i c t i o n s so aa to 
enable each individual to enjoy the f r u i t of his l ibe r ty 
7 
without any unauthorised t respasses . 
What is l i be r ty? According to Chamber's Twentieth 
Century Dictionary, ' l i b e r t y means freedom to do as one 
p l ea ses , the unrestrained employment of natural r i g h t s , 
power of free chance, p r iv i l eges , exemption, re laxat ion 
freedom of r e s t r a i n t , the bounds within which cer ta in 
p r iv i l eges are enjoyed, freedom of speech and action beyond 
ordinary c i v i l i t y . ' 
John Stuart Mill says ' a l l r e s t r a i n s qua r e s t r a i n t 
i s an e v i l ' . ^ Laski takes the same l ine and argues that 
Q 
l i be r ty is e s sen t i a l ly an absence of r e s t r a i n t . According 
to Lock, the idea of l i be r ty is the l i be r t y of a power in any 
person to do or farbear any pa r t i cu la r action according to 
10 the determination or thoughts of the mind. Freedom consists 
7. Ibid p. 7 
8. S.L. Benn & R.S. Peters, 'Social Principles and the 
Democratic State', 1959, p. 220. 
9. Laski, Harold J., 'Liberty in the Modern State', 1954, p.48 
10. Lock, 'An Essay Concerning Human Understanding', Book 2, 
Chapter 21; pp. 7-8. 
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in one being able to act or not to act according as one shall 
11 
choose or will. By liberty we can mean a power of acting 
12 
according to the determinations of the will . According to 
John E.Ji.D. Acton, Liberty means 'the assurances that everyman 
shall be protected in doing what he believes his duty against 
the influence of authority and majorities, custom and 
opinion' . 
Lord Denning M.R. says, ' liberty means freedom of every 
law abiding citizen to think, what he will, to say that he 
will and to go where he will on his lawful occasions without 
let or hindrance from any other person. It must be matched, 
of course, with social security by which he meant the peace 
and good order of the community in which he l i v e ' . 
In a dictatorial society, by liberty according to John 
Stuart Mill, was meant protection against the tyranny of the 
poli t ical ru lers . -^  Neither liberty nor state can be without 
regulation. None can be absolute and without limit. The 
liberty, therefore, means the absence of restraints on the 
power of a person to act or not to act according to the 
determination of his will which implies that there will be 
no hindrances to exercise that will . 
TT' „lbid P'2J, . 
12. Hume, 'Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding' 
1951, p. 73. 
13. 'Essay on Freedom and Power', p. 55. 
14. 'Freedom under the Law', 1949, p.5. 
15. Mill J.S., On liberty, Representative Government, the 
subjection of Women, Three Essays (London Gbrford 
University Press, 1971), p.5. 
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The concept and contents of l ibe r ty are varying accor-
ding to the needs of the t ime. I t has no fixed r ig id and 
s t a t i c content . However, the core of l i be r ty i s that i t 
cons i s t s in doing what he desires but his desires have to be 
balanced with the soc ia l control tha t i s the exercise of 
s imi l a r desires of other people so tha t .he may not create 
nuisance for o thers . 
Whatever, ' l i b e r t y ' may mean today, the l ibe r ty 
guaranteed by our b i l l s of r i g h t s , said Roscoe ?ound, ' i s a 
r e se rva t ion to the individual of ce r ta in fundamental reason-
able expectations involved in l i fe in c iv i l i zed society and a 
freedom from arb i t ra ry and unreasonable exercise of the power 
and au thor i ty of those who are designated or chosen in a 
p o l i t i c a l l y organised society to adjust r e l a t ion and order 
conduct, and so are able to apply the force of that society to 
17 i n d i v i d u a l s ' . Liberty postulates the creat ion of a climate 
wherein there i s no suppression of the human s p i r i t s , wherein, 
there i s no denial of the opportunity for the fu l l growth of 
human personal i ty , wherein head is held high and there is no 
s e r v i l i t y of the human mind or enslavement of the human body. 
Thus, J .S . Mill denounced every kind of r e s t r a i n t on the 
individuals ac t ion . 
16. Bansal, V.K., Right to Life and Personal Liberty in India. p.16. 
17. 'The Development of Const i tu t ional Guarantee of Liber ty ' , p . 1. 
18. Khanna, H.R.,2 JILI, Vol. 18, 1978, p. I33. 
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Liberty , therefore , considered as an author i ty to do 
something which would otherwise be wrongful or i l l e g a l , means 
' t h e r e i s no r e s t r a i n t upon conditions which, in modern 
c i v i l i z a t i o n , are the necessary guarantees of individual 
happiness. 
Liberty, thus , is a freedom from a l l r e s t r a i n t s but 
such as are j u s t l y imposed by law. Beyond that l ine l i es 
the domain of usurpation and tyranny. The i n s t i nc t of man 
f o r l iber ty leads us to believe tha t 'free w i l l , and not 
f o r c e , i s the true basis of government.' I t would evidently 
seem that the concept of ' l i b e r t y ' en ta i l s freedom of action 
on the part of an individual without any hidrance or r e s t r a i n t , 
i t i s the r i gh t to follow one's own way of l i f e without being 
disturbed by o the r s , but such freedom of ac t ion , way of l i f e 
i s subject to regula t ion of law. Dean Roscoe i-ound explained 
tne idea tjiusj 
"What is meant by ' l i b e r t y ' ? In the nineteenth 
century there was no d i f f i cu l t y in answering 
the ques t ion. Kant's idea of the l iber ty of 
each - the free se l f -asse r t ion of each - limited 
only by the l ike l iber ty of a l l , was generally 
accepted". 
Ar t ic le 21 guarantees const i tu t ional protection to 
l i f e and personal l iber ty occurs in Part I I I of the Constitution 
of India, which ccctfers ce r t a in other fundamental r ights upon 
19. Laski, Harold J . , Liberty in the Modern S ta te , 1961, p.135. 
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the c i t i z e n s and n o n - c i t i z e n s . These fundamental r i g h t s have 
t h e i r deep r o o t s in the s t r u g g l e for independence and, as 
pointed out by Granv i l l e Austin : 
"They were included in the C o n s t i t u t i o n in the 
hope and expec ta t ion t h a t one day the t r e e of 
t r u e l i b e r t y would bloom in I n d i a ' . 2 0 
21 Bhagwati J . , as he then was, in Maneka Gandhi has 
very ably t r aced out the h i s t o r i c a l development of the 
fundamental r i g h t s contained in Par t I I I of the C o n s t i t u t i o n , 
who said : 
"These r i g h t s were i n d e l i b l y w r i t t e n in the 
sub-conscious memory of the race which fought 
f o r wel l nigh t h i r t y years f o r secur ing f r e e -
dom from B r i t i s h r u l e and they found express ion 
in the form of fundamental r i g h t s when the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n was enac t ed . These fundamental 
r i g h t s r e p r e s e n t the b a s i c va lues cher i shed by 
the people of t h i s count ry s ince the vedic times 
and they a r e incu lca ted to p r o t e c t the d i g n i t y 
of the i n d i v i d u a l and c r e a t e cond i t ions in which 
every human being can develop h i s p e r s o n a l i t y 
to the f u l l e s t e x t e n t . They weave a p a t t e r n 
of gua ran tees on the b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of human 
r i g h t s and impose nega t ive o b l i g a t i o n s upon the 
s t a t e not to encroach on i nd iv idua l l i b e r t y in 
i t s v a r i o u s d imensions . I t i s apparen t from 
the enunc ia t i on of these r i g h t s t h a t the r e spec t 
f o r the i nd iv idua l and h i s capac i ty f o r ind iv idua l 
v o l i t i o n which f inds express ion the re i s not a 
s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy. I t s purposes i s to 
help the ind iv idua l to f ind h is own v i a b i l i t y , 
to give express ion to h i s c r e a t i v i t y and to 
prevent governmental and other f o r c e s from p„ 
' a l i e n a t i n g the i n d i v i d u a l from h i s c r e a t i v i t y ' . 
20 . Granv i l l e Aus t in , The Indian C o n s t i t u t i o n - Cornerstone 
of a Nat ion. 
2 1 . Maneka Gandhi v . Union of Ind ia . AIR 1978 SG 597. 
22 . Supra n . 21at pp. 619-620 
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These rights are, therefore, wide ranging and compre-
hensive enough to cover all aspects of human life. Therefore, 
a brief historical deliberations which took place in the 
constituent assembly in regard to the enactment of the right 
to life and personal liberty, if mentioned, would not be out 
of place. When the Drafting Committee, beaded by Dr. B.R. 
Ambedkar and assisted by the Constitutional Adviser, Sir B.N. 
Rau, took up the most arduous task of framing the Constitution 
for the country, they looked towards the various constitutions 
then prevailing over the world. The relevant constitutions 
with which the founding-fathers of our Constitution were 
familiar are that of the England, America, Australia and 
the Ireland. For the right to personal liberty, they were 
deeply influenced by the Constitutions of America, England 
and Japan. Let us, therefore, put them here so as to know 
as to how Article 21 became part of our Constitution, h^e 
5th Amendment to the American Constitution says -
•No person shall be ... deprived of his life, 
liberty or property without due process of law' 
(with reference to federal power). 
The Hth Amendment (with reference to states) says -
'Nor shall state deprive any person of life, 
liberty or property without due process of 
law ...' 
Article XXXI of the Japanese Constitution says -
•No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, 
nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, 
except according to procedure established by law'. 
19 
Ar t i c l e 4-0(4-) of the I r i sh Consti tut ion says -
•No c i t i zen sha l l be deprived of his personal 
l iber ty save in accordance with law*. 
ArticleS3 and 7 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights read -
•iiveryone has the r igh t to l i f e , l iber ty and 
securi ty of person ' . No one sha l l be sub;)ected 
to a rb i t r a ry a r r e s t or de t en t ion . ' 
The 5th and H t h Amendments of the American Constitution 
use three words ' l i f e ' , ' l i be r ty* and ' p r o p e r t y ' , the Japanese 
Const i tut ion and the UN Declaration of Human Rights use the 
words ' l i f e ' and ' l i b e r t y ' and does not use the ' p rope r ty ' . 
The I r i sh Consti tution uses the phrase 'personal l i b e r t y ' 
and does not use the term ' l i f e ' . The Indian Constitution 
uses the words ' l i f e ' and 'personal l i b e r t y ' and does not use 
the words ' p r o p e r t y ' . I t shows that the makers of the 
Const i tut ion have not copied down from one or the other . 
But they were conscious enough of the i r enormous duty of making 
the cons t i tu t ion for the free people of a free nat ion. Thus, 
they studied the various cons t i tu t ions , considered implications 
v i s - a - v i s the socio-economic and p o l i t i c a l conditions while 
incorporat ing a p a r t i c u l a r provision of the Const i tut ion. 
The absence of the 'proper ty ' from Ar t ic le 21 guaranteeing 
pro tec t ion to l i f e and personal l i be r ty appears to have been 
j u s t i f i e d on the ground that the ' r i g h t to property ' was 
guaranteed by Art ic les 19(1 )(?) and Ar t ic le 31 of the 
Const i tut ion.2^ Now th i s r igh t to property i s no longer a 
fundamental r ight of Part I I I of the Const i tut ion. The 
23. 
r: 
Ar" 
property save by authority of law'7 
2i» 
Parliament in i t s amending capacity has deleted these two 
Ar t i c l e s 19(l)(F) and 31 from the Part 113 of the Constitution 
and converted the r igh t to property from fundamental into an 
ordinary cons t i tu t iona l r igh t by placing i t in Part XII 
O A 
Chapter IV — Right to property renumbering as Article 300A. 
The First Drait Art. 15 (now Article 21) as originally passed by 
the Constituent Assembly provided that 'no person shall be 
deprived of his life or liberty without due process of law'. 
What appears from the reading of the FiCst Draft Article 21 
is that the Constituent Assembly used the 'liberty' without 
prefixing it with the word 'perscmal' and used the phrase 
'without due process of law'. Subsequently, the Constituent 
Assembly added the word 'personal' before the word 'liberty'. 
The reason given for this change by the Drafting Committee 
was that 'otherwise (liberty) might be construed very widely 
so as to include even the freedoms already dealt with in 
Article 13 (now Article 19). The phrase 'without due process 
of law' used in Article 15 of the Draft Constitution was replaced 
or substituted by the Constituent Assembly as a result of the 
discussion took place between the Constitutional Adviser 
Sir B.N. Rau and Mr. Justice Frankfurter of the US Supreme Court. 
Thus, the phrase 'except according to procedure established 
by law' of the Japanese Constitution displaced the American 
Constitutional phrase 'without process of law' from Article 15 
(now Article 21). 
25. C.A.D. Vol. VII 
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The using of the word 'personal' before the word 
'liberty* in Article 21 might have been due to the various 
freedoms incorporated in Article 19 and the use of phrase 
'Personal liberty' in other constitutions of the countries. 
For example, the Constitutions of -Ireland. Burma the 
Federal Republic of Germany. the i^ erman Democratic Republic 
30 
and the Free City of Danzig;. What, therefore, emerged 
finally out of the Constituent Assembly is Article 21 which 
runs - 'no person shall be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty except according to procedure established by law'. 
As we know that the preamble of our Constitution 
31 promises to secure to all the citizens of our country 'liberty' 
32 
and 'dignity' of the individual. Both liberty and dignity 
of the individual together shape one's personality. This is 
26. Article 40(4) of the J.rish Constitution uses the word 
'personal liberty'. 
27. Art. 16 oi the Burmese Constitution, 1948, states ^xio 
citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty ...' 
28. Section 2(2) of the Constitution of Federal Republic 
of Germany reads - 'everyone has the right of personal 
security of life and limb. Personal liberty is 
inviolable. The rights can only be curtailed by virtues 
of law' . 
29. Section 8 of the German Democratic Republic reads -
•Personal liberty ....' 
50. Article 74 of the Free City of Danzig Constitution states-
'The liberty of the person has been declared in violable 
and no limitation of deprivation of personal liberty may 
be imposed by public authority except by virtue of a law' 
31. Supra n. 4. 
32. Ibid. 
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guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. Article 21 of 
the Constitution is a bulwark of the 'life' and 'personal 
liberty' of the individual- Therefore, the question is : 
what is personal liberty? What is its Scope? Though Article 21 
of the Constitution is negatively drafted which is known in 
legal jargon as an non-obstante clause, yet it has assumed a 
great constitutional importance. It has been judicially 
construed as saviour of one's life. Therefore, let us 
investigate bow the Supreme Court has expanded the contours 
of personal liberty contained in Article 21 of the Constitution. 
In this regard let us know how the court has dealt with 
meaning of certain terms used in Article 21 of the Constitution. 
Life - has been defined as the period between life-^  and death. 
34 Field J. in Munn v. People of Illinois explained that the 
term 'life', as here used, something more is meant than mere 
animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation 
extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is 
enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits mutilation of the 
body by the amputation of an arm or leg, or tne puttin'g out 
of any other organ of the body through which the soul conunu-
nicates with the outer world. 
36 
In Allegever v. Louisiana, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the life, includes all personal rights and their 
33. Black Law Dictionary, 5tb edition, West Publishing Co.,1979 
34. (1876) 94 US 113 at p. 113, followed by the S.G. in Kbarak 
Singh V. State of U.P.. AIR 1963 SC 1295. 
35. Sunil BatJta v. Delhi Admin.. AIR 1978 SC 1675. 
36. (1896) 165 US 578. 
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enjoyment embracing the use and enjoyment of f a c u l t i e s , 
a c q u i r i n g useful knowledge, the r i g h t t o marry, e s t a b l i s h 
a home and freedom of worsh ip , consc ience , c o n t r a c t , occupa-
t i o n , speech, assembly and p r e s s . Every limb or f a c u l t y 
through which l i f e i s enjoyed i s thus p r o t e c t e d by Ar t . 21 
and t h i s inc ludes the f a c u l t y of th ink ing and f ee l i ng a l s o . 
Bvery kind of d e p r i v a t i o n , t o t a l or p a r t i a l , permanent oi 
temporary i s p r o h i b i t e d . 
37 In Kr ishna ^ d d y the ques t ion w-^ s whether the 
i n d i v i d u a l s t a t u s enjoyed by a person could be included in 
the meaning of the terra l i f e used in A r t i c l e 21 of the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . The Andhra High Court sa id t h a t we cannot 
accep t t h a t the word ' l i f e * in -ar t ic le 21 t akes in i t s scope, 
m a t t e r s l i k e i n d i v i d u a l s t a t u s enjoyed by a person. 
However, the term ' l i f e ' as i s used in A r t i c l e 21 of 
our C o n s t i t u t i o n has not been defined by the Supreme Court. 
What do we mean by the word ' l i f e ' ? V/hat we mean by the 
word ' l i f e ' - i s tha t a man i s pe r fec t with a l l limbs or 
organs of h i s phys i ca l body with which he communicates with 
the world. 
Personal L ibe r ty - i s the p r i v i l e g e of doing what one p l e a s e s , 
sub jec t to c e r t a i n good, predetermined laws, enacted by common 
39 
consent.-^ I t i s f u r t h e r desc r ibed as the ' n a t u r a l f a cu l t y 
3 7 . Krishna Reddv v . C o l l e c t o r , Karimnagar. AIR 1970 AP 180. 
3 8 . M^ a t p . 192. 
3 9 . Corpus J u r i s , v o l . 137 CJ 159. 
Zi 
which permits everyone to do anything he pleases except that 
42 
which i s r e s t r a i n t by law or f o r c e ' / ' L i b e r t y ' there fore 
A i 
is inestimable good, or 'is more favoured than other things'. 
'Liberty' therefore, means the enjoyment of the rights which 
4-3 belonged to us as individual. By 'liberty', said Laski, 'I 
mean the eager maintenance of that atmosphere in which men 
have the opportunity to be their best selves'. This is what 
Bhagwati J. has said in Maneka Sandbi that 'its purpose is to 
45 help the individual to find his own viobility'. Accordingly, 
liberty therefore, is a 'product of rights' or a 'positive 
thing', which does not merely mean absence of restraint. 
However, it would be immensely fruitful to reproduce 
here what Blackstone has propounded in order to know the 
nature and importance of natural rights and liberty. Black-
stone said : The absolute rights of man, considered as a 
free agent, endowed with discernment to know good from evil, 
and with power of choosing those measures which appear to him 
to be most desirable, are usually summed up in one general 
appellation, and denominated the natural liberty of mankind. 
This natural liberty consists properly in a power of acting 
40. Corpus Juris, vol. 137 SC 159. 
41. 37 Corpus Juris, vol. 137 CJ 159. 
42. 39 Corpus Juris, vol. 137 CJ 159. 
43. paski, Harold J., A Grammer of Politics, IV Impression 
1977 at p. 142. 
44. Supra n. 21. 
45. Ibid. 
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ds one tninks fiu, without any restraint or control, 
unless by the law ot nature; being a right inherent in 
us by birth, and one or the gifts of God to man at nis 
creation, when ne enibued him with tne faculty of free will, 
out everyman, when ne enters into society, gives up as a 
^art or ills natural liberty as the price of so valuable or 
a purchase; and, in consideration of receiving the advantages 
of mutual comiT^ erce, obliges himself to conform to those 
laws, which the community has thought proper to establish, 
f^ na chis s^ ^^ ecies of legal obeuience and conformity is infi-
nitely more desirable than that wild and savage liberty 
which is sacrificed to obtain it. For no man that considers 
a moment would wish to retain the absolute and uncontrolled 
j^ ower of doing whatever he pleases; the consequence of which 
is, tnat every other man would also nave the same power, and 
than there would be no security to individuals in any of tne 
enjoyn.ents of life. political, or civil liberty, which is 
thac or a member or society is no other than natural iibertv 
so far restrained by iiumian laws { and no further ; ia ia 
w^cossciry r^iu expeaient roi the general advantage oi tne 
public. 
^ne absolute rigncs ^f every ilnglishman ^ wnich taken 
in - political and ext-_nsive serise, are usually calleu their 
liberties),as they are founded on nature and reason, so they 
..re coeval with our form of government; though subject of 
ci.i.es to fluctuate and change; tneir estab J ishmen t texcellen t 
<^t' it xsj oeiny still nm.an. 
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And these may be reduced to three pr incipal or primary 
a r t i c l e s ; the r ight of personal secur i ty , the r ight of 
personal l i b e r t y , and the r igh t of pr ivate property, because, 
as there is no other known method of compulsion, or abridging 
man's natural free w i l l , but by an infringement or diminition 
of one or other of these important r i g h t s , the preservation of 
these , i nv io l a t e , may ; |ustly be said to include the preserva-
tion of our c i v i l immunities in the i r l a rges t and most 
extensive sense. 
I . The r igh t of personal security cons is t s in a person's 
legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his l i f e , his limbs, his 
body, his health and his reputa t ion . 
I I . Next to personal secur i ty , the law of England regards, 
a s s e r t s , and preserves the personal l i be r ty of individuals . 
This personal l ibe r ty cons is t s in the power of locomotion 
of changing s i tua t ions or moving one's person to whatsoever 
place one's own inc l ina t ion may d i rec t , without imprisonment 
or r e s t r a i n t , unless by due course of law concerning which 
we may make the same observations as upon the preceding 
a r t i c l e , tha t i t i s a r igh t s t r i c t l y na tu ra l ; that the laws 
of England have never abridged i t without suff ic ient cause 
and tha t , in th is kingdom, i t cannot ever be abridged at the 
mere d i sc re t ion of the Magistrate, without the exp l ic i t 
permission of the laws. 
I I I . The third absolute r i g h t , inherent in every Englishmen, 
27 
i s t h a t of p r o p e r t y ; which oonaia ta in the f r ee use , enjoyment, 
and d i s p o s a l of a l l h i s a c q u i s i t i o n s , wi thou t any con t ro l or 
d i m i n a t i o n , save only by the laws of the l a n d . The o r i g i n a l 
of p r i v a t e proper ty i s probably founded in n a t u r e , as w i l l be 
more f u l l y explained in the second book of ensuing commentaries: 
but c e r t a i n l y the mod i f i ca t ions under which we a t present find 
i t , the method of conserv ing i t in the p r e s e n t owner, and of 
t r a n s l a t i n g i t from man to man, are e n t i r e l y derived from 
s o c i e t y : and are some of those c i v i l a^lvantages, in exchange 
for which every i n d i v i d u a l has res igned ?par t of his n a t u r a l 
l i b e r t y ' . 
In Golaknath, Subba Rao, C . J . , speaking for the court 
has h i g h l i g h t e d the importance of the fundamental r i g h t s . The 
learned Chief J u s t i c e has sa id : 
"They are the p r imord ia l r i g h t s necessary for the 
development of human p e r s o n a l i t y . They are the 
r i g h t s which enable a man to chalk out h is own 
l i f e in the manner he l i ke s b e s t * . (47) 
Hidayatu l lah J . in ^olaknath has sa id tha t 'of a l l 
4^ the r i g h t s , the r i g h t to o n e ' s l i f e is the most v a l u a b l e ' . 
L a s k i , has a l s o descr ibed l i b e r t y in to ' p r i v a t e l i b e r t y ' , 
' p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y ' and the 'economic l i b e r t y ' . " ^ ^ Beg C.J . 
r i g h t l y said in Maneka Gandhi tha t both the r i g h t s of 
46 . Blackstone : Commentaries on the Laws of England. 
Book 1 p . 134. 
4 7 . Golaknath v . S t a t e of Pun.iab. AIR 1967, SC 1643 p . 1656. 
48 . Supra n.47 a t 1704. 
'^ ^* J^ofS^'^^ff^^? •^•' ^^ammer of P o l i t i c s , Fourth Impression, 
I y {< a t ? 4 f c - 1 4 8 . 
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•persona l s e c u r i t y ' and ' p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y ' , recognised by 
what Blackstone termed ' n a t u r a l l a w ' , are embodied in A r t i c l e 
50 21 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
A r t i c l e 39 of the Magna Carta of 1225 runs : 'no f ree 
man s h a l l be taken or itcprisoned or d i s s e i s e d , or outlawed, 
or e x i l e d , or anyways des t royed ; nor w i l l we go upon him, nor 
w i l l we send upon him, un le s s by the lawful judgment of his 
p e e r s , or by the law of the l a n d ' . 
Taswell Langmead has defined the l i b e r t y in the 
fo l lowing way : 
"The r i g h t of pe r sona l s e c u r i t y c o n s i s t s in a 
p e r s o n ' s l ega l and un in te r rup ted enjoyment of 
h i s l i f e , h i s l imbs , h i s body, h i s wealth and 
h i s r e p u t a t i o n to each of which he has a na tu-
r a l inheren t r i g h t which cannot be wantonly 
des t royed , inf r inged or r e s t r i c t e d without a 
mani fes t breach of c i v i l l i b e r t y . Every 
c i t i z e n enjoys the r i g h t of pe r sona l l i b e r t y ; 
he i s e n t i t l e d to s tay a t home or walk abroad 
a t h i s p leasure wi thout i n t e r f e r e n c e or 
r e s t r a i n t from o t h e r s " . (51) 
Prof. Dicey, an a u t h o r i t y on English C o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
Law, has sa id : 
"The r i g h t to pe r sona l l i b e r t y fj .t 
means in substance a pe r son ' s r i g h t not to be 
sub jec ted to imprisonment, a r r e s t or other 
p h y s i c a l coerc ion in any manner t h a t does not 
admit of l e g a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' . (52) 
Accordingly, fidmund Burke defined ' l i b e r t y ' as 
' r e g u l a t e d f reedom' . I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , u n r e s t r a i n t . 
50 . Supra n. 21 a t 608. 
51. Taswell Langmeads : The English Constitutional History, 
1 1th ed. at 77. 
52. Dicey, A .V., An Introduction to the Study of Law of the 
Constitution, at 207. 
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unres t r ic ted or uncontrolled l iber ty is ' l icent iousness* 
or ' f ree for a l l ' . Therefore, the regula ted , r e s t r a i n t , 
r e s t r i c t e d and control led l iber ty is in the in te res t of a l l . 
This is possible only if i t is controlled by the society or 
S t a t e , However, the s t a te should put r e s t r i c t i o n s on the 
exercise of the l ibe r ty based upon the w i l l s of those whom 
they affect .^^ 
Let us see how the Americans have coined the screening 
54 of the term ' l i b e r t y ' . In Munn v. People.of I l l i n o i s , 
Field J . in his d issent ing opinion defined ' l i b e r t y ' as 
follows : 
"By the term 'liberty', as used in the provision, 
something more is meant than mere freedom from 
physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. 
It means freedom to go where one may choose, and 
to act in such manner not inconsistent with the 
equal rights of others, as his judgment may 
dictate for the promotion of his happiness; that 
is, to pursue such calling and avocations as may 
be most suitable to develop his capacities, and 
give to them their highest enjoyment". 55 
In Allegeyer while upholding the claim of the defendants 
the U.S. Supreme Court said : 
"Liberty mentioned in the Hth Amendment, means not 
only the right of the citizen to be free from the 
mere physical restraint of his person, as by 
incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace 
the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoy-
ment of all his faculties; to be free to use them m 
53- 5upra n. 45 at 143. 
54. Munn v. People of Illinois^. 1876, 94 USC 113 
55. Supra n. 36 at 578, see also Bradley J. views in Butcher's 
Union S.H. & L.S.L. Co. v. Crescent City L.S.L. & S.J. Go. 
111 US 746. 
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in a l l lawful ways, to live and work where be 
w i l l ; to pursue any livelihood or vocation, 
and for that to enter into a l l contrac ts which 
may be proper, necessary, and e s sen t i a l to his 
carrying out to a successful conclusion the 
purpose above mentioned." 
McReynolds J . has stated : 'without doubt, i t denotes 
not merely freedom from bodily r e s t r a i n t , but also the r ight 
of the individual to cont rac t , to engage in any of the common 
occupations of l i f e , to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, 
e s t ab l i sh home and bring up children, to worship God according 
to the d i c t a t e s of his own conscience, and, generally, to 
enjoy those pr iv i leges long recognised at common law as 
e s s e n t i a l to the orderly pursuit of happiness of freed'm^n. 
Therefore, the l iber ty means the r e s t r a i n t of another 
so as not to infringe the r igh ts of the former. Warren Q.J. 
said : 'although the court has not assumed to define l iber ty 
with any great p rec i s ion , that term is not confined to mere 
bodily r e s t r a i n t . Liberty under law extends to the f u l l 
range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and 
i t cannot be r e s t r i c t e d except for a proper government 
o b j e c t i v e ' . But the established doctrine is that th i s l iberty 
ay not be interfered with under the gu-ise of protect ing the 
public in te res t by the l eg i s l a t ive action which is a rb i t ra ry 
or without reasonable re la t ion to some purpose within the 
competency of the s t a te to e f fec t . 
The discussion re l a t ing to the concept of personal 
l i b e r t y used i-, .Article 21 of the Cons t i t i i t lon took place 
m 
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i n Gopalan . In Gopalan who wag a c i t i z e n of I n d i a , c h a l l e n g e d 
the v a l i d i t y and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the P r e v e n t i v e D e t e n t i o n 
A c t , 1950 , under which he was d e t a i n e d . The Counse l f o r the 
p e t i t i o n e r fir. A.K. Gopalan c o n t e n d e d t h a t the impugned Act 
was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l because -
i ; P e r s o n a l l i b e r t y i nc luded the f reedoms c o n f e r r e d by 
A r t i c l e 1 9 ( 1 ) and the impugned law d id n o t s a t i s f y t he 
t e s t of A r t i c l e 1 9 ( 2 ) t o ( 6 ) . ^ ' ^ 
i i ) In t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t h e impugned law d i r e c t l y v i o l a t e d 
G o p a l a n ' s r i g h t t o move f r e e l y t h r o u g h o u t the t e r r i t o r y 
of I n d i a 1 9 ( l ) ( d ) b e c a u s e the freedom of movement i s of 
the e s s e n c e of p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y and t h e impugned Act 
did not s a t i s f y the t e s t A r t i c l e 1 9 ( 5 ) . 
i i i ) A r t i c l e 1 9 ( 1 ) and A r t i c l e 21 s hou ld be r ead t o g e t h e r 
b e c a u s e A r t i c l e 19 (1 ) d e a l t wi th s u b s t a n t i v e r i g h t s 
59 
and A r t i c l e 21 d e a l t w i t h p r o c e d u r a l r i g h t s . 
i v ) The r e f e r e n c e i n A r t i c l e 21 ' p r o c e d u r e e s t a b l i s h e d by 
l a w ' meant 'due p r o c e s s of lav.'' and the impugned Act 
d i d not s a t i s f y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of 'due p r o c e s s ' . 
v ) In any e v e n t , the word ' l a w ' in A r t i c l e 21 meant not 
s t a t e e n a c t e d law b u t j u s n a t u r a l e or t he p r i n c i p l e s 
of n a t u r a l j u s t i c e . The impugned Act d id not comply 
w i t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of n a t u r a l j u s t i c e . ^ ^ 
5 6 . A.K. Gopalan v . S t a t e of Madras. AIR 1950 SC 27 ; (1950) SCR 8 3 . ~ ~ — • V -^ > / 
5 7 . Supra n . 1 a t 100. 
5 8 . i d ^ a t 1 0 1 . 5 9 . i ^ ^^ ^ 0 3 . 
6 0 . i d ^ a t 107. 6 1 . I d , , j t t 104 . 
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Since the judgment in Gopalan consists of 250 of the 
-Supreme Court Report and all the judges of the Supreme 
Court have delivered their separate opinions on each issue 
raised in it, no common view emerges from the judgments 
which can be said to be an authoritative exposition on the 
meaning of the expression 'personal liberty' used in 
Article 21. However, the Supreme Court has given its own 
opinion on 'personal liberty' in harmony with the meaning 
as it has been defined in -England. 
Before our Constitution came into force on January 26, 
1950, the position in India was the same as in England. The 
courts in India have relied and acted on the doctrine that 
62 
'what is not prohibited is permitted'. In &opalan it was 
stated -
"In ordinary language personal l iber ty means 
l iber ty r e l a t i n g to or concerning the person 
or body of the individual ; and personal l iber ty 
in th i s sense is the a n t i - t h e s i s of physical 
r e s t r a i n t or coercion". 
In the opinion of Mukherjea J . , Article 21 connotes : 
"This negative right of not being subjected to 
any form of physical r e s t r a i n t or coercion 
that cons t i tu tes the essence of personal 
l ibe r ty and not mere freedom to move to any 
part of the Indian t e r r i t o r y . In the Indian 
Const i tut ion, on the other hand, the expression 
'personal l i b e r t y ' has been de l ibera te ly used to 
r e s t r i c t i t to freedom from physical r e s t r a i n t 
of a person by incarcerat ion or otherwise". 
Then the learned judge proceeded to s ta te his view : 
"Article 21 to my mind gives protection to 
l i fe and personal l i be r ty to the extent 
62. Const i tut ional and Administrative Law, 9th ed. by 
Prof. A.W. Bradley 1977, at 465-66, c i t i ng the report 
of the Committee on Privacy : Comnd. 5012, 1972 at 10, 
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t h e r e i n mentioned. I t does not r ecognise the 
r i g h t to l i f e and p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y as abso lu te 
r i g h t but d e l i m i t s the ambit and scope of the 
r i g h t i t s e l f . The abso lu te r i g h t i s by the 
d e f i n i t i o n cut down by the r i s k of i t s being 
taken away in accordance with procedure e s t a b -
l i s h e d . I t i s t h i s c i rcumscr ibed r i g h t which 
i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y p ro tec ted by A r t i c l e 21 as 
a g a i n s t the execut ive as we l l as l e g i s l a t u r e , 
f o r the C o n s t i t u t i o n has condi t ioned i t s dep-
r i v a t i o n by the necess i ty fo r a procedure r-, 
e s t a b l i s h e d by the law made by i t s e l f . . . " 
Mukherje"^ J . has d e a l t with the meaning of express ion 
in &opalan said t h a t the words ' p e r sona l l i b e r t y ' take t h e i r 
co lou r from the words of ' d e p r i v a t i o n of l i f e ' . I t means 
64 
l i b e r t y of the person, t h a t i s freedom from personal r e s t r a i n t , 
S a s t r i J . in Gopalan said t ha t the ' r i g h t to l i f e i s the most 
fundamental r i g h t . He observed t ha t t r u t h i s tha t A r t i c l e 2 1 , 
American prototype in the ii^ if tb and Four teen th Amendments of 
the C o n s t i t u t i o n of the U.S. r e p r e s e n t s an example of the 
fu s ion of procedural and subs t an t i ve r i g h t s in the same p r o v i -
s i o n . The r i g h t to l i v e , though the most fundamental of a l l , 
65 is a l s o one of the most d i f f i c u l t to def ine . . . ' He f u r t h e r 
proceeded to say tha t A r t i c l e 21 i s p e r f e c t l y genera l and 
covers d e p r i v a t i o n of personal l i b e r t y - pun i t ive . , and preven-
t i o n . Das J . in Gopalan, has said t h a t the express ion 
' p e i s o n a l l i b e r t y ' used in A r t i c l e 21 as a compendious term 
i n c l u d i n g wi th in i t s meaning a l l the v a r i e t i e s of r i g h t s 
which go to make up the personal l i b e r t i e s of men. 
6 3 . Supra n . 56. 
64 . Supra n. 56 . 
6 5 . Supra n. 56. 
66 . Supra n. 56 a t 111 . 
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The learned judge has f u r t h e r observed tha t r i g h t in Ar t ic le 
21 i s a subs t an t i ve fundamental r i g h t and i s not mere a 
p rocedura l p r o t e c t i o n . I t s avowed purpose i s to def ine the 
ambit of the r i g h t to l i f e and pe r sona l l i b e r t y which i s to 
be p ro tec ted as a fundamental r i g h t . The r i g h t to l i f e and 
personal l i b e r t y p ro t ec t ed by A r t i c l e 21 i s not an abso lu te 
r i g h t but i s a q u a l i f i e d r i g h t - a r i g h t c i rcumscr ibed by the 
p o s s i b i l i t y or r i s k of being l o s t according to procedure 
e s t a b l i s h e d by law. 
Dealing with the nature and scope of the l i b e r t y Das 
J . observed t h a t l i b e r t y does not only mean l i b e r t y of the 
person but i t means l i b e r t y fo r the r i g h t s a t t ached to the 
person (jus person-^-rum). Expla ining the r i g h t s a t tached to 
67a 
the person, he f u r t h e r observed -
" C i v i l r i g h t s of a person are g e n e r a l l y divided 
in to two c l a s s e s , namely the r i g h t s a t t ached to 
the person (jus personarura) and the r i g h t s 
a t tached to th ings i . e . , p roper ty ( jus serum) . 
Of course , r i g h t s a t tached to the person , the 
f i r s t and foremost i s the freedom of l i f e , which 
rneanw the r i g h t to l i v e i . e . , the r i g h t t h a t 
o n e ' s l i f e s h a l l not be taken away except under 
the a u t h o r i t y of law. Next to the freedom of 
l i f e comes the freedom of the person, which 
means t h a t o n e ' s body s h a l l not be touched, 
v i o l a t e d , a r r e s t e d or imprisoned and one ' s limbs 
sha l l not be injured or maimed except under 
a u t h o r i t y of law. The t r u t h of the ma t t e r i s 
t h a t the r i g h t to l i v e and the freedom of the 
person are the primary r i g h t s a t tached to thf 
person, if a man's person i s f r e e , i t i s then 
cind then only t h a t he can e x e r c i s e a v a r i e t y 
of o ther a u x i l l i a r y r i g h t s t h a t i s to say , he 
can, w i t h i n c e r t a i n l i m i t s , speak what he l i k e s , 
aaaemble where he l i k e s , form any a s s o c i a t i o n 
or unions move about f r ee ly as h i s 'own i n c l i n a t i o n 
67 . Supra n . 56 at 114-. 
67c.. ^u^JT^ n. i 6 a t 110 
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may d i r e c t , r e s ide and s e t t l e anywhere he l i k e s 
and p r a c t i s e any profess ion or ca r ry on any occu-
p a t i o n , t rade or b u s i n e s s ' . These are a t t r i b u t e s 
of the freedom of the person and are consequently 
r i g h t s a t t ached to the person . I t should be 
c l e a r l y born in mind that these are not a t a l l 
the r i g h t s a t t ached to the pe r son . Besides them 
the re are v a r i e t i e s of other r i g h t s which are a l so 
the a t t r i b u t e s of the freedom of the person. All 
r i g h t s a t tached to the person are u sua l l y ca l l ed 
pe r sona l l i b e r t i e s and they are too numerous to be 
enumerated. Some of these a u x i l l i a r y r i g h t s are 
so important and fundamental t ha t they are regarded 
as valued as s e p a r a t e and independent r i g h t s apa r t 
from the freedom of the person. 
Personal l i b e r t i e s may be compendiously summed up 
as the r i g h t to do so as one p leases wi th in the 
law. I say wi th in the law because l i b e r t y 13 
not unbr id led l i c e n c e . I t i s what Edmund Burke 
ca l led ' r e g u l a t e d f reedom' . 
Mr. Fazle Ali J . in Gopalan has opined t ha t the 
e x p r e s s i o n ' pe r sona l l i b e r t y ' and personal freedom, have, 
as we find in s e v e r a l books, a wider meaning and a l s o a 
narrower ra^ an ing . In the wider s e n s e , they include not only 
immunity from a r r e s t and de t en t i on but a l so freedom of speech, 
freedom of a s s o c i a t i o n . In the narrower sense , they mean 
immunity from a r r e s t and d e t e n t i o n . I have shown t h a t the 
j u r i s t i c concept ion of personal l i b e r t y when these words 
a r e used in the sense 'of immunity from a r r e s t i s t ha t i t 
c o n s i s t s in freedom of movement and locomotion. 
For the f i r s t time the concept and meaning of the 
exp re s s ion ' p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y ' used in Ar t i c l e 21 of the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n came up for j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n in Kharak 
69 Sjj2£J2.. Dealing with the ques t i on Ayyanger J . de l ive red 
69 . Supra n. 56 a t 55-
6 9 . Kharak SinRh v . S t a t e of U .P . . AIR 1963 SC 1295. 
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the court's opinion and thus observed : 
"We shall now proceed with the examination of 
the width, scope and content of the expression 
'personal liberty' in Article 21. Having 
regard to the terms of Article 19(1 )(d), we 
must take it that expression is used as not 
to include the right to move about or rather 
of locomotion. The right to move about being 
excluded, its narrowest interpretation would 
be that it comprehends nothing more than 
freedom from physical restraint or freedom 
from confinement within the bounds of a prison; 
in other words, freedom from arrest and deten-
tion from false imprisonment or wrongful 
confinement. We feel unable to hold that the 
term was intended to bear only this narrow 
interpretation but on the other hand consider 
that 'personal liberty' is used in the Article 
as a compendious term to include within itself 
all the varieties of rights which go to make 
up the 'personal liberties' of man other than 
those dealt within the several clauses of 
Article 19(1 ). In other words, while Article 
19(1) deals with particular species or 
attributes of that freedom, 'personal liberty' 
in Article 21 takes in and comprises the 
residue" . 70 
Disagreeing with it the minority view was expressed by 
Mr. Justice Subba Rao who explained majority view in the 
following words ' 
"The fundamental right of life and personal 
liberty has many attributes and some of them 
are found in Article 19". 71 
70. AIR 1963 SC 1295 
71. See A.G. Kazi v. C.V. Jethwani. AIR 1966 Bom. 54, Tarkunde 
J. dealing with the meaning and scope of personal liberty 
used in Art. 21 held that it recognises and protects the 
right of every person to 'personal liberty' of which he 
cannot be deprived except according to procedure established 
by law. He has used the term 'personal liberty' in a com-
pendious and comprehensive way so as to include all varie-
ties or rights of a man; Ali Kazmi v. C.V. Jethwani, AIR 
1967 Bom.255 Tombe G.J. was also of the view that the 
language used in this Article also indicates that the 
expression 'personal liberty' is not confined only to freedom 
from physical restraint i.e., freedom from arrest, imprison-
ment or any other form of physical restraint but a full 
range of conduct which an individual is free to pursue 
within law. 
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In Maneka Gandhi the meaning of the express ion 
' p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y ' used in Ar t i c l e 21 of the Cons t i t u t i on 
•was taken up for j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Having r e fe r r ed 
Gopalan and Kharak Singh, Bhagv/ati J . observed : 
" I t i s indeed d i f f i c u l t to see on what p r i n c i p l e 
we can refuse to give i t s p l a in n a t u r a l meaning to 
the exp res s ion 'pe r sona l l i b e r t y ' as used in 
Ar t i c l e 21 and read i t in a narrow and r e s t r i c t e d 
sense so as to exclude those a t t r i b u t e s of pe rsona l 
l i b e r t y which a re s p e c i f i c a l l y d e a l t with in 
A r t i c l e 19 . . . An at tempt of the cour t should be 
to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental 
r i g h t s r a t h e r than a l i e n a t e t h e i r meaning and 
con ten t by a p rocess of j u d i c i a l cons t ruc t i on . . . 
The express ion ' p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y ' in A r t i c l e 21 
i s of the wides t amplitude and i t covers a 
v a r i e t y of r i g h t s which go to c o n s t i t u t e the 
p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y of man and some of them have 
been r a i s e d t o the s t a t u s of d i s t i n c t fundamen-
t a l r i g h t s and given a d d i t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n under 
A r t i c l e 19".72 
In A.D. N3abalpur, Khanna J . , as a lone d i s s e n t e r 
but in a fo rce fu l language said t ha t ' t he r i g h t to l i f e and 
pe r sona l l i b e r t y i s the most p rec ious r i g h t of human beings 
in c i v i l i z e d s o c i e t i e s governed by the r u l e of Law'. In 
74 F ranc i s G o r a l i e , Bhagv/ati J . made a fo rce fu l p re fa to ry 
observa t ion before expanding the ambit of A r t i c l e 21 i s nothing 
but an r e i t e r a t i o n of h i s e a r l i e r view expressed in Maneka 
75 Gandhi, Bhagwati J . observed ; 
72 . Supra n . 21 a t 621-622 
7 3 . A.P.M. J a b a l p u r v. Shivkant Shukla. Al'd 1976 S3 12)7-
7 4 . F r a n c i s Gora l ie v . Union T e r r i t o r y of D e l h i , AIR 1981 
SC 746. ^ 
7 5 . Supra n . 1 a t 622. 
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" i^ery limb or f a c u l t y through which l i f e i s 
enjoyed i s thus p ro t ec t ed by A r t i c l e 21 and 
a f o r t i o r i , t h i s would inc lude the f a c u l t i e s 
of th ink ing and f e e l i n g . Now dep r iva t i on 
which i s i n h i b i t e d by A r t i c l e 21 may be t o t a l 
or p a r t i a l , n e i t h e r any limb or f a c u l t y can 
be t o t a l l y destroyed nor can i t be p a r t i a l l y 
damaged. Moreover, i t i s every kind of d e p r i -
va t ion t h a t i s h i t by A r t i c l e 21 , whether such 
d e p r i v a t i o n be permanent or temporary and, 
f u r t h e r more, d e p r i v a t i o n i s not an a c t which 
i s complete once and for a l l ; i t i s a c o n t i -
nuing ac t and so long as i t l a s t s i t must be 
in accordance with procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by 
law. I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t any ac t which 
damages or in ju res or i n t e r f e r e s with the 
use of any limb or f a c u l t y of a person e i t h e r 
permanently or t emporar i ly , would be wi th in 
the i n h i b i t i o n of A r t i c l e 2 1 " . 76 
' L i b e r t y ' was a condi t ion in which f ree e x e r c i s e of the 
w i l l was r e s t r a i n e d only so f a r as necessary to secure a 
harmonious c o - e x i s t e n c e of the f ree w i l l of each and the free 
7 7 
w i l l of a l l o t h e r s . 
In American h i s t o r y , the n a t i o n a l i s t s cry of 'g ive me 
l i b e r t y , or give me dea th ' of P a t r i c k Henry of V i r g i n i a , USA 
\1975) has often been l ikened • The Dec la ra t ion of Indepen-
dence , 1776, proclaimed the r i g h t of a people to abol i sh a 
government t h a t f a i l e d to secure the peop l e ' s i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s 
7R 
among which were l i f e , l i b e r t y and the p u r s u i t of happiness . 
76 . ^upra n , 74 a t 753. 
77 . A.K. Brohi , Fundamental Law of Pak i s t an , a l s o see 
Pa twar i , A.B.M. Mahfizul I s lam, Fundamental Rights and 
Personal L ibe r ty in I n d i a . Pak i s t an and Bangladesh 
(Deep & Deep P u b l i c a t i o n s ) 1988 a t 24. 
7 8 . The Independence : The C o n s t i t u t i o n of the United S ta tes 
of America a t 204. 
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Personal l i b e r t y , according to the c o u r t , l a r g e l y 
79 
c o n s i s t s oi the r i g h t of locomotion to go where one p l e a s e s . 
Peckham J . , viewed : 
"Liber ty . . . means, not only the r i g h t of the 
c i t i z e n to be f ree from the p h y s i c a l r e s t r a i n e d 
of h i s person to e n t i r e incarce t i l l , but the 
term i s deemed to embrace the r i g h t of the c i t i -
zen to be f ree in the enjoyment of a l l h i s 
f a c u l t i e s ; to be f ree to use them in a l l lawful 
ways; to l i v e and work when he w i l l ; to earn 
h i s l i ve l ihood by any lawful c a l l i n g ; to pursue 
any l i v e l i h o o d or avoca t ion and f o r t h a t 
purpose to e n t e r i n t o a l l c o n t r a c t s which may 
be p rope r , necessary and e s s e n t i a l to h i s 
ca r ry ing out to a success fu l conclusion . . . " 8 0 
Q -1 
^" Meyg^ V. Jtebraska, the term l i b e r t y has been used 
to denote not merely freedom from bodily r e s t r a i n t , but a l so 
the r i g h t of the ind iv idua l to c o n t r a c t , to engage in any of 
the common occupat ion of l i f e , to acquire use fu l knowledge, 
to marry, e s t a b l i s h a home and b r ing up c h i l d r e n , to worship 
God according to the d i c t a t e s of h i s own consc ience , and 
g e n e r a l l y to enjoy those p r i v i l e g e s long recognised a t common 
law as e s s e n t i a l to the o rde r ly p u r s u i t of happiness by 
f r e e men. 
S i r Ivor Jenn ings , a noted a u t h o r i t y of English 
G o n s t i t u t l o n def ines pe rsona l l i b e r t y ' t h e r i g h t to pe r sona l 
freedom is a l i b e r t y to so much p e r s o n a l freedom aa i s not 
taken away by law. I t a s s e r t s the p r i n c i p l e of l e g a l i t y , 
t h a t eve ry th ing i s l e g a l t ha t i s not i l l e g a l . . . 
7 9 . William v . F e a r s . 179 (US) 270, 
8 0 . Supra n. 36 a t 589-
8 1 . 262 US 390. 
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I t i n c l u d e s , t h e r e f o r e , the ' r i g h t s ' of f r ee speech, 
of a s s o c i a t i o n , and of assembly. For they a s s e r t only tha t 
a man may not be deprived of h i s personal freedom for doing 
c e r t a i n k inds of a c t s - exp re s s ing op in ions , a s s o c i a t i n g , 
and meeting t o g e t h e r - un less in so doing he offends agains t 
the law. The ' r i g h t ' of pe r sona l freedom a s s e r t s tha t a man 
may not be depr ived of h i s freedom for doing any ac t unless 
an 
in so doing he offends a g a i n s t the law. (emphasis i s mine) 
Lord Alfred Denning says - 'by personal freedom I mean 
the freedom of every law-abiding c i t i z e n to th ink what he 
w i l l , t o say what he w i l l , and to go where he w i l l on h is 
lawful occasions wi thou t l e t or h inderance from any o the r 
p e r s o n s ' . 
Therefore , the r i g h t to pe rsona l l i b e r t y in England 
con ta ined in the Magna Carta 1275, the P e t i t i o n s of R i g h t s , 
1628, the Bi l l of R igh t s 1688, and the Act of Se t t l emen t , 
1701, i s p ro tec ted by ' a v a r i e t y of means p a r t l y under the 
84 
common law, p a r t l y under s t a t u t e . I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , 
secured by the s t r i c t maintenance of the p r i n c i p l e t ha t no 
man can be a r r e s t e d or imprisoned except in due course under 
some l e g a l warrant or a u t h o r i t y , and what i s of for more 
consequence, i t i s secured by the p rov i s ion of adequate legal 
8 2 . S i r Ivor J e n n i n g s , The Law and the C o n s t i t u t i o n , 5th ed 
p . 260. 
8 3 . Lord Alfred Denning, Freedom under the Law, 1949 a t 5 . 
84 . Anson, the Law of Custom of the C o n s t i t u t i o n , v o l . IJ 
P a r t I (Oxford a t the Clarendon P r e s s , 1935) a t 297. 
a 1 
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means f o r the enforcement of the p r i n c i p l e -^  and when there 
i s any c o n f l i c t betv/een personal l i b e r t y and other r i g h t s or 
i n t e r e s t s , then no ma t t e r ho\g e:rept or pov^erful those o the r s 
may be , the persona l l i b e r t y of the humblest c i t i z e n s h a l l 
p r e v a i l over i t . 
Procedure Es l ab l i shed by Law 
The f i r s t d r a f t A r t i c l e 15 (new A r t i c l e 21) as passed 
by the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly was, 'no person s h a l l be deprived 
of h i s l i f e or personal l i b e r t y without due p rocess of l a w ' . 
Thereupon a change was made in the d r a f t A r t i c l e 15 at the 
behes t of the Drafting, Committee. The Draf t ing Committee 
suggested t h a t the exp res s ion 'except accord ing to procedure 
e s t a b l i s h e d by law' be s u b s t i t u t e d in p lace of the express ion 
'w i thou t due process of l a w ' . The reason g iven by the 
Draf t ing Committee fo r the s u b s t i t u t i o n was t h a t the 
express ion 'procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law' i s more s p e c i f i c , 
c l e a r and unambiguous than the 'due p rocess of l aw ' . 
R7 The rea f t e r , an amendment to the Draft Ar t i c l e 15 was moved 
88 by Shr i B. P a t t a b h i Sitaramayya t h a t in A r t i c l e 15 for the 
8 5 . Supra n . 52 a t 208. 
8 6 . A.V. Dicey w r i t e s : 'This s t r u g g l e for pe r sona l l i b e r t y , 
which means much more than mere r e s i s t e n c e to obvious 
oppress ion , such as could be guarded a g a i n s t by the Habeas 
Corpus Act, gave to e a r l y Benthamism i t s whole s p i r i t and 
l i f e as a m i l i t a n t c r e e d ' . See l e c t u r e s on the r e l a t i o n s 
between law and publ ic opinion in England a t 149. 
87 . F i f t h Amendment of the American C o n s t i t u t i o n (with reference 
to -Federal Po^^r) says , 'no person s h a l l be . . . deprived of 
A^^ } I ^i-^!?*-^ °^ p roper ty wi thout p rocess of l aw ' . U t b 
Amendment of the American C o n s t i t u t i o n (with re fe rence to 
s t a t e s ) runs : 'nor s h a l l any s t a t e deprived of any person 
Of l i f e , l i b e r t y or proper ty w i thou t due process of l a w ' . 
88„ This amendment was tabled by M/s B.P. Si taramayya, 
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. .o rds ' e x c e p t a c c o r d i n g t o p r o c e d u r e e s t a b l i s h e d by law' t h e 
woras ' s a v e i n a c c o r d a n c e witi"i l aw ' be s u b s t i t u t e d , a r t i c l e 
16 or t . ie ouruiese C o n s t i t u t i o n h a s a l s o u s e d t h e p h r a s e ' s a v e 
i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h l a w ' . T h u s , i t a p p e a r s t h a t 5 h r i p a t t a b h i 
90 j i t a r a m m a y a and h i s c o l l e a g u e s were p r o b a b l y i n s p i r e d by t h e 
C o n s t i t u t i o n s of I r e l a n d and Burma. But t h e amendment was 
u l t i m a i . e l y r e j e c t e e oy t r i t C o n s t i t u e n t a s s e m b l y . 
Yet a n o t h e r aiaenuinent of i^raf t / - a r t i c l e 15 was moved by 
9 1 
o n r i Ut jendranath barman^ and he was o i t h e view t h a t t n e woras 
' w i t h o u t due p r o c e s s jf lav/ ' be r e t a i n e d i n a r t i c l e 15 and t n e 
words ' e x c e p t a c c o r d i n g t o p r o c e d u r e e s t a b l i s n e d by l a w ' s h o u l u 
n o t be i n s e r t e d , i-iaving r e j e c t e d t f i ese two amendments , t h e Cons-
t i t u e n t . . s se inb ly f i n a l l y auOi^ted t n e e x p r e s s i o n ' e x c e p t a c c o r d i n 
t o p r o c e d u r e e s t a b l i s h e d b y l a w ' u s e d i n n r t . 3 1 of t h e J a p a n e s e 
o . i^urgabi^i, i ' t^akurdas b h a r g a v a , L.V. K e s k a r , i ' . i . 
K r i s h n a m a c h a r i , i-i. n.nantJiasayanam -.^yyangar u K. can thanam. 
a^ . . - i r t i c l e ^v.-C\l of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ot Jo^^an 1946 run--
'no j^erson s n a i l be dej . jr ived of l i f e or l i b e r t y , n o r 
s n a i l any o t h e r c r i n i i i i ^ l ^. .enalty be imposed , e x c e p t 
a c c o r d i n g t o ^ . aocedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law. 
?G. . a r t i c l e 4G or the- c o n s t i t u t i o n of. I r e l a n e r u n s , ' no 
c i t i z e n s n a i l be d e p r i v e d or h i s p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y 
s a v e i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h l a w ' . 
^ 1 . AGO, O . o h i v a , rhe dra in ing or I n d i a ' s C o n s t i t u t i o n , 
V o l . I V / a t 39 . r e a s o n s f o r t h e i n s e r t i o n of t h e e x p r e s -
s i o n ' e x c e p t a c c o r d i n g t o ^^rocedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law' 
recoirunended by t i ie ^-wdvisory Commit tee on f u n a a m e n t a l 
i x i g h t s have ex^_.lained i n t h e f o o t n o t e t o a r t . 15 of t h e 
d r a f t C o n s t i t u t i o n ' . 
Hi 
C o n s t i t u t i o n and thus made i t i n t e g r a l pa r t of A r t i c l e 15 
(now A r t i c l e 21) r e a d s , *no person s h a l l be deprived of h i s 
l i f e or personal l i b e r t y except according to procedure 
e s t a b l i s h e d by l a w ' . This change in Draft A r t i c l e 15 was 
the r e s u l t of a d i s cus s ion which the Cons t i t u t i ona l Adviser 
S i r 3.N. Kau had with Mr. J u s t i c e F rankfur te r of the U.S. 
Supreme Court . There was a stronr, oppos i t ion to the d e l e -
t i o n of the phrase 'wi thout due p rocess of law' as used in 
the 5th and 14th Amendment of the American C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
The members of the Cons t i tuen t Assembly spoke s t rong ly and 
wi thou t any h e s i t a t i o n v e n t i l a t e d t h e i r apprehensions agains t 
the d e l e t i o n dur ing the d i s c u s s i o n s t h a t took place on 
no 
December 6 and 13, 1948. However, ?;fter a g rea t dea l of 
d i s c u s s i o n , the Cons t i tuen t Aggembly accepted the Draf t ing 
Committee 's sugges t ion by i n s e r t i n g the phrase 'except accor -
ding to procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law' in the Draft A r t i c l e 
93 15 (now A r t i c l e 2 1 ) . Never the less , the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , 
f e a r and apprehension on account of the d e l e t i o n of the 
phrase 'wi thou t due p roces s of law' from the Draft A r t i c l e 15 
did not die down the re on the Cons t i tuen t Assembly's f l o o r . 
The members had continued to voice both i n s i d e and outs ide 
the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly. To remove the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , 
f e a r and apprehension genera ted due to the d e l e t i o n of 'due 
p r o c e s s ' c l a u s e , Dr. Arabedkar moved a new A r t i c l e 15 
^ ? . G.A.D. Vol. VII a t S42-857 and 999-1001. 
9 3 . See ^upra n. 91 a t 235-23B. 
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(now Ar t i c l e 22) and speaking on the motion a i d : 
"We a r e , t h e r e f o r e , now, by i n t roduc ing A r t i c l e 
15A, making, if I may say so , compensation for 
what was done then in passing A r t i c l e 15. In 
o t h e r words, we are providing fo r the substance 
of the law 'due p r o c e s s ' by the i n t r o d u c t i o n 
A r t i c l e 15A. A r t i c l e 15A merely l i f t s from the 
p r o v i s i o n s of the Criminal Procedure Code two 
of the most fundamental p r i n c i p l e s which every 
c i v i l i z e d country fo l lows as p r i n c i p l e s of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e . I t i s q u i t e t rue tha t 
t hese two p r o v i s i o n s contained in Clause (5) 
and Clause (2) are a l ready to be found in the 
Criminal Procedure Code arid t h e r e f o r e , probably 
i t might be sa id t h a t we are r e a l l y not making 
any very fundamental change. But we a r e , as I 
contend, making a fundamental change because 
what we are doing by the i n t r o d u c t i o n of Ar t ic le 
15A i s to put a l i m i t a t i o n upon the a u t h o r i t y 
both of Par l iament as wel l as of the p r o v i n c i a l 
l e g i s l a t u r e not t o abrogate these two p r o v i s i o n s , 
because they are not in t roduced in our Cons t i -
t u t i o n i t s e l f . I t is q u i t e true tha t t h e 
e n t h u s i a s t s for persona l l i b e r t y are probably 
not c o n t e n t with the p rov i s ions of c l ause (1) and 
( 2 ) . They probably want something more by way 
of f u r t h e r safeguards a g a i n s t the in roads of the 
execu t ive and the l e g i s l a t u r e s upon the personal 
l i b e r t y of the c i t i z e n s . I pe r sona l ly th ink 
t h a t while I sympathesise with them t h a t probably 
t h i s a r t i c l e might have been expanded t o inc lude 
some f u r t h e r s a f egua rds , I am q u i t e s a t i s f i e d 
t ha t the p r o v i s i o n s contained a re s u f f i c i e n t 
aga ins t i l l e g a l or a r b i t r a r y a r r e s t s " . 94 
Why the members of the Cons t i tuen t Assembly were adament 
to have the American due process c lause in Ar t i c l e 15 (now 
A r t i c l e 2 1 ) . Because they knew that e f f e c t i v e ro l e had been 
played by t h i s c lause in America? How the cour t s in America 
have used t h i s due process clause in p r o t e c t i n g and safeguarding 
the l i f e , l i b e r t y and p roper ty of t h e i r c i t i z e n s . That i s the 
e f f i c a c y and e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the 'due p roces s of law' used in 
94. C. A.D. Vol. IX p . 1497 
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the 5th and H t h American Cons t i t u t i on was known to them. 
On the oth^r hand the Draf t ing Committee was heavi ly influenced 
by the d i scuss ion which the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l adv i se r had had 
with the American l ega l luminar ies no tab ly Mr. J u s t i c e 
F r a n k f u r t h e r . There a r e two reasons which might have i n f l u -
enced both Dr. Ambedkar and Si r B.N. Rau. F i r s t l y , the 
trammels of l e g a l t e c h n i c a l i t i e s involved i-n the phrase 
'w i thou t due process of law' must have been t o l d by 
Mr. J u s t i c e F rank fu r t e r as a judge of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Secondly, the Japanese C o n s t i t u t i o n , 1946, had been enacted 
under the American guidance & t h e r e f o r e t h e l ega l u t i l i t y 
and e f f i c acy of the express ion ' except according to procedure 
e s t a b l i s h e d b y law' was wel l understood by Dr. Ambedkar and 
S i r B.N. Rau. Thus, the express ion 'procedure e s t a b l i s h e d 
by law' was advised to and adopted by the Cons t i tuen t 
Assembly bes t s u i t e d to the genius of the Indian p e o p l e . 
However, by s u b s t i t u t i n g fo r the words 'due process of law' 
the express ion ' excep t according to procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by 
law' the Draf t ing Committee did not make the American concept 
of 'due p r o c e s s ' more p r e c i s e as a mat te r of d r a f t i n g - the 
committee gave up t h a t concept a l t o g e t h e r . ^ 
After t h i s b r i e f h i s t o r i c a l background of A r t i c l e 21 
of our Cons t i t u t i on r e s p o n s i b l e fo r the inco rpora t ion of the 
' p rocedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law' and of the d e l e t i o n of due 
p roces s of law' i t i s proper to n a r r a t e a br ief account on 
9 5 . S e e r v a i , H.M., C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law of Ind ia , v o l . I J I 1983 at 693. ' ^^ 
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what i s due process of law. How has i t or iginated? How the 
American legal people have understood and construed? 
However, there are two notable speeches of Alladi 
Krisbnaswamy and Dr. Ambedkar made in defence and j u s t i f i -
cation of 'procedure established by law' inserted in Article 21 
of the Const i tu t ion . For Alladi Krisbnaswamy i t was vrong 
that three gentlemen or five . . . s i t t i n g as a court of law, 
and stat ing what exactly i s 'due process' according to them 
in any pa r t i cu l a r case . . . may appeal to ce r t a in democrates 
more than the expressed wishes of the l eg i s l a tu re or the 
act ion of an executive responsible to the l e g i s l a t u r e . In 
the development of the doctrine the U.S. Supreme Court has 
not adopted a consis tent view at a l l and the decisions are 
96 conf l i c t ing . Thereafter, the Vice-President of the 
Constituent Assembly called upon Dr. Ambedkar to explain his 
posi t ion in connection with the delet ion of 'due process of 
law' from Art ic le 21 . Dr. Ambedkar put forth his views for 
and against the matter without committing himself to e i ther 
view and l e f t i t to the wisdom of the Constituent Assembly 
to decide in any way i t l i k e s . While explaining his posi t ion 
Dr. Ambedkar said : 
"The question of 'due process ' r a i s e s , in my judgement, the question of r e l a t i onsh ip between 
the l eg i s l a tu r e and the jud ic ia ry . In a federal 
cons t i tu t ion i t i s always open to the judiciary 
to decide whether any pa r t i cu la r law passed by 
the l e g i s l a t u r e is u l t r a v i res or i n t r a v i res 
with reference to the powers of l eg i s l a t ion which 
96. CAD v o l . VII a t 853. 
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are f',: anted by the C o n s t i t u t i o n to the p a r t i -
c u l a r l e g i s l a t u r e exceeds the a u t h o r i t y or the 
power given to i t by the C o n s t i t u t i o n , such law 
would be u l t r a v i r e s and i n v a l i d . This i s the 
normal th ing t h a t happens in a l l f ede ra l 
C o n s t i t u t i o n s . Every law in a f e d e r a l c o n s t i -
t u t i o n whether made by the Par l iament a t the 
Centre or made by the L e g i s l a t u r e of the 
S t a t e i s always sub j ec t to the examination 
by the j u d i c i a r y from the point of view of the 
au tho r i t y of the l e g i s l a t u r e making the law. 
The 'due p r o c e s s ' c l ause in my judgment would 
give the j u d i c i a r y the power to ques t i on the 
law made by the l e g i s l a t u r e on another ground. 
The ground would be whether tha t law i s in 
keeping with c e r t a i n fundamental p r i n c i p l e s 
r e l a t i n g to the r i g h t s of the i n d i v i d u a l . In 
o the r words, the j u d i c i a r y would be endowed with 
the a u t h o r i t y to ques t ion the law not merely on 
the ground whether i t was in excess of the 
a u t h o r i t y of the l e g i s l a t u r e but also on the 
ground whether the law was good, a p a r t from the 
ques t ion of t h e powers of the l e g i s l a t u r e making 
the law. The law may be p e r f e c t l y good and va l i d 
30 f a r as the a u t h o r i t y of the l e g i s l a t u r e i s 
concerned. But i t may not be a good law, t h a t 
i s to say, i t may v i o l a t e c e r t a i n fundamental 
p r i n c i p l e s ; and the j u d i c i a r y would have the 
a d d i t i o n a l power of d e c l a r i n g ' t h e law i n v a l i d . . . 
The q u e s t i o n now ra i sed by the i n t roduc t i on of 
the phrase 'due p r o c e s s ' i s whether the j u d i -
c i a r y should be given the a d d i t i o n a l power to 
ques t ion the laws made by the s t a t e on the 
ground t h a t they v i o l a t e c e r t a i n fundamental 
p r i n c i p l e s " . 
There are two views on the po in t - one i s t h i s t h a t 
the l e g i s l a t u r e may be t ru s t ed not to make any law which would 
ab roga te the fundamental r i g h t s of man, so to say , the funda-
mental r i g h t s which to every i n d i v i d u a l , and consequently 
the re i s no danger a r i s i n g from the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the 
phrase 'due p r o c e s s ' . Another view i s t h a t i t i s not pos s ib l e 
to t r u s t the l e g i s l a t u r e , the l e g i s l a t u r e i s l i k e l y to e r r , i s 
l i k e l y to be led away by p a s s i o n , by pa r ty p r e j u d i c e , by pa r ty 
48 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and the l e g i s l a t u r e may make a law which may 
a b r o g a t e what may be r e g a r d e d a s the f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s 
which s a f e g u a r d s the i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t of a c i t i z e n . We 
a r e , t h e r e f o r e , p l aced i n two d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s . One i s 
t o g ive the j u d i c i a r y t h e a u t h o r i t y t o c i t e in judgement 
o v e r the w i l l of the l e g i s l a t u r e and t o q u e s t i o n the law made 
by the l e g i s l a t u r e on t h e ground t h a t i t i s no t a good law, 
i n consonance w i t h fundamen ta l p r i n c i p l e s . I s t h a t a d e s i r -
a b l e p r i n c i p l e ? The second p o s i t i o n i s t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e 
ough t t o be t r u s t e d not t o make bad l a w s . I t i s very d i f f i c u l t 
t o come to any d e f i n i t e c o n c l u s i o n s . There a r e dange r s on 
bo th s i d e s . F o r myse l f , I c a n n o t a l t o g e t h e r omi t the p o s s i -
b i l i t y of a l e g i s l a t u r e packed by a partyraen making laws 
which may a b r o g a t e or v i o l a t e what we r e g a r d a s c e r t a i n 
fundamen ta l p r i n c i p l e s a f f e c t i n g the l i f e and l i b e r t y of an 
i n d i v i d u a l . At the same t ime I do not s e e how f i v e or s i x 
gen t l emen s i t t i n g in the F e d e r a l Cour t o r Supreme Court 
examin ing laws made by the l e g i s l a t u r e and by d i r t of t h e i r 
own i n d i v i d u a l c o r n c i e n c e o r t h e i r b i a s or t h e i r p r e j u d i c e s 
be t r u s t e d t o de te rmine which law i s good -and which law i s bade 
I t i s , r a t h e r a c a s e where a man has to s a i l be tween 6 h a r y b d i s 
and S e y l l a and I , the re fo i*e , would not say a n y t h i n g . I would 
97 l e a v e i t to the House t o d e c i d e in any way i t l i k e s . 
I t was t h i s speech which made the C o n s t i t u e n t -Assembly 
t o adoDt the e x p r e s s i o n ' p r o c e d u r e e s t a b l i s h e d bv law* in 
9 7 . C.A.D. Vo l . VII a t 9 9 9 - 1 0 0 1 . 
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place of 'due p r o c e s s ' by repos ing i t s confidence and t r u s t 
t ha t for the d e p r i v a t i o n of l i f e and l i b e r t y the future Sansad 
and Vidhan Sabhas be t r u s t e d not to make bad laws and the 
Courts should not be allowed to s i t in the w i l l of the e l ec ted 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the people . 
The Great c h a r t e r of l i b e r t i e s of England, commonly 
known as th e Magna Carta was granted under the s e a l of King 
John in the meadow ca l led Rumymede on 15th June , 1215. I t 
was rev i sed by Henry I I I 1217 and untimely another cha r t e r 
was re i s sued by Henry I I I in 1225 as "9 Henry I I I 1225". 
Due Process of Law 
The phrase occurs in the 5th and H t h amendments of 
the American C o n s t i t u t i o n . In both the amendments what i s 
provided i s t b a t mo persoT^ s h a l l be deprived of h i s l i f e , 
98 l i b e r t y and p rope r ty without due process of law. What i s 
a 'due p r o c e s s ' ? A lo t of valuminous works have been done 
by the c o u r t s , lawyers and the academicians to def ine what 
i s 'due p r o c e s s ' yet the phrase remains ambiguous. What 
p r o c e s s i s due once i t i s recognised tha t the guarantee 
98 . The 5th Amendment of the American C o n s t i t u t i o n says -
•no person s h a l l be deprived of l i f e , l i b e r t y or 
proper ty wi thout due process of l a w . ' The H t h amend-
ment to the United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n says , 'nor sha l l 
any s t a t e depr ive any person of l i f e , l i b e r t y or 
p roper ty wi thout due process of l a w ' . 
qq 
a p p l i e s in a g i v e n c a s e . ^ The U . S . Supreme Cour t c o n t i n u e d 
t o a d h e r e t o i t s l o n g s t a t i d i n g p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e c o n t e n t of 
due p r o c e s s i s e x t r e m e l y f l e x i b l e , and not s u s c e p t i b l e to 
p r e c i s e d e f i n i t i o n . H i s t o r i c a l l y , i t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t 
t h e p h r a s e 'due p r o c e s s of law' i s based on the Magna C a r t a ' s 
1 01 
'Law of the L a n d ' . Magna C a r t a a s a Ghar t e ro f E n g l i s h 
l i b e r t y was conf i rmed by s u c c e s s i v e E n g l i s h mona rchs . I t was 
i n one of these c o n f i r m a t i o n s known as ' S t a t u t e of Wes tmins te r 
of the L i b e r t i e s of London ' t h a t e x p r e s s i o n 'due p r o c e s s of 
l a w ' a p p e a r s to h aye been used f o r the f i r s t t i m e . N e i t h e r 
of t he e x p r e s s i o n s ' due p r o c e s s of l a w ' o r 'Law of the Land ' 
was e x p l a i n e d or d e f i n e d i n any of t h e documents S i r Edward 
Coke p r o b a b l y meant t h a t both the e x p r e s s i o n s have t h e same 
m e a n i n g , i^ord Coke, commenting on the 29th C h a p t e r of Magna 
102 C a r t a used t h e words 'due c o u r s e and p r o c e s s of l a w ' . 
9 9 . Some of the n o t a b l e w r i t i n g s on t h i s i s s u e : F r i e n d l y , 
some kind of H e a r i n g , 1234 P . A . L . Rev. 1267 ( 1 9 7 5 ) ; 
N o t e , s p e c i f y i n g t h e p r o c e d u r e s r e q u i r e d by due p r o c e s s : 
t o w a r d s l i m i t s on t he use of i n t e r e s t b a l a n c i n g , 8S Har . 
L. Rev. 1510 ( 1 8 7 5 ) . 
1 0 0 . "(Due' ' p r o c e s s i s f l e x i b l e and c a l l s f o r such p r o c e d u r a l 
p r o t e c t i o n s a s t h e p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n demands" , 
Schweike r v . McClure , 456 US 188, 200 (1982) q u o t i n g 
M o r r i s s e y v . Brewer , 408 US 4 7 1 , 481 a972 ) . 
1 0 1 . A r t i c l e 39 of the Magna C a r t a 1225 s a i d no p e r s o n s h a l l 
be t a k e n or i m p r i s o n e d or d i s s e i s e or out lawed or e x i l e d 
e x c e p t a c c o r d i n g t o the ' law of l a n d ' . 
102 . Z. Coke, I n s t . 46 Coke s a i d , 'no man s h a l l be d i s s e i s e d 
e t c . u n l e s s i t be the l a w f u l j udgmen t , t h a t i s , v e r d i c t 
of e q u a l s or by t h e law of the l a n d , t h a t i s , t o speak 
i t once f o r a l l , by the due course and p r o c e s s of 
l a w ' . 
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103 Blackstone uses the phrase ' law of the l a n d ' . Both Lord 
wOke and Blacks tone , the g r e a t a u t h o r i t i e s on the l^w of 
iingland, have d i f fe red each o the r on the d e f i n i t i o n of the 
Magna C a r t a ' s 'Law of the Land ' . Both made concerted 
lega l e f f o r t s to give supremacy to the common law o^ver the 
Pa r l i amen t . Lord Coke's p o s i t i o n was the term 'per legem 
t e r r a c ' was e q u i v a l e n t to the Magna C a r t a ' s due process 
and included in i t s ambit the con ten t s of n a t u r a l lav; and 
was t h e r e f o r e , capable of ove r r i d ing Par l i amenta ry a c t i o n . 
However, Eas terbrook claims t h a t 'Coke was a s o l i t a r y voice 
in English Law. His n a t u r a l law u t t e r a n c e s were u n i n f l u e n t i a l 
105 
with o ther Engl ish judges and commentators ' . Indeed Rodney 
Mott po in t s out t h a t ' t he in f luence of Coke may be found in 
the a t t i t u d e of the English c o u r t s a t the p r e s e n t time as 
we l l as in the w r i t i n g s of p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s ' . Coke's 
view of the scope of the ' p e r legem t e r r a c * was v i r t u a l l y 
unanimously accepted a t the time of the d e c i s i o n in Dr. Bonham's 
106 
c a s e . But the Blacks tonian concept was tha t the Magna 
C a r t a ' s Law of Land i . e . Coke's Common Law did not over r ide 
tne Parliament;ary a c t i o n . 
103. Blackstone s t a t e s t ha t the language ' p ro tec t ed every 
i nd iv idua l of the na t ion in the f ree enjoyment of h is 
l i f e , his l i b e r t y and his p r o p e r t y , un less declared to 
be f o r f e i t e d by the judgment of h i s peers or the lav.' of 
l a ; :" ' • 4 A'. Blacks tone , Commentaries.; on the Law of 
En^^-land, 417 (1s t eu. 1769) 
104. I I Coke, I n s t i t u t e s 50 (4th ed . 1671) . 
105. Eas te rbrook , Substance & the P r o c e s s , 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
85 a t 96. 
IO60 R. Mott, Due Process of Law 123 (1926) . 
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107 Due process means fundamental f a i r n e s s . The concept 
of 'due process of law' demands t h a t a law s h a l l not be 
un reasonab le , arbi trary? or c a p r i c i o u s and tha t the means 
s e l e c t e d sha i ; have a reasonable and s u b s t a n t i a l r e l a t i o n to 
the ob jec tbe inc j sough t . ' ^ 
The U.S. Supreme Court e x p l i c i t l y r e j ec ted the English 
l e g a l doc t r ine in vjhich ' t h e ocunipotence of Parl iament over 
the common law was a b s o l u t e , 'even a g a i n s t common r i g h t and 
r e a s o n ' . ' " The cour t declared t h a t the C o n s t i t u t i o n , 
u n l i k e the Magna C a r t a , c l e a r l y l i m i t s the powers of the 
government. ' ' Though the fraraers of the US C o n s t i t u t i o n 
and the B i l l of Rights have imported the express ion 'due 
p r o c e s s of law' from theEnglish l e g a l system , yet they 
have understood and construed i t from what the English 
people have had i t . Because the English p e o p l e ' s Magna 
Car ta and the American C o n s t i t u t i o n have emerged from d i a -
m e t r i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i e s . Soon 
Af te r the adopt ion of the American C o n s t i t u t i o n the p o s i t i v i s t s 
argued that t h a t c o u r t s should have no ro l e in de f in ing what 
p rocedu re , provided by the Congress, i s requi red to s a t i s f y 
the 'due p r o c e s s ' c l ause - a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e . They 
107. 28 Ed. I l l , Chapter 3 . 
108. Black Law Dictionary. 
109. Hurtado v. California. 110 US 516 at 531, I884. 
110. 'In this country written constitutions were deemed 
essential to protect the rights and liberties of 
the people ... Id. supra n. 2 at 531. 
'^^ 
f u r t h e r sa.y t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e has notrecognised the r igh t 
t o a p a r t i c u l a r p r o c e d u r e ' . However, thus p o s i t i v i s t s ' 
p r o p o s i t i o n was r e j e c t e d by the U.S. Supreme Cour t . Indeed 
the US Supreme Court observed - " I t i s manifest t ha t i t was 
not l e f t to the l e g i s l a t i v e power to enact any process which 
might be Jev i sed . The A r t i c l e i s a r e s t r a i n t on the l e g i s l a -
t i v e as well as on the execut ive and j u d i c i a l powers of the 
government and cannot be so construed as to leave congress 
f r e e to tiake any p rocess 'due process of l a w ' , by i t s mere 
w i l l . " ^ 1 1 
The e x p r e s s i o n 'due process of law' came to be a pcirt 
of the US C o n s t i t u t i o n by the 5th Amendment 1791 and s i m i l a r 
express ion was used in the 14th Amendment 1868 and has been 
said th at few phrases in the law are so e l u s i v e of exact 
apprehension as 'due process of l a w ' . I'he US Supreme Court 
has always dec l ined to give a comprehensive d e f i n i t i o n of i t 
and has p r e f e r r ed t ha t i t s f u l l meaning should be gradual ly 
a s c e r t a i n e d by the process of inc lus ion and exc lus ion in 
the course of the d e c i s i o n s as and when they a r i s e . In England, 
i t has used as p r o t e c t i o n aga ins t roya l tyranny and execu t ive 
usu rpa t ion and in America i t became a bulwark aga ins t a r b i t r a r y 
in 
l e g i s l a t i o n . 'Due process of l aw ' , accord ing to Cooley, "means/ 
each p a r t i c u l a r case such an exe rc i s e of the powers of government 
as the s e t t l e d maxims of law permit and s a n c t i o n , and under such 
111. Murray 's Lessee v , Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. 59 US 
U 8 How; 272 a t 276, 1855. 
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safeguards f o r h is p r o t e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s as those 
maxima p r e s c r i b e l o r the c l a s s of cases to which one in 
112 ques t ion b e l o n g s " . 
All the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l developments r e l a t i n g to the 
p r o t e c t i o n of l i f e , l i b e r t y and proper ty as provided ,in the 
5 th and H t h Amendments of American C o n s t i t u t i o n was due to 
the word ' d u e ' used t h e r e i n , which in i t s c o n t e n t , knows ^o 
bound and not subject to any fixed d e f i n i t i o n . Thus, the word 
' d u e ' was bound to r e s u l t in complicated anomal ies . Thus, 
the 'due process of law' c lause became a l l i n c l u s i v e and 
i n d e f i n a b l e . The 5th and H t h Amendments used the phrase 
'due process of law' whereas some of the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n s 
used the phrase 'due course of l a w ' , some repeated the Magna 
C a r t a ' s phrase ' law of the l and ' but most of them used the 
exp res s ion 'due p rocess of l a w ' . All the exp re s s ions meant 
and conveyed the same sense i . e . , no person could be deprived 
of h i s l i f e , l i b e r t y or proper ty except in due p rocess of 
l aw. Edward J . defined the word ' d u e ' thus : "Due process 
of law undoubtedly means, in the due course of l e g a l proceed-
i n g s , according to those r u l e s and forms which have been 
e s t a b l i s h e d for the p r o t e c t i o n of p r i v a t e r i g h t s " . 
112. Cooley : C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L i m i t a t i o n s , v o l . I I a t 741. 
113. Vfestervelt v . Gregg. 12 N.Y. 202. 
c 
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Webester appear ing as Counsel for the p l a i n t i f f 
desc r ibed the express ion ' l a v of the l and ' as procedura l 
due process of law argued : "By the law of the land i s 
most c l e a r l y intended the genera l law; a law which hea r s 
be fo re i t condemns; which proceeds upon inqu i ry and renders 
judgment only a f t e r t r i a l . The meaning i s t h a t every 
i t i z e n s h a l l hold his l i f e , l i b e r t y , p roper ty and immuni-
t i e s , under the p r o t e c t i o n of the genera l r u l e s which governs 
s o c i e t y , i iverything which may pass under the form an e n a c t -
114 
ment i s not the re fo re to be considered the law of the l and , 
W i l l i s def ines the phrase 'due p rocess of law' as 
fo l lows : "The guarantee of due process of law as a mat te r 
of procedure means t ha t no par t of a p e r s o n ' s personal l i b e r t y . 
i nc lud ing ownership, s h a l l be taken away from him except by 
the observance of c e r t a i n f o r m a l i t i e s . Hence i t s objec t i s 
„ 11S 
the p r o t e c t i o n of the soc i a l i n t e r e s t in personal l i b e r t y . 
W i l l i s f u r t h e r enumerates the requi rements of the 
p rocedura l due process as follows : i ) n o t i c e , i i ) oppor tuni ty 
to be hea rd , i i i ) an i m p a r t i a l t r i b u n a l , and iv ) an o r d e r l y 
course of p rocedure . In s h o r t , the p rocedura l process r e q u i r e s 
tha t a peraon who i s to be deprived of his l i f e , l i b e r t y or 
p r o p e r t y s h a l l have had ' h i s day in c o u r t ' . This accord ing to 
Willoughby means : " i ) t h a t he s h a l l have had due n o t i c e , which 
114. The Trus t ees of Dartmouth College v . Woodward, 4 Law ed 
629 a t 645 . 
115. W i l l i s , C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law, 662. 
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may be actual or constructive, of the institution oi the 
proceedings by wnicn nis legal right may be affected; 
a±) that he shall be given a reasonable opportunity to 
appear and defend his rights, including the right himself 
to testify, to produce witnesses, and to introduce irrelevant 
documents ana other evidence; Uii) that the tribunal in or 
before which his rights are adjudicated is so constituted 
as to give reasoriable assurance of its honesty and impar-
tiality; anddv) t^ iat it is . court of competent jurisdiction". 
ine experience of the re,.ressive laws and the habit of 
all legislative bodies to grosp and exercise more and more 
^owars and the political pniloso,.hy of the time induced the 
framers of tne .^erican Constitution to ado^.t safeguards not 
only against the executive but also against the legislature, 
on the development of the doctrine of due process Carl Brent 
owisher said: "The .^nerican history of its interpretation 
.alls into three ,.erious. :.uriny the first period covering 
rougr.ly the first ce::cury .x .ovamment under the Consticution 
'oue ,.rocess' was interpreter ^principally as a restriction 
apon procedure. <^ nd largely tne judicial procedure-by which 
tne government exercised its procedure. During the second 
period, which, against roughly speaking extended through 1;^ 36, du< 
process'was exj^anded to serve as .^  restriction not merely upon 
.jrocedure but upon tne substance of the activities in wnich the 
to^  
Govt.might engage.During the 3rd period extending from i:>'3^ Glate 
116. . . i l louhby 
117. riunro:The oovt. of tne U . o. ed. 5, Chap, IV a t 53 Si. 58-61 ;Coolei 
Cons t i tu t iona l Limitat ions ed, 6 , v o l . I I Chapter XI, a t 755. 
5? 
the use of 'due process ' as a substantive r e s t r i c t i o n has been 
la rge ly suspended or abandoned, leaving i t pr incipal ly in i t s 
1 1R 
or ig ina l s ta tus as a r e s t r i c t i o n upon procedure". 
The expression 'due process of lavj* used as j ud i c i a l 
tool in America f i r s t to ins i s t on a due process to be followed 
before a person was deprived of his l i f e and l i b e r t y . 
Subsequently, i t came to be applied to personal l i be r t y to 
soc i a l cont ro l , to procedure, to j u r i s d i c t i o n and to substan-
t ive law. Thus, the doctrine 'due process ' helps the courts 
in America to abrogate to themselves the power to make and 
revise the laws what l ega l ly , cons t i tu t iona l ly and legi t imately 
belongs to the l eg i s l a tu re . Thus, due process turned course 
of events by giving supremacy to the courts over the congress 
contrary to the English concept of the Magna Car ta ' s law of 
the land. Consistent ly, the U.S. Supreme Court baa refused to 
define the phrase but has used i t to declare unconst i tut ional 
any l eg i s l a t i on which i t thought unreasonable. The Court 
119 observed in Holden v . Hardy i 
"This court has never attempted to define with 
precision the words 'due process of law' . . . 
i t i s suff ic ient to say that there are ce r t a in 
immutable pr inc ip les of ju s t i ce which inherent 
in the very idea of free government which no 
member of the union may regard". 
118. Carl Brent Swisher, The Growth of the Const i tut ional 
Power m the United States a t JM. ^^-^^ 
119. 169 US 366 at 389. 
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In Tavlore v. Peter Brouson J. observed : 
"The words 'by the law of the land' as used in 
the Constitution, do not mean a statute passed 
for the purpose of working the wrong. That 
construction would render the restriction 
absolutely nugatory, and turn this part of the 
Constitution into mere non sense. The people 
would be made to say to the two Houses ; 'you 
shall be vested with legislative power of the 
state, but no one shall be disenfranchised or 
deprived of any of the rights or privileges 
of a citizen, unless you pass a statute for 
that purpose. In other words, you shall not 
do the wrongs unless you choose to do it". 
Therefore, the phrase 'due process of law' firmly 
established the supremacy of the U.S. Supreme Court over the 
other two limbs of the State - Congress and the Executive. 
In the words of John Dickinson said with reference to the 
due process clause that 'the judges of Aragon began by setting 
121 
aside laws and ended by making them". 
Procedure must be a procedure established by law. For -.-.e 
-[ op 
f i r s t time in Gopalan, the phrase 'p rocedure e s t a b l i s h e d by 
law' came, up for the c o u r t s j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Kania 
G.J . sa id : 
"The word ' d u e ' in the express ion 'due process of 
law' in the American C o n s t i t u t i o n i s i n t e r p r e t e d 
to mean j u s t ' a cco rd ing to the opin ion of the 
Supreme Court of USA'. That word impar ts j u r i s -
d i c t i o n to the c o u r t s to pronounce what is ' due ' 
from otherwise accord ing to law. The d e l i b e r a t e 
omissions of the word ' due ' from A r t i c l e 21 lends 
s t r e n g t h t o t h e con ten t ion tha t , the j u s t i c i a b l e 
a spec t of law i . e . , to cons ider whether i t i s 
r easonab le or not by the c o u r t , does not form pa r t 
120. 4 H i l l 140 a t 145. 
121. f-run-ro, The Government of the United S t a t e s a t 6 1 . 
122. Supra n . 56. 
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of the Indian Const i tut ion. The omission of the 
word ' due ' , the l imi ta t ions imposed by the word 
'procedure' and the inser t ion of the word 
' e s t a b l i s h e d ' , thus brings out more clear ly the 
idea of l eg i s l a t i ve prescr ip t ion in the expression 
used in Article 2 1 . By adopting the phrase 
'procedure es tabl ished by law' the Constitution 
gave the l eg i s l a tu r e the f ina l word to determine 
the law'.123 
Patanjal i Sas t r i J . observed : 
" I t i s d i f f i c u l t to accept the suggestion that 
the ' law' in Art icle 21 stands for the Jus 
naturale of the c iv i l law and that the phrase 
•according to procedure established by law' is 
equivalent to 'due process of law' in i t s 
procedural aspect fo r , that would have the 
ef fect of introducing into our Const i tut ion 
those ' sub t l e and elusive c r i t e r i a ' implied in 
that phrase which i t was the del ibera te purpose 
of the fram,ers of our Constitution to avoid".124 
Mahajan J . Said : 
"This Article gives complete immunity against 
the exercise of despotic power by the executive. 
I t fu r the r gives immunity against invalid laws 
which contravenes the cons t i tu t ion . I t gives 
also fur ther guarantee that in i t s true concept 
there should be some form of proceeding before 
a person can be condemned e i ther in respect of 
his l i f e or his l i b e r t y . I t negatives the idea 
of f a n t a s t i c a rb i t r a ry and oppressive forms of 
proceed in^s".125 
Mukherje^ J . Said : 
" I have no doubts in my mind that if the 'due 
process ' clause which appeared in the or ig inal 
draf t was f ina l ly re ta ined by the Constituent 
Assembly; i t could be safely presumed that the 
framers of the Indian Const i tut ion wanted that 
123. Supra n. 1 at 39. 
124. Supra n. 1 at 73. 
125. Supra n. 38 at 92-93. 
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expression to bear the same sense as i t does 
in America. But when that form was abandoned 
and another was del ibera te ly subst i tu ted in 
i t s p lace , i t is not possible to say that 
in spi te of the difference in the language 
and expression, they should mean the same 
thing and convey the same idea . . . I t is 
quite that the framers of the Indian Consti-
tut ion did not desire to introduce into our 
system the elements of uncertainty. , vague-
ness and changeability that have grown around 
the 'due process' doctrine in America. They 
wanted to make the provisions c lea r , de f in i t e 
and precise and de l ibera te ly chose the words 
'procedure established by law' , as t he i r 
opinion, no doubt, would ordinar i ly a r i se 
about the meaning of t h i s expression. In the 
Supreme Court of America, s t r e s s has been laid 
uniformily upon the word 'due ' which occurs 
before and qual i f ies the expression 'process 
of law' . 'Due' means what is jus t and proper 
according to the circumstances of a pa r t i cu l a r 
case . It i s t h i s word which introduces the 
var iable element in the appl ica t ion of the 
doct r ine ; for what i s reasonable in one set 
of circumstances may not be so in another and 
in a different s e t . In the Indian Consti tut ion, 
the word 'due' has been de l ibe ra te ly omitted 
and t h i s shows c lear ly that the Consti tution 
makers of India had no intent ion of introducing 
the American doc t r ine . The word ' e s tab l i shed ' 
ord inar i ly means ' f ixed ' or laid down and if 
' law' means as Mr. Nambiyar contends not any 
pa r t i cu la r piece of law but the indef ini te and 
undefinable pr inciples of natural jus t i ce which 
underlie systems of law, i t would not at a l l 
be appropriate to use the expression ' e s t ab l i shed ' 
for natural law or natural j u s t i c e cannot es tab-
lish anything like a def in i te procedure".126 
S.R. Das, J . observed : 
"What is the meaning of the expression 'procedure 
establ ished by law'" 
The word 'procedure' in Article 21 must be taken to 
signify some s tep or method or manner of proceeding leading 
126. Supra n. 38 at 101-102 
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up to the d e p r i v a t i o n of l i f e or personal l i b e r t y . According 
to the language used in • '^rticle, t h i s pro?edure has to be 
' e s t a b l i s h e d by l a w ' . The word ' e s t a b l i s h e d ' means amongst 
o the r t h i n g s , • to render s t ab le or f i rm ; to s t rengthen by 
m a t e r i a l suppor t ; to f i x , s e t t l e , i n s t i t u t e or ordain perma-
nen t ly by enactment or agreement" . . . I t fol lows tha t the 
word ' e s t a b l i s h e d ' in i t s ordinary na tu ra l sense means, amongst 
o t h e r t h ings enac t ed . 'Es t ab l i shed by law' w i l l , t h e r e f o r e , 
mean ' enac ted by l a w ' . This sense of the word ' e s t a b l i s h e d ' 
i s accepted then the word ' l aw' must mean s t a t e made law and 
cannot poss ib ly mean the p r i n c i p l e s of n a t u r a l j u s t i c e for no 
procedure can be sa id to have ever been ' enac t ed ' by those 
p r i n c i p l e s . . . The Engl ish p r i n c i p l e of 'due process of law' 
i s , t h e r e f o r e , more in accordance with our Cons t i t u t i on than 
the American d o c t r i n e . . . I t i s common knowledge th Pit our 
C o n s t i t u t i o n makers d e l i b e r a t e l y decl ined to adopt the 
unce r t a in and s h i f t i n g American doc t r ine of 'due process 
of law' and s u b s t i t u t e d the word 'except in the process of 
law' tha t were in o r i g i n a l d r a f t by the more s p e c i f i c 
expres s ion ' excep t in accordance with procedure e s t ab l i shed 
by l a w ' . To t ry t o br ing in the American d o c t r i n e , in sp i t e 
of t h i s f a c t , w i l l be s h i f t i n g the i n t e n t i o n of the Cons t i tu -
1 ?7 t i o n as expressed in A r t i c l e 2 1 " . 
Fazle Ali J . in h is f o r c e f u l d i s s e n t i n g opinion observed 
t h a t no person can be condemned without a hea r ing being a p a r t 
of Br i t i sh system of law and procedure which we have inhe r i t ed 
127. AIE 1950 SG 27 a t 114-118. 
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must become p a r t of the 'p rocedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law' • He 
v/as of the view tha t t he re i s nothing r e v o l u t i o n a r y if the 
' p rocedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law' inc ludes the four p r i n c i p l e s 
s e t out in Prof. W i l l i s ' b o o k " . 
In Maneka Gandhi, Beg C.J. was of the view tha t the 
f i e l d of 'due p r o c e s s ' f o r cases of p r e v e n t i v e de t en t ion i s 
f u l l y covered by A r t i c l e 22 but o ther p a r t s of tha t f i e l d not 
be covered by A r t i c l e 22, are ' i n o c c u p i e d ' , by i t s s p e c i f i c 
p r o v i s i o n s . I have no doubt t h a t , in what may be c a l l e d , 
inoccupied po r t ions of the v a s t sphere of personal l i b e r t y , 
t rue s u b s t a n t i v e as wel l a s procedural laws made to cover 
them must s a t i s f y the requi rements of both A r t i c l e s H and 19 
130 
of the C o n s t i t u t i o n " . 
Ray C.J . fo l lowing Gopalan and S. Krishnan he ld , 
"the express ion 'p rocedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law' inc ludes 
s u b s t a n t i v e as wel l as procedura l law . . . i t means some 
s t e p or method or manner of procedure leading up to 
d e p r i v a t i o n of personal l i b e r t y . A law depr iv ing a person 
of pe r sona l l i b e r t y must be a s u b s t a n t i v e and procedura l 
law a u t h o r i s i n g such d e p r i v a t i o n . I t can not be a bare law 
12B. AIR 1950 SC 27 a t 60 . 
129- Villls, Constitutional Law at662, the essentials of 
'due process of law' i) notice, ii) opportunity to 
be heard, iii) an impartial tribunal, and iv) orderly 
course of procedure . 
130. Supra n. 21 a t 606. 
131. S. Krishnan v . S t a t e of Madras. AIR 1951 30 301 a t 307. 
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a u t h o r i s i n g dep r iva t i on of personal l i b e r t y . The subs t an t ive 
as well as procedura l p a r t s in law depr iv ing a person of 
personal l i b e r t y must be s t r i c t l y followed . . . Therefore , 
there i s no d i f fe rence between the exp re s s ion 'except 
accord ing to procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law' in Ar t i c l e 21 and 
the express ion 'save with the a u t h o r i t y of law' in A r t i c l e "51(1) 
132 
or the express ion ' excep t by a u t h o r i t y of law' in A r t i c l e 265". 
Bhagwati J . observed J " i t i s c l e a r on p l a i n n a t u r a l 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of i t s language t h a t A r t i c l e 21 imports two 
r e q u i r e m e n t s . F i r s t , there must be a law a u t h o r i s i n g d e p r i -
v a t i o n of personal l i b e r t y , and secondly such law must 
133 p r e s c r i b e a p rocedure . The learned judge has f u r t h e r 
emphasised h i s po in t of view by hold ing tha t A r t i c l e 21 
enac ted one aspec t of the p r i n c i p l e of r u l e of law t h a t the 
e x e c u t i v e requirement t h a t the law which a u t h o r i s e s such 
•i T A 
d e p r i v a t i o n must p r e s c r i b e a p rocedu re" . 
In Maneka Gandhi, while dea l ing with the r i g h t to 
t r a v e l abroad under A r t i c l e 21 and ag ree ing with h i s b r o t h e r Judge 
Bhagwati , Chandrachud J . observed, ' b u t the were p r e s c r i p t i o n 
of some kind of procedure cannot ever meet the mandate of 
A r t i c l e 21 . '^ 'he procedure p rescr ibed by law has to be f a i r , 
j u s t and r e a s o n a b l e , and f a n c i f u l , oppress ive or a r b i t r a r y . 
132. Supra n. 73 a t 1230-1231 
133 . 1±:_ a t 1362. 
134. ld_^ a t 1366. 
135. Supra 21 a t 613 . 
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Fur the r developing tha t law must a l so not be repugnant 
to any of the fundamental r i g h t s enumerated in Par t I I I held 
in A.D»M« Jaba lpur and taking s t r e n g t h from Bank Na t iona l i -
137 ""^ ^ 132 
z a t i o n . Sambhu Nath Sarkar . and Khudi Ram. Bhagwati J . s a id , 
"obviously the procedure cannot be a r b i t r a r y , un fa i r or unrea-
sonable and not any procedure howsoever a r b i t r a r y , oppressive 
or unjust say be prescri'b&d hy the law • • . A r t i c l e H strikes 
a t a r b i t r a r i n e s s in s t a t e a c t i o n and ensures f a i r n e s s and 
e q u a l i t y of t r e a t m e n t . The p r i n c i p l e of r e a s o n a b l e n e s s , which 
l e g a l l y as well as p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , i s an e s s e n t i a l element 
of e q u a l i t y of n o n - a r b i t r a r i n e s s pervades A r t i c l e 14 l ike a 
brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by 
A r t i c l e 21 must answer the t e s t of r easonab leness in order to 
be inconforraity with A r t i c l e 14. I t must be ' r i g h t j u s t 
and f a i r ' and not a r b i t r a r y f a n c i f u l and o p p r e s s i v e , o therwise , 
i t would be no procedure a t a l l and the requi rement of Ar t i c l e 21 
140 
would not be s a t i s f i e d " . 
While going whole hogingly with h i s b r o t h e r Bhagwati, 
J . , Krishna I y e r , J . , d e a l t with the meaning of the express ion 
'procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law' in h i s own way and observed, 
'What i s procedure*? What do we mean by ' e s t a b l i s h e d ' ? And 
what i s? Anything, formal , l e g i s l a t i v e l y proceeded, a l b e i t 
136. Supra n . 7 3 . 
137- R.C. Cooper v. Union of India. AIR 1970 SC 560. 
138. S.N. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal. AIR 1973 SC 1425 
139. Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal. AIR 1975 SC 550. 
140. Supra n. 21 at 622and 624-
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absurd or arbitrary? reverence ox. life and liberty must over-
power this reduction and ad absurdeu ... Law is when it is 
legitimated by the conscience and consent of the community 
generally ... Procedure established by law, with its lethal 
potentiality, will reduce life and liberty to a precarious 
play thing if we do not necessitate import into those weighty 
woras an adjuaictival rule of law, civilised in its soul, fair 
in its heart and fixing those imperatives of procedural pro-
tection absent which his processual tail will was the substan-
tive heaa. . . •ji enacted apparition is a constitutional illusion, 
i-rocessual justice is writ patently on Article 21. It is too 
gtave to be circumvented by a black letter ritual processed 
through the legislature.. So I am convinced that to frustrate 
rtrt. 21 by relying on any formal adjectual statute,hgwever, 
flimsy or fantastic its provisions to be, is tc role what the 
constication, restricting or even rejecting a fundamental right 
falling within rt.rticle ^1 uas to be fair, not foolish, carefully 
designed to effectuate, not be submit the substantive right 
itself. Thus, understood, 'procedure* must rule out anything 
arbitrary, freakish or bizarre. -^^  valuable constitutional right 
can be canalised only by civilized process ... .vhat is fundamentaJ 
is life and liberty, w'hat is procedural is the manner of its 
exercise. xhis quality of fairness in the process is emphdsised 
by the strong word ' established ' which means 'settled 
firaily ' not want-only or whimsically. if it is rooted 
in the legal consciousness of the community it becomes 
•established' procedure, ^nd 'law' leaves little doubt that 
66 
i t i s normal regarded as j u s t s ince law i s the means and 
j u s t i c e i s the end . . . To sum up, ' p rocedure ' in Ar t ic le 21 
means f a i r , not formal p rocedure . 'Lav*' i s reasonable law, 
not any enacted p i e c e . . . In s h o r t , f a i r a d j e c t i a i law is the 
very l i f e of the l i f e - l i b e r t y , fundamental r i g h t (Ar t ic le 21) 
not a u t o c r a t i c supremacy of the l e g i s l a t u r e ' . 
Kailasam J . in h i s s o l i t a r y but a s t r ong d i s sen t ing 
opinion s a i d , ' t h e procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law does not 
mean procedure , however, f a n t a s t i c and oppress ive or a r b i t r a r y 
14-1 
which in t r u t h and r a a l i t y is no procedure a t a l l " . 
Conclus ive ly speaking the phrase 'p rocedure e s t ab l i shed 
by law' under A r t i c l e 21 means a procedure ' s e t t l e d f i r m l y ' , 
and must be ' f a i r , j u s t and r e a s o n a b l e ' . Culminating in to 
i t s f i n a l shape as has been held by Bhagwati J . t ha t " i t must 
144 be ' r i g h t and j u s t and f a i r ' , and not a r b i t r a r y , f anc i fu l 
and o p p r e s s i v e " , otherwise i t would not procedure a t a l l and 
145 the requirement of Ar t i c l e 21 would not be s a t i s f i e d . I t 
t h e r e f o r e , means tha t procedure p rescr ibed by law for the 
d e p r i v a t i o n of one ' s pe rsona l l i b e r t y under A r t i c l e 21 must 
be j u s t , f a i r and reasonab le shor t of i t would v i o l a t e the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guaran tees made under A r t i c l e 14 and 21 of our 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
141. Supra n . 21 a t 658-660 
142. Id . a t 660. 143. I d . a t 613 
144. Id_^ a t 624. 
145. I b i d . 
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Law meaning : in l^^opalan , i t was argued tha t the word law 
meant p r i n c i p l e s of n a t u r a l j u s t i c e and i t meant ' j u s* i . e . , 
a b s t r a c t sense of na tu ra l j u s t i c e and not ' l e x ' i . e . , enacted 
law. 
Kania, G.J . s a i d , t h a t the word ' law' as used in t h i s 
p a r t has d i f f e r e n t shades of meaning but in no o the r Ar t i c l e 
i t appears to bear the i n d e f i n i t e meaning of n a t u r a l j u s t i c e . 
To read the word ' l a w ' as meaning r u l e s of n a t u r a l j u s t i c e 
w i l l land one in d i f f i c u l t i e s because the r u l e s of na tu ra l 
j u s t i c e as r ega rds procedure , are nowhere defined and in my 
opinion the C o n s t i t u t i o n can not be read as l ay ing down a 
vague s t anda rd . There i s , t h e r e f o r e , no j u s t i f i c a t i o n to 
1 /I T 
give the meaning of ' j u s ' to ' l a w ' in A r t i c l e 2 1 . 
P a t a n j a l i S a s t r i J . observed : " I am unable to ^ r e e 
t h a t the ' l aw ' in Ar t i c l e 21 means the immutable and un iversa l 
p r i n c i p l e s of n a t u r a l j u s t i c e . . . In my op in ion , ' l aw ' in 
14.8 A r t i c l e 21 means ' p o s i t i v e ' or s t a t e made law". 
Mukherjea, J . , the word ' l a w ' has ^ot been used in the 
sense of genera l law, connoting what has been descr ibed as 
the p r i n c i p l e s of n a t u r a l j u s t i c e outs ide the realm of 
p o s i t i v e law . . . Law i s c e r t a i n l y meant the law of s t a t e " . 
While concluding h i s views on the meaning of the term ' law' 
as used in A r t i c l e 2 1 , Mukherjea J . said : "In A r t i c i s 21 
the word ' l a w ' has been used in the sense of s t a t e made law 
H 6 . Supra n . 56 . 147. Supra n. 1 
U S . 2 1 L a t 72. 
149. Id . a t 102. 
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and not as an e q u i v a l e n t of law in the a b s t r a c t or genera l 
150 
sense embodying the p r i n c i p l e s of n a t u r a l j u s t i c e " . 
S.R. Das J . , refused to l e t in p r i n c i p l e s of na tu ra l 
j u s t i c e as be ing wi thin the meaning of the word ' law' as used 
in A r t i c l e 2 1 . He opined t h a t law in A r t i c l e 21 meant s t a t e 
, , 151 Eade law. 
Fazle Ali in h is d i s s e n t i n g opinion held that ' law used 
152 in A r t i c l e 21 d i d not mean s t a t e made l a w ' . 
15^ 5 Bhagwati J . in A.P.M. Jaba lpur -^ -^  sa id t h a t ' l aw ' wi th in 
the meaning of A r t i c l e 21 must be a va l id law and not only must 
i t be w i th in the l e g i s l a t i v e competence of the l e g i s l a t u r e 
enac t ing i t , bu t i t must a l s o not be repugnant to any of the 
fundamental r i g h t s enumerated in Par t I I I . 
1 54-In Ramchandra Prasad , while upholding the v a l i d i t y 
of Sect ion 4 of the Prevent ion of Corrupt ion Act, 1947, as 
not v i o l a t i v e of Ar t i c l e 21 the Supreme Court emphasised t ha t 
the word ' l a w ' under A r t i c l e 21 means law made by the s t a t e 
and not a b s t r a c t sense embodying the p r i n c i p l e s of na tu ra l 
j u s t i c e . 
150. Supra n. 1 a t IO3. 
151. Supra n . 1 a t 115. 
152 . Supra n. 1 a t 
153. 3upra n . 73 a t 1363-
154. Ramchandran Prasad v . S t a t e of Or i saa . AIR 1956 SC 298. 
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1 5S 
In Maneka Gandhi while holding the right to go abroad 
as an essential integral part of the right to personal liberty 
under Article 21 cannot be interferred which is not supported 
by law, Bhagwati, J. observed that 'law here means enacted law 
or state law'. 
Krishna Iye r , in Maneka Gandhi s a i d , ' law i s law when 
i t i s l e g i t i m a t e d by the conscience and the consent of the 
community g e n e r a l l y Law i s r easonab le law, not any enacted 
p i e c e " . 
Ka i lasan J . , procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law r e f e r s to 
s t a t u t e law. 
I'he import of r u l e of law or the p r i n c i p l e s of na tu ra l 
j u s t i c e was ind ica ted by Mahajan J . in Gppalan wherein he 
sa id t ha t the re should be some . form of proceedings 
be fo re a person can be condemned e i t h e r in r e s p e c t of h i s l i f e 
or h i s l i b e r t y . Faz le Ali even advocated fo r the i nc lu s ion 
of W i l l i s four r u l e s i n t o A r t i c l e 2 1 . However, the meaning 
of the word ' l aw ' used in A r t i c l e 21 has gone underchange in 
Maneka Gandhi onwards. I t i s t h i s Maneka Gandhi which has 
dec lared tha t law does not only mean enacted law but a l so 
means and inc ludes a b s t r a c t law embodying p r i n c i p l e s of 
n a t u r a l j u s t i c e . This i s what was avoided by the founding; 
f a t h e r s of our C o n s t i t u t i o n by dropping the American 'due 
p roces s of law' c l ause from A r t i c l e 2 1 . This is v^hat was 
155 . Supra n . 2 1 . 
7 a 
rejected by the majority judges of the Supreme Court in 
Gopalan who categorically refused to read principles of 
natural justice into Article 21. But it was the judicial 
activism and in fact the need of the time which made the 
Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi to break its shakles and 
fetters created by it in Gopalan, by holding that law means 
and includes 'principles of natural justice and state made 
law*. It can, therefore, be said that law for the purpose 
of the personal liberty means both state made law' and 
the principles of natural justice, A greater and much more 
effective safeguards have been thrown around the right to 
life and personal liberty. 
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THE DOCTRlhik. OF EXCLUSlVrL'Y 
157 
In Gopalan the question was raised that 
Articles 19 and 21 should be read together as implemen-
ting each other. How far these Articles in Part III 
affect and control each other? Dealing with this 
issue Kania C.J, said; The contents and subject 
matters of Arts. 19 and 21 are thus not the same and 
they proceed to deal with the rights covered by their 
respective words from totally different angles 
Therefore, Art. 19(5) cannot apply to a substantive law 
depriving a citizen of personal liberty It seems 
to me improper to read /irt. 19 as dealing; with the 
same subject as Art, 21 In my opinion therefore 
"158 Art, 19 should be read as a separate complete Article . 
Mukherlea J. "The contents and siibject matter 
of the two provisions are not identical and they proceed 
on totally different principles. In my opinion, there-
fore preventive detention does not come either within 
the express language or within the spirit and intendment 
of CI,1 (d) of Art. 19 of the Constitution which deals 
15^ 
with a totally different aspect or form o±civil liberty, 
157. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras,AIR 1950 SC 27 
158. Supra> note l at p. 37 
159. Supra, note 1 at pp. 94' 6c 96 
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Sastri J. said: "It is, however, to be observed 
that Art. 19 confers the rights therein specified only 
on the citizens of India, while Art, 21 extends the 
protection of life and personal liberty to all persons-
citizens and non-citizens alike. Thus the two articles 
do not operate in a coterminus field, and this is one 
160 
reason for rejecting the corelation suggested. 
The learned Judge further said "I am unable to 
161 
agree with this view." Das J, did not agree with the 
Attorney General's suggestion that Art.22 is self con-
tained or complete code.Thfe learned Judge said I am unable 
162 
to accede to this extreme point of view also." 
Mahajan J. while expressing his agreement with 
the Attorney - General's view that Art. 22 is a self-
contained in respect of the preventive detention, said, 
"I am satisfied on a review of the whole scheme of the 
Constitution that the intention was to make Art, 22 
self-contained in respect of the laws on the subject 
163 
of the preventive detention". Mahajan J. went on to 
hold that "In ray judgment, therefore, an examination of 
the provision of Art. 22 clearly suggests that the 
intention was to make it self-contained as regards the 
160. aupra,note 1 at p. 71 
161. Supra,note i at p. 75 
162. Supra,note 1 at p. 120 
163. 
Supra,note 1 at p. 82 
73 
law of preventive detention and that the validity 
of a law on the subject of preventive detention cannot 
be examined or controlled either by the provisions of 
1 64 
Art. 21 or by the provisions of Art. 19(5),.;." 
The Attorney General contended that Art.21 
did not apply to preventive detention at all as Art. 22 
formed a complete code of constitutional safeguards in 
respect of preventive detention. I am unable to accept 
that contention. 
"nrticle 19/ enunciates certain particular 
forms of civil liberty quite independently of the 
rights dealt with under art. 21 and in my opinion, 
therefore, the proper test for determining the validity 
of an enactment under which a person is sought to be 
deprived of his life and personal liberty has to be 
found not in Art. 19, but in the three following 
165 
Articles of .the constitution". 
Hukherjea j, further said that "the intention 
obviously was to exclude the contents of Art.19 from 
166 
the concept of 'Personal liberty* as used in Art. 21. 
164. Supra,note 1 at p. 84 
165. Supra,note 1 at p. 94 
166. Supra, note 1 at p. 97 
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Das J» observed; In my judgment. Art, 19 
protects some of the important attributes of personal 
liberty as indepenaent rights and the expression 
"personal liberty" has been used in Art. 21 as a com-
pendious term including within its meaning all the 
varieties of rights whiclrPto make up the personal liber-
ie? 
ties of man. Das J, further observed: Art. 19 has no 
bearing on the question of the validity or otherwise 
168 
of prevention detention". 
The Interrelationship between Articles 14, 19 and 21 — 
The doctrine of Exclusivity -
169 
In SiM. sarkar the Attorney General urged that 
Gopalan has stood for such a long time that it should 
not be disturbed unless there are strong and manifest 
reasons to do so. Since the matter involves the right 
of personal liberty, the fact that the decision has • 
held the field should not by itself be a deterrent 
against its reconsideration. The principles on which 
such reconsideration would be resorted to have been 
170 
explained by the Suprezne Court in Bengal Immunity Co, 
171 
and Legal Remembrancer, Shelat ACJ saids 
167. Supra, note 1 at p. 114 
168. Ibidy, 
169. S.N, sarkar v. State West Bengal,AIR 1973 SC 1425 
170. The Bengal Immunity Co.Ltd.v. State of^Bihar, 
AIR,1955 SC 661 
171. Legal Remembrancer, West Bengal v. The Corpora-tlon 
Calcutta; ,AIR 1967 SC 997" 
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These decisions have laid down that this Court would 
review its decisions if it is satisfied of its error 
of the beneful effect such a decision would have on 
the general interest of the public or if it is incon-
sistent with the legal philosophy of our constitution, 
and that in constitutional matters this court would 
do so more readily than in other branches of law as 
perpetuation of an error would be harmful to public 
172 
interests. ' The major premise in the majority decision 
in Gopalan is that Art. 22 was a self-contained code 
and that therefore the provisions of a law permitted 
by that Article would not have to be considered in the 
light of the provisions of Art. 19, This Gopalan's 
view holding a field for more than twenty years was 
173 
disapproved by the Supreme Court in R.C, Cooper in 1970. 
Taking a cue from the Bank Nationalization Shelat ACO 
speaking on behalf of seven judges constituting the 
Supreme Court's bench said: In tJopalan the majority 
court had held that Art, 22 was a self contained code 
and therefore a law of preventive detention did not 
have to satisfy the requirements of Arts, 19, 14 and 21. 
The view of i'azls All, J. on the other hand was that 
preventive detention was a direct breach of the right 
"^72. H.C. Cooper v. Union of India,AIR 1970 SC 564 
173. Supra, note l^ a^t p. 144: 
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under Art. 19 (1) (a)6t(d) and that a law providing 
for preventive detention had to subject to such 
judicial review as is obtainable under clause (5) 
of that Article. In 1970 the aforesaid premise of 
the majority in Gopalan was disapproved and there-
fore it no longer holds the field. The Cooper's 
case, dealt with the inter-relationship of Art. 19 
and Art. 31, the basic approach toccnsftruing the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in the different pro-
visions of the constitution and adopted in the case 
held the major premise of the majority in Gopalan 
to be incorrect. 
R.C. Cooper - was a shareholder and a director of 
the Central Bank of India,Ltd. challenged the vires 
of the Banking Companies ( Acquisition and Transfer 
of Undertakings) Ordinance and Act 1S>69. 
The question was; whether the validity of a law passed 
under . Art. 31(2) could also be tested on the 
requirements of Art. 19(1) (F) . The Court has held 
in some cases that these articles are mutually 
exclusive. The ratio of Gopalan is that the freedoms 
under Arts. 19, 21,22 and 31 are exclusive - each 
article enacting a code relating to protection of 
distinct rights. 
77 
Kania C.J. "It (Art. 19 } means that the 
legislation to be examined must be directly in 
respect of one of the rights mentioned in ; such 
clause The true approach is only to consider 
the directness of the legislation and not what will 
be the result of the detention otherwise valid, on 
the mode of the detenue's life". 
Fazle Ali J. said : 
"The scheme of the chapter dealing with the 
fundamental rights does not contemplate,... that each 
article is a code by itself and is independent of 
174 
others......" The learned Judge observed: 
that "there can be no escape from the conclusion 
that preventive detention is a direct infringement 
175 
of the right guaranteed in article 19(1) (d). " 
Further fazle Ali observed: .... (T)his article 
(Art. 22) does not exclude the operation of 
articles 19 and 21, and it must be read subject to 
those two articles, in the same way as Articles 19 
and 21 must be read subject to article 22, The 
correct position is that article 22 must prevail in 
so far as tnere are specific provisions therein 
174. Gopalan. at 52 
175, Gopalan, at 53 
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regardiny preventive detention/ but# where there 
are no such provisions in that article, the opera-
tion of articles 19 and 21 cannot be excluded.The,§»re 
fact that different aspects of the same right have 
been dealt within three different articles will not 
make them mutually exclusive except to the extent 
176 
I have indicated". 
This view expressed in Gopalan was reaffirmed 
177 178 
in Ram Singh and in Chiranjit Lai by Das J, who 
observed that the right to property under Art. 19(1) 
(f) would continue until the owner was under Art. 31 
deprived of such property by authority of law". 
179 
The view laid down in Subodh Gopal by S.R. Das 
180 
has been given a concrete shape in Banji Munji 
wherein Bose J., speaking for the Court observed: 
"(I)t is enough to say that Art. 19(1) (f) read 
with clause (5) postulates the existence of property 
which can be enjoyed, and over which rights can be 
exercised because otherwise the reasonable restric> 
tions contemplated by clause (5) would not be brought 
into play. If there is no property which can be 
176. Gopalan at 61 
177. Ram Singh U others v. The State of Delhi, (1951) 
178. Chiranlit Lai v. Union of Indiail9503 sCR 451 
SCR 869 at p. 919 
179. State of West Bengal v. Subodh. Gopal. 1954 SCR 587 
ISO' State of Bombay v. Banji Mum'i & Another (1955) l 
SCCR 777, This view was fallowed in Bahu Barkya 
Thakur v. State of Bombay(1961) 1 SCR 128; 
7.4 
acquired, held or disposed of, no restriction can be 
placed on tne exercise of the right to acquire, hold 
or dispose it of, and as clause (5) contemplates the 
placing of reasonable restrictions on the exercise of 
tnose rignts it must follow that the -^ticle postulates, 
the existence of property over which the rights are 
to be exercised. 
181 
in Kcchuni, Subha Rao J. held that cl, (2) of 
Art. 31 alone deals with the compulsory acquisition 
of property by the State for a purpose, and not ^t.31 
(1) and he proceeded to hold that the expression 
"authority of law" means authority of a valid law, 
and on that account validity of the law seeking to 
deprive a person ot his property is open to challenge 
on the ground that it infringes other fundamental 
rights , e.g. , under art. 19(1) (6). 
After Kochuni, the - Banji Mum'i "no longer 
holds the field". There are two divergent views emerged 
out of Kochuni are (1) "authority of law" in Art, 31(1) 
is liable to be tested on the ground that violates 
other fundamental rights and freedoms including the 
Smri,Sitabati Debi and another v. State of West 
Bengal and Another (1967) 2 SCR 940. 
181. Kavalppara Kotharathil Kochuni & Others v. 
State of Madras (1960), 3 SCR 887 
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right to hola ^^ roperty guaranteed by .-article 19(1) (f) 
and v2) " authority of law" within the meaning of rtrt.31 
v2j is not liable to be tested on the ground that it 
impairs the guarantee of .-article 19(1) (F) in so far as 
it imposses substantive restrictions — though it may 
lb2 
be tested on the ground of impairment of other guarantees. 
183 
In lianoj i Rao Shinde the Court opined that the 
validity of Clause ,2) of Article 31 may be adjudged in 
the lignt of article 1::'(1) (f) . 
In shantilal rianqaldas - decided after Ranojira — 
Snah J. stated that it had been settled in Sitavati Debi 
that a law for the acquisition or requisition of property 
cannot be tested on the criterion of Article 19(1) (f) read 
with «.rticle 19(5), 
In Bank i\.ationalization ahah J. speaking for the 
Court said thiat Part III of the Constitution weaves 
a pattern of guarantees on the texture of basic human 
rights. The guarantees delimit the protection of those 
rights in their allotted fields: They do not attempt to 
enunciate distinct rights In our judgment, the 
182. Supra, note 181 
183. State of K.P. v. Ranojirao shinde; (1968) 3 SCR 489 
n 
assumption in i^ .K. Gopalan that certain articles 
in the constitution exclusively deal with specific 
matters and in determining whether there is infringe-
ment of the individual's guaranteed rights, the 
object and the form of the State action alone need 
be considered, and effect of the laws on fundamental 
rights of the individuals in general will be ignored 
184 
cannot be accepted as correct. 
185 
In Haradhan Saha the arguments were raised: 
(1) the law of preventive detention is unreasonable 
and therefore violates Article 19;(2) that the., law 
violates article 21 be cause the guarantee of a right 
to be heard is infringed ,'(3) that the law does not 
lay down the just procedure for giving effect to 
Article 22 (5)_; 4^) that it violates Article 14 because 
it permits discrimination. After referring GopalahAs 
view and relying on Bank Nationalization Ray,C.J, 
proceeded under aa assumption that the Preventive 
Detention may be tested with regard to its reasona-
bleness with reference to Article 19. The learned 
Chief Justice said that "even if Article 19 be examined 
in regard to preventive detention, it does not increase 
the content of reasonableness required to be observed 
186 
in respect of orders of preventive detention. 
184. ^c Cooperg970) 3 SCR 530 at PP.577-578 
1^5. Hardhan Saha v. State of West Bengal, (1974)2 
186 .ri^ radhan SAha at'p. 1485 pr_ , .. , .„_ 
^ Cr,L,u.l479 
187 
In Faqu Shaw Hathew J. delivery the leading 
judgement of the court dia not touch the issue whether 
the law for preventive detention could be tested under 
/4rt. 19.But Alagiriswami J. was of the view that 
Parliament cannot fetter its own hands in the matter 
of legislating with regard to the maximum period of 
detention. If the Parliament can fix the maximum 
period it can also alter it. But if the maximum period 
so fixed is unreasonably long Art, 19 (1) would be 
188 
attracted. In his dissenting judgment Bhagwati J. 
observed that the maximum period specified by the par-
liament must obviously be a reasonable one, because 
otherwise the parliamentary law would be bad as offen-
ding clauses (a) and <d) Article 19(1). So much is 
189 
clear and beyond dispute, Bhagwati J, once aga+n 
reiterated his views that "it is true that theoretically 
it may be possible to say that the fixation of the 
maxiixium period can be varied by Parliament arbitrarily 
according to its sweet-will, but in practice such an 
eventuality would be highly remote having regard to 
the pressure of democratic forces and sanction of public 
opinion. Moreover, if the maximum period is fixed 
187, Faqu Shaw v. State of W,B. AIR 1974 SC 613 
188, Fagu Shaw at p, 625 
189, Fagu Shaw at 628 
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unreasonable^ it can always be struck down by the 
court as violative of clauses (a) and (d) of 
190 
Article 19, 
191 
In Khudiram Das> delivering the judgment of 
tne Court and having referred and relied on Bank 
j?Jationalization« S,i\i« Sarkar. Hardhan Saha» Bhagwatl J. 
has emphatically concluded and a final seal is put 
on this question that "it is not open to any one now 
to contend that a law of preventive detention/ whicn 
falls within Art. 22, does not have to meet the 
requirement of Art, 14 and u^:t. 19. 
In Maneka Gandhi/ while refering and relying 
on Bank Nationalisation/ ai.N« Sarkar, Hardhan Saha, 
and KhudlraiH i^ as decisions of the Supreme Court, 
bhagwati J, said; 
"The law must/ therefore/ now be taken to be 
well settled that Art. 21 does not: exclude article 19 
and if that even if there is a law prescribing a pro-
cedure for depriving a person of 'personal liberty' 
dnd there is consequently no infringement of the 
fundamental right conferred by Article 21/ such law/ 
in so far as it abridges or takes away any fundamental 
190. Ibid., at 632 
191. Khudiramdas v. State of Bengal,AIK 1975 SC 550 
at p. 559 — 
right under /urticle 19 would have to meet the 
challenge of that article" Now, if a law dep-
riving a person of 'personal liberty' and prescribing 
a procedure for that purpose within the meaning of 
Article 21 has to stand the test of one or more of 
the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 
which may be applicable in a given situation, ex hypo-
thesi it must also be liable to be tested with refe^ 
192 
rence to Article 14. 
In i^ aneka Gandhi having referred and relied on 
Bennett Coleman and ahambhu i>iath Sar.kar, Krishna Iyer 
•J., in his own usual way said: 
" Be that as it may, the law is 
now settled, as I apprehend it, 
that no article in Part III is 
arv i sland but part of a continent, 
and the conspectus of the whole 
gives the direction and correction 
needed for interpretation of these 
basic provisions. Man is not dis-
sectible into separate limbs and, 
likewise, cardinal rights in an 
organic constitution, which make 
man human have a synthesis. The 
proposition is indubitable that Art. 
21 does not, in a given situation, 
exclude Art. 19 if both rights are 
breached". 193 
192. Maneka Gandhi at 623 
193. i'ianeka Gandhi, at p. 662 
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m t-ianeka Gandhi, Kailasani J, in his lone 
dissenting juaginent did not agree with what ftas 
been said about the doctrine of exclusivity or 
rights guaranteea by Articles 19/ 21 and 22 of the 
constitution, Gopalan's view was affirmed by the 
i>upreine Court ia Kam ainqn wherein it was hela tnat 
law whicn authorises Deprivation of personal liberty 
did not fail witnin the personal liberty did not fall 
witnin tne purview of «.rt, 19 and its validity was 
not to be judged by the criteria indicated in that 
Article but depended on its conpliance with the re-
quirements of /irts. 21 & 22.This view was again affirmeu 
in Kameshwar ^inqh wherein Oas J. opined that the 
moment even this regulated freedom of the individual 
becomes incompatible witn and threatens the freedom 
of the community the State is given power by ttxt, 21, 
to deprive the individual of his life and personal 
liberty in accordance with procedure established by 
law, subject of course, to the provisions of Art. 22 
However, in Kochuni aubha Rao J. doubted tne correct-
ness of Gopalan as affirmed in ^ am oinqn. ^fter 
referring i'azal ^li's dissenting given in Gopalan» 
Subha Rao J. said that we are bound by it. 
86 
In Haneka Gandhi Kailasam J. in his dissenting 
opinion said that the majority view of the Supreme 
Court delivered by ohah J. in Bank Nationalisation 
was based on the wrong assumption that the majority 
of the court in Gopalan held that ^^t, 22 as complete 
self-contained code. Vvhereas Kania* Sastri and Das JJ 
have expressed their inability to agree with the 
/ittorney-General's view that /^t. 22 was a complete 
Coae by itself, i-'iukherjea J. thought it otherwise 
unnecessary to inter into the discussion on the ques-
tion raised by the Attorney-General, So it was 
I'iahajan J. among the majority judges who held Art. 22 
as a self-contained code in respect of the cases on 
the subject of preventive detention. Kailasam J, 
therefore held that the assumption in Bank Nationali-
sation that "the majorityof the Court held that Art.22 
is a complete coae is erroneous and the basis of the 
decision stands shaken. If the obiter dicta based on 
the wrong assumption is to be taken as the correct 
position in law, it would lead to strange results. 
It can therefore/ be safely said that the 
wrong committed in Bank Nationalisation regarding 
Gopalan's view has been repeatedly reaffirmed by 
the Supreme Court in S.N, sarkar , aaradhan Saha ana 
Knudiram das. Therefore, Kailasam J. said that the 
view taken in Bank Nationalisation that a law relating 
«7 
to aeprivation of life and liberty has to meet 
the requirements of ^rt, 19 is due to an error in 
proceeding on the basis that the majority court 
in Gopalan's case held that Article 22 was a self-
contained, 
iiowever, Mr, ii,»-i. aeervai has thrown his weight 
in favour of (Jopalan as demonstrated by Kailasram J. 
in his dissenting judgment in i-ianeka oanuhi. The 
persistence of the court in perpetuating the error of 
the Bank Nationalisation about Gopalan raises a 
question which is crucial to tue proper discharge 
of the judicial function . aeervai made the follow-
ing submissions in this regard: 
It is submitted that the judges in Maneka 
Gandhi who repeated the funaamental errors of the 
Bank ixat-ionalization, after the error haa baen pointed 
out by ivailasam J,, nave, unwillingly, done a grave 
injury to the judicial process. For it means that 
Supreme Court judges do not mind resting their judg-
ments on a fundamental error so long as it subserves 
a desirable end. But it is submitted, that 
substitutes tn^ rulf=^  Of ludges for the rule of law. 
Secondly, it would shock the ordinary man's idea of 
a court of justice, to be told that judgements can be 
)]8 
rested on a fundamental error, if the judges consider 
that the error serves a desirdble end. But there is 
no general agreement about ends - what may appear a 
desirable end to one judge, may appear undesirable 
to another. To make the interpretation of the cons-
titution and the law dependent u^on the individual 
views of a shifting majority or judges is subversive 
of law ana justice. It is submitted that Aristottle 
went to the root of the matter when he said* "Plato 
is dear to me, but dearer still is truth", adopting 
his words , a judge should say to himselfs "Fundamental 
rignts are dear to me, but dearer still is truth, and 
justice founded on truth, and tney must prevail in a 
cuuit of justice. " This is altogether apart from what 
every judge knows, namely, that the sanction of truth 
is that it nolds together, and the sanction against 
194 Ibib 
falsehood is that it falls apart. Prof. P.K. Tripathi 
while emphasizing that the ^,K, Gopalan needs rereading, 
prof, goes on saying that "unfortunately, both these 
cases, K.G. Cooper and Maneka Gandhi were cases invol-
ving neither preventive nor punitive detention. Con-
sequently, they offeree extensive scope for rhetoric 
extolling the virtues or freedom and condemning 
1^4. deervai, ri.M.: 1158 at PP.731-732,Constitutional 
i^ aw of India, Vol. I Ed. Ill , 1983 
195. Prof. P.K. Tripathi,"The Fioscb of Over-ruling 
".K. Gopalan", ^IR 1990 Jour. iJ ' ' 
Sifl 
detention unhampered by the constraints of any factual 
context. out when the Court came to deal with 
actual preventive detention cases in riaradhan saha 
and r%,K. Royjt drew exactly the same conclusions as 
were attributed to the majority in /i,.K« Gopalan. It 
iS/thus/ clear that the oupreme Court nas returned, 
full circle, to tne majority view in v^ »K. Gopalan's 
case, and all the chetoric about conaemning that view 
and declaring that it "no longer holds the field" has 
proved futile and is no longer relevant. Also in the 
meanwhile the riddles of tne constitutional interpre-
tation that troubled the court in H.K. Gopalan have 
remainea unattended. 
It is submitted tnat the reason for this fiasco 
has been that the real issue that came up before the 
court in <^ .K. Gopalan has not been patiently iden-
tified ana the solution offered to it by the majority 
in that case has not been appreciated in its proper 
perspective". 
Inter se relationship between i^rticles 14 and 21— 
How aeveloped; 
Thouyn the reading ot ^rt, 14 and 21 has never 
been done in any case before Haneka Gandhi yet the 
196, Supra,note 195 at p. 2 & 3. 
9.1 
theme of reae^iging the two articles together was 
197 
introducea in 1960, In Vaqravelu the three writ 
petitions filed under Art. 32 of the constitution 
raised the question of the constitutionality of the 
i»dnd acquisition I i-iadras A;nendnient ) Act/ 1961. The 
counsel for the petitioners challenged the validity 
of the impugned law on the grouna that it violated 
^^ts. 14, 19 and 31(2) of the constitution. The counsel 
for the State denied that the impugnea law violated 
the rights guaranteed in rurticles 14, 19 and 31 of the 
constitution. 
In dealing with the issue and delivering the 
majority judgement of the Court justice Subba Rao did 
not decide the effect of the impugned law on the funda-
mental rights together, further the learned judge 
aia also not throw any light on the relationship bet-
ween Articles 14,19 and 31 of the Constitution. 
Justice d\ibba Rao had discussed the validity of law 
on the anvil of Art. 14 and Art. 19 separately and 
declared the law void. i-robabiy, the reason which 
might have dissuaded oubba Rao not to discuss the 
relationship between i^ticles 14 and 31 together was 
the Gopalan's view in which the majority of the court 
held that each Article in Part III of the Constitution 
197. Vajravelu v. Special ueputy Collector,r^lR 
1965 SC 1017 
Hi 
was a self-code in itself. The doctrine of exclusivity 
was introduced In Goya Ian under which aubi/a aao J, In 
Vajravelu might have discussed the constitutionality 
of the law Acquisition ( Madras Amendment) Act 1961 
under articles 14 and 31 of the Constitution separately. 
Put it in a aifferent way, the doctrine of ,exclusivity 
must have coloured the mind of Justice Subba Rao who 
did not judicially evaluate the co-relationship between 
i^ticles 14 and 31 of the Constitution. 
However, an attempt was made in Vajravelu to 
join Article 14 and 31 together by the Counsel of the 
petitioners. The positive and good aspect of SuJsb a Kao 
judgment in Vajravelu regarding these two articles is 
that the learned judge has not negatived the issue ana 
nas left the whole issue untouched. This was a legal 
technique of the learned counsel to sneak article 14 
into the domain of Article 31 through the back door. 
198 
In Bank Nationalization the Court was called 
upon to decide the constitutionality of the Banking 
Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) 
Act,1969, The petitioners challenged the impugned legis-
lation on the ground that it violated the rights con-
tained in articles 14,19 and 31 of the constitution, 
198. K.C, Cooper v. Union of India,AIR 1970 SC 564 
rl 
It was argued that since /^ rt. 31 (2) and Art. 19(1) 
F^) operating on the same field of the right to 
property and hence a law directly providing for acqui-
sition of property for public purpose must be tested 
lor its validity on the plea that it imposes unreaso-
nable restrictions. Justice Shah delivering the 
majority opinion of the Court said that "the validity 
of the State action must be adjudged in the light of 
its operation upon the rights of the individual and 
199 
groups of individuals in ail their dimensions". Thus, 
the doctrine of exclusivity propounded and applied 
in Gopalan was completely demolished in Bank Nationali-
zation and the Court said that the validity of the 
impugned law can be determined by its "direct operation 
upon the individuals rights." This doctrine of direct 
operation of the impugned law upon the individual 
rights laid down in Bank Nationalization was further 
reaffirmed in Benett Coleman & Co. in which it was h41d 
that the direct operation of the Act upon the rights 
forms the real test. 
The process of making i^ rticle 14 as an integral 
part of personal liberty in Art. 21 reached its final 
destiny in iManeka Gandhi where in Beg CJ in his separate 
but concurring opinion saids " I have no dovibt, that, 
199. Maneka Gandhi at p. 596 
33 
in what may be called " unoccupied" portions of 
the vast sphere of personal liberty the sxobstantive 
as well as procedural laws made to coyer them must 
satisfy tne requirements of both Articles 14 and 19 
200 
of the Constitution". While citing and relying on 
201 
Bank Nationalization, Mohd. >jabir , jahambhu Nath 
20^ 20"3 "lol 
oarkar, Khudi Ram Das and Haradhan Saha and delivering 
the main judgement of the Court with whom all except 
KaiJlasami. J. agreed,Justice Bhagwati held* "Now, 
if a law depriving a person of 'Personal liberty' 
and prescribing a procedure for that purpose within 
the meaning of >irticle 21 has to stand the test of 
one or more of the funaaaiental rights under Art. 19 
which may be applicable in a given situation, ex-
nypothese it must also be liable to be tested with 
20 5 
reference to Art. 14," This process of merging the 
right to equality in Art. 14 culminated in the per-
sonal liberty in Art. 21 when Justice Bhagwati having 
206 
followed Royappa saidi Article 14 strikes at arbitra-
riness in state action and ensures fairness and equality 
of treatment. The principles of reasonableness, which 
200. Haneka Gandhi, ^Ik 1976 SC 597 at P. 60 6 
201. J^ohd. Sabir v. State of J.K. ,AIR 1971 SC 1713 
20 2. Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 
AIR 1973 SC 1425 
20 3. Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal,AIR 1975 iC 550 
20 4, Haradhan Saha v. State of west Bengal, 
AIR 1975 SC 2154 
205. Haneka Gandhi, ^IR 1978 SC 597 at P, 623 
20 6, c^ Kovappa v. State of Tamil Nadu,AIR , 1974 
SC 555 
94 
legally as well as philosophically, is an essential 
element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades 
*^t, 14 like a brooding omni presence and the proce-
dure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test 
ot reasonableness in order to be i^n confirmity with 
Article 14. It must be "right and just and fair" and 
not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise it 
wouio be no proceaure at all and the requirement of 
207 
Article 21 would not be satisfied". 
Thus/ a law abriaging or infringing the per-
sonal liberty woula no-c only satisfy the requirements 
of Art. 21 but would also ^^tisfy the requirements of 
A^rticle 14 and 19 of the constitution. Thus t this 
trio of Articles 14, 19 and 21 has become, as Chan-
drachud CJ said, "a oolden triangle", ivow the right 
to personal liberty under Article 21 can be taken in 
accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure 
established by law. American "due process ot law" has 
been implanted in the "procedure established by law" 
contained in Art. 21 ot our constitution. 
207, Maneka Gandhi, AIR 1978 SC 597 at P. 624 
f]5 
Khudiram Nature of Preventive Detention; The power 
of detention is clearly a preventive measure. It 
dees not partake in any manner of the nature of 
punishment. It is taken by way of precaution to 
prevent mischief to the community. Since every pre-
ventive measure is based on the principle that a 
person should be prevented from doing something which 
if left free and unfettered, it is reasonably probably 
he would do, it must necessarily proceed in all cases, 
to some extent, on suspicion or anticipation as dis-
208 
tinct from proof. 
208a 
In Bhuth Nath the Supreme Court held that the 
exercise of the power of detention "iropliies a quasi-
judicial approach, that the power must be regarded 
as a quasi-judicial power," Bhagwati J. clarified in 
Khudiram Das that this observation was meant to convey 
that the power of detention is a quasi-judicial power 
The only thing which it 
intended to emphasise was that the detaining authority 
must exercise due care and caution and act fairly and 
justly in exercising the power of detention. 
In Khudiram Das, Bhagwati J. said 
"There is nothing like unfettered discretion 
immune from judicial review ability. The truth is 
208. Khudiram Das at 556 
208a. Bhuth Nath at 
96 
that in a government under law^ there can be no 
such thing as unreviewable discretion". 
Douglas J. said: 
"Law has reached its finest moments 
When it has freed man from the un-
limited discretion of some ruler, 
some official, some bureaucrat ,,., 
absolute discretion is a rethless 
Master. It is more destructive of 
freedom than any of man's other 
inventions". 209 
In Fagu Shaw, Bhagwati J, discussed the 
power of Preventive Detention and the Personal 
liberty and observed: 
"The power to detain without trial is itself 
as a drastic power justified only in the interest of 
public security and order. It is tolerated in a free 
society as a necessary evil. But the power to detained 
a person for life without trial is something unthinkable 
in a democracy governed by the rule of law, it is a 
draconic power subversive of freedom 
209, U.S. V. Wundurich, (1951) 342, us 98 
.97 
ana liberty and can have no place in our 
constitutional arrangement. To grant such, a power 
would be to destroy the democratic way of life, to 
anihilate one of the most cherished values of a free 
society and to vest in the State authoritarian power 
is the anti thesis of the rule of law. It would be 
tbe fundamental guarantee of personal liberty of all. 
210 
meaning and content and reduce it to a mere husk. 
BUKDEM OF PROOF i 
The question is that in case of violation 
or the right to life and personal liberty under Art. 21 
on whom does the burden of proof lie? Does it lie 
on the petitioner to show that law and its procedure 
is unjust, unfair and aroitrary? Does it lie on the 
State to show that law and its procedure is Just, 
fair and reasonable? This question became the most 
211 
vital in Bachan Singh , in which the death penalty 
was challenged in view of Art. 21 of the Constitution, 
212 
In saghir Ahmad, in which the UP Koad Transport 
Act 1951 was challenged on the ground that it con-
flicted with the fundamental right of the petitioner 
210 . jTagu Shaw , a t 635 
2 1 1 . o a c n a n cainqh v . S t a t e of Pun jab ,AIR 1980 SO 898 
2 1 2 . s a g n i r >inmad v . S t a t e of U . P . , ^IR 1954 SC 728 
•)8 
guaranteed under i^ rt, 19(1) (ti) of the Constitution, 
In dealing with the constitutional validity of the 
impugned legislation Justice Wukherjea speaking for 
the court held: 
"There is undoubtedly a presumption in favour 
of the constitutionality of a legislation. But when 
the enactment on the face ot it is found to violate 
a fundamental right guaranteed under Art, 19(1) (g) 
of the constitution, it must be held to be invalid 
unless those who support the legislation can bring it 
within the purview, of the exemption laid down in clause 
(6) of the constitution. If the respondents do not 
place any materials before the court to establish 
that the legislation comes within the permissible 
limits or clause (6), It is surely not for the appel-
lants to prove negatively that the legislation was 
not reasonable and was not conducive to the welfare 
213 
of the community". 
What has been held in Saghir Ahmad is that if 
the oetitioner succeedes in showing that the impugnea 
law prima facie abriages or transgresses the rights 
covering under any of the sub-^  clauses of clause U) 
of Art, 19, the onus is on the State to show tnat the 
legislation comes within the permissible limits as 
213, 6upra, note 212 at p, 738 
9i) 
author J. sed by any of clauses U) to 16) by 
placing the relevant materials before the Court 
in support of its case, What is decided is that 
in case of infringement of several civil liberties 
guaranteed by nrt, 19U) of the Constitution the 
burden of proof of the constitutional validity of 
the law is on tne State and not on the citizen. 
The real legal confusion about the burden 
of proof in regard to the violation of the right 
to personal liberty under Art, 21 has been created 
214 215 
by Chiranj it Lai and the i^ almia in which the infringe-
ment of the right to equality under Art. 14 of the 
constitution was involved. The majority of the 
Supreme Court in Chiranj it Lai and Dalmia held that 
"there is always a presumption in favour of the 
constitutionality of an enactment and the burden 
is upon him who attacks it to stiovt that there has 
been a clear transgi'ession oi tne constitutional 
216 
principles, •' The Court has further added that it 
must be presumed that tne legislature understands 
and correctly appreciates the need of its own 
people that its laws are directed to problems made 
manifest by experience and that its discriminations 
are based on adequate grounds," 
214, Ghiranl it Lai v. Union of India, /^if< 1951 jc 42 
215, R.K. Dalmia v. Justice Tendulkar.AIR 1958 SC 538 
216, Supra,note 215 at pp. 547-548 
100 
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In Khyerabari Tea Co. a similar question was 
raised in which the constitutional valiaity of the 
/issajn Taxation ( on goods carriea by road or on Inland 
^^ ater ways) act, 1961 was cnallenged on the grouna 
that it placed unreasonable restrictions on the freedom 
of trade juaranteea by /irt. 301 and infringed the 
rignt guaranteed in Art. (19)(G) of the constitution. 
Kelying on aaghir U^iiuad/ Gajendragadkar J. speaking 
tor the Court sdid; 
where a Statute is impeached as being uncon-
stitutional, but as has been held in saqhir Ahmad in 
regard to the fundamental right under Art. 19(1) (G) , 
as soon as the invasion of right is proved, it is tor 
the state to prove its case th»t the infringed legis-
lation falls within clause (6) of Art. 19. The posi-
tion may be different when we are dealing with Art. 14 
because under that Article the initial presumption of 
constitutionality may nave a larger a/ay in as much 
as it may place the burden on the petitioner to show 
that the impugned law deniea equality before the law 
or equal protection of the laws... In our opinion, .. 
217. Khvrabari Tea Co.Ltd. v. State of Assam, ^IR 1964 
SC 925 
rtrt. 19(1) (G) to practice any profession, or to 
carry on any occupation, trade or 
business. 
Art.14 State snail not deny to any person 
equality before the law or the equal 
protection of the laws within the 
territory ot India. 
*^t, 301 Subject to the other r-
other provisions of tnis 
1;U 
the said decision is a clear authority for the pro-
position that once the invasion of the fundamental 
rignt under Art. 19 (Die proved the State must justity 
its case under clause (6) which is in the nature o± 
an exception to the main provisions contained in 
^^t. 19(1). 
21b 
In inohd. Faruk the petitioner who carries on 
tne vocation of slaughtering bulls and bullocks at 
the Wadar Tekdi slaughter House at Jabalpur claims a 
declaration that the notification dated January 12,1967 
issued by the Governor of H.P. in exercise of the 
Powers conferred under 3ub-section (3) of Sec. 430 of 
the MP MunicipalCorporation Act, 1956 cancelling the 
confirmation of the bye-laws made by the Jabalpur 
i-iunicipal Corporation for inspection and regulation 
of slaughter houses "in so far as the bye-laws relate 
to slaughter of bulls ana bullocks" infringes the 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Articles 14 and 
19 of the Constitution, 
In dealing witn the constit"tional validity 
of the imnugned /ict. Justice Shah delivering judgment 
on behalf of the five-judge cnnstitutior^ai Bench said: 
part,trade/commerce and intercourse throughout 
the territory of India shall be free. 
218, Mohd. Faruk v. State of MP. AIR 1970 SC 93 
L)2 
"When the validity ot a law placing restric-
tion upon the exercise oi fundamental rights in 
iirticle ly (1) is challenged, the onus of proving to 
the satisfaction of the court that the restriction is 
reasonable lies upon the State .... Imposition of 
restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right may 
be in the form of control or prohibition, but when 
the exercise of a fundamental right is prohibited,the 
burden of proving that a total ban on the exercise of 
the rignt alone may ensure the maintenance of the 
219 
general pxiblic interest lies heavily upon the State". 
The Supteme Court has made it clear that when 
the valiaity of a law is questioned on the ground that 
it violates the freedoms guaranteed in art. 19 the 
burden of proof that tne law is perfectly within the 
limits and thus is reasonable lies heavily on the 
State as he la Joy it in saghir Ahmad, Khyrabari Tea Co. 
and Mohd. i:'aruk« But a different line of argument w«s 
220 221 
adopted by the Supreme Court in B. Banarjee and Pathumma 
in which it said that the burden.',of proof when the 
validity of law is challenged lies on the petitioner 
to show that it violates Art. 14 of the constitution. 
219, Supra, iMote 191 at p. 96 
220, B. Baneriee v. Anita pan,AIR 1975 3C 1146 
221, pathumma v. State of Kerala ,^1R 1973 SC 771 
1)3 
Baner1ee where Justice Krishna Iyer speaking 
on behalf of the court and having relied on R«K, 
paLTiia added that "if nothing is placed on record 
by the challengers, the verdict ordinarily goes 
against them", and further relying on Chamarbhugwala, 
the learned jusge again emphasied "Some courts 
have gone to the extent of holding that there is pre-
sumption in favour of constitutionality, and a law 
will not be declared unconstitutional unless the case 
is so clear a.3. to to be free from doubt. " 
In Pathumroa the constitutional validity of 
the Karala Agriculturalists Debt Relief Act 1970 was 
challenged on the ground of violation of both Arts. 14 
and 19(1) (F). While relying on Justice SR Das's 
223 
opinion delivered in Mohd. Hanif ^Justice-'-yi. Fazle Ali 
speaking on behalf of himself. Beg,C.J, Krishna Iyer 
and Jaswant Singh JJ observed that the Court will 
therefore interfere with a statute only "when the 
Statute is clearly violative of the right conferred 
on the citizen under Part III of the Constitution" 
and proceeded to add that it is on account of this 
reason "that courts have recognised that there is 
222^ State of Bombay v. RMD Chamar.bh\Qwala,aIR 1957 
223, Fiohd. Hanif v. State of Bihar.AIR 1951^ ^ ^^ 
SC 7 31 at para 15 
1,)4 
always a presiamption in favour of the constitutionality 
o£ a statute and the onus to prove its invalidity 
224 lies on tne party which assails the rank. 
225 
In Laxmi Khandsari tne petitioner challenged 
the notification of tiie U.P. Cane Commissioner issued 
by virtue of clause (8) of the sugar cane (Control) 
order 1966 with a view to overcoming the sugar scarcity. 
In dealing with the validity of this impugned notifica-
tion Justice FazaJ^ Ali said that "it is no doubt well 
settled that where a citizen complains of the violation 
of fundamental rights contained in sub-clause (g) of 
clause (1) of Article 19 or for that matter in any of 
sub-clauses (a) to (g) thereof, the onus is on the 
State to prove or justify that the restraint or res-
trictions imposed on the fundamental rights under 
226 
clauses (2) to (6) of the State are reasonable." 
Having relied on and agreed to Saghir Ahmad Mohd.Faruk 
Justice M.FazaJ Ali further proceeded to add in order 
to strengthen his views ±n Laxmi 
Khandsari in the following words: 
224. Supra, note 2 at P. 775 
225. Laxmi Khandsari v. State of u.p., AIR 1981 
SC 873 
226. Supra, note 198 at 880 
Iji) 
"we* therefore, fully agree with the con-
tention advance^ by the petitioners that where there 
is a clear violation of Article 19(1) (g), the State 
has to justify by acceptable evidence, inevitable 
consequences of sufficient materials that thetores-
triction, whether partial or complete is in public 
interest and contains the quality of reasonableness. 
228 
In bachan Sinqn Justice Sarkaria delivering 
the majority judgment of the court formulated certain 
probing questions: On whom will the onus of satis-
fying the requirements under article 19 lie? Will 
such onus lie on the State or the person challenging 
its validity? And what will be the nature of the onus? 
The principle of presumption in favour of 
tne constitutionality of an enactment and the burden 
is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been 
a clear transgression h^s been evolved and applied in 
cases where the impugned law has been challenged as 
violative of Art. 14 of the constitution. The cases 
in which the principle of presumption on constitutiona-
lity of law and the burden of proof has been fixed on 
the petitioner did not involve either Article 19 or 
227. Ibid. 
228, Bachan Singh v. Jtate of Punjab,AIR 1982 SC 1325 
MS 
article 21 but were confined to article ly of the 
Jonstitution. Thus* the rule of burden of proof laid 
aown in these judgements cannot be extended to cover 
laws abridging the right to personal liberty under 
/article 21 of the constitution. 
Here we would like to ^ joint out the judicial approach 
and reasoning of Justice M. r'azale all who adopted diffe-
rent approaches in regard to the burden of proof to 
establish as to whether the law at all touches the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 19 and 21 falls 
on the person who challenges in Pathumma and Laxmi Khandsari. 
In patiiumma Art. 19 (1) (F) along with Art. 14 was involved 
and in Laxmi Khandsari iut. 19(1) (g) was in question. 
Justice M, razale Ali delivered the courts' judgment on 
benalf of himself and three judges relying on Mohd. Hanif 
held that "the presxamption of the Constitutionality of 
a statute and the onus to prove its invalidity lies on 
the party which assails" it. But the learned Judge while 
delivering the majority judgment in Laxmi Khandsari has 
not only taken a judicial somersault regarding the issue of 
onus to prove but has not referred his own judgment 
given in pothumma . Having cited and relied 
i" 3aghir ahmad and Hohd. Faruk Justice M. Fazale Ali 
held that where a law abridges any of the citizens 
i.r; 
rights guaranteed by Article 19 of the constitution, 
tne onus is upon the State to prove that law is 
covered by the restrictions contained in clauses 2 
to 6 of Art, 19 of the Constitution. 
Agreeing with the principle of presumption 
of the constitutionality of a law and the onus to 
prove lies on tiie petitioner to the extent that it 
is he who attacks the law has to establish that the 
impugned law violates a Fundamental right conferred 
under one or other sub-clauses of Art, 19 and is, 
therefore, unconstitutional but when that is done,the 
question arises on whom does the burden of showing 
whether the restrictions are permissible or not lie? 
229 
In his dissenting judgment delivered in Bachan Singh 
Justice Bhagwati said: "Once it is shown by the peti-
tioner that the impugned law imposes restrictions 
which inrringe one or the other sub-clauses of clause 
(1) of Article 19, the burden of showing such restric-
tions are reasonable and fall within the permissible 
category must be on the State and this burden the State 
raay discharge "either by producing socio-economic data 
before the Court or on consideration of the provisions 
in the impugned law read in the light of the constitu-
tional goals set out in the Directive Principles of 
State Policy," ^^^ 
229, Supra, note 228 
230. Supra,note 228 at p. 1350 
I,)8 
In dealing with the question as to where 
does the burden of proof lie when the challenge to 
a law enacted by the legislature is based on viola-
tion of Art, 21 Justice Bhagwati in Bachan Singh said; 
••where there is deprivation of life, and by 
life I mean not only physical existence, but also use 
of any faculty or limb through which life is enjoyed 
and basic human dignity, or of any aspect of personal 
liberty, the burden must rest on the State to establish 
by producing adequate material or otherwise that the 
procedure prescribed for such deprivation is not arbi-
trary but is reasonable, fair and just The right 
to life stands on a higher footing than even personal 
liberty, because personal liberty too postulates a 
sentiment human being who can enjoy it. Where there-
fore, a law authorises deprivation of the right to 
life, the reasonableness, fairness and justness of 
the procedure prescribed by it for such deprivation 
must be established by state Throwing the burden 
of proof of reasonableness, fairness and justness on 
the State in such a case is a homage which tfte consti-
tution and the court must pay to the right to life".^^^ 
231. Ibid. 
1 0 Ji 
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In Municipal Corporation Ahma^abad,the Consti-
tutional validity of the two standing orders made 
by the Municipal Commissioner of Ahmadabad Municipal 
Corporation in exercise of his powers under Sec.466 
(1) u^) ib) of bombay provincial Municipal Corporation 
Act, 1949. The Municipal Commissioner ordered that 
Municipal slaughter houses were directed to remain 
open on all days except on seven days as mentioned 
in the two impugned standing orders and these seven days 
i.e. Janamashthami, Jain Samvatsari, Ram Navami, 
Mahavir Jayanti, 2nd October (Mahatma Gandhi's birth-
day) , 12th February (Sharadha day of Mahatma Gandhi) 
30th January (Mahatma Gandhi's Wirvan Day. These 
seven days were declared as public holidays for tne 
slaughter houses. 
Ih dealing with the constitutional validity 
of the two standing orders of the Municipal Commis-
sioner the question of burden of proof was taken up. 
Justice R,B, Misra speaking for a Constitutional 
bench of five-judge said: 
"when tne validity uf a law placing restric-
tion on the exercise of a fundamental right in 
Art.19(1)(g) is challenged, the onus of proving to 
232. Municipal Coruoration,Ahmadabad v, Jan Mohammad, 
AIR 1986 SO 1205 
11.1 
the satisfaction of the Court that the restriction is 
reasonable lies upon the State ..... Imposition of 
restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right 
may be in the form of control or prohibition. But 
when txie exercise of a fundamental right is prohibitea* 
the burden of proving that a total ban on the exercise 
of the right alone may ensure the maintenance of the 
233 
interest of general public lies heavily upon the State." 
Wnat therefore emerges out of the decisional 
work regarding the onus to prove the legality of a 
law violating the seven freedoms enshrined in Art. 19(1) 
and the right to life under Art. 21 the foundation 
of all other fundamental rights guaranteed in various 
articles of part III of the Constitution is that the 
onus to prove lies heavily on the State because it is 
the State which is in possession of all and therefore 
due to which it imposes restriction on the citizen^ 
fundamental freedoms. It is the State which deprives 
a person of his life or personal liberty. It is well 
settled that it is the individual who has to convince 
the court that the impugned law violates his fundamental 
right under Part III of tne Constitution. But there-
after his duty comes to an end and the duty of the 
2 33. Supra*note 2 32 at p. 1210 
I l l 
State begins. Why the entire burden to prove the 
validity o£ law falls on tne State is that it iS/ 
in fact/ the State which intends to impose restric-
tions upon the exercise of the fundamental right 
of a citizen. It is therefore for the State to 
justify the validity of the Statute to the satis-
faction of the Court. it is the duty of the State 
to convince the court about the reasonableness* just-
ness and fairness of the restriction imposed on the 
freedoms under Art.19(1) or deprivation of life or 
personal liberty under Art, 21 of the constitution. 
Having followed what nas been laid dpwn by the Supreme 
Court in saqhir Ahmad/ Mohd. Faruk/ Khyrahari Tea Co. / 
Laxmi Khandsari and Municipal Corporation Ahmedabad 
Justice Bhagwati has rightly laid down a law in this 
regard in his minority opinion in Bachan Singh and 
which seems to be a lodestar who opinedi 
"The right to life stands on a higher 
footing than even personal liberty 
because personal liberty too postu-
lates a sSntJUnerit human being who can 
enjoy it, inhere therefore a law autho-
rises deprivation of the right to life, 
the reasonableness/ fairness and justness 
of the procedure prescribed by it for such 
deprivation must be establisned by the 
State",^^^ 
234. Deena v. State of Punjab/ AIR 1983 SC 1155 
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It is therefore rightly held that in case 
of violation of the right to life or personal 
liberty under Art, 21, the duty to prove the 
constitutionality and legal validity of law infringes 
the said right heavily and squarely falls on the 
State. 
Wow the question arise^ on whom the onus 
of proof liesV Because there is a conflict of 
opinion on this point. According to one set of 
decided cases the onus to prove the constitutionality 
of an enactment whicn infringes the rights in 
Articles 14,19 lies on a person who attacks it. But 
equally strong judicial opinion says the onus lies 
heavily on the State tojustify the validity of law, 
infringing the trio to the satisfaction of the 
Court. There is unanimity among the judges right 
from Chiranj it Lai, R.K. oalmia, Mohd. Hanif, B. 
Banerjee and Pathuroma that the court presumes that 
the law is legal and constitutionally perfect and 
the petitioner shows that the legislature has trans-
gressed its constitutional limits. It is therefore 
rightly said that in case of Art, 19 onus lies upon him 
who assails the constitutionality of the law. 
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But in case of law infringes several freedoms 
under Art. 19 the onus is upon the State to justify 
it under any clauses (2) to (6) of Art, 19(1), It 
is the duty of the State to prove that law is 
reasonable falling in any of the reasonable res-
trictions mentioned in clauses (2) to (6) of Art, 19 
(1) . It is the duty of the State to prove that 
law is reasonable falling in any of the reasonable 
restrictions mentioned in clauses (2) to (6) of 
clause <1) of the Art. 19 of the Constitution, 
iixtending this principle to Art, 21 as has been done by 
Justice Bhagwati in Bachan Singh that the onus of 
proof is on the State, where therefore a law autho-
rises deprivation of the right to life, the reaso-
nableness, fairness and justness of the procedure 
prescribed by it for such deprivation must be 
established by the State, 
Now what emerges on t^ e surface is that the 
burden of proof of a law infringing Art. 14 lies on 
the petitioner and in case of Art. 19(1) and Art, 21 
on the State, 
IH 
PEhi30tiAL LIBERTY 
riow to Locate its Infringement: 
What is the method or manner or the test or 
yardstick to be applied for determining whether a 
law infringes a fundamental right particularly personal 
liberty provided in Articles 21 of the Constitution? 
i^iuch waters have gone down under the judicial barrages 
erected by the Supreme Court since the days of Gopalan. 
However/ let us make cycloraxnic review of the decisional 
work of the Supreme Court done since Gopalan* Kania C.J, 
in Gopalan said: "the true approach is only to consider 
the directness of the legislation and not what will be 
the result of the detention, otherwise valid, on the 
mode of the detenue's life". 
sastri J. in Gopalan said: "there is no room for 
— 236 
the application of the rule of Pith and substance. How-
ever, the learned judge has quoted Kania,C.J. views 
laid down in Gopalan, with approval in Kam Singh wherein 
sastri J. while upholding Ram Singh's preventive deten-
tion under the Preventive Detention Act 1950 said that 
the direct object of the order was the preventive deten-
tion and not the infringement of the right of freedom of 
speech and expression which was merely consequential. 
23s. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 at 
236. Supra,note 235 at p. 70 P. 235 
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Therefore, the inevitable result of these two deci-
sions handed down by the Supreme Court in Gopalan and 
Ram Singh is that the object and form of State action 
became the determining test for determining when, how 
ana what right is affected by the law, 
riaving referred and relied on Gopalan and Ram jingh 
N.H. Bhagwati J., formulated the doctrine of the direct 
and inevitable effect test for the purpose of adjudging 
whether a law offends a particular right. All the 
consequences resulted on account of the working Journa-
lists ( conditions of Service ) and miscellaneous Act, 
1955, said i^.ri. Bhagwati J., would be remote "unless 
these were the direct or inevitable consequences of the 
23a 239 
measures enacted in the impugned Act". in sakal Papers 
while considering the constitutionality of the Newspaper 
iPrice 6( Page ) Act, 1956 and the Daily Newspaper (Price 
and page ) Order, 1960 the court evolved and applied the 
direct and immediate effect test, held the impugned Act, 
1956 and Order, 1960 as affecting the petitioner's freedom 
of speech and expression guaranteed by Art, 19(1) (a) 
240 
directly and immediately. In Dwarkadas Shrinivas the 
237. Ram Singh v. State of Delhi, i^ lR 1951 SC 270 
238. Express Mewspapers (Pvt,) Ltd, v. Union of India. 
AlK 195S SC 578 
23y. sakal fetewspapers (Pvt,) Ltd. v. Union of India, 
AIR, 1962 SC 305 
2V0, Dwarkadas Srinivasa v. The Sholapur Spinning & 
weaving Co.Ltd,, AIR 1954 SC 119 
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Supreme Court had formulated the test of Substance and 
practical result of the state action and devaluated the 
legal aspect of the impugned law upon the citizens' fun-
damental rights. The Supreme Court opined that "the 
correct approach in such cases should be to enquire as 
to what in substance is the loss or injury caused to the 
citizen and not merely what manner and method has been 
241 
adopted by the State in placing the restriction". 
What can be deduced froia the decisional work of 
the Supreme Court done in bwarkadas Srinivas« Express 
newspapers, and Sakal Paper is that the court laid mucn 
emphasis on the direct and inevitable effect and not on 
the object and form of the State action upon the rights 
2^ 42 
of the citizens. in Naresh S. Mirajkar, Gajendrakar C.J. 
after referring Kania C.J's views in Gopalan, Ram Singh, 
Express Newspapers and Atiabari decisions, agreed to 
accept the test of direct effect and object, "Any inci-
dental consequence which, observed oc;jendragadkar,C,J ., 
"may flow from the order will not introduce any consti-
243 
tutional infirmity". It therefore, means that if the 
impugned Statute directly hits upon or violates any of 
the fundamental rights of an individual, and not of its 
incidental encroachment or violation, would attract neither 
2^1. Ibid., 
242. l^ aresh Shridhar Merajkar v. State of Maharashtra, 
AIK, 1967 SC 1. ' 
243. Ibid., at p. 12 
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jurisdiction of the court nor its judicial relief. 
This is inevitable result on account of the applica-
tion of the doctrine of Pith and substance wnich is a 
juaicial technique evolved and applied when the consti-
tutional validity ot a law is challenged on the ground 
of the lack of the legislative competence of the legis-
lature. 
In Bank Nationalization^ Shah J,# speaking for 
the Court said: 
"We have carefully considered tne weighty pro-
nouncements of the eminent judges who gave shape to 
the concept that the extent of protection of important 
guarantees* such as the liberty of person, and right 
to property, depends upon the form and object of the 
State action, and not upon its direct operation upon the 
individuals' freedom. But it is not the object of the 
authority making the law impairing the Right of a 
citizen; nor the form of action taken that determines 
the protection he can claim; it is the effect of the 
law and of the action upon the right which attract the 
jurisdiction or tne court to grant relief. If this be 
the true view and we think it is, in detenjaining the 
impact of State action upon consitutional guarantees 
which are fundamental, it follows that the extent of 
protection against impairment of a fundamental right is 
UK 
determined not by the object of the legislature nor 
by the form of the action, but by its direct opera-
244 
tion upon the individuals rights," 
rthat emerges out of Bank Nationalization is the 
airect operation upon the Fundamental rights which 
means the direct consequence or etrect of the law on 
245 
the rights, Tnus, Shah J. delivering judgment on 
behalf of the ten judges of the Supreme Court in Bank 
i-iationallzation has rejected the theory of object and 
form o£ the State action as it is inconsist with the 
246 
constitutional scheme and declared that the validity 
of the State action must be adjudged in the light of 
its operation upon the rights of the individual and 
247 
groups of individuals in all their dimensions. 
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In Bennett Coleman and Co./ while expressing his 
agreement with Mr. Palkhivala and describing his views 
of Pith and substance of the subject matter and of 
direct and of incidental effect of the legislation are 
relevant questions of legislative competence but are 
irrelevant to the question of infringement of fundamental 
rights as sound and correct approach Ray J, opined: 
244. R.C.Cooper v. Union of India,AIR 1970 SC 564;-; 
245, See Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South 
Wales, (1950) AC 235 
2A6. R.C.Cooper v. Union of India,AIR 1970 SC 564 at p.596 
2-^ 7, R.C.Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970, SC 564 at p.593 
248. Bennett Coleman v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106 
11.4 
"Hr. Palkhivala said that the tests of Pitch 
and substance of the subject matter and of direct and 
of incidental effect of the legislation are relevant to 
questions of legislative competence but they are irre-
levant to the question of infringement of fundamental 
rights. In our view this is a sound and correct approach 
to interpretation of legislative measures and State 
action in relation to fundamental rights. The true 
test is whether the effect of the impugnea action is to 
take away or abridge fundamental rights. If it be 
assumed that the direct object of the law or action has 
to be direct abridgement of the right of free speech by 
the imjt^ /ugned law or action it is to be related to the 
directness of the subject matter of the impfeached law 
or action. The action may have a direct effect on a 
fundamental rights altnough its direct subject matter 
may be different therefore, the word "direct" would 
go to the quality or character of the effect and not to 
the subject-matter. The object of the law or executive 
action is irrelevant when it establishes the petitioner's 
249 
coptention about fudamental right". ^ 
Ray J., has further suggested that the correct 
approach should be to enquire what in substance is the 
loss or inquiry caused to the citizen and not merely 
249. Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 
SC 106 at PP. 119- 120 
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what manner and method has been adopted by the State 
in placing the restrictions. After having discussed 
Gopalan and Bank Nationalization Ray J, speaking for 
the court has laid down two testss First, it is not 
the object of the autnority making the law impairing 
the right of the citizen nor the form of action that 
determines the invasion of the right. Secondly, it is 
the effect of the law and the action upon the right 
whicn attracts the jurisdiction of the court to grant 
relief. The direct operation of the Act upon the 
rights forms the real test." ^ 
However, Mathew J., in his dissenting judgment 
in Bennett Coleman & Co. has likened and equated the 
"pitch and substance" theory to the direct effect test" 
and pointed out that " the Pith and substance test, 
although not strictly appropriate, might serve a useful 
25"2 
purpose" in deciding whetner the law in question 
infringes fundamental right. 
Therefore, the thing which came out of the judicial 
work done by the Supreme Court in the above stated 
cases is that the pith, and substance has, though high-
lighted by iXlathew J. in Bennett Coleman &t Co.. been 
250. Benett Coleman u Co. v. Union of India,AIK 
1973 S.C. 106 at P. 120 ~ 
251. Ibid., 120 
252. ggP^.^ at^ pr"l36'-^ '^ ' ^' ^"^^^ o^ ^"^la. AIR 1973 
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c l e a r l y negatived and disapproved by the Bank 
JMationalization and Bennett Coleman u Co. The theory 
_ijropounded by ijhah J . in Bank i^at ional izat ion had 
been applied and e laborated hy Ray J , in Bennett 
Coleman and Co, and uhe theory was : the d i r ec t 
operation the i n d i v i d u a l ' s funda;nental r i g h t . In 
i^ianaka Candhi / while r e f e r r i ng and agreeing with 
what has been l a id down by the court in Bxpress 
iviewspaper/ Bank Nat iona l iza t ion and the Bennett Goleman 
J u s t i c e Bhagwati tiius observed: 
" The p i t h and substance theory was thus negatived 
in the c l e a r e s t terms and the t e s t appl ied was as to 
what i s the d i r e c t and inev i t ab le consequence or 
e f fec t of the impugned s t a t e act ion on the fundamental 
r i g h t of* the p e t i t i o n e r . I t i s poss ib le tha t in a given 
case the p i t h and substance of the Sta te act ion may 
deal with a p a r t i c u l a r fundamental r i g h t but i t s 
d i r e c t and inev i t ab le e f fec t may become another fun-
damental r i g h t and in t h a t case , the Sta te act ion would 
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have to meet the challenge of the latter fundamental 
right. The pith and substance doctrine looks only 
at the object and subject-matter of the State action 
but in testing the validity of the State action with 
deference to fundamental rights/ what court must 
consider is the direct and inevitable consequence of 
the State action. otherwise the protection of the 
253 
fundamental right would be subtly but surely eroded. 
Bhagwati J. has in Maneka (iandhi emphasised the direct 
and inevitable effect test in the following words: 
"iNlow/ if the effect ot State action on a 
fundamental right is direct and inevitable, then a 
fortiori it must be presiamed to have been intended 
by the authority taking the action and hence this 
doctrine of direct and inevitable effect has been 
described by some jurists as the doctrine of intended 
and real effect". 
Wow the question is what has the Bank Nationa~ 
ligation done? Has it evolved something new? or Has 
it elaborated what has been said by Kania C.J. in 
Gopalan? 
253. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 
SC 597 at P. 635 
25-4. .Ibid. 
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Undoubtedly, Kania C.J. in his judgment in 
Gopalan nas used and emphasised the directness of 
the legislation upon the fundamental right as a 
determinant test for its infringement. This approach 
of Kania C.J. in Gopalan was approved by sastri J. in 
JKam Singh wherein he opined whether the State action 
is directly in respect of tue subject covered by any 
particular article of the constitution or touches 
the said article only incidentally or indirectly. 
This snows that both Kania C.J. and Sastri J. were 
under the heavy influence of the theory of Pith and 
substance. To put it differently, while they were 
dealing with the issue: what is the test to determine 
whether a Statute infringes a fundamental right, they 
did not know any other theory except Pith and Substance 
or the theory was dominating their minds. Similar 
view • was taken by Gajendragadkar C.J. in Naresh S. 
i^ ierajkar wherein he accepted that the test of direct 
effect and object is described as the Pitb and Subs-
tance, This approach adoptea Kania C.J. in Gopalan 
and Sastri J. in Kam Singh was adopted by ix.H, Bhagwuti 
in Express iviewspapers Pvt.Ltd. Though i.M.H. Bhagwati 
did not use the phrase "Pith and Substance" yet the 
learned judge had strenously laboured to develop the 
test of direct and inevitable consequences. Mr. ^..h. 
m 
Bhaywati J. formulatea this test to adjudge the valiuity 
or the impugned legislation. Thus, tne doctrine oi 
direct ana inevitable errect was clearly evolvea in 
uwarlcaaas arinivas and a little emphasis was laid on 
it by the Court in express i>iewspa^ ers P^) Ltd, i^vhy did 
not oajenarayadkar C.J. mention, tne airect and inevi-
table effect test in Uwarkadas carinivas in iMaresh j. 
aerajkar. Why did he bank on the Pith and Substance? 
why did the learned judge remain contended merely treating 
the "direct effect" as the "Pith and Substance". The 
test of direct effect and tne i-ith and substance have 
deen synonymously and interchangibly used construea 
and connoted in the same sense of the term in Kam Singht 
express i'.ewsuapers (P) Lta, and Maresn S. Herajkar. But 
this line of thinking was given a final go by the 
supreme Court in Bank jMationalizatlon, Bennett Coleman 
ot Co. ana aaneka Gandhi. In Bank Nationalization ShahJ. 
did not even refer the pith and substance. The learned 
uuage has rejected the form and object test as approvea 
in vjopalan. It was Kay j. in Bennett Coleman U Co. who 
rejected the Pitn dnd substances as suggested by Palkhi-
vala, a constitutional lawyer for the Petitioner. There-
fore, the test of direct ana inevitable effect has been 
categorically formulated by Bhagwati J. in Maneka Gandhi 
^^^^^ °" ^ warkadas Srinlvas. express ivews^apers iPvt) Ltn. 
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and bank Nat iona l iza t ion . In riindi Hitrakshak ^jamiti 
while dealing with the wr i t p e t i t i o n f i l ed under 
rtrt. 32 of the Const i tu t ion for i s sue of a wr i t of 
mandamus d i r ec t i ng the Central Government to hold pre-
medical and p re -den ta l entrance examinations in riindi 
ana otner reg iona l languages oabyasachi inukherj i ,C . J . 
has once again emphasisea tiie importance of the 
• a i r ec t anu i n e v i t a b l e ' t e s t . The learnea Chief Jus t i ce 
observed: 
"In order to establish the violation 
of a fundamental riynt, the court 
has to consider the direct and inevi-
table consequences of the action which 
is sought to be remedied or the guarantee 
of which is sought to be enforced". 25'6 
Now, therefore, the libert:y guaranteed by Article 21 
of the constitution has much wider protection. The 
Supreme Court has therefore, established its creden-
tial as the guardian of the citizens' fundamental rights. 
The narrow and cold ap^ r^oach adopted towards the demo-
cratic rights from Gopalan upto naneka Gandhi was not 
unexpected because of the fact that early judges 
appointed to the Federal Court could not adapt to the 
new life dawned by the democratic constitution. 
265, nindi riitrakshak Samiti v. Union of India, 
AlK 1990 SC 851 
25'6. Supra note/235 at P.853 
I2() 
Having surveyed the decisional work of 
tne Supreme Court on the matter it may be said 
that whenever the legislative enactment or the 
executive action is cnallenged as being violative 
oi a fundamental right the court has to find out 
whether the alleged act has direct and inevitable 
effect on the fundamental right. The court has 
therefore rightly given a final ourial to the "Pith 
and Substance" theory and has accepted the "direct 
and inevitable effect" of action on a fundamental 
right. 
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Rule of Law and Natural Justice - How extended to Personal 
Liberty : 
The term of 'Rule of Law' is derived from the French 
phrase 'Law Principe de legalite' (the Principle of legality) 
which means a government based on principles of law and not of 
men. The principle was meant to appose to arbitrariness, 
Edward Coke is considered as the originator of 'Rule of 
Law' when he said that the king must be under God and thus 
-vindicated the supremacy of the term of 'Rule of Law' and rule 
according to law*. 
The rule of law therefore means that the law rules, using 
the word 'Law in the sense of 'jus* and 'lex' both in jurispru-
dence , Romans called it 'jus naturale', Mediqevalists called 
it the 'Law of God', Hobbes, locke and Roussueau called 'social 
contract' or the 'natural law' and the modern man calls it the 
'Rule of law'. 
Diecey an authority on English constitutional law 
said : when we say that the supremacy or the rule of law is a 
characteristic of the English constitution, we generally include 
under one expression at least three distinct though kindered 
conceptions. 
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In the first place, no man is punishable or can be lawfully 
made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of 
law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary 
courts of the land. 
In the second place, the rule of law* as a characteristic of 
our country, not only that with us no man is above the law, but 
(what is a different thing) that here every man, whatever be his 
rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm 
and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals. In 
England the idea of legal equality, or of the universal subjuga-
tion of all classes to one law administered by the ordinary 
courts, has been pushed to its utmost limits with us every offi-
cial, from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector 
of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done 
without legal justification as any other citizen. 
In the third place, the 'rule of law' or the predominance of the 
legal spirit may be described as a special attribute of English 
institutions. We may say that the constitution is pervaded 
by the rule of law on the- ground that the general principles of 
the constitution (as for example the right to personal liberty, 
or the right of public meeting) are with us the result of judi-
cial decisions determining the rights of private persons in 
particular cases brought before the courts. 
I2S) 
Prof. Diecy after explaining the three postulates of 'Rule 
of Law* which torms a fundamental principle of the English 
constitution, has summarised it in three meaning from three 
Different points of view as follows: 
1. It means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or 
predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of 
arbitrary power and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of 
prerogative, or even of wide discritionary authority on the 
part of the government. Englishmen are ruled by the law and by 
the law alone; a man may with us be punished for a breach of 
law, but he can be punished for nothing else. 
2. It means, again, equality before the law, or the equal 
subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land admi-
nistered by the ordinary law courts; the rule of law in this 
excludes the idea of any exemption of officials or others from 
the duty of obedience to the law which governs other citizens or 
from the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals. 
3. The 'rule of law', lastly, may be used as a formula for 
expressing the fact that with us the law of the constitution, 
the rules which in foreign countries naturally form part of a 
constitutional code, are not the source but the consequence of 
the rights of individuals, as defined and enforced by the courts; 
that in short, the principles of private law have with us been 
by the action of the courts and parliament so extended as to 
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aetermine the position of the crown and of its servants; Thus 
the constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the land" 
The above stated essential postulates of 'Rule of Law' 
were published in his book law of the constitution in 1885 based 
on lectures he gave as Vinerian Professor of English Law at Oxford. 
The three distinguishing characteristics of the English consti-
tution that he chose to explain and illustrate were 'the 
sovereignty of parliament, the Rule of Law, and the conventions 
2 58 
of the constitution" ". Diecy's notion of equality before the 
law has been criticised by the constitutional and Administrative 
259 
land authorities . However, Professors Hood Phillips and 
0 
257. Diecy A.V., An Introduction to the Law of the Constitution. 
258. Diecy, Law of the constitution (8th ed. 1914), P. XVII, 
See also Diecy, Law of the constitution (10th ed.) Part II, 
H.W. Arondt. 'The Origins of Diecy's concept of 'Rule of 
Law' (1957) 31 ALJ 117, Points out that Diecy elaborated 
and expanded the ideas of W.E. Hearn in the Government of 
England (1867), to which Diecy made a general reference 
in the Preface to his first edition. 
259. Sir Ivor Jennings : The Law and the Constitution (5th ed.) 
Chap. 2 and Appendix II; 'In Praise of Diecy' (1935) 13 
Public Administration 123; B. Schwartz, French Administra-
tive Law and the Common Law World, Chap. 10, For a re-
appraisal of Diecy's doctrine, see F.H. Lawson, 'Diecy 
Revisited' (1959), Political Studies, Vol. VII, PP. 109, 
207. For other versionsof the rule of law, see Wade and 
Phillips, Constitutional Law (8th ed.) Chap. 5; A L Goodhart 
'The Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty(1958) 106 Univ. 
Pennsylvania Law Rev. 943. Wade and Phillips - Consti-
tutional La(w (7th ed.) PP. 74-75. Wade - Administrative 
Law (IV ed.). 
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Paul Jackson have pointed out the significant aspect of the 
Rule of Law in three ways. It influences legislations. It 
provides cannons of interpretation and it is a rule of 
260 
evioence" 
Though, fundamental rights are found in all the modern 
constitutions of the world yet they are restricted, expressly 
or impliedly, by same such concepts as 'Public order', 'due 
process of law' or 'procedure established by law'. Incorpora-
tions of natural rights known fundamental rights date from the 
revolutionary period in America and France . Both these coun-
tries have borrowed largely from English experience and thought, 
especially as embodied in the writings of locke and, in the case 
of America, Coke's commentary on Magna carta and Blackstone's 
commentaries (176b). For Blackstone's commet^tairs the'absolute 
rights of Englishmen were the rights of personal security, 
personal liberty and private property. The American Declara-
tion of Independence (1776), The American 'Bill of Rights' 
consists of 10 Amendments added in 1791 to the Federal consti-
tution of 1787. The US constitution 1st, 5th and 8th Amendments 
have jointly recognised certain valuable fundamental rights. 
These few rights guaranteed by 1st, 5th and 8th cannot be taken 
260 . 0. Hood Phillips and Paul Jackson : Constitutional and 
Administrative Law (Sixth Ed.) (1978) Chap. 40. 
i:U 
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away without due process of law . The importance and signi-
ficance of the fundamental rights can he observed by going 
through some universal and international documents . However 
the new meaning given to the 'Rule of Law* in the Declaration 
of Delhi 1959 are given below: 
1. The legislature - there is a right to representative and 
responsible government; and there are certain minimum standards 
oi principles for the law, including those contained in the 
universal Declaration and the European convention, in particular 
freedom of religious belief, assembly and association, and the 
dosence of retroactive penal laws; 
2. the executive : especially that delegated legislation should 
ue subject to independent Jucicial control, and that a citizen 
wno is wronged should have a remedy against the state or govern-
ment; 
3. the criminal process : a 'fair trial' involves such elements 
as certainly of the criminal law, the presumption of innocence. 
2 61. 'Due Process of Law' may be traced back to (1354) 28 Edn. 
Ill C.3. 
2 62. Lanterpacht, H. : International Law and Human Rights; F.G. 
Jacolis, The European Convention on Human Rights (1975); 
A.H. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe (1963;. A Declara-
tion of the Rights of Man was prepared to the French 
Constitution of 1791 and was confirmed the Preambles of the 
Constitutions of 1946 and 1958. The U.N. Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948; The European Convention 
(^ o^^ *^ ^ Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1953. 
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reasonable rules relating to arrest accusation and detention 
pending trial, the giving of notice and provision for legal 
advice, public trial, right of appeal, and absence of cruel or 
unusual punishments; 
4. the judiciary and the legal profession:thus re-quires the 
independence of the judiciary, and proper grounds and procedure 
for removal of judges; and imposes a responsibility on an 
263 
organised and autonomous legal profession 
Various fvindahiental rights ' have been incorporated 
in a number of constitutions of common wealth countries inclu-
ding India, Malaysia, Malta, Nigeria and other African 
countries 
With this background of the Rule of Law as developed in 
England and followed by the commonwealth countries let us 
therefore see it has been judicially interjected in our legal 
system. The Rule of law has assumed a greater role to play in 
our constitutional edific by putting its effective weight upon 
the constitutional functionaries.It has largely been successful 
263. Declaration of Delhi (1959) 2 J. International Commission 
of Jurists PP. 7-43; The Rule of Law in a Free Society 
•Report of International Congress of Jurists (New Delhi, 
1959). See further, N.S. Marsh, 'The Rule of Law as a 
Supra National Concept 'Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 
(ed. AG Guest 1961) Chap. 9; N.S. Marsh, 'Civil Liberties 
in Europe (1959) 7LQR 530'; A.H. Robertson, Human Rights 
in the world (1972). 
264. Sir Kenneth Roberts - Wray, 'Human Rights in the Common-
wealth' (1968) 171CLQ908. 
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in safeguarding the citizens' liberty against the powerful 
portents of the state. The constitutional efficacy of Rule 
of Law in our country has been made by the Supreme Court in a 
number of cases. In Sonawati Kumari ' the supreme court empha-
sised the importance of the rule of law and observed : It is of 
the essence of the rule of law that every authority within the 
state including the executive government should consider itself 
bound by and obey the. l*w. .-»when the state government obeys the 
law or gives effect to an order of the court passed against it, 
it is not doing anything which detracts from its dignity, but 
rather invests the law and the courts with the dignity which are 
their due, which enhances the prestige of the executive govern-
ment itself, in a democratic set*. In a similar tone the 
supreme court has once again highlighted the existence of rule 
2-66 
of law in our constitutional setup in A.K. Kraipak and thus 
observed 'Under our constitution the rule of law pervades over 
the antifield of administration. Every organ of the state under 
our constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. 
in a v;elfare state like ours it is inevitable, that the juris-
aiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid 
rate. The concept of our constitution would lose its validity 
it the instrumentalities of the state are not charged with the 
26.b. State of Bihar v. Sonawati Kumari. AIR 1961 SC 221 at P. 231. 
2^6. A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India C1970) ISCR 457 
1:^ 5 
duty of discharging their function in a fair and just manner', 
Similarly Justice H.L. Anand of the Delhi High Court has ex-
pressed his views about the rule of law and its role in our 
2f{7 democratic society in Om Oil and Oilseeds Exchange Ltd. "^  , the 
learned judge has upheld the sanctity of the rule of law even 
during the emergency and the suppresion of the fundamental 
rights. Justice H.L. Anand observed : 
The expression 'Rule of Law' is used in contradistinction 
of the rule of man. In the system in which Rule of law prevails 
it is the lav that rules even through the instrumentality of 
man, and not the man independently of or above the law. In such 
a system all executive actions must be based on legal sanction 
and tnere is no place for executive action that springs from in-
uiviauul whim . malice or caprice. Rule of law, therefore, 
has ia built safeguard against arbitrary action. Arbitrary 
action is complete anti thesis of the Rule of Law'. 
Arbitrary executive action is justiciable independently of 
any of the fundamental rights because of the concept of the Rule 
of Law that every executive action must have legal sanction 
behind it'. 
In Keshawananda Bharti rule of law has been held as a 
2^7. Om Oil and Oilseeds Exchange Ltd. v. Union of India. AIR 
1977 Delhi 132 at PP. 137-138. 
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basic structure of the constitution. Referring diceian concept 
of Rule of Law and Jenning's criticism that it is an unruly 
horse and other authorities on the subject Justice Methew has 
968 in Indira Nehru Gandhi observed : 'The provisions of the 
constitution were enacted with a view to ensure the rule of law... 
The equality aspect of the rule of law and of democratic 
republicanism is provided in Article 14*. Further the learned 
judge has observed that'the concept of equality which is basic 
to rule of law and that which is regarded as the most fundamental 
269 
postulate of republicanism are both embodied in Article 14' 
270 
In ADM Jabalpur. Ray C.J. has described that the constitution is 
271 the rule of law'. Similarly the learned chief justice said 
272 • 
that 'Article 21 is our rule of law regarding life and liberty 
In dealing with the question whether Rule of Law overrides the 
Presidential order Ray C.J. made an observation about the Rule 
2-68. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Rainarain. AIR 1975 SC 2299 at PP. 
2384-2385. See also Juome Frank 'If Men were Angles (1942J 
P. 203; Friedrich A. Aayek 'Road to Serfodom' and 
'Constitution of Liberty', Franks Committee Report (1957) 
P. 6. 
2-69. Supra note 248 at P. 2385, See also Jaisinahani v. Union 
of India AIR 1967 SC 1427 at P. 1434; Das C,J, said that 
Article 14 combines the English doctrine of the rule of 
law and the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment 
to the American Constitution. Basheshar Nath v. The 
Commr. of Income Tax AIR 1959 SC 149; 'P^tanjali Sastri 
C. J.'s opinion in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali S rkar 
AIR 1952 SC 75 at P. 79. 
2;t). ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla AIR 1976 SC 1207 
Popularly known as 'Habeas Corpus Case'. 
271. Supra note 250 at P. 1224. 
2f72. Id. at P. 1229. 
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of Law in his judicial views in the following ways : 'The Rule 
of law is not a mere catchword or incantation. Rule of law is 
not a law of nature consistent and invariable at all times and 
in all circumstances. The cert-iinty of law is one of the 
elements in the concept of the Rule of law but it is only one 
element and taken by itself, affords little guidance. The 
essential feature of 'Rule of law is that the judicial power of 
the state is, to a large extent separate from the executive and 
the legislature. Rule of law is a normative as much as it is a 
aiscriptive term. It exprfe'si^ s ^- i^if^ai as much as a juristic 
2 73 fact. The Rule of law is not identical with a free society '. 
In ADM JabalDur. Khanna J. in his strong dissent observed that 
274 
•Rule of law is the antithesis of arbitrariness' 
The Rule of law has therefore been accepted as a norm of 
all civilized society. Rule of law has come to be regarded as 
the mark of a free society 
97 6 
In Bachan Singh while delivering the minority opinion 
of trie court justice Bhagwati described the importance and signi-
ficance of the constitution and of the fundamental rights 
ensuring the dignity of man. The learned judge has observed : 
273. Id. at P. 1234. 
274. I^. at P. 1254. 
275. Ibid. See also H. Malcolm Macaonald : Rule of Law. 
at PP. 3-6. 
276. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab. AIR 1982 SC 1325. 
a 
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'It may be pointed out that our constitution is a unique 
ocument. It is not a mere pedantic legal text but it embo-
oies certain human values cherished principles and spiritual 
norms and recognises and upholds the dignity of man. It accepts 
the inaividual as the focal point of all development and regards 
nis material, moral and spiritual development as the chief 
concern of its various provisions. It does not treat the indi-
vidual as a C og in the mighty all powerful machine of the state 
but places him at the centre of the constitutional scheme and 
focuses on the fullest development of his personality. The 
preamble makes it clear that the constitution is intended to 
secure to every citizen social, economic and political justice 
and equality of status and opportunity and to promote fraternity 
assuring the dignity of the individual^ 
Giving a practical content to Rule of Law and describing 
it as a basic feature of our constitutional edific justice 
Bhagwati has in Bachan Singh observed : It is clear that the 
rule of law permeates the entire fabric of the constitution and 
indeed forms one of its basic features. The rule of law exclu-
aes arbitrariness. Its postulatesis intelligence without 
passion' and 'reason freed from desire'. Wherever we find 
arbitrariness or unreasonableness there is denial of the rule 
2 77. Supra note 256 at P. 1336. 
m 
of law. That is why Aristotle preferred a government of laws 
rather than of men. 'Law!, in the context of the rule of law 
does not mean any law enacted by the legislative authority, 
howsoever arbitrary or despotic it may be. Otherwise even 
under a dictatorship it would be possible to say that there is 
rule of law, because every law made by the dictator, howsoever 
arbitrary and unreasonable has to be obeyed and every action 
has to be taken in conformity with such law. In such a case 
too even where the political set up is dictatorial, it is the 
law that governs the relationship between men and men and bet-
ween men and the state. But still it is not rule of law as 
understood in modern jurisprudence, because in jurisprudential 
terms, the law itself in such a case being an emanation from the 
absolute will of the dictator it is in effect and substance the 
rule of man and not of law which prevails in such a situation. 
What is necessary element of the rule law is that the law must 
not be arbitrary or irrational and it must satisty the test of 
reason and the democratic form . of policy seeks to ensure this 
element by making the framers of the law accountable to the 
people'?^® 
With the demolition of the doctrine of exclusivity pro-
pounded in Gopalan the court has qiven much vitality to the 
three fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 14, 19 and 21 of 
2Vd, Id. at PP. 1336-1337. 
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the constitution. The majority judgement in Bank Nationali-
zation has rightly done away with mutual exclusivity or 
separatist nature of the fundamental rights described in 
Gopalan. This judicial attitude has infused a new active life 
into otherwise inactive, passive and docile fundamental rights 
gauranteed by Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the constitution. These 
three Articles 14, 19 and 21 constituting, as Chandrachud C.J. 
said in Minerva Mills, a golden triangle have breathed vitality 
in the concept of the rule of law. It is this rule of law which 
has compelled Justice Bhagwati while relying on Rovappa to 
Declare in Maneka Gandhi that 'Equality is antithetical to 
aroitrariness. In fact, equality and arbitrariness are sworn 
enemies. One belongs to the rule of law while the other to the 
^•19* 
whim and caprice of an absolute monarch'^  , Therefore Justice 
Bhagwati in order to widen the ambit of rights contained in 
Articles 14 and 21 has read them together and allowed the rule 
of law to play its vital and effective role in safeguarding them 
from the unjust, unfair and arbitrary state action. The learned 
judge has therefore said : 
•Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in state action and 
ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of 
reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is 
an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades 
2'?9. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India. AIR 1978 SC 597 at P. 624 
1 4 1 
Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure 
contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonable-
ness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be 
'right, and just and fair' and not arbitrary, fanciful or 
oppressive, otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the 
2 3D 
requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied' 
It was Justice Bhagwati who read Diceyian rule of law 
into the right to life and personal liberty in Article 21 in 
in Maneka Gandhi. Since Dicey has described the principle of 
equality as a second postulate of his celebrate theory ot rule 
of law which has been treated as a core of English constituti-
onal system. It is this doctrine of equality before law has 
been incorporated in Article 14 as a base of constitutional 
equality. When Justice Shah speaking for the Supreme Court in 
Bank Nationalization has demolished the doctrine of exclusivity 
of fundamental rights as propounded in Gopalan, then what has 
been done by Justice Bhagwati in Maneka Gandhi is that the 
procedure for the deprivation of person's liberty under Article 
21 must oe 'right and just and fair'. The rightness, justness 
an; idirness of the procedure established by law under Article 
21 must be determined on the anvil of reasonableness contem-
plated by Article 14. Thus Maneka Gandhithrouah Justice 
Bhagwati is responsible for interjection and infilteration of 
280. Ibid. 
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Rule of law in the domain of personal liberty guaranteed in 
Article 21 of the constitution. It is Maneka Gandhi which gave 
to the law a new dimension and a new vitality. It is with this 
decision that the court burst forth into unprecedented crPcitive 
jucicidl activity. Until Maneka Gandhi the view held by the 
Supreme Court was that Article 21 merely embodied Diceyian 
concept of the Rule of Law that no one can be deprived of his 
personal liberty by executive action unsupported by law. It 
was intended to be no more than a protection against executive 
action which had no authority of law. If there was a law oro-
vioing some sort of procedure, it was held enough to deprive a 
person of his life or personal liberty. That is if the law 
enacted by the legislature contains a procedure for the depri-
vation of life or personal liberty is a law within Article 21 
which can not be questioned at all. It was this idea of 
Diceyian concept of rule of law which made the majority judges 
of the Supreme Court in Gopalan to read that the word 'law' 
under Article 21 meant state made law. It was this idea of 
law under Article 21 which coaxed justice S.R. Das in Gopalan 
to agree that if the law provided that the Bishop of Rochester 
be boiled in oil, it would be valid under Article 21. This 
Gopalan idea of concept of the rule of law has been thrown away 
in stock, lock and barrel by Justice Bhagwati in Maneka Gandhi. 
Maneka Gandhi marks a watershed in the development of the 
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most cherished fundamental right of the citizens guaranteed 
in Article 21 in which the court has viewed that Article 21 
aflords protection not only against executive action but also 
aqdinst legislation and any law which deprives a person of his 
lite or personal liberty would be invalid unless it prescribes 
a procedure for such deprivation which is just, fair and 
reasonable. The concept of reasonableness therefore wins 
tfirough the entirefabric of the constitution. The concept of 
reasonableness contemplated by Article 14 as held by Bhagwati 
J. in Maneka Gandhi is a brooding omnipresence demands that it 
is not enough tor the law merely to provide some semblance of 
a procedure but the procedure for depriving a person of his 
life or personal liberty must be just, fair and reasonable. 
In the three Husainara Khatoon cases Justice Bhagwati 
delivering the opinion of the court and relying on Maneka 
Gdndhi and M H Hoskot said that there can be little doubt, after 
the dynamic interpretation placed on Article 21 that procedure 
prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty must be 
'just, fair and reasonable'. No procedure which does not ensure 
a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair 
or just' and it would be fall foul of Article 21. There can, 
tnerefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial 
we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essen-
tial part of the fundamental right to life and liberty 
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ensnrined in Article 21^®^. Further, while relying on Maneka 
Gandhi and M H Hoskot Justice Bhagwati observed that a procedurp 
prescribed by law does not make available legal services to an 
accused person who is too poor to afford a lawyer can not 
possibly be regarded as 'reasonable, fair and just'. The right 
to free legal services is, therefore, clearly an essential 
ingredient of reasonable, fair and just procedure for a person 
accused of an offence and it must be held implicit in the 
guarantee of Article 21 . Thus, the dynamic and comprehen-
sive legal service has now become a part of Article 21 in order 
to make the justice available to the poor, ignorant and illi-
terate ordinary common man. 
Therefore the constitutional mandate of equality implicit 
in Article 14 and the right to life and liberty conferred by 
Article 21 and as interpreted in Maneka Gandhi Justice Bhaqwati 
has unhesitatingly extended the rule of law into Article 21 by 
holding that a procedure established by law must be just, fair 
and reasonable' which includes in itself the right to speedy 
trial and the right to free legal service. 
281. Husainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar AIR 1979 SC 1360 
at P. 1365. See also Khatri v. State of Bihar. AIR 
1981 SC 928. 
282. Id. at P. 1374 
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In Francis Coralie Mullin Justice Bhagwati has held 
the right to live with human dignity as a part of the right to 
life and personal liberty guaranteed in Article 21 of the 
constitution. In the same may justice Bhagwati has emphasised 
the free legal aid as a right implicity included in the right 
to life and personal liberty guaranteed in Article 21 of the 
constitution. In Sheela Barse the court has clearly 
observed that the legal assistance to a poor is sine qua non 
of justice and where it is not provided injustice may result 
and hence it corrodes the iounajtion of democracy and rule of law. 
985 
In a host of cases the free legal assistance to a poor, 
ignorant and indigent accused has been declared as an essential 
ingredient of the right to life and personal liberty, 'The free 
legal aid to poor has now become a rule of law. The state is 
under a constitutional manaate to orovide a lawyer to an 
accused person if the circumstances of the case and the need of 
justice so require. If the state fails to discharge' its 
constitutional obligation by not providing a competent lawyer 
at its own cost to an accused despite the circumstances and the 
263. Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territorv of Delhi. AIR 
1981 SC 746 at P. 753. 
264, Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1983 SC 378 
2'8&. M H Hoskot V. State of Maharashtra. AIR 1978 SC 1548J 
Husainara Khatooi^ v. State of Bihar. AIR 1979 SC 1360f 
Husainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar. AIR 1979 SC 1369; 
Khatri v. State of Bihar. AIR 1981 SC 928; Kadia Pahadiva v, 
State of Bihar. AIR 1981 SC 939 and Sheela Barse v. 
State of Maharashtra. AIR 1983 SC 378. 
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need of justice such failure would protanto result into the 
deprivation of the life and liberty guarantee not in accordance 
with the procedure established by law. To ensure fairness, 
justness and reasonableness even in depriving a citizen of his 
life or personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 the obser-
vance of rule of law as a watch dog is a must. Keeping this 
basic rule of law in view Justice Bhagwati has in Bachan 
Singh said that the rule of law has much greater vitality under 
our constitution than in other countries like the United Kingdom 
which has no constitutionally enacted fundamental rights. 
Describing the three basic and fundamental postulates of Rule 
of Law Justice Bhagwati has in Bachan Singh observed : 
The rule of law has really three basic and fundamental 
assumptions one is that law making must be essentially in the 
hands of a democratically elected legislature suject of course 
to any power in the executive in an emergent situation to pro-
mulgate ordinances effective for a short duration while the 
legislature is not in session as also to enact deligated legis-
lation in accordance with the guide lines laid down by the 
legislature; the other is that, even in the bands of a demo-
cratically elected legislature, there should not be unfettered 
legislative power, for as Jefferson said : 'Let no man be 
trusted with power but tie him down from making mischief by the 
grace of the constitution', and lastly there must be an 
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independent judiciary to protect the citizen against excesses 
of executive and legislative power. Fortunately, whatever 
uncharitable and irresponsible critics might say when they 
find a decision of the court going against the view held by 
them, we can confidently assert that we have in our country all 
these three elements essential to the rule of law. It is plain 
and indisputable that under our constitutional law can not be 
arbitrary or irrational and if it so, it would be clearly in-
valid, whether under Article 14 or Article 19 or Article 21, 
286 
whichever be applicable 
It can therefore be said that the Supreme Court has been 
engaged in expanding and strengthening the roots of rule of 
law in our system. The court has undoubtedly treated the rule 
of law as a protective umbrella to or shield to protect an 
ordinary citizen against the onsloughts of the executive. 
Every facet of the law which deprives a person of his life or 
personal liberty would therefore have to stand the test of 
reasonableness, fairness and justness in order to be outside 
the inhibition of Article 21. 
2^6. Bachan Slnah v. State of Punjab. AIR 1982 SC 1325 
at P. 1340. 
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RIGHT TO LIVELIHOOD 
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THE RIGHT TO LIVELIHOOD 
For the first time the right to livelihood was raised 
in Sant Ram . The brief facts of Sant Ram leading to the 
argument that the word 'life' in Article 21 includes 
'livelihood' are; On receipt of a letter dated April 28, 
1959 from the Secretary of the Supreme Court Bar Association 
the Registrar of the Supreme court issued notices to Sant 
Ram and Budh Dev Sharma to show cause why their names 
should not be included in the "list of touts" to be kept 
hung up on the court notice board according to Rule 24 of 
the Supreme Court Rules framed by the Supreme Court under 
the power conferred by Article 145 of the Constitution. 
The petitioners have, inter alia, challenged the impugned 
rule that it infringes Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution, 
Because it has the tendency to deprive the petitioner of 
his livelihood. 
It was further argued that the word "life" in Article 
21 of the Constitution includes "livelihood", Sinha C.j. 
speaking for the court, rejected the contention. The ques-
tion has not in terms been dealt with by Article 21 of the 
Constitution. That question is included in the freedoms 
enumerated in Article 19, particularly Clause (g) or even 
in Article 16 in a limited sense, but the language of 
!• in re Sant Ram. AIR 1960 SC 932, The case is popularly 
)cnown as "Touting Case". 
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Article 21 cannot be pressed into aid of the argument 
that the word "life" in Article 21 includes "livelihood" 
also. 
3 
in A.V« Nachane once again the validity of the Life 
Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 and the Life 
Insurance Corporation Class m and Class IV employees 
(Bonus and Dearness Allowance) Rules, 1981 has been sought 
to be challenged inter alia on the ground that it deprived 
the Lie employees of their livelihood included in the 
fundamental right to life guaranteed in Article 21 of the 
Constitution. Mr. Justice Gupta has, having referred and 
relied on Sant Ram, said that "the word 'life' in Article 
21 includes livelihood was considered and rejected"* in 
that case. 
Thus, the right to livelihood was raised both in 
Sant Ram and Nachane but was rejected tersely. In Sant Ram 
the Chief justice Sinha did not think it proper to discuss 
and has outrightly rejected it by saying that "the word 
'life' in Article 21 includes livelihood has to be stated 
to be rejected." The learned Chief justice has neither 
discussed the issue nor has given any reason for the rejec-
tion of the same. However, Sinha C.J, has indicated that 
issue of livelihood may be included in Article 19(1)(g) 
2. Supra note 1 at 935. 
3. A.V. Nachane v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1126. 
4. A.V. Nachane, 1982 Lab. I.e. 161 at p. 166. 
lafl 
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or in Article 16 of the Constitution. The reason which 
seemed to have influenced the mind of the Chief Justice 
in holding that the word 'life' in Article 21 cannot be 
read to include livelihood was to clean the corridors of 
Justice in the Supreme Court - the highest court is the 
land - of which he was the head. Moreover, the Rules 23 
and 24 were drafted by the Supreme Court itself in exercise 
of the power conferred oh it by Article 145 of the Consti-
tution for taking action against the person or persons 
engaged in corroding the places of the justice like the 
Supreme Court. However, the 'touting' cannot be said to be 
a fair, just and legitimate source of livelihood of the 
petitioner like 'gambling' or prostitution or running and 
keeping brothel houses. Since the recommendation was made 
by the Secretary of the Supreme Court Bar Association 
passed in its executive meeting, the Supreme Coxirt would 
have become party to the dirty game of 'touting' if it 
had not rejected the argument. Therefore, the Supreme Court 
did nothing except cooperating with the Supreme Court Bar 
Association. 
Even after 22 years, the Supreme Court speaJcirig 
through justice A.C. Gupta gave the reply in the same style 
to the question that the word 'life' in Article 21 includes 
Article 19(1)(g); All the citizens shall have the right 
to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupa-
tion, trade or business. Article 16 there shall be 
equality of opportunity for all citizens in rr..?tters 
relating to employment or appointment to any office 
under the State. 
ir.i 
livelihood in Nachane as Sinha C.J. had given in Sant Ram 
In dealing with the issue of the right to livelihood raised 
in Nachane justice Gupta has not felt the judicial wind 
started blowing from the East to the West favouring Funda-
mental Right particularly Article 21 from Maneka Gandhi. 
The facts and circumstances of Sant Ram differ from Nachane 
-^•^  Sant Ram what was sought to be protected was 'touting' 
within Article 21 which could not be said to be a fair and 
legal profession atleast in the precincts of the Supreme 
Court though it has become a well accepted 'trick' of the 
trade in the Supreme Court and the High Courts. And in 
N.achane what was claimed was the bonus by describing it as 
a 'livelihood' within the meaning and ambit of the word 
'life' used in Article 21 of the Constitution. 
As we know the bonus is an award to be given to the 
workers in return of their labour. It is well accepted 
monetory benefit to be given to the employees. The bonus 
has delinked itself from the 'productivity linkage' and 
now it is given to all employees irrespective of the fact 
whether they are working in productivity or non-producti-
vity section with the result the very basis of the limit 
of Rs. 750 per month or Rs. 1600 per month fixed in the 21C 
Class III and Class IV Employees (Bonus and Dearness 
Allowance) Rules, 1981 has been raised to Rs. 1150 per 
month and Rs. 2500 per month so as to include all central 
1^2 
employees for the purpose of Bonus. This change of time, 
therefore, should have been noticed by Justice Gupta in 
Nachane. Mr. Justice Gupta has either deliberately or 
knowingly, ignored or refused to make a clear cut distinc-
tion between Sant Ram and Nachane on the basis of their 
facts and circumstances. Justice Gupta seems to be absessed 
with the labour problem afflicting the society largely and 
has, therefore, adopted a rigid approach regarding the most 
fundamental right of livelihood raised in Nachane. But 
the learned judge and for that matter no judge in the 
Supreme Court should forget the Chief Justice Marshal 
observation made in Marbury v. Madison that "it is the 
Constitution we are expounding ", Therefore, what was 
involved in Nachane was the bonus claimed as livelihood, 
I hope it is, to be read as included in the word 'life' 
used in Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, 
Justice Gupta was called upon to expound the right to live-
lihood within the right to life and personal liberty 
guaranteed in Article 21 of the Constitution. But the 
honourable judge has neither realised the importance of 
the right involved nor his own constitutional status in 
Nachane. Justice Gupta mis^ jeo the opportunity which 
knocked his judicial door to read 'livelihood' in 'life' 
used in Article 21 of the Constitution because he is now 
a retired man. Drawing analogy and inspiration from Sant 
Ram for the purpose of reading 'livelihood' in Article 2.1 
was therefore logically incorrect. 
ir.3 
l-:owever, the_Maneka Gandhi has been illuminating the 
dark aspects of our society. Justice Bhagwati taking ins-
piration from the Preamble of our Constitution designed 
to assure the dignity of the individual and Maneka Gandhi 
expanding and illuminating capacity held in Asiad Case 
that Article 21 includes in its ambit the 'right to live 
with basic human dignity*. In dealing with the Public 
Interest Litigation writ filed by the People's Union of 
Democratic Rights with a view to help judicially the poor, 
ignorant and illiterate workers engaged in the country's 
prestigious construction work due to their indigenous 
position they were living in subhuman conditions, Bhagwati 
J. made an observation* 
"the right of life guaranteed under Article 21 is 
not only confined merely to physical existence or 
to the use of any Faculty or limb through which 
life is enjoyed or the soul communicates with out-
side world but it also includes within its scope 
and ambit the right to live with basic human 
dignity ""^  
Therefore, the tarch of expanding the concept of life 
and personal liberty under Article 21 lighted in Maneka 
Gandhi by no less than Bhagwati J. has been carried 
6. People's Union of Democratic Rights v. Union of India, 
AIR 1982 SC 1473. It is popularly known as 'Asiad Case' 
1, Supra note 6 at P. 1485. 
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forward to ensure justice to the labour force labouring 
to level up the,ir deficiency in Aslad Case by holding that 
the right to life and liberty in Article 21 includes the 
right to live with basic human dignity. Now this right 
to live with basic human dignity as held in Maneka Gandhi 
and Francis Coralie is nothing but a judicial fulfil-
ment of the pledge made by we 'the people' in its national 
parchment designed to assure the dignity of the individual , 
This preamblar purpose the dignity of the individual is 
further augmented by the 'right to live with basic hvunan 
dignity' which is dependent upon his 'livelihood' and, 
therefore, it must be read as an integral part of the 
right to life and personal liberty enshrinedin Article 
Q 
21 of the Constitution. 
9 
In Begulla Bapi Raju a three judge constitutional 
Bench of the Supreme Court speaking through Justice R.B. 
Misra held SantRam as holding the field. In challenging 
the validity of the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agri-
cultural Holdings) Act, 1973 is being violative of 
Article 21, Mr. Pradece, Counsel for the petitioners, 
argued that the impugned Act has deprived the petitioners 
of their surplus land which in effect has deprived them 
8. Surendra Kumar v. Union of India^ 1986 Lab. I.C. 
lAll) 1516 at P. 1519. Justice B.N. Sapru delivering 
judgement for himself and on behalf of Justice A.N. 
Dikshita.for the Division Bench of the Allahabad High 
Court having relied on Olga Tellis held that "in res-
pect of the employees, like the Petitioner, the right 
to employment would be a right protected under Article 
21 of the Constitution as his livelihood depends on 
his continued employment". 
ir.5 
of their livelihood affecting their right to live as 
guaranteed by Article 21. The learned Counsel brushed 
aside Sant Ram and Nachane argued that whether the right 
to live with human dignity the decision on Maneka Gandhi 
must be deemed' to be the correct exposition of the law 
on the subject. Justice R.B. Misra has repelled the 
contention that the life includes livelihood within the 
meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution as Maneka 
Gandhi did not take into consideration the case of 
Sant Ram. 
Again the Supreme Court speaking through Justice 
R.B. Misra has refused to read 'livelihood' in Article 
21 of the Constitution. In a successive manner the Sup-
reme Court has repelled the reading of livelihood in life 
used in Article 21 without the least, I hope it is not, 
realising what it was doing in Sant Ram, Nachane and 
Bequlla Bapi Raju. This last judicial delivery in Begulla 
Bapi Raju came to the close heels of Asiad Case in which 
Bhagwatl J. reiterated his earlier view expressed in 
Maneka Gandhi to remind the role of the court in interpre-
ting the fundamental rights. Bhagwati J, said: "when 
9. Bequlla Bapi Raju v. State of A.P., AIR 1983 SC 1073; 
Board of Trustees, Port of Bombay v. Dilip Kumar 
Nadkarni, AIR (1983) 1 SC 124. 
10. Supra note 1 at P. 1080; See also Justice B.L. Yadav's 
judgement delivered for the (DB) of the Allahabad High 
Court in Prem Prakash v. State of U.P., 1986 Lab.I.C. 
896 at P. 899 wherein after referring Sant Ram,Nachane 
15fi 
interpreting the provisions of the Constitution conferr-
ing fundamental rights, the attempt of the court should 
be to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental rights 
11 
rather than to attenuate their meaning and content." 
Viewed in this angle it can safely be concluded that 
no attempt has been made by the Supreme Court to expand 
the concept of 'life* as used in Article 21 so as to 
include llivelihood' in Sant Ram, Nachane and Begulla 
3api Raju. While i>inha C.J. Gupta and R.B. Misra JJ. in 
these cases expounding or interpreting the constitution 
or an ordinary xegislative enactments . 
12 In Baldev Raj in which a constable in Punjab Police 
was suspended from service for participating in the 
agitation was reinstated in service as per the decision 
of the Supreme Court and was compulsorily retired on the 
same day. In the absence of any record and the annuaa. 
confidential report the compulsory order was made not in 
public interest but to make a pretence of reinstatement 
and to get rid of the constable. Justice Desai delivering 
judgement of the court said: "The order of compulsory 
retirement affects the livelihood of the person in whose 
and Begulla Bapi Ra-ju held that "the concept of the 
livelihood of the petitioner can be derived from 
Article 16 and Article 19 of the Constitution and it 
could never be the intention of the legislature to 
include the concept of livelihood in the word 'life' 
as provided under Article 21". 
^^- People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, 
AIR 1982 SC 14/3 -at P. 1487. ' 
15? 
respect the order is made " However, in the instant 
case the question of the inclusion of 'livelihood' in 
Article 21 was not raised. But was raised whether the 
compulsory retirement affected the person's livelihood 
and justice Desai answered in affirmative. But it may be 
pointed out that when an order of compulsory retirement 
has been held to have affected the retired person's 
livelihood, then it would have-been better for Justice 
Desai to declare the livelihood as included in Article 
21 of the Constitution. Alas Justice Desai has also 
failed to rise to the occasion. 
13 In Venkata Reddy . the constitutional vali-
dity of the Andhra Pradesh Abolition of Posts of Part-
Time Village Officer orders 1984 was challenged. It was 
argued that ^ abolishing the posts of Part-time village 
officers and by throwing the petitioners out of the posts 
has violated Article 21 of the Constitution. Justice 
Venkataramiah delivering the court judgement said; 
"It is hardly necessary to deal with the point 
elaborately since the petitioners are not being 
deprived of their right to life and liberty by 
ee' s 
12. Baldev Raj v. State of Punjab; 1984 Lab. I.C (SC) 
621 at P. 623; See also Justice A.M. Bhattacharj 
judgement in Sonam Lama v. State of Sikkim; 1986 Lab 
I C. (Sikkim) 815 who held that an order of compul-
sory retirement deprives a person of its livelihood 
which is included in the right to life conferred by 
Article 21 of the Constitution. 
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the abolition of the posts of part-time Village 
Officers by their ceasing to be holders of those 
posts." 
In the instant case Justice Venkataramiah delivered 
the judgement on behalf of his brother Judges Chandrachud 
C.J., Desai, Chinappa Reddy and R.N. Misra, JJ. The lear-
ned judge has outrightly said that the abolition of part-
time Village Officers has not deprived the petitioners 
of their right to life and liberty under Article 21 of 
the Constitution. These two cases Baldev Raj and Venkata 
Reddy are directly connected with the creation, continua-
tion and abolition of the post which is a sovereign power 
14 
as held in Ramanathan Pillai. Nevertheless, Justice 
VenKataramiah should have attempted to expand rather than 
to attenuate the right to life so as to include livelihood 
in its ambit and devised the judicial technique to save 
the constitutionality of the A.P. Abolition of Part-Time 
Village Officers Ordinance, 1984 as the Acting Chief 
Justice Bhattacharjee has done in Sonam Lama referred 
above. 
1 5 1 fi 
In Bandhua Muktl Morcha and Neerja Chaudhary 
Justice Bhagwati was called upon to deal with the Public 
13. Venkata Reddy v. State of A.P., 1986 Lab. I.C. (SC) 
357 at P. 368. 
14. Ramanathan Pillai v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 2641 
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Interest Litigation petitions involving the identifica-
tion, release and rehabilitation of the bonded labourers 
under the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976. 
v;hile describing the bonded labourers' consigned to a 
life of utter deprivation and degradation'as a blot on our 
national life'. Justice Bhagwati J. has once again made 
it clear that "It is the fundamental right cf everyone 
in this country, assured under the interpretation given 
17 
to Article 21 by this court in Francis Coralie Mullin 
18 to live with human dignity free from exploitation." 
The entire judicial credit goes to Justice Bhagwati 
who has been consistently and constantly emphasising and 
upholding the "right to live with human dignity in Maneka 
Gandhi, Francis Coralie Mullin, Asiad Case, Bandhua Mukti 
Korcha and Neer.ja Chaudhary. This strong desire of Justice 
Bhagwati expressed in the above mentioned decisions has 
been finally given a judicial seal of approval by 
Chandrachud C.J, on behalf of his other four judges in 
19 ' Oleaa Tellis. 
15. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, 
1984 Lab. l.C. (SC) 560. 
16. Neerja Chaudhari v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC 1099 
17. Francis Coralie Mullin v. Delhi Administration, 
AIR 1980 SC 849. 
18. Supra note 15 at P. 569. 
19. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 
SC 180 the case is referred herein as Pavement and 
Slum Dwellers." 
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in Olqa Tellis the three petitioners in the group 
of writ petitions are journalists and two pavement dwel-r 
lers. One of the pavement dwellers, P. Angamuthu migrated 
from Salem, Tamil Nadu to Bombay in 1961 in search of 
employment. The second came to Bombay in 1969 from Sangani-
ner Maharashtra and got job in Bombay as a BadlL Kamagar 
for Rs. 350 per month. On July 13, 1981 the then Chief 
>'.inister A.R. Antulay made an announcement that the pave-
ment dwellers will be evicted forcibly and deported to 
places to their respective places of origin or removed 
to places outside the city of Bombay. The Chief Minister 
directed the Police Commissioner to provide the necessary 
assistance to the Bombay Maa-icipdl OorporatiOfi to .demolisn the 
ptivement dwellings and deport the pavement dwellers. 
Another batch of writ petitions relate to the Kamraj 
Nagar hutment or slum or basti dwellers were more than 
500 and were engaged in laying water pipes along the wes-
tern Express Highway. These residents are municipal, 
factory, hotel workers. They obtained a High Court interim 
injunction restraining the Officers of the State Govern-
ment and Bombay Municipal Corporation from implementing 
the order of the Chief Minister. 
They challenged the impugned order of the Chief Minis-
ter on several grounds. The main thrust of their attack 
on the order of the Chief Minister for demolishing the 
l i ) l 
pavement and slum dwellings is that they have a right to 
live, a right which cannot be exercised without the means 
of livelihood. They have no option but to flock to big 
cities like Bombay, which provide the means of bare subsis-
tence. They only choose a pavement or a slum which is 
nearest to their place of work. In a word, their plea is 
that the right to live is illusory without a right to the 
protection of the means by which alone life can be lived. 
Mr. Prafulla Chandra Bidwai, a journalist in his 
statement in reply to the Bombay Municipal Commissioner, 
stated that the pavement and slum dwellers, who number 
about 47,7 lakhs, constitute about 50 percent of the total 
population of Greater Bombay that they supply the major 
work force for Bombay from menial jobs to the most highly 
skilled jobs and thus they have been making a significant 
contribution to the economic life of Bombay and, therefore, 
it is unfair to destroy their homes and to deport them. 
In the end Mr. Bidwai made a passionate appeal to the 
court: A home is a home wherever it is "The slxom dwel-
lers are the sine qua non of the city. They are entitled 
to a quid pro quo." It is conceded expressly that the peti-
tioners do not claim any fundamental right to live on the 
pavements. The right claimed by them is the right to live, 
20 
atleast to exist. 
20. Olqa Tellis at 187. 
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The senior lawyers of the Supreme Court India, jaising, 
Mr. U.M. Tarkunde and Mr. Ram jethmalani argued that 
evicting a pavement dweller or slxjun dweller from his habi-
tat amounts to depriving him of his right to livelihood, 
which is comprehand«d in the right guaranteed by Article 
21 of the constitution. In other words, the eviction of 
pavement and slum dwellers will lead in a vicious circle, 
to the deprivation of their employment, their livelihood 
and, therefore, to the right to life. Mr. Ram Jethmalani 
21 
relied on Justice Douglas observation made in Baksey in 
which the learned judge said: 
"The right to work I have assumed was the most pre-
cious liberty that man possesses. Man has indeed, as much 
right to work as he has to live, to be free and to own 
property. To work means to eat and it also means to live." 
In his concluding arguments, Mr. Ram Jethmalani sub-
mitted that the right to live and the right to work are 
integrated and interdependent and, therefore, if a person 
is deprived of'his job as a result of his eviction from a 
slum or a pavement, his right to life is put in jeopardy. 
The petitioners have further rebutted the contention 
of the respondents and argued that the Urban Land (Ceiling 
and Regulation) Act, 1975 has failed to its object that in 
Bombay 5% of the land holders own 55% of the land. Even 
21. Baksey v. Board of Regents. (1954) 347 MD 442. 
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though 2952.83 hectares of urban land is available in 
excess of the permissible ceiling area, only 41.51% of this 
excess land was so far acquired. The pavement dwellers and 
the slum dwellers who constitute 50% of the population of 
Bombay, occupy only 25% of the city's residential land. 
It is in these circumstances that out of sheer necessity 
for a bare existence, the petitioners are driven to occupy 
the pavements and slums. They live in Bombay because they 
are employed in Bombay and they live in pavements because 
there is no other place where they can live. 
Chandrachud C.J. observedJ 
We will assume the factual correctness of the premise 
that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, 
they will be deprived of their livelihood. Upon that assump-
tion, the question which we have to consider is whether the 
right to life includes the right to livelihood. We see only 
one answer to that question, namely, that it does. The 
sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide 
and far reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot 
be extinguished, except according to procedure established 
by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An 
equally important facet of the right is the right to live-
lihood because, no person can live without the means of 
living, that is, the means of livelihood, if the right to 
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livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional 
right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his 
right to life would be to deprive him of his means of 
livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation 
would not only denude the life of its effective content 
and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to 
live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in 
accordance with the procedure established by law, if the 
right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right 
to life. That which alone makes it impossible to live, 
leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be 
an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a per-
son of his livelihood and you shall have deprived him of 
his life."^^ 
Drawing unimpeachable nexus between life and the means 
of livelihood from the massive migration of rural people 
in search of livelihood Chandrachud CJ observed that "they 
have to 6at to live : only a handful can afford the luxury 
of living to eat. They can do, namely, eat, only if they 
23 have the means of livelihood." The learned Chief Justice 
Chandrachud has elaborated his theme of philosophy based 
on Justice Douglas's views expressed in Baksey. Chandrachud 
CJ said: "The right to work is the most precious liberty 
22. Olga Tellis, at 193-194. 
23. Ibid at P. 194. 
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that man possesses. It is the most precious liberty because 
it sustains and enables a man to live and the right to life 
24 
IS a precious freedom." 
Employing Article 39(a) and Article 41 as a judicial 
interpretative tool so as to know the meaning and content 
of fundamental rights, Chandrachud CJ said "If there is 
an obligation upon the State to secure to the citizens an 
adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it 
would be sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood 
from the content of the right to life. The State may not, 
by affirmative action, be compellable to provide adequate 
means of livelihood or work to the citizens. But, any per-
son, who is deprived of his right to livelihood except 
according to procedure established by law, can challenge 
the deprivation as offending the right to life conferred 
by Article 21 ."^^ 
Turning to the factual situation that the landless 
labourers imbeded in the mire of poverty are forced to 
migrate to urban areas like Bombay, in search of job. 
Chandrachud CJ said. "To lose the pavement or the slum is 
to lose the job. The conclusion, therefore, in terms of 
the constitutional phraseology is that the eviction of the 
petitioners will lead to deprivation of their livelihood 
24. Ibid at P. 194. 
25. Ibid at P. 194. 
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and consequently to the deprivation of life." The L«arned 
Chief Justice after a great deal of his discussion relat-
ing to the question whether the 'right to livelihood' is 
included in the 'right to life' under Article 21 he has 
summarised his views: 
"Two conclusions emerge from his discussion: One, 
that the right to life which is conferred by Article 
21 includes the right to livelihood and two, that it 
is established that if the petitioners are deprived 
of their livelihood. But the constitution does not 
put an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life 
or personal liberty. But Article 21 such deprivation 
27 has to be according to procedure established." 
28 In K. Chandru the constitutional validity of the 
T.N. slum areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1971 was 
challenged by the pavement dwellers and slum dwellers. 
Chandrachud CJ having followed his own judgement delivered 
in Olga Tell is on behalf of his four brother judges expres-
sed his confidence that "the Government will continue to 
evince the same dynamic interest in the pavement dwellers 
and slum dwellers" and the learned Chief Justice reminded 
the State Government of what the Collector of Madras, Shri 
Badrinath, has stated in his Report: "The motto of slum 
26. Olga Tellis at 185, 
27. Olga TelTTs at PP. 195-196. 
•23' K. Chandru v. State of T.N., AIR 1986 SC 20*. 
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clearance is : God revealeth in the smiJe of the poor." 
29 
Let the poor smile for a while." 
Thus, the Five-Judge Constitutional Bench of the 
supreme Court consisting of Chandrachud CJ, S. Murtaza 
Fazal Ali, Tulzapurkar, Chinappa Reddy and Varadarajan JJ. 
speaking through the Chief justice chandrachud delivered 
two decisions in Olga Tellis and K. Chandru on 10.7.1985 
in which it has been held that the right to life in Arti-
cle 21 includes livelihood. The Chief Justice Chandrachud 
has expanded the ambit of the right to life in Article 21 
to the extent that it includes the person's right to live-
lihood. Articles 39(a) and 41 of Part IV of the Constitu-
tion imposas.fi constitutional obligation, which works as a 
pressure, upon the State to secure to all its citizens 
'adequate means of livelihood' and the 'right to work'. If 
the right to livelihood and the right to work are taken 
away, no person can live with dignity, Chandrachud CJ hav-
ing relied on Justice Douglas has rightly said that 
"Deprive a person of his livelihood and you shall have 
deprived him of his life." 
What is more surprising is that the Supreme Court 
30 
speaking through Chandrachud C.J. decided Olga Tellis 
31 
and K. Chandru holding that right to life includes 
29. K. Chandru at P. 207. 
30. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 
AIR 1986 SC 180. 
31. K. Chandru v. State of T.N., AIR 1986 SC 204. 
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livelihood within its meaning and ambit in Article 22 on 
10,7.1985. But the two Division Benches of the Allahabad 
High Court, one speaking through Justice B.L. Yadav 
refused to read 'livelihood' in 'life' as used in Article 
3 2 21 in Prem Prakash and pronounced the said judgement on 
5.8.1985 without referring Olqa Tellis. Second Bench of 
Allahabad High Court speaking through B.N. Sapru J. deli-
33 
vered its judgement on 4.10.1985 in Surendra Kumar in 
which it held 'livelihood' as included in 'life' in Arti-
cle 21. Is it possible that the Qlga Tellis could not 
reach Allahabad High Court ? Were the judges and the law-
yers careless enough in not keeping themselves in touch 
with the day to day development of law ? Did they do it 
deliberately if so, what was the dity of the lawyer for 
the petitioner ? 
34 After Qlga Tellis in various High Courts a spate 
of writ petitions were filed to invoke Article 21 of the 
Constitution. The Calcutta High Court in Bastuhara Commit-
tee and Sankar heavily relied on Olga Tellis but did 
not give any specific relief sought by the petitioner. In 
32. Prem Prakash v. State of U .P., 1986 Lab.iC (All) 896. 
33. Surendra Kumar v. State of U.P., 1986 Lab. I.C. (All) 
1516; See also R.M, Uyavasayee Samiti v. Collector, 
Raipur, AIR 1986 MP 237 in which C.P. Sen J. speaking 
for the court delivered his judgement on 24.3.1986 
has refused to read the closing all heavy vehicular 
traffic on the Great Eastern Road, Raipur between 
9.00 AM to 10.00 PM as a deprivation of livelihood 
included in the right to life in Article 21 of the 
Constitution. 
m 
Bastuhara Committee canal locally known as owned and 
maintained by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation was requi-
red to be excavated to flush out sewerage water and rain 
water. The excavation of the canal was extremely urgent, 
especially since the monsoon had already set in and there 
was a likelihood that large areas in and around the canal 
were likely to be inundated causing serious hardship to 
a large number of residents in the locality. However, in 
order to excavate the canal the municipality sought the 
eviction of the hutment and Shanti Dwellers who were liv-
ing by the sides of the canal and also sought demolition 
of their hutments and Shanties. These hutment and Shanti 
Dwellers were earning their livelihood through various 
avocations of life in and around the place of their habi-
tation. 
While relying on Olga Tellis the learned Counsel for 
the hutment and Shanti Dwellers argued that the right to 
live life which has been guaranteed by Article 21 of the 
Constitution includes right to livelihood and since the 
petitioners and other dwellers in the canal area will be 
deprived of their livelihood if they are evicted from their 
hutments and Shanties, such eviction will be tantamount to 
deprivation of their lives and such the same must be held 
34. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 
AIR 1986 SC 180. 
35. in the matter of No. 57 Block Bastuhara Committee and 
Others, AIR 1987 Cal. 122. 
36. Sankar v. Durgapur Projects Ltd., AIR 1988 Cal. 136. 
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to be unconstitutional. The sole question before the Court 
for its determination was : whether the eviction of the 
hutment and Shanti Dwellers from the side of the canal, 
and demolition of their hutments and Shanties, so as to 
aarry out excavation of the canal, amounted to deprivation 
of their lives, as to result in violation of Article 21 
of the Constitution, which guaranteed the right to live. 
While agreeing with the Supreme Court's view expres-
sed in Olga Tellis that the right to live includes right 
to livelihood and the sweep of the right to life conferred 
by Article 21 is wide and far reaching justice G.N. Ray 
said: that this does not mean that right cannot be extin-
guished or taken away and thus held that the demolition 
of hutments and Shanties from both sides of the canal so 
as to carry its excavation is not violative of Article 21 
of the Constitution. 
37 In Sankar the petitioner an Upper Division Assistant 
of the Durgapur Steel Projects Limited joined the projects 
initially as a Mate in 1960. His mother Indu Banerjee was 
Head Mistress of the "A" Zone Junior Basic School was in 
occupation of rent free two roomed quarter. The petitioner 
has been living with his mother even after he Joined the 
project in 1960. The petitioner's mother requested the 
Town Administrator to consider the allotment of her quarter 
37. Supra note 36. 
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to the petitioner on payment of rent. Thereupon the town 
Administrator allotted one of the two rooms in the quarter 
in favour of the petitioner. On the demise of the peti-
tioner' s mother the petitioner was directed to hand over 
the room to the School Authority. The petitioner's repre-
sentations dated May 23/ 1983 and March 7, 1984 failed to 
yield any result. Ultimately on June 26, 1984 the peti-
tioner was served with a purported charge sheet-cum-
suspension order for his alleged unauthorised occupation 
of the quarter. The question before the High Court was: 
whether a big Shramik family living in one room sharing 
the single bath room toilet and single kitchen violates 
Article 21 of the Constitution. 
In dealing with this question the learned judge has 
while taking up the cue from Olga Tellis, elaborated the 
right to life guaranteed by Article 21 with the help of 
Article 43 which obliges the State to'ensure a decent 
standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure' to all its 
workmen. The learned judge has said: "Thus, if 'life' 
includes livelihood, since no person can live without the 
means of living; it shall also include such living condi-
tions without which it is not possible for a person to live 
a human life or to have a human existence so as to say 
since man does not live by bread alone and to compel a 
person to lead an animal existence is worse than taking 
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his l i f e . Elaborating t h i s theme the learned Judge goes 
on to add t h a t "the sweep of the r i g h t to l i f e , conferred 
by Ar t i c l e 21 of the Cons t i tu t ion , which according to the 
Supreme Court i s "wide and far reaching", should, t he re -
fore, include such minimum l iv ing condi t ions without which 
a human being ceases to be one of the said spec i e s . " 
The learned Judge, the re fore , s a id : An equal ly impor-
t a n t facet of tha t r i g h t according to me i s the r i gh t to 
l i v e l ike a human being, which conforms to much l e s s e r 
degree t h a t S t a t e ' s obl iga t ion to 'ensure a decent s t an -
dard of l i f e and fu l l enjoyment of l e i s u r e ' t o a l l i t s 
workmen as provided by Ar t i c l e 43 of the Cons t i tu t ion . 
Compelling a person to l i ve in sub-human condi t ions a lso 
amounts to the taking away of h i s l i f e , not by execution 
of a death sentence but by a slow and gradual process by 
roDiaing him of a l l h i s human q u a l i t i e s and graces , a 
process which i s much more cruel than sending a man to the 
gal lows. To convert human exis tence in to animal exis tence 
no doubt amounts to taking away human l i f e , because a man 
l i ve s not by his mere physical ex is tence or by bread alone 
by his human ex i s t ence . 
The accomodation given to the p e t i t i o n e r compelling 
him to share the common s ing le bath room, t o i l e t and 
kitchen with another family is not f i t for a human being 
173 
but amounts to compell him to lead an animal life. It is 
not in conformity with his fundamental right to life as 
envisaged by Article 21 and with Article 43 which ensures 
him a decent standard of life. 
38 in V.P. Shop Keepers Association the petitioner 
claims to have been a lessee of one of the petty shops 
leased to her by the Bangalore Municipal Corporation. To 
widen the road and to put an end to the lease the shops 
were demolished. Thereupon the writ of mandamus was filed 
directing the Corporation and State of Karnataka to build 
shops and lease them to the petitioner. The Counsel for 
the petitioner having relied on plqa Tellls argued that 
the right to livelihood has been denied and, therefore, 
violates Article 21 of the Constitution. The question for-
mulated for the judicial determination is: whether the 
refusal to renew the lease of land to petty shopkeeper vio-
lates Article 21. Turning the plea of the petitioner the 
oourt observed: 
The Corporation or the State Government has not in 
any way interferred with the right to livelihood in 
so far as the petitioner is concerned. Petitioner and 
the like of her were no moreVlessears of the Corpora-
tion. The lease having come to an end in accordance 
38. y.P. Shopkeepers Association v. City of Bangalore 
Municipal Corporation, AlFTgs? Karnat. 159. 
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with law they cannot now complain that there is dep-
rivation of livelihood. Because the lease has been 
terminated, either they are entitled to a fresh lease 
if the Corporation is willing to lease the land to 
them or they are entitled to carry on their business 
activity somewhere else than the area from which 
they have been evicted. That cannot be said to be 
39 deprivation of their right to livelihood." 
40 In A.P. Adimajati Sangham once again the question 
of livelihood was raised before the Andhra High Court. 
The Andhra Government gave direction to the authorities 
of the Municipalities/Panchayats/Corporations to kill all 
unlicensed pig straying in unhygienic conditions as they 
constitute the main source for the transmission of the 
disease. The writ petitions were filed by owners of pigs 
and pig rearing associations questioned the justification 
for the killing of the pigs indiscriminately. It is stated 
that these pig owners have been engaged in the business 
of rearing pigs for several decades and they do not know 
how to live otherwise. If the pigs owned by them are des-
troyed, all the pig owners and their families will be 
denied of their right to survive as their means of liveli-
hood is lost. 
:r:?!:,,?^°f^.^^^" Association V. City of Bangalore 
40 yg^<^^Pal corporation, AI^--T987 Karnat.159 at PP:160-61 
tlK'l98f;j^?93!^^^ ^^ "^ ^^ "^  ^ - G^ntur Municipal rnnn.Tl 
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Disagreeing with the petitioner's claim the Andhra 
High Court speaking through Anjaneyulu J. held that Article 
21 of the Constitution cannot be interpreted to assure sur-
vival of the means of living of the petitioners ignoring 
the dangerous consequences felt in the society resulting 
in the death of precious young children. Public interest 
demands that this court ought to uphold any action taken 
by the Government to ensure that the disease is not spread 
causing death of young children. Whether or not the pig is 
the main source of transmission of the disease, it is 
clear that the mosquitoes biting the PLgs carry the infec-
tion and transmit the same to human beings. While no ser-
ious danger is caused to adults. 
The above mentioned judicial work done by the various 
High Courts on the 'right to livelihood' as the Supreme 
Court read it implicitly in the right to life and personal 
liberty guaranteed in Olga Tellis shows enthusiasm and 
overzealousness of the legal fraternity in the bar. This 
reflects legal acximen of those who are helping the Supreme 
Court and High Courts in the dispensation of justice in 
the protection of the citizen's rights and in the defence 
and preservation of the Constitution and law. A close analy-
sis of these cases reveals that Article 21 is envoked on 
some flimsy and pitched against societal welfarism. The 
right to livelihood as held by the Supreme Court in 
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01ga T e l l i s has been use^ as weapon to des t roy or k i l l the 
l i f e of the soc ie ty as a wnoie . 
G.N. Ray, J . placing his r e l i ance on Olqa Te l l i s 
held in in the matter of No. 57 Block Bastuhara Committee 
t h a t removal of hutment and Shanty Dwellers and t h e i r demo-
l i t i o n from both s ides of the canal so as to excavate i s 
not v i o l a t i v e of Ar t i c le 21 of the Cons t i t u t ion . In 
Sankar 5 a J ^ _ ^ } « ^ ^ J J • of the Calcutta High Court having 
r e l i e d on Olqa T e l l i s said tha t the r i g h t to l i v e l i k e a 
human being conforms to the S t a t e ' s obl iga t ion to 'ensure 
a decent standard of l i f e and f u l l enjoyment of l e i s u r e ' 
t o a l l i t s workmen as provided by Ar t i c l e 4 3 of the Cons-
t i t u t i o n . Therefore, the court held t ha t the accomodation 
given t o the p e t i t i o n e r with a common s ingle bathroom, 
t o i l e t and kitchen i s a v i o l a t i o n of Ar t i c l e 21 and A r t i -
c le 43 of our Cons t i tu t ion . I t i s not only the duty of the 
S t a t e to provide s h e l t e r to i t s c i t i z e n s but i t should pro-
vide an accomodation in which a human being l i v e . The 
c i t i z e n s should be t r ea t ed as human beings and should not 
be t r ea t ed as sub-humans or animals . Keeping the s ize of 
the family and the grade in view the accomodation should 
be su f f i c i en t and spacious . If an accomodation i s i n su f f i -
c i e n t , i t wi l l have a l l around bad effect on the heal th -
physical and mental - of the workman and h i s family members. 
This would be a slow and gradual process of robbing the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s of a l l h i s human q u a l i t i e s and graces . 
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In V.P. Shopkeepers Association the petitioner chal-
lenged the renewal of her lease as violative of Article 
21 which guarantees right to livelihood as held by the 
Supreme Court in Olga Tellis. Tne Karnataka High Court 
held that the refusal to renew the lease did not violate 
the petitioner's right to livelihood under Article 21 as 
held by the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis. 
in A»P. AcjLmajati Seva Sanqham Justice Anjaneyulu of 
the Andhra High Court did not agree with the petitioner's 
contention that they have had a right to rear pigs at the 
cost of the health of the society. Anjaneyulu J. was of 
the view that Article 21 cannot be interpreted to assure 
survival of the means of living of the petitioners ignor-
ing the dangerous consequences felt in the society resul-
ting in the death of precious young children. While hold-
ing the Governmental steps taken by the Government to save 
the precious lives of young children Justice Anjaneyulu 
observed: "To serve the avowed cause of sustenance of a 
few persons rearing pigs, we cannot permit misery to oe 
inflicted upon the society." 
In the matter of No. 57 Block Bastuhara Committee the 
Calcutta Municipal Corporation wanted to excavate the 
canal in order to save the area from the inundation but 
the same was to be stopped by raising the bogey of the 
right to livelihood under Article 21 as held by the 
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Supreme Court. In V.P. Shopkeepers Association the Banga-
lore Municipal Corporation wanted to widen the road refu-
sed to renew the petitioner's lease. It is, therefore, 
desdJCBvable and advisable that both the bar and the Bench 
should not engage themselves in such matters if held, 
would affect the society adversely. However, the right to 
livelihood as an integral part of Article 21 should be 
raised very sparingly and too to save the life of the peti-
tioner. 
However, the Calcutta High Court speaking through 
jxistice^uM^^j^f^has done well in Sankar by invoking 
Article 43 alongwith Article 21 with a view to ensuring 
a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure 
to all workmen. In a similar tone Justice Sabyasachi 
Mukherji held in Prabhakaran Nair shelter as one of our 
fundamental rights. 
The issue whether livelihood is included in the 
Right to Life has been raised in a catena of cases right 
from In re Santaram to Olqa Tellis. In re Santaram the Court 
emphatically held that the question of livelihood has not 
in terms been dealt with by Article 21 of the constitu-
tion." The court did not declare the right to livelihood 
as an integral part of the right to life in Article 21 of 
our Constitution. In Nachane the court reiterated its 
17» 
e a r l i e r ru l ing given in Santaram and held t h a t the emplo-
yees cannot claim a r igh t t o have a se t t lement for payment 
of bonus as l i f e does not include l i ve l ihood . But in 
Chandrabhaa Tale while s t r i k ing down a law providing one 
rupee per month as subsis tence allowance as v io l a t i ve of 
Ar t i c l e 21 said t h a t subsis tence allowance f a l l s under the 
head of l ive l ihood as employment f a l l s under l ive l ihood . 
Again in B. Bapi Raju the Supreme Court re jec ted the con-
t en t ion t h a t ' l i f e ' in Ar t i c l e 21 means l ivel ihood and 
upheld the v a l i d i t y of the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on 
Agr icu l tu ra l Holdings) Act, 1973 which deprived the land 
holders of t h e i r l i ve l ihood . In a process of i den t i f i c a t i on , 
r e lease and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of the bonded labourers the 
Supreme Court has in Neeraja Chowdhary spel led out the 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of bonded labour as providing l ive l ihood 
to the freed labour . Thus r e h a b i l i t a t i o n means l ivel ihood 
became part of l i f e for the purpose of Ar t i c l e 21 of our 
Cons t i t u t i on . In Venkata Reddy the Supreme Court rejected 
the p e t i t i o n e r ' s contention tha t depr ivat ion of job is 
depr ivat ion of t h e i r r i gh t to l i f e whereas the A.P. Aboli-
t ion of Posts of Part-Time Vil lage Officers Act, 1984 dep-
rived the Part-Time Vil lage Officers of t h e i r employment. 
The supreme Court has refused to hold the r igh t to work 
and earn l ive l ihood as a fundamental r i gh t under Ar t i c l e 21 
' ' • kTR%st T U i r ^ "• 9^-^--^^-- Tale. 
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in F e r t i l i s e r Corporation Kamaqar Union. F ina l ly , the 
j u d i c i a l cu r ta in was drawn on the issue by holding t h a t 
the r igh t t o l ive l ihood i s an e s s e n t i a l cons t i tuen t par t 
of the fundamental r i gh t to l i f e and l i b e r t y guaranteed 
in Ar t i c l e 21 by U^, Court in Qlqa T e l l i s . 
However, Qlga T e l l i s has not escaped J u s t i c e Krishna 
Iyer ' s incjesive and sharp i n t e l l e c t s with powerful pen who 
sa id : 
"Here comes the j u r a l water loo of the shove aways. 
The brave bui ld-up of the r i g h t s of these s h e l t e r l e s s 
c rea tu res breaks down in an ant i -c l imax of b r i t t l e 
logic To chop lega l logic drained of the warm 
blood of l i f e i s a d i f f e ren t s t r e e t from sizing up 
a soc i a l c r i s i s . Where the dear l i f e of dozens of 
thousands of b ro thers and S i s t e r s , pregnant women and 
suckling babies who have deserted t h e i r inhospi table 
v i l l a g e t o pick a crawling l i v i n g in the cal lous 
pavements and slimy slums of heaitLess urban sprawls, 
i s in p r i l . Legal mechanics with l i t t l e l ex i ca l too l s 
are s l i g h t l y d i f fe ren t from humane j u r i s t s with cons-
t i t u t i o n a l v i s ion . "^^ 
No human being would, worth the name, l i k e t o "cook 
and s leep where they ease", but for economic compulsions. 
^^* Igs l at^82"S.^^;f ' Y^nlfn^J^^^ " ^ ^ " P°°^ i " India" lyss a t 82-83. See also Shhatr^apati^sinqh, "«iaht to 
JIL? 2 4 9 ' ? ? 9 8 ^ K ' " ' ^ ' " o r ^ * r i ^ - f i ^ r s m - ^ / v o ! ! ^ 2 8 , ' ° 
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The poverty-other social reasons compelled the have nots 
to leave their inhospitable villages to live on the pave-
ments and slums in search of their livelihood. Because the 
right to live and the right to work are integrated and 
interdependent and hence both are provided to the poors, 
the right to life guaranteed by Article 21 would be 
denuded of its life. Accepting justice Douglas's views 
"to work means to eat and it also means to live" Chandrachud 
CJ held that "if a person is deprived of his job as a 
result of his eviction from a slum or a pavement, his very 
right to life is put in jeopardy." The Chief Justice goes 
on holding that "An equally important facet of that right 
is the right to livelihood because, no person can live 
without the means of living, that is, the means of liveli-
hood." Therefore the Chief justice has categorically and 
clearly held that if the right to livelihood is not treated 
as a part of constitutional right to life, the easiest way 
of depriving a person of his right to life would be to 
deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of 
abrogation. "Strangely enough the Chief Justice has failed 
to live upto the expectation of the people. 
in sodan Singh once again a Five-Judge Constitutional 
Bench of the Supreme Court confronted with an issue whether 
the Delhi pavement hawkers have a right to trade on pavements 
47. sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, 
AIR 1989 SC 1988. 
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They contended that the Delhi Municipal Authorities did 
not permit them to continue with the trade which is in 
violation of their fundamental rights guaranteed under 
Articles 19(1) (g) and Article 21 of the Constitution. 
Undoubtedly, the practise of street trading is well 
established in all the civilized countries of the world 
including England, America and India. 
48 Inspite of the Olga Tellis, the Supreme Court 
speaking through Justice L.M. Sharma has once again failed 
the destitute and deprived people like pavement and slum 
dwellers, the Delhi hawkers have no right to trade on the 
pavement. Justice Sharma said: 
"In our opinion Article 21 is not attracted in 
a case of trade or business-either big or small. 
The right to carry on any trade or business and 
the concept of life and personal liberty within 
Article 21 are two remote to be connected 
49 together." 
The above approach of justice Sharma seems to be 
contradictory with Chief Justice Chandrachud opinion in 
Olga Tellis, the court held that right to livelihood is 
an important facet of the right to life and, therefore, 
"no person can live without the means of living, that is 
48. Olga Tellis, AIR 1986 SC 180. 
49. supra note 47 at 1996-97. 
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the means of livelihood," whereas justice Sharma held in 
Delhi Hawker's case that "right to carry on any trade or 
business and the concept of life and personal liberty 
within Article 21 are too remote to be connected together." 
Does it mean Justice Sharma has tried to deprive right to 
life of its content as enriched by Olqa Tell is. If right 
to carry on trade or business is not connected with right 
to life whatelse remains in right to life. As Justice 
Douglas said to work means to eat and it also means to 
live" which is coined in our own way by the Supreme Court 
as "right to live and right to work are integrated and 
interdependent and, therefore, if a person is deprived of 
his job as a result of his eviction from a slum or pave-
ment, his very right to life is put in jeopardy." 
The judgement has, therefore, attempted to undo or 
undermine what has been done by Olga Tellis. Both Olga 
Tellis and Sodan Singh have depicted judicial dilemma as 
Iyer said seems to run with hound and hunt with the hare." 
Therefore, the Supreme Court has generated a new hope 
in the hearts and confidence in the minds of the deprived 
dejected and neglected people of our country, that the 
third organ of the State is there to safeguard their 
50. V.R. Krishna Iyer : Law and the Urban Poor in India, 
1988 at 94; See also Rajeev Dhavan : Hawker's Right 
to Livelihood, The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 
October 11, 1989; See also V.J. Rao, Advocate General 
of SiKkim, Gangtok : Life and Livelihood in Article 
21, AIR 1937 (Jour.) 52. 
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interests as their guardian. The people have begun to look 
towards the Supreme Court as a last hope for the satisfac-
tion of their needs. For the executive and the legislature 
have failed to wipe every tear from every eye.' Thus the 
Supreme Court has rendered a commendable judicial service 
by displaying its judicial wisdom and farsightedness in 
interpreting the word 'life' used in Article 21 of our 
constitution in sugh a broad and progressive manner that 
the right to livelihood is now a part of the right to life 
and liberty. 
CHAPTER HI 
RIGHT TO TRAVEL ABROAD 
1S3 
THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL ABROAD 
The Right to travel abroad is not constitutionally but a 
judicially recognised right. Whether the right to travel is or 
is not a fundamental right came up for judicial determination 
in Satwant Sinoh . Before Satwant Singh there was a conflict 
of opinion among the High Courts relating to the travel aborad. 
Z 
The high Courts of Kerala in Francis Maniooyan and Bombay in 
3 
Jethwani held that the right to travel abroad was included in 
Article 21 of the constitution of India. On the other hand 
Delhi High Court in Rabindra Nath refused to read the right to 
travel abroad in Article 21 of the constitution. The Supreme 
Court therefore siezed an opportunity offered by Satwant Sinah 
to expand the horizons of personal liberty guaranteed by Article 
21 of the constitution in such a manner so as to include the 
right to travel abroad. 
In Satwant Singh the petitioner was engaged in the business 
of import* export and manufacturer of automobile parts and 
engineering goods in the name of India-European Trading Corpo-
ration. He was also engaged in another business of Engineering 
goods in the name of 'Sawhney Industries'. For the purpose of 
1. Satwant Sinah v. A.P.O. New Delhi, AIR 1967 SC 1836. 
2. A.G. Kazi v. C.V. Jethwani, AIR 1967 Bom. 235; Choith.ram 
V. A.G. Kazi, AiK 1V66 Bom. 54 (Simple Bench)." 
3. Francis Manjooran v. Government of India. AIR 1966 Ker. 20. 
4. Rabindra Nath v. Regional Passport Officer. AIR 1967 
Delhi 1. 
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his business it was necessary for the petitioner to travel 
abroad. From 1958 he was having a passport. He obtained a 
regular passport on December 8, 1966 valid upto March 22, 1969. 
On October 27, 1965 he obtained another passport which was valid 
upto March 22, 1967. On August 31, 1966 the Assistant Passport 
Officer, Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs wrote 
to the petitioner calling upon him to return the said two pass-
ports as the Union of India had decided to withdraw the passport 
facilities extended to him. So, too, the Regional Passport 
Officer, Bombay wrote to the petitioner a letter dated September 
24, 1966 calling upon him to surrender the said two passports 
to the Government of India failing which action would be taken 
against him. 
Mr. Soli Sorabji, learned counsel for the petitioner has 
argued interalia^ that the right to leave India and travel 
5. The arguments of the counsel for the petitioner may be 
summarised: (l) The right to leave India and travel outside 
India and return to India is part of personal liberty 
guaranteed under Article 21 of the constitution. 
(2) Refusal to give appassport or withdrawal of one given 
amounts to deprivation of personal liberty in as much as; 
(a) it is not practically possible for a citizen to leave 
India or travel abroad or to return to India without a pass-
port, (b) instructions are issued to shipping and air 
companies not to take passangers on board without passport, 
(c) under the Indian passport Act reentering India without 
Passport is penalised (3) The deprivation of personal 
liberty is not in accordance with the procedure established 
by law within the meaning of Article 21, as admittedly 
there is no law placing any restrictions or the citizens of 
the country to travel abroad (4) The unfettered discretion 
given to the respondents to issue or not to issue or Pass-
port to a person offends Article 14 of the constitution in 
as much as (a) it enables the State to discriminate between 
persons similarly situated and also because it offends the 
doctrine of rule of law (b; the rule of law reguires that 
an executive action which prejudicially affects the rights 
of a Citizen must be pursuant to law. And (5) the said 
orders offended the principles of fairplay. 
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outside India and return to India is part of personal liberty 
guaranteed under Article 21 of the constitution. Subba Rao, 
C.J., speaking for the majority court declared the right to 
travel abroad as a fundamental right inexplicitly included in 
Article 21 of the constitution. It is, therefore necessary to 
make cycloramic survey of the judicial work done in this regard 
giving ri e to the necessity of its acceptance. Now the ques-
tion is : What is right to travel? Does it a part of Personal 
liberty? Does the freedom to move freely within the territory 
of India include the right to travel abroad? 
In England the right to go abroad was recognised as an 
attribute of personal liberty as early as in the Magna Carta of 
1215 which runs : 'It shall be lawful to any person for the 
future, to go aut. of our kingdom and to return safely and 
securely, by land or by water, saving his allegiance to us, 
unless it be in time of war, for some short space, for the common 
good of the kingdom? excepting prisoners and outlaws according 
to the laws of land, and of the people of the nation at war 
against us, and Merchants who shall be treated as it is said 
above*. 
6. Article 21 of the constitution says : 'No person shall be 
deprived of life or personal liberty except in accordance 
with the procedure established by law'. 
7. Article 19(d) runs : Ho move freely throughout the 
territory of India*. 
m 
Though the right to go abroad as incorporated in Article 
42 of Magna Carta 1215 could not be retained in Article 39 of 
the final version of the Magna Carta 1225. Yet the concept of 
personal liberty as recognised by it gave assurance to the 
personal liberty in clear and absolute terms. No harm can be 
Q 
inflicted upon a free man without the 'law of the land' . 
Blackstone great authority on common law, defines : 'Per-
sonal liberty* consists in the power of locomotion, of changing 
direction or moving one's person to whatever place one's own 
9 
inclination may desire '. Odgers, another authority on common 
law states : 'Every citizen enjoys the right to personal 
libertry; he is entitled to stay at home or work abroad at his 
pleasure without interference or restraint from others'. 
It is therefore well established that in England, subject 
to any special legislation, British subjects are entitled at 
common law to leave and enter the country at will. The right 
of exit is a common law right' . 
8. 'No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disregarded 
on outlawed, or exiled, or anyway aestroyed; nor will we 
go upon him, nor will we send upon him, unless by the 
lawful judgement of his peers, or by the law of the land' 
9, Blackstone : The Halesbury's law of England. 
J-^ ' Odgers : Common Law Chapter II, 'Rights 
common to all'. 
^^' Satwant Singh v. APO. New Delhi. AIR 1967 SC 1836 at 
P. 1843. 
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In America the ric^t to travel abroad is neither recognised 
nor defined by the constitution. The only recognition accorded 
to the liberty is the enactment of the 5th and 14th Amendments 
which together guarantee that no person shall be deprived of 
his life and liberty without due process of law. Therefore, the 
right to travel abroad may be deduced from the American Juri-
sprudence which defines personal liberty as follows: 'Personal 
liberty largely consists of the right of locomotion - to go 
where and when one pleases only so far restrained as the rights 
of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other 
citizens' 
13 However, the US Supreme Court in Leonard B. Bourdin 
observed that 'travel abroad is more than a mere privilege 
accorded American citizens. It is a right, an attribute of 
personal liberty which may not be infringed upon or limited in 
any way unless there be full compliance with the requirements 
of due process'. 
Chief Justice Fuller of the American Supreme Court in 
14 
R.A. Williams has observed 'undoubtedly the right of locomo-
tion, the right to move from one place to another according to 
inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right 
12. American Jurisprudence, 2nd Ed. at p. 359. 
13. Leonard B. Bourdin v. John Foster Dulles; 136 Fed. Sup. 
14. R.A. Williams v. Edaar Fears; (1900) 45, Law Ed. 186. 
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ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of 
any State is a right secured by the 14th Amendment and by other 
provisions of the constitution'. 
15 In Kent v. Dulles the US Supreme Court reaffirmed its 
earlier view and declared that the right to travel is a part of 
the liberty of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due 
process of law under the Fifth Amendment. The court further 
* 
emphasised that freedom to travel is an important aspect of the 
citizen's liberty. 
In Harbert Aothekar . the US Supreme Court reaffirmed its 
earlier view expressed in Kent v. Dulles. Douglas J, in his 
concurring judgement emphasised the importance of the right to 
travel abroad in the following words : 
Freedom of movement, at^  home and abroad, is important for 
job and business opportunities for cultural, political and 
social activities - tor all the commingling which aggregarious 
man enjoys'. The learned judge has further emphasised the 
freedom of movement and described it geographically thus : 
•America is of course sovereign; but her sovereignty is woven 
in an international web that makes her one of the family of 
nations. The ties with us all the continents are close commer-
cially as well as culturally. Our concerns are planetary. 
15. Kent v. Dulles 
16. Apthekar v. Secretary of State: (1964) 378 US 500: 
12 Law Ed. 2nd 992. 
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beyond sunrises and sunsets. Citizenship implicates us in 
those problems and perplexities, as well as in domestic ones. 
We can not excercise and enjoy citizenship in world perspec-
tive without the right to travel abroad and I see no constitu-
tional way to curb it unless, as I said, there is the power to 
detain. 
In Kent v. Dulles^^ the US Supreme Court recognised the 
right to travel as guaranteed by 5th Amendment and held that 
the denial of passport by the Secretary of State was valid 
because the congress had not, under the Passport Act, 1926, 
authorised the Secretary of State to refuse Passport on the 
ground of association with the communist party and refusal to 
file an affidavit relating to that affiliation and such legis-
lation was necessary before the Secretary of State could refuse 
Passport on those grounds. 
In Aothekar"'-^  
The question which arose for determination in this case related 
to the constitutional validity of Section 6 of the Subversive 
Activities Control Act, 1950. The impugned section prohibited 
the use of Passport by communists, Following a final registra-
tion order by the Subversive Activities Control Board under 
Ejection 7 and following the mandate of this section, the State 
17, Supra note 15. 
18. Supra note 1I.U964) 378 US bOO : 12 Law ^d. 2nd 992). 
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Department revoked the existing Passports of the appellants, 
After exhausting all administrative remedies, the appellants 
svjed for declarative and injunctive relief before the District 
Court which upheld the validity of the section on direct appeal, 
the Supreme Court reversed the judgement by the majority of six 
against three and held the section to be invalid. The court 
declared that the right to travel abroad is an important aspect 
of the citizens' liberty guaranteed by the due process clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. Judge Wyzanski has said : 
•This travel does not differ from any other excercise of 
the manifbJLca, ; freedoms of expression from the right to 
speak to write, to use the mails, to public, to assemble to 
petition*. 
19 In Zemel v. Rusk this case raised the question whether 
the Secretary of State was statutory authorised to refuse to 
validate the Passports of US citizens for travel to Cuba and if 
so, whether the exercise of such authority was constitutionally 
permissible. The court by a majority of six against three, 
held that the ban on travel to Cuba was authorised by the broad 
language of the Passport Act, 1926, and that such a restriction 
was constitutionally permissible. Warren C.J. speaking 
for the majority of the US Supreme Court observed that freedom 
of movement was a right protected by the 'liberty' clause of the 
19. Zemel v. Rusk 
l f )3 
Fifth Amendment and that the Secretary of State justified in 
attempting to avoid serious international incidents by restri-
cting travel to Cuba and summarily rejected Zemel's contention 
that the Passport denial infringed his First Amendment rights 
by preventing him from gathering first hand knowledge about 
Cuban situation. 
Justice Douglas while following Kent v. Dulles has refused 
to interpret the Passport Act, 1926 as permitting the Secretary 
of State to restrict travel to Cuba. While doing so Justice 
Douglas in his dissenting opinion setressed the relationship of 
the right to travel to First Amendment rights. The learned 
judge said : 'The right to know, to converse with others, to 
consult with them to observe social, physical, political and 
other phenomenenous abroad as well as at home gives meaning and 
substance to freedom of expression and freedom of the press'. 
He further added that freedom to travel abroad is a right peri-
pheral to the enjoyment of the First Amendment guarantees', 
Douglas J. concluded by observing that 'the right to travel is 
at the peripheral of the First Amendment', and therefore 
'restrictions on the right to travel in times of peace should 
be so particularised that a First Amendment right is not thereby 
precluded', 
The right of locomotion, the right to move from one place 
to another according to inclination is an attdtude of personal 
liberty. Freedom to leave one's country temporarily for travel 
IHiJ 
abroad was considered to be important to an individual, 
20 
national and international well being' 
So what emerges out of the US Supreme Court's decisions 
given in Kent v, Dulles. Aothekar and Leonard B. Bourdin is 
that it made the right to travel abroad as a part of personal 
liberty guaranteed by the 5th Amendment. 
21 In V.G. Rao , the Division Bench of the Madras High 
Court considered the scope of a Passport and in its place in 
the foreign travel and came to the conclusion that, as the law 
then stood, the State could not prevent the petitioner from 
leaving for USSR merely on the ground that he did not hold a 
passport endorsed to that country and there was no provision of 
law under which a citizen like the petitioner could be preven-
ted from re-entering India after travel to foreign countries 
except with a passport. However the conclusion of the court 
was due to Article 19(l)(d) which applied to foreign travel and 
without restrictions. The petitioner did not involve Article 
21 of the constitution. 
In Francis Maniooran""'^  the petitioner a graduate in 
Medicine and Surgery obtained facilities for higher training 
20. Yale Law Journal, 61, YLJ 171. 
21. V.G. Rao V. State of MP^CJT^^^ AIR 1954 Mad. 240. 
22. Francis M^njooran v. Government of India- AIR 1966, Ker. 20. 
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and studies in the USA applied for Passport. The application 
vvas rejected and hence filed a writ petition in the Kerala High 
Court Challenging the order of the government. While deliver-
ing their separate judgements all the three learned judges have 
agreed that the expression 'personal liberty' occurring in 
Article 21 of the constitution includes the right to travel 
abroad and return to the country, Menon. C.J., observed: 'the 
right to trav.l, except to the extent provided in Article 19(1) 
(d), is within the ambit of the expression 'personal liberty' 
as used in Article 21 and, as a passport is essential for the 
enjoyment of that right, the denial of a passport amounts to a 
deprivation of that rights'. Ramana Nayar J. held 'the right 
of free movement whether within the country or across the fron-
tiers, either in going out or in coming in, is a personal 
liberty within the meaning of Article 21.' Gopalan Nambiyar J. 
held 'right to travel beyond India or at least to cross its 
frontiers is within the purview of Article 21. Personal liberty 
is not intended to bear the narrow interpretation of freedom 
from physical restraint'. 
23 Tarkunde J., in Choith ram Verhoroal Jethawani held that 
the compendious expression in 'personal liberty' used in Article 
21 included in its ambit the right to go abroad and a person 
could not be deprived of that right except according to proce-
23, Choithram v, Jethwani v. A,G. Kazi. AIR 1966 Bom, 54 (SB), 
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citizen cannot have higher than what is conferred upon the 
citizen. Making this distinction Article 19(1)(d) and Article 
21 is not a new judicial technique but was devised by the 
Supreme Court in Gooalan. Narrowly construing and strictly 
relying on the language and Scheme of the freedoms guaranteed 
by Article 19(1)(d) and Article 21 Dua ACJ instead of adopting 
what has been done by Bombay, Kerala and Mysore High Courts in 
Jethwani, Francis Manjooran and Sadashiva ^ao. has shorten the 
arms of the personal liberty to catch the air bus. In Satwant 
Singh Subba Hao, C.J., speaking for the court has followed the 
rullings of the High Courts of Bombay, Kerala and Mysore and 
has refused to fall in with the Delhi High Court. 
In Gooalan"^ the validity of the Preventive Detention Act 
1950 was challenged on the ground of Article 19(1)(d) and 
Article 21 of the constitution. Therefore the judicial result 
was also confusing and confounding. Because the task before 
the court was how to link the freedom to movement under Article 
19(1)(d) with the personal liberty under Article 21. The inevi-
table judicial delivery was that once a person was arrested did 
not have any right to enjoy. Further the two said freedoms 
made a distinction between the citizen and non-citizens. The 
same line of argument wes also repeated in Kharak Sinah. Thus, 
the meaning of personal liberty was construed very narrowly. 
28. Gopalan v. State of Madras. AIR 1950 SC 27 at p. 111. 
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dure established by law as laid down in Article 21. Tombe, C.J. 
delivering judgement on behalf of the Division Bench of the 
Bombay High Court in Jethwani"^ came to what has been held by 
25 
Tarkunde J. in his single judgement in Jethwani . Having 
considered the arguments and the case cited Tombe, C.J., conclu-
ded that the 'personal liberty' occurring in Article 21 included 
the right to travel abroad and to return to India. In Sadashiva 
Rao'^^, Hedge, J., speaking for the Division Bench of the Mysore 
High Court, held that (i^ the petitioners have a fundamental 
right under Article 21 to go abroad, (ii) they also have a funda-
mental right to come back to this country....' But Dua, Acting 
27 C.J., in Rabindranath Malik speaking tor the court, held that 
'personal liberty' guaranteed by Article 21 was not intended to 
extend to the liberty of going out of India and coming back. 
What has influenced Dua J. in Rabindranath Malik is the 
language and Scheme of Article 19(l)(d) and Article 21 of the 
constitution. The right to move freely throughout the territo-
ries of India guaranteed by Article 19(1)(d) is available to the 
citizens. This liberty is available only within and not outside 
the country. Where as personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 
is available to both citizen and non-citizen and hence a non-
24. A.G. Kazl v. C.V. Jethwani. AIR 1967 Bom. 235 (DB). 
25. Supra note 23. 
26. D.S.S. Sadashiva Rao v. Union of Indi;.. 1965-2, Mys.L.J. 605. 
27. Rabindranath Mf^ Ilk v. R.P.O. New Delhi. AIR 1967 Delhi 1. 
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However having followed American concept of personal liberty 
Das J. has, in Gopalan. defined ; 
In my judgement, Article 19 protects some of the important 
attributes of persohal liberty as independent rights and the 
expression 'Personal Liberty' has been used in Article 21 as a 
compendious term including within its meaning all the varieties 
29 
of rights which go to make up the personal liberties of Men 
In Gopalan while defining the nature and scope of freedom 
guaranteed by Article 19(i;(d) Das J. said that Article 19(1) 
(d) comprehends only a specific and limited aspect of the free 
dom of movement. The learned judge has further said that 'it 
is a protection against provincialism. It has nothing to do 
with the freedom of the person as such. That is guaranteed to 
every person, citizen or otherwise, in the manner and the extent 
30 
formulated by Article 21* . Kania, C.J., was also of the same 
view that what is sought to be protected by Article 19(1)(d) is 
the right to freedom of movement without any restrictions, 
throughout the territory of India. Read in this what is meant 
by Kania C.J. is that no restriction can be put upon movement of 
a citizen from State to State or even with a State^ "''. While 
stressing upon the phrase 'throughout the territory of India' 
29. Supra note 2^ / at p. 111. 
30. Ibid, at p. 112. 
31. Supra note 28 at p. 35. 
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used in Article 19(l)(d; Mukherjea j. said that it is a parti-
cular and special kind of right, viz., that of free movement 
throughout the Indian territory, that is the aim and object of 
32 the constitution to secure* 
The purpose of inserting Article 19(i;(d; was to break all 
artificial barriers and hinderances created by British India 
and princely" Indian states. The preambuiar aim was to create 
oneness of the Union of India in all the Indians. Therefore 
the free flow of persons and things have been secured and ensured 
by Article 19(l)(d) and Article 301 of the constitution. Das J. 
in Gopalan was right in making a distinction between freedom 
of movement guaranteed by Article 19(1)(d) and the power of 
33 locomotion, a Black Stonian coacept, included in Personal 
34 liberty guaranteed in Article 21. In Kochuni it has been 
pointed out by the Supreme Court that personal liberty in Arti-
cle 21 is more comprehensive concept and has a much wider 
connotation than the right conferred under Article 19(1)(d). 
32. Supra note 28 at p. 95. 
33. Blackstone define the right to personal liberty: 'Personal 
liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing 
situation, or removing one's person to whatsoever place 
one's own inclination may^direct, without imprisonment or 
restraint unless by due^.use of law' Blackstone. commen-
taries on the laws of England. Vol. 1, 134 (8th Ed. 1771). 
/v 
34. K.K. Koehuni v. States of Madras and Kerala. AIR 1960 SO 
1080. 
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35 In Kharak Singh the argument was whether the state by 
placing the petitioner under police surveillance infringed his 
fundamental right under Article 21 of the constitution. While 
dealing with scope of personal liberty used in Article 21 and 
quoting a passage from the dissenting judgement of Justice Field 
delivered in Munn v. Illionois Ayyangar J. speaking for the 
Supreme Court said : 'personal liberty' used-in Article 21 as a 
compendious term includes within inself all the varieties of 
rights which go to make up the 'personal liberties' of man other 
than those dealt within the several clauses of Article 19(1). 
In other words, while Article 19(1) aeals with particular spe-
cies or attributes of that freedom, 'personal liberty' in 
Article 21 takes in and comprises the residue'. Expressing his 
disagreement with the distinction between the freedoms guaran-
teed in Articles 19(1) and 21 or the freedom to movement guaran-
teed in Article 19(1)(d) was carved out of personaIJiberty done in 
Gopalan and Kharak Singh. Subba Rao in his minority judgement 
said : 
No doubt the expression 'personal liberty' is a comprehen-
sive one and the right to move freely is an attribute of 
personal liberty. It is said that the freedom to move freely 
is carved out of personal liberty and, therefore, the expression 
personal liberty in Article 21 excludes that attribute. In our 
35. Kharak Sinah v. State of U.P.. AIR 1963 SC 1295. 
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view, this is a correct approach. Both are independent funda-
mental rights, though there is overlapping. There is no question 
of one being carved out of another. The fundamental right of 
life and personal liberty have many attributes and some of them 
are found in Article 19. If a person's fundamental right under 
Article 21 is infringed, the state can rely upon to a law sus-
tain the action, but that cannot be a complete answer unless the 
said law satisfies test laid down in Article 19(2) so far as the 
attributes covered by Article 19(2) are concerned. In other 
words, the state must satisfy that both the fundamental rights 
are not infringed by showing that there is a law and that- it 
does not amount to unreasonable restriction within the meaning 
of article 19(2) of the constitution. 
Subba Rao, C.J., following Kharak Singh observed in Satwant 
Sinoh s 'liberty in our constitution bears the same comprehen-
sive meaning as is given in the expression 'liberty' by the 5th 
and 14th Amendments to the US constitution and the expression 
'personal liberty' in Article 21 only excludes the ingredients 
of 'liberty' enshrined in Article 19 of the constitution. In 
other words, the expression 'personal liberty* in Article 21 
takes in the right of locomotion and to travel abroad, but the 
right to move throughout the territories of India is not covered 
by it in as much as it is specially provided in Article 19^ *^ .' 
36. Supra note 1 at 1852. 
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Having relied on Kharak Sinah and Satwant Sinah. Bhagwati 
J. has in Menaka Gandhi, observed : 'It safeguards the right 
to go abroad against executive interference which is not 
supported by law, and here means* enacted law ' or 'State law'. 
Thus, no person can be deprived of his right to go abroad unless 
there is a law made by the State proscribing the procedure for 
so depriving him and the deprivation is effected strictly in 
accordance with such procedure Obviously, the procedure 
37 
cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable' , 
37. Menaka Gandt^ i. AIR 1978 SC 597 at 622. 
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Right to Travel Abroad - I6 it a Part of Article 19(l)(a) 
In Maneka Gandhi it was argued that the inpugned provisi-
ons of Section 10(3)(c) of Passport Act, 1950 violative of 
Article 19(1)(a) of the constitution. Putting it differently 
the question is whether the right to travel abroad is an inte-
gral part of Article 19(l)(a) of the constitution.. Before 
deciding this question Bhagwati J. said that the validity of 
state action must be adjudged on the basis of its direct and 
inevitable effect upon the fundamental right which is in other 
words described as the doctrine of intended and real effect. 
The learned counsel for the petitioner developed his argu-
ment inter alia that"the right to go aborad is an integral part 
of the freedom of speech and expression and whenever state 
action, be it law or executive fiat, restricts or interferes 
with the right to go abroad, it necessarily involves curtail-
ment of freedom of speech and expression, and is, therefore, 
required to meet the challange of Article 19(1)(a). 
The petitioner's contention was repelled by the learned 
counsel for the Union of India in two fold: The first limb of 
the contention was that the right to go abroad could not possi-
bly be comprehend within the freedom of speech and expression, 
because the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under 
2d4 
A.rtlcle 19(i;(a) was exerciseable only within the territory of 
Zndia and the guarantee of its exercise did not extend outside 
the country and hence State action restricting or preventing 
exercise of the right to go abroad could not be said to be 
violative of freedom of speech and expression and be liable to 
be condemned as invalid on that account. 
The second limb of the contention was that the right to go 
abroad was not integrally connected with the freedom of speech 
^nd expression, nor did it partake of the same basic nature and 
character and hence it was not included in the free speech and 
expression guaranteed under Article'l 9ClKa) and imposition of 
restriction on it did not involve violation of that Article. 
In dealing with this question in fAaneka Gandhi Bhagwati J. 
has very ably traced out the historical background of the 
fundamental rights inspired by the dynamic spiritualism of 
Mahatma Gandhi. While enhancing the Importance of these funda-
mental rights in the life of the individual Bhagwati J, said: 
•Freedom of speech and expression carries with it the right 
t<5 gather information as also to speak and expression oneself at 
home and abroad and to exchange thoughts and ideas with others 
not only in India but also outside We have, therefore, 
no doubt that freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by 
Article 19il)U) is exercisable not only in India but also 
outside ,38 
58- M»nek» G^ndhj v. Union of TnW... A I R 1978 SC 597 at p. 637. 
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Both the treedom of speech and expression guaranteed by 
Article 19(l)Ca) and its restriction under Article 19(2; are 
operatives both inside and outside the country. While hammering 
out of the operational constitutional value of the freedom of 
speech and expression under Article 19(i;(a>) both, inside and 
outside India, Bhagwati J. sought to buttress his view on what 
has been said by Leonard B. in this regard who writes : 
'The final objection to limitations upon the right to 
travel is that they interfere with the individual's freedom of 
expression. Travel itself is such a freedom in the view of one 
scnoiarly jurists. But we need not go that far; it is enough 
that the treedom of speech includes the right of Americans to 
exercise it any where without the interference of their govern-
ment. There are no geographical limitations to the Bill of 
Rights, rt government that sets up barriers to its citizens' 
freeoom of expression in any country in the world violates the 
constitution as much as if it enjoined such expression in the 
United States' .. 
Finally, Bhagwati J. affixed the judicial seal of approval 
by holding: 'It is, obvious, therefore, that there are no geo-
graphical limitations to freedom of speech and expression guar-
anteed under Article 19(i;(aj and this freedom of speech and 
39. Leonard B. Bourdin: 'The Constitutional Right to Travel. 
Columbia Law Review, 1956. 
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expression guaranteed under Article 19(l)(a) and this freedom 
is exercisable not only in India but also outside and if state 
action sets up barriers to its citizens' freedom of expression 
in any country in the world, it would violate Article 19(l)(a) 
as much as if it inhibited such expression within the country. 
This conclusion would on parity of reasoning apply equally in 
relation to the fundamental right to practice any profession or 
to carry on any occupation, trade or business guaranteed under 
Article 19(1) (g) •'^°. 
It is argued that it is true that the right to go abroad 
is not expressly included as a fundamental right in ahy of the 
clauses of Article 19(1), its existence is necessary in order 
to make the express freedoms mentioned in Article 19(1) meaning 
ful and effective. To associate with the like minded persons 
in other parts of the world for the purpose of advancing social, 
political or other ideas and policies are indispensable for a 
human being and are parts of the freedom of speech and expre-
ssion which cannot be effectively implemented without the right 
to go abroad. If the Passport of a person is impounded with a 
view to preventing him from going abroad to share his ideas, 
thoughts and views with others is a direct interference with 
freedom of speech and expression guaranteed in Article 19(1)(c) 
of the constitution. It is therefore, argued that the right to 
40. Supra note 37 at pp. 638-639. 
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go abroad is a peripheral right emanating from the right to 
freedom of speech and expression and is, therefore, covered by 
Article 19(l)(a;. 
Justices iJouglas, Goldberg and BlacV have strongly dissen-
tea from the majority opinion, aeJivered by the Chief Justice 
hdrren in Zemel v.Kusk 1966. Reliance has been placed on 
uouglds opinion who said that freedom to travel abroad is a 
riyht 'peripheral to the enjoyment of the First Amendment guara-
ntees'. The learned judge has concluded by saying that 'the 
riyht to travel is at the peripheral of the first Amendment', 
and therefore 'restrictions on the right to travel in times of 
peace should be so particularised that a First Amendment right 
is not thereby precluded*. 
The distinction may be made in the notable decisions 
decisions decided by the American Supreme Court. In Kent v. 
Dulles. Apthekar what has been held is that the denial of 
passport has directly affected the First Amendment guarantee. 
But in Zemel v. Rusk the denial of passport did not directly 
hit the hirst Amendment guarantee. Together first hand infor-
mation about Cuban crisis has been treated as a peripheral 
right to the enjoyment of the First Amendment guarantees. 
Therefore, the right to travel for gathering first hand infor-
mation about the Cuban cirsis has been accepted as a peripheral 
to the enjoyment of the First Amendment guarantee. But neither 
the Chief Justice Warren nor Justice Douglas has considered 
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this peripheral right as a part of the First Amendment guarant-
ee. Baring on this view Bhagwati J. concluded his views by 
saying that 'The right to go abroad cannot therefore, regarded 
as included in the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed 
under Article ,19(1) (a) on the theory of peripheral or concombi-
tant right So also, for the same reasons, the right to 
go abroad cannot be treated as part of the right to carry on 
trade, business, profession or calling guarantee under Article 
19(i;(g;''^\ 
Therefore, what emerges is that the freedom of speech and 
expressions under Article 19(lKa<), the most cherished and 
valued freedom in our democratic society, can be exercised both 
inside and outside the country. But this freedom of speech and 
expression is not a part of the right to go abroad included in 
Personal liberty in Article 21. If this is being done, the 
very scheme and purpose of the Part III guaranting fundamental 
rights would be disrupted. Both Chandrachud and Bhagwati' Jd 
have agreed to the point that freedom to speech and expression uoes 
not form part and parcel of the right to to aborad. Chandrachud 
J. said that 'the right to go abroad on one hand and the right 
of free speech and expression on the other are made up of basi-
cally different constituents, so different indeed that one can 
not be comprehended in the other,'^^ Bhagwati J. has also felt 
41. Supra note 37 at p. 644. 
42. Supra note 37 at p. 615. 
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hesitation to include the right to free speech and expression 
in the right to go abroad who opined. 'Every activity which 
facilitates the exercise of the fundamental right is not 
necessarily comprehended in that fundamental right nor can it 
be regarded as such merely because it may not be possible other 
wise to effectively exercise that fundamental right. The con-
trary construction would lead to incongruous results and the 
entire scheme of Article 19(1) which confers different rights 
and sanctions different restrictions according to different 
43 
standards depending upon the nature of the right will be upset ' 
Making his point clear justice Bhagwati has said : 'It is no 
doubt true that going abroad may be necessary in a given case 
for exercise of freedom of speech and expression. Every acti-
vity that may be necessary for exercise of freedom of speech 
and expression or that may facilitate such exercise or make it 
meaningful and effective cannot be elevated to the status of a 
fundamental right as if it were part of the fundamental right 
of free speech and expression. Otherwise, practically every 
activity would become part of some fundamental right or the 
other and the object of making certain rights only as fundamen-
tal rights with different permissible restrictions would be 
frustrated •. 
43. Supra note 37 at p. 641. 
44. Supra note 37 at p. 641. 
210 
Another question raised was whether the riqht to leavp 
India is part of the rights to speech and expression guaranteed 
unaer Article 19(i;(a> and (g) respectively. Since what is true 
of the import of Article 19(1) (a-) is equally true of the import 
of Article 19(l)(g). 
While considering the petitioner's argument in detail 
Justice Bhagwati propounded a crucial test and applied it for 
determining whether or not the right claimed was a part of the 
righL to freedom of speech and expression. The test as enunci-
dted by the learned Juc^e is : 
'-vnether the right claimed by the petitioner is an integral 
part of a named fundamental right or partakes of the same basic 
nature and cjiaracter as the named fundamental right so that the 
exercise of such right is in reality and substance nothing but 
an instance of the exercise of the named fundamental riqht'. 
Applying this test to the contention of the petitioner 
Bhaywati J. has rightly held that the right to leave India was 
not a part of the right to freedom of speech and expression 
guaranteed in Article 19(l)(a) of the constitution ^, 
However, Bhagwati's holding is only for certain peculiar 
circumstances but the learned judge would in some situations 
regard the right to leave India as a part of the right to freedom 
45. Supra note 37 at P. 
46. Supra note 37 at P. 
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of speech. This is clearly evident trom Justice Bhagwati's 
observation which runs: 
'If this be the correct test, as we apprehend it is, the 
rignt to go aDroad cannot in all circumstances be regarded as 
47' included in freedom of speech and expression 
However, Justice Krishna Iyer in his own way hinted upon 
the possible situations in which the right to leave might become 
part of the right to freedom of speech and expression which 
he illustrated: 
'The first may be illustrated, if the Passport Authority 
specifically conditions the permission with a direction not to 
address meetings abroad or not to be a Journalist or Professor 
in a foreign country, the order violates Article 19(l)(a) 
If a person is an international pilot, astronaut, judge of the 
International court of Justice, Secretary of the World Peace 
Council the particular profession not only calls for its 
practice travelling outside Indian territory but its care itself 
is international travel. In such an area, no right of exist, 
no practice of profession for vocation. Similarly, a cricketer 
of tennis player recruited on world tour. Free speech may 
similarly be hit by restriction on a campaigner for liberation 
of colonial peoples or against genocide before the united 
Nations Organisation'^®'. 
47. Supra note 37 at P. 
48. Supra note 37 at P. 
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Thanks a lot that Bhagwati's judicial activism has 
halted expansionist trend of the fundamental rights. 
The Right to Passport : Nature. Concept and Purpose 
Before the first world war there was no existence on the 
passport. But its necessiry and importance was increasingly 
felt and hence the possession of the passport has become a 
must. The British Government of India issued passport rules 
1917 thereby introducing a 'double obligation*. It prescribed 
that it required a person to obtain passport to leave and to 
return to India. For leaving and entering India, an Indian was 
under an obligation to obtain double passports. In 1920, the 
Indian Passport Act was passed doing away with the requirement 
of obtaining Passport to leave India. But it became useless on 
account of the refusal by the Shipping Company to take any 
passenger without passport well as the existence in the posse-
ssion of Passport by the visiting country. However, the Indian 
Passport Rules 1917 were updated in 1950 and the Indian Pass-
port Act 1920 was repealed and new Passport Act 1967 was 
enacted. 
However the question is what is a Passport? Averstone 
C.J. defines Passport as follows: 
' is a document issued in the name of sovereign on 
the responsibility of a Minister of the crown to a named indivi-
dual, intended to be presented to the Governments of foreign 
nations and to be used for that individuals' protection as a 
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British subject in foreign countries, and it depends for its 
validity upon the fact that the Foreign office in an official 
49* 
aocument vouches the respectability of the person named 
50 Mr. Justice Tarkunde in Choithram defines passport as 
as follows : 
A passport is an official document issued in the name of 
the head of a state, to a traveller for his safe passage to and 
protection in a foreign country, and is intended to be presented 
to a foreign government for this purpose. 
'In India Passport reads : 'There are to request and 
require in the name of the President of the Republic of India 
all those whom it may concern to allow the bearer to pass 
freely without let or hindrance and to afford him or her every 
assistance and protection of which he or she may stand in need*. 
This Indian Passport is on the British Pattern and sligh-
tly differs from the American Passport which runs as follows: 
'The Secretary of State requests all whom it may concern 
to permit safely and freely to pass and in case of need to qive 
all lawful aid to.... a citizen of the United States'. 
Mr. Justice Hidayatullah. J., (as he then was) has in 
Satwant Singh defined the Passport as follows: 
'In essence this document serves as a means of establi-
49. R.N. Brailsford; (1905) 2 KB 730. 
50. Supra note 23. 
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shing identity and nationality it is a political document 
and the ownership of it strictly speaking remains in the Govern-
51' 
ment which grants it although may be charged for it 
Passports may be granted by the crown at any time to 
enable British subjects to travel with safety in foreign coun-
tries, but such passports would clearly not be available so as 
52 to permit travel in an enemy's country during war' 
The passport therefore is an identity card or an official 
political document signed by the competent authority by a 
sovereign country to its citizen to enable him to travel abroad 
or to visit countries endorsed in it safely and securely. The 
passport has now become an essential neither he can leave nor 
can be return to his country without a valid passport. 
In Maneka Gandhi the court has unanimously reiterated its 
aftirmation made in Satwant Singh that the expression 'Personal 
liberty' - used in Article 21 comprehends the right to travel 
abroad^^. Justice Bhagwati held : 'The right to go abroad is, 
51. Supra note 1 at P. 1847 
52. Halsburv's Laws of England. Vol. IV, P. 519, See also Weiss; 
Nationality and Statelessness in International Law P. 266:, 
Harry Street; Freedom, the Individual and the Law. P. 277; 
The Grotius SocTetv. Vol. 32 (1946J: Kenneth Diolock; Pass-
port and Protection in International Law. 
53. See Mohammad Ghause; 'The Vicissiiludes of Freedom of Exist 
in India' (76W 559 and Hioht to Passportt A Constitutional 
Guarantee'. 7JILI, 273. (1965;; V.P. Sastri 'Right to Travel 
Abroad'. 11 Andh. WR(j; 63; K.N. Nambiar.'The Right to 
Travel', 7 JILI, 562; Kailash Ral. Right to Travel Abroad 
Under the Constitution of India'. (I97l) All L:J.(J) 24; 
For a contrary view See B. Errabbi. 'The Right to Travel 
Abroad and the Issue of Passport*^ U C and PS, 101. 
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as held in Satwant Singh Sawhney's case included in 
•personal liberty' within the meaning of Article 21 and is 
54 thus a fundamental right protected by that Article* 
The nature and significance of the right to go abroad : 
Movement is inherent in the human being. Thus, there 
must exist, as Bhagwati J. said, 'a basically free sphere for 
man resulting from the nature and dignity of the human being 
55 
as the bearer of the highest spiritual and moral values' 
Keeping the nature of human being in view, the right to go 
abroad is a must for an individual to shape his destiny and 
to develop his personality in his own way. Therefore, the 
right to go abroad, like other basic human rights, must be given 
its due place. This right also nourishes independent and self-
determinating creative of the individual. Some of the impor-
tant advantages of the right to travel aborad have been pointed 
out by Justice Bhagwati in Maneka Gandhi. 
'It is a right which gives intellectual and creative 
workers in particular the opportunity of extending their spiri-
tual and intellectual horizon through study at foreign univer-
sities, through contact with foreign colleagues and through 
54, Supra note 37 at P. 
55. Supra note 37 at P. 639. 
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participation .in discussion and conferences. The right also 
extends to private life: marriage, family and friendship are 
humanities which can be rarely affected through refusal of 
freedom to go abroad and clearly show that this freedom is a 
genuine human right. Moreover, this freedom would be a highly 
valuable right to where man finds himself to flee (a) because 
he is unable to serve his God as he wished at the previous 
place of residencepc(b) because his personal freedom is threat-
ened for reasons which do not constitute a crime in the usual 
meaning of the word and many were such cases during the emer-
gency, or (c) because his life is threatened either for reli-
gious or religious or political reasons or through the threat 
to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living compatible 
with human dignity. These reasons suggest that freedom to go 
aborad incorporates the important functions of an ultimum 
56 
refunium libertatis when other basic freedoms are refused' 
In Kent v. Dulles Justice Douglas said : 
•Freedom of movement across frontier in either direc-
tion, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage. 
Travel abroad, like travel within the country, may be necessary 
for livelihood. It may be as close to the heart of the indivi-
dual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Free-
dom of movement is basic in our scheme of values'. 
56. Supra note 37 at P. 639. 
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Relying on Justice Douglas's opinion. Justice Bhagwati 
has also said that 'freedom of movement at home and abroad is 
a part of our heritage and, as already pointed out, it is a 
highly cherished right essential to the growth and development 
of the human personality and its importance cannot be over 
57 
emphasised' , Justice Krishna Iyer in his own volatile way 
said: 
• it is common place that the world - the family of 
nations - vibrates, and men - masses of men- move and 'jet' 
abroad, even in Concorde, on a scale unknown to history. Even 
thoughts, ideologies and habits travel beyond. Tourists crowd 
out airlines services; job seekers rush to passport offices; 
lecture tours, cultural exchanges, transnational evangilical 
meets, scientific and scholarly studies and workshops and semi-
nars escalate, and international associations alround - all for 
the good of world peace and human progress, save where are 
involved high risks to sovereignty, national security and other 
substantial considerations which constitutions and courts have 
58 
readily recognised' 
Though the right to go or travel aborad is not constitu-
tionally recognised fundamental right, yet, like the liberty of 
Press implicitly has been read into the freedom of speech and 
expressionin Article iy(l)(a;, this right has also been 
57, Supra note 37 at P. 641. 
58. Supra note 37 at PP. 663-664, 
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declared as an integral part of Personal liberty in Article 21. 
The narrow and negative concept of personal liberty adopted by 
the majority of judges in Gopalan in the light of the Black-
stonian concept of personal liberty was to some extent was 
repaired by the majority of the Supreme Court in Kharak Singh* 
The seed of personal liberty shown by SR Das J. in Gopalan 
describing it as a 'compendious term inclusive all varieties of 
man's rights' in its ambit' was expanded by Ayyangar J. in his 
majority judgement in Kharak Sinoh. But it was again Subba Rao 
who expanded the contours of 'personal liberty' in Article 21 
by making his dissenting opinion given in Kharak Singh as the 
court's decision in Satwant Singh. But the concept of personal 
liberty in Article 21 reaches in its highest constitutional 
status only in Maneka Gandhi. The restricted narrow and limited 
sense of personal liberty as understood and construed in 
Gopalan. Kharak Singh is Obliterated by Maneka Gandhi which has 
liberated the personal liberty from the arrest or detention. 
Now the personal liberty in Article 21 has become all pervasive, 
embrassing and brooding omnipresence. By doing away with the 
•theory of exclusivity' or 'splitting up' as propounded in 
Gopalan. the Supreme Court has declared all rights as an inte-
gral part particularly Article 19(1) of Article 21. 
Due to these judicial efforts, the right to travel abroad 
nas been made part and partial of the man's personal liberty 
in Article 21 of the constitution. But the tender plant of the 
right to go abroad planted by Tarkunae J., in Choitram who held 
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that the expression 'personal liberty' as used in Article 21 
includes the right to go abroad' grows with the passage of , 
time from case to case and has now become a well strengthened 
and deeply rooted fundamental right in our constitutional demo-
cratic set up. Tambe C.J. has affirmed Tarkunde J. views in 
Jethwani and held that the expression 'personal liberty' is 
wide enough to include the right to travel abroad and to return 
to India'. Both Ramana Nayar and Gopalan'^ Harabiya.rJJ in Francis 
Maniooran have held the right to travel abroad as a part of the 
personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21. Accordingly the 
right to travel abroad has been included in Personal liberty in 
Satwant Singh and Bhagwati J. has accepted it in Maneka Gandhi. 
The right to leave and to return both are concomitants of 
the movements. Thus, the right to travel abroad includes and 
consists of the leaving and returning back to the country. 
Similar is the case of Passport. No person can leave his coun-
try and visit any other's country without a valid passport. 
Even if a person leaves his country without a passport, he may 
not be allowed by the country of his own choice. Further he 
may not be allowed to re-enter his own country without a pass-
port. It is rightly held by Subba Rao J. in Satwant Sinah that 
the right to travel, the right to leave and return to India are 
the necessary incidents of the 'personal liberty' guaranteed 
under Article 21 of the constitution. It may be possible that 
an Indian may enter India without a passport but has to 
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establish his identity with document as it happens in France. 
This is what has been held in Abdul Rahim. 'It may not be 
possible to prevent a citizen of India from entering India, but 
there seems to be nothing unreasonable in requiring that even 
a citizen should carry a passport or other document or identi-
59 
fication at the time he returns to India' 
Therefore the right to leave and to return to India are 
essential parts of the right to travel abroad have all been 
considered as -parts of the personal liberty . As the expre-
ssion •personal liberty' has been construed as a compendious 
term which includes in its ambit all varieties of right of a 
man, vis,the right to passport, the right to leave and to 
return to India and the travel abroad are included in the 
personal liberty. If any one of the three rights is denied 
to an Indian, it would be turncated, torn, incomplete and 
imperfect personal liberty which would be violative of Article 
21 of the constitution. 
In concluding the cycloramic journey of the right to travel 
abroad as a concomitant right of 'personal liberty* under 
59. Abdul Rahim v. State of Bombay. AIR, 1959 SC 1315 at P. 
1316; See also Ebrahim Vazir v. State of Bombay. AIR 1954 
SC 229, Sabir Husain v. UP State. 1952 All. 257-263; 
Nisar Ahmad v. Union of India. AIR 1958 Raj. 68 at P. 70 
and Nizamuddin v. State. AIR 1959 All. 19 at P. 20. 
60. Jethwanl v. A.G. Kazi. AIR 1966 Bom. 55, A.G. Kazi v. 
C.V. Jethwani. AIR 1967 Bom. 235, Francis Maniooran v. 
Government of India. AIR 1966 Ker, Sadashiva Ran v. 
Union of India (196'S - Mys. L.J.). 
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Article 21 started by Subba Rao CJ in Satwant Singh reached to 
its ultimate destiny in Maneka Gandhi when Bhagwati J. by hi» 
judicial crafting and grafting declared the right to travel 
abroad as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the constitu-
tion. It can therefore safely by summarised; 
(1) The right to travel or go abroad is included in the expre-
ssion 'Personal liberty' as used in Article 21 of the 
constitution. 
(2) The right to passport is a part of the right to travel 
abroad. 
(3) The right to leave and the right to return to India are 
also parts of the right to travel abroad. 
(4) The right to free speech and expression in Article 19(l)(a) 
does not include in its ambit right to travel abroad. 
All the above stated rights are included in the personal 
liberty - a compendious term which includes in its ambit all 
the varieties of rights except those independently guaranteed 
in Article 19(1)(a) essential for the growth and development of 
the personality of a person. 
CHAPTER IV 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
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THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The free state offers what a 
police state denies -the privacy 
of the home, the dignity and 
peace of mind of the individual. 
That precious right to be let 
alone is violated once the police 
enters our conversation. 
- Justice Douglas 
Right to privacy is not a constitutionally but a 
judicially recognised right. It v;as for the first time 
that the right to privacy was raised in Kharak Singh, 
The m.ajority view of the court was expressed by Justice 
Ayyangar who refused to fall in or lean in favour of the 
petitioner. Justice Ayyangar could not agree to read the 
right to privacy in Art, 21. 
i-lr, Karimuddin had proposed addition of a clause to 
the Draft Article 14 (now Article 20) which was intended 
to serve the purpose of the right of privacy. The 
resolution provided* "The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
!• Kharak Singh v. State of UP. AIR 1963 SC 1295. 
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unreasonable searches and se izures sha l l not be v io la ted 
and no warrant sha l l issue but upon probable cause supported 
by oath or affirmation and p a r t i c u l a r l y descr ibing the place 
2 to be searched and the persons or th ings to be se ized , " 
Though there was nothing novel in Kariro.uddin' s 
suggestion as the Cr, P.C, as a law of the land contained 
such procedural safeguard, yet Dr. Arobedkar, as the 
Chairman of the Drafting Committee, has expressed his 
concurrence to the d e s i r a b i l i t y of i t s incorpora t ion . 
But the cons t i t uen t Assembly a f te r a postponem.ent of t h i s 
ques t ion , issue of a par ty whip and two c a l l s for d iv i s ion , 
4 
voted against the adoption of the Karim.uddin • s r e so lu t ion . 
Thereupon the Right of Privacy akin to the 4th Am.endment 
was denied, the Const i tu t ion guaranteed the second r i g h t 
akin to the 5th Ariiendment i . e . r i g h t aga ins t self-incrim.ina-
t ion in clause (3) of Art, 20 of the Cons t i tu t ion . Therefore 
the r i g h t of Privacy against the a r b i t r a r y a r r e s t , search 
and seizure of a person by the Pol ice or by any agency of 
the State having sim.i lar i ty with the 4th Amendm.ent could 
not becom.e p a r t and parcel of the pe r son ' s fundamental 
2 . CAD Vol . VII p . 7 9 4 . 
3 . CAD V o l . VII P . 7 9 6 . 
4 . CAD V o l . VII P . 797 a t PP . 840 - 8 4 2 , 
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r i g h t s . Therefore the cons t i t uen t Assembly has fa i led 
to r i s e to the occasion. 
In Kharak Singh" the p e t i t i o n e r was a r res ted in a 
dacoity case but was re leased as there was no evidence 
agains t him. Ite was h i s to ry sheeted by the p o l i c e . He 
was put under pol ice survei l lance as defined in Regulation 
236 of the UP Police Regulat ions. Survei l lance involves 
s ec re t p icke t ing of the house, of approaches to the houses 
of the suspec ts , dom.icill iary v i s i t s a t n igh t , pe r iod ica l 
enqui r ies by o f f i ce r s not below the rank of Sub-Inspector 
in to r epu te , h a b i t s , a s soc ia t ion , incom.e, expenses and 
occupation, repor t ing by constables and chaukidars of 
m.ovem.ents and absences from, home, the v e r i f i c a t i o n of 
m.ovem.ents and absences by m.eans of inquiry s l i p s and col lec-
t ion and record on a h i s to ry sheet of a l l inform.ation 
bearing on the conduct of h i s to ry shee t e r s . 
The question was whether the in t rus ion in to the 
residence of a c i t i z e n and knocking a t h i s door, d is turbing 
h i s s leep and ordinary confort c o n s t i t u t e a v io la t ion of 
the personal l i b e r t y guaranteed by Ar t i c le 21 ? 
5, Supra note 1. 
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Having taken cue from Jus t i ce F i e l d ' s d i ssen t ing 
regarding the de f in i t ion of ' l i f e and l ibe r ty* and the 
preairhular purpose of the Indian c o n s t i t u t i o n , Jus t i ce 
Avvangsaid "the r i g h t of privacy i s not a guaranteed r i g h t 
under our c o n s t i t u t i o n and therefore the attempt to 
ascer ta in the movem.ents of an individual which i s merely 
a maneoverer in which privacy i s invaded i s not an infringe-
.. 6 
m.ent of a fundam.ental r i gh t guaranteed by Par t I I I . " 
Ju s t i ce Subba Rao in h i s d i s sen t ing view sa id : "the 
r i g h t to personal l i b e r t y takes in not only a r i g h t to be 
free from, r e s t r i c t i o n s placed on h i s p r iva te l i f e . I t i s 
t rue ( tha t ) our c o n s t i t u t i o n does not expressly declare 
a r i g h t to privacy as a fundaroental r i g h t , but the said 
r i g h t i s an e s s e n t i a l ingredient of personal l i b e r t y . 
Every dem.ocratic country s a n c t i f i e s dom.estic l i f e ; i t i s 
expected to give h i s r e s t physical happiness , peace of 
m.ind and s ecu r i t y . In the l a s t r e s o r t , a pe r son ' s house, 
where he l i v e s with h i s fam.ily, i s h i s " c a s t l e " , i t i s h is 
ram.part agains t encroachment on h i s personal l i b e r t y . 
The pregnant words of fam.ous Judge, Prankf u r t h e r , in Wolf v. 
Colordo point ing out the im.pojrtance of the secur i ty of 
6. Kharak Singh (1964) 1 SCR 333 a t P. 351. 
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one ' s privacy aga ins t a r b i t r a r y in t rus ion by the P o l i c e , 
could have no l e s s appl ica t ion to an Indian hom.e as to 
an American one. i f physical r e s t r a i n t s on a pe r son ' s 
m.ovements af fect h i s personal l i b e r t y , physical encroach-
ments on h i s p r iva te l i f e would a f fec t i t in a l a rge r 
degree. Indeed, nothing i s more d e l i t e r i o u s to a m.an's 
physical happiness and hea l th than a ca l cu la t ed i n t e r -
ference with h i s pr ivacy. We v/ould t he r e fo re , define the 
r i g h t of personal l i b e r t y in Ar t ic le 21 as a r i gh t of an 
individual to be free from r e s t r i c t i o n s or encroachments 
on h i s person, v;hether those r e s t r i c t i o n s or encroachments 
are d i r e c t l y im.posed or i n d i r e c t l y brought about by 
ca lcu la ted m.easures, " 
In Gobinda i t was argued t h a t the r i g h t to privacy 
was i t s e l f a f und^en t a l r i g h t and t h a t r i g h t was v io la ted 
as M.P, Police regula t ion 856 provided for dom.iciliary v i s i t s 
and other provis ions in to i t . The question form.ulated by 
the Supreme Court was whether r i g h t to privacy was i t s e l f 
a fundamental r i g h t guaranteed t o a c i t i z e n under Part I I I ? 
7, Supra note 6 at P, 359. 
8, Gobinda v. State of M.P., AIR 1975 SC 1378 
at P, 1385, 
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Being a staunch supporter of l i b e r t y and digni ty 
Ju s t i c e Mathew picked up the r igh t to privacy from where 
Subba Rao J , l e f t i t in Kharak Singh and ra i sed i t to 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t u s in Gobinda Mathew J , said t h a t 
•'Privacy digni ty claim.s deserve t o be examined with care 
and to be denied only when an im.portant counterva i l ing 
i n t e r e s t i s shown to be supe r io r . " I t appears tha t the 
privacy and d igni ty of a m.an should not be unnecessari ly 
exposed to ser ious invasion. The govemm.ent should not 
v io l a t e or in t rude in to the Privacy of any person unless 
the com.pelling State (public i n t e r e s t ) i n t e r e s t i s t he re . 
I t has r i g h t l y been held t h a t the privacy may be regulated 
by imposing reasonable I ' e s t r i c t ions in the Compelling 
Public i n t e r e s t . The nature and scope of the r i gh t to 
privacy has been explained by Mathew J , in Gobinda as 
fol lows: 
"The r i g h t t o privacy in any event 
wi l l necessa r i ly have to go through 
a process of case-by-case develop-
ment. Therefore, even assum.ing 
t h a t the r i gh t to personal l i b e r t y , 
the r i g h t to m.ove freely throughout 
the t e r r i t o r y of India and the 
freedom of speech crea te an inden-
dent r i gh t of privacy as an emanation 
from them which one can c h a r a c t e r i s e 
a fundam.ental r i g h t , we do not th ink 
t h a t the r i g h t i s ab so lu t e , " 9 
9, Gobinda at 1384. 
lU 
This means t h a t the r i g h t to privacy i s not 
e x p l i c i t l y provided by the cons t i t u t i on but i s an 
em.anating from, other fundam.ental r i g h t s guaranteed 
by the c o n s t i t u t i o n . By exerc is ing j u d i c i a l power 
of giving meaning to dry words, the Superem.e Court 
speaking through Mathew J, has c rea ted a nev; r igh t 
of privacy to the Indian people. But the r i gh t of 
pr ivacy , an added r i gh t decorating Par t I I I of the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n , i s not an absolute r i g h t . The r i g h t of 
privacy m.ay be regu la ted , infr inged or r e s t r i c t e d by 
the 'compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t . • 
Now the question i s what do we m.ean by Privacy? 
or what i s the de f in i t ion of Privacy? Of course , 
pr ivacy prim.arily conderns the ind iv idua l . I t i s 
therefore r e l a t e s to and overlaps with the concept of 
l i b e r t y . Any way, r i gh t to privacy m.ust encom.pass or 
com.prehends and p ro t ec t the personal intim.acies of the 
home, the fam.ily, marr iage, m.otherhood, procreat ion and 
ch i l d r e a r i n g . There are som.e of the zones of m.an 
in which he does not l i k e the in te r fe rence of any person 
howsoever high he m.ay be and how-so-ever low he m.ay be. 
These are the areas which he keeps and t r e a t s them, as 
the m.ost s e c r e t s . Because the s c i e n t i f i c and technological 
10. Supra note 8 a t P, 1385. 
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development in e l e c t r o n i c appliances has exposed the 
man's l i f e t o publ ic gaze. Everybody f ee l s se r ious ly , 
unsecured and unprotected. Mathew J . has every r i g h t l y 
pointed out in Qobinda t h a t ".svibtle and far reaching 
means of invading privacy wi l l make i t poss ib le to be 
heard in the s t r e e t what i s whispered in the c l o s e t . " 
The concept of 'P r ivacy ' o rg ina tes from the word 
' P r i v i ' or ' P r ivy ' which m.eans something very secre t or 
assigned t o personal uses or som.ething P r iva t e ly known. 
This shows t h a t there are ce r t a in ac t ions or 'moments 
in m.an's l i f e which he wishes to discharge them, without 
any in te r fe rence from, any one. Take for ins t ance , t a l k 
and sexual in te rcourse between husband and wife, the 
12 del ivery of pregnancy (and sim.i larother, a c t i v i t i e s 
which every person wants to do without any m.an's gazing 
eyes . This i n s e c u r i t y in Privacy i s increas ing v;ith the 
passage of time and technological advancem.ent. The 
psychological prison i s thrown around a m.an's l i f e by a 
com.plex technology not knowing v/hen and by whom he i s 
being watched or overheard. In Blackstone 's time eaves-
droppers were known who l i s t e n e d concealing themselves 
11 . Supra note 8 at P.1384. 
12. The m.ajority of the Indians (Men and Women) are 
accustomed t o ease them, in an open space under the 
open sky in a broad day l i g h t and in publ ic gazing 
eyes (India i s a vast i a t e r i n e ) . 
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near walls or windows but in our day e l e c t r o n i c survei l lance 
has l e f t no aspect of man's l i f e uncovered. But to equate 
the Blackstonian eavesdropping and the e l ec t ron i c su rve i l l ance , 
s a i d j u s t i c e Douglas, i s "to t r e a t man's f i r s t gunpowder 
13 as on the same l eve l as the atomic bombi' All along with 
o thers have been described as an added "new and menacing 
14 dimension to fami l ia r t h r e a t s to Privacyi* 
In 1890 Warren and Brandies wrote and published a 
j o i n t a r t i c l e , The r i gh t to Privacy in the Harvard Law 
Review, '^ey wrote the a r t i c l e with a view t o recognising 
the general r i g h t to Privacy based on the p r inc ip le of 
• inv io la te individual personal i ty* and which sought t o give 
pro tec t ion t o ind iv idua l s against the publ ic explosure of 
t h e i r p r iva te a f f a i r s without t h e i r consent . The reason 
which com.pelled Warren and Brandies was a developing techno-
logy of wiretapping procedures, of devices of eavesdropping 
and bugging and the growth of inform.ation gathering system.s 
Q 
and t h e i r e a s i l y aco&.'ssible loca t ions and t h e i r free and 
< 
rapid dissemination to others have m.ade it possible to 
intrude upon private lives and activities and to expose 
13. Douglas J. in US vs. White; (1971) 401 US 745 at p.756. 
14. Younger Reports cond, 5012 of 1972 at P.8. 
See also Ruth Redmond.Cooper: "The Press and the law 
of privacy" Vol. 34 International and Comparative 
Law quarterly 769 (October 1985), 
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them to publ ic gaze for reasons no b e t t e r than m.ere 
t i t i l l a t i o n and vulgar c u r i o s i t y or other equal ly abno-
xious reason lilce charac te r a s sa s s ina t ion , p o l i t i c a l , 
blackmail and the l i k e . This Warren Brandies wr i t ings 
made the people feel the necess i ty of the r i g h t to Privacy, 
These reasons have been supplemented by the Younger 
ComjTdttee which noted t h a t "the computer problem as i t 
e f f e c t s privacy in Great Br i ta in i s one of apprehensions 
15 and fears and not , so f a r , one of f ac t s and f i g u r e s , " 
Sim.ilar views were expressed by Prof. Itorison in respect 
to the Austral ian s i t ua t i on wherein he noted tha t computer 
o rganisa t ions displayed the g rea t e s t sens iv i ty t o the ; 
poss ib le e f f ec t s on privacy of what they were doing and the 
utmost anxiety to see t h a t privacy was fu l ly pro tec ted . 
The growing tendency of inves t iga tory journalism, and the 
advancing technology have enabled the media to m.ake even 
m.ore searching i n t ru s ions in to individual pr ivacy, lidward 
s h i l s has j u s t i f i e d the penet ra t ion of the profess ional 
journalism, in to m.an's p r iva te l i f e as i t s m.ain occupational 
t a sk and for the s a t i s f a c t i o n of popular des i r e s and the 
17 freedom of the press to enl ighten the p u b l i c . However, 
15. Younger Comjciittee Qrsd, 5012 of 1972. 
16. Report on the Law of Privacyi Parl iamentary Paper No.85 
Comm.onwealth of A u s t r i l i a , 1973 at P. 51, 
17. Shils» Privacyi i t s cons t i t u t i on and v i c i s s i t u d e s 
(1966) Law and Contem.porary Problem.s; 28 at P. 293 -94, 
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the Younger Committee has further dealt with the hazards 
of the modern urban life. The industrial society intruding 
into the m.an's life and home leaving no escape from, the 
observation of neighbours have inspired and stim.ulated the 
urban people to dem.and protection against the intrusion 
of their life and home. Nevertheless, the two reports 
in the United Kingdom, have declined to recomjmend a statutory 
18 
enactment of a general right to Privacy. In Grieswold 
19 
v. Connecticut a Connecticut statute m.ade the use of 
contraceptives crim.inal offence. The executive and medical 
directors of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut 
were convicted in the circuit court on a charge of having 
violated the statute as accessories by giving information, 
instruction and advice to m.arried persons as to the m.eans of 
preventing conception. The appellate Division of the circuit 
court affirmed and its judgem.ent was reaffirmed by the 
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. On appeal the 
Suprem.e Court of the United States reversed the judgem.ents 
of the law courts. Expressing the views on behalf of five 
judges of the US Suprem.e Court, Douglas J., said: 
18, Report of the Comxi^ -ittee on Privacy Younger Comjv.ittee, 
y.K.TCand, 5012 of Morison: Report on the law of 
Privacy, See also Cowen's: Individual liberty and the 
law. Eastern Law House, Oceana Publications, 1977. 
19, Grlswold V, Connecticut. (1971) 381 US 479. 
233 
"the statute was invalid as an 
unconstitutional invasion of the 
r ight of Privacy of married 
persons. The freedom of speech 
and press includes not only the 
r ight to u t t e r or to p r in t , but also 
the right to d i s t r ibu te , the r ight 
to receive, the r ight to read and 
tha t without those peripheral r igh ts 
the specific r ight would be less 
secure and that likewise, the other 
specific guarantees in the Bill of 
r ights have penumbras form.ed by 
ewanations from those guarantees 
tha t help give them l i fe and substance, 
that the various guarantees create 
zones of privacy, and that protection 
againfet a l l governmental invasions 
"of the sancti ty of a man's hom.e and 
the privacies of l i f e " was fundamental. * 
ile further said that the inqury i s whether 
a r ight involved i s of such a character 
that i t cannot be denied without vio-
la t ing those 'fundam-ental pr inciples of 
l iber ty and jus t ice which l i e at the 
base of a l l our c iv i l and po l i t i c a l 
ins t i tu t ions* and that privacy i s a 
fundamental personal r igh t , emanating 
from, the t o t a l i t y of the const i tu-
t ional schem.e under which we (Americans) 
l i v e , " 20 
21 In Jane Roe v. Henry Wade an unm.arried pregnant woman 
who wished to term.inate Yer pregnancy by abortion ins t i tu ted 
an action in the Northern Distr ict court of Texas seeking a 
declaratory judgement that the Texas crim.inal abortion 
s t a tu t e s , which prohibited abortions except with respect to 
20. 381 US 479 at 510. 
21, Jane Roe v. Henry Wade (1973) 410 US 113. 
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t h o s e p rocured or a t t empted by niedical adv ice for the 
purpose of s a v i n g t h e l i f e of t h e -mother, were u n c o n s t i -
t u t i o n a l . 
The US Supreme Court s a i d t h a t a l though t h e c o n s t i -
t u t i o n of t h e USA does no t e x p l i c i t l y mention any r i g h t 
of p r i v a c y , t h e United S t a t e s c o u r t r e c o g n i s e s t h a t a 
r i g h t of Pe r sona l p r i v a c y , or a gua ran t ee of c e r t a i n a r e a s 
or zones of p r i v a c y , does e x i s t under t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , 
and " t h a t t h e r o o t s of t h a t r i g h t may be found in t h e 
F i r s t Amendment, in t h e Four th and F i f t h Amendm.ents, in 
t h e penumJoras of t h e B i l l of R i g h t s , in t h e Nin th Amendm.ent, 
and in t h e concept of l i b e r t y guaran teed by t h e f i r s t 
s e c t i o n of t h e F o u r t e e n t h Ari>endrftent" and t h a t t h e r i g h t 
22 t o P r i v a c y i s not a b s o l u t e , " 
However t h e a c t i o n s o r r e l a t i o n s of a man have been 
c l a s s i f i e d by l i b e r a l i n d i v i d u a l i s t s are those in which they 
advocate t h e m.inim.al i n t e r f e r e n c e by the s o c i e t y . The 
l i b e r a l i n d i v i d u a l i s t t r a d i t i o n has s t r e s s e d , in p a r t i c u l a r , 
t h r e e p e r s o n a l i d e a l s , t o each of which co r r e sponds a range 
of ' p r i v a t e a f f a i r s i 
22 V Jane Roe v. Henery Wade (1973) 410 US 113, 
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There i s n o t h i n g t o p r e v e n t one from u s i n g t h e word 
' p r i v a c y ' t o mean t h e freedom, t o l i v e o n e ' s l i f e w i t h o u t 
g o v e r n m e n t a l i n t e r f e r e n c e . But t h e c o u r t o b v i o u s l y does 
n o t so u s e t h e t e r m n o r c o u l d i t , f o r such a r i g h t i s a t 
23 
s t a k e i n e v e r y c a s e , " 
I-lr. J u s t i c e Mathew h a s a d v o c a t e d two r e a s o n s which 
make a m.an t o l i v e i n p r i v a c y P u t t i n g i t in a d i f f e r e n t 
way, a m.an s e e k s t o p r e s e r v e h i s p r i v a c y on a c c o u n t of 
t h e f o l l o w i n g two w a y s : Hathew J . i n Gobinda o b s e r v e d : 
T h e r e a r e two p o s s i b l e t h e o r i e s f o r 
p r o t e c t i n g p r i v a c y of• hom.e. The f i r s t 
i s t h a t a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e hom.e harm, 
o t h e r s o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y c a u s e 
o f f e n c e r e s u l t i n g from, t h e mere t h o u g h t 
t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s m.ight be e n g a g i n g in 
s u c h a c t i v i t i e s and t h a t s u c h a c t i v i t i e s 
and t h a t s u c h 'harm. ' i s n o t c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t i b l e by t h e S t a t e , 
The s e c o n d i s t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s n e e d a 
p l a c e of s a n c t u a r y where t h e y can be 
f r e e from, s o c i e t a l c o n t r o l . * The im.por-
t a n c e of s u c h a s a n c t u a r y i s t h a t 
i n d i v i d u a l s can d r o p t h e m.ask, d e s i s t 
f o r a w h i l e from p r o j e c t i n g on t h e wor ld 
t h e image t h e y want t o be a c c e p t e d a s 
t h e m . s e l v e s . An im.age t h a t m.ay r e f l e c t 
t h e v a l u e s o f t h e i r p e e r s r a t h e r t h a n 
t h e r e a l i t i e s of t h e i r n a t u r e . 24 
2 3 . The Wages of c r y i n g Wolf: A Comr.ient on Roe v . 
Wade, 82 Ya le Law J . 920 a t P . 9 3 2 . 
2 4 . S u p r a n o t e 8 a t P . 1385 ; See 26 S t a n f o r d Law Rev. 
1161 a t P . 1187 ; Ben, " P r i v a c y , Freedom and 
R e s p e c t f o r P e r s o n s " in J . Pennock & J . Chapman 
Ekis. P r i v a c y Norms X I I I , 1 ,15 - 1 6 . 
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The growth of right to Privacy usually starts from 
the Warren and Bradeis views published in the name of 
the Right to Privacy in 1890, The learned lawyers said 
that "the right to life has to come to m.ean the right to 
enjoy life - the right to be let alone; the right to 
liberty secures the exercise of extensive civil privilegesl' 
This development of the law was inevitable. The intense 
intellectual and emotional life, and the heightening of 
sensations which came with the advance of civilization, 
made it clear to men that only a part of the pain, 
pleasure and profit of life lay in physical things, 
thoughts, emotions, and sensations dem.anded legal recogni-
tion , and the beautiful capacity for growth which charac-
terizes the common law enabled the judges to afford the 
requisite protection, without the interposition of the 
legislature. 
Recent inventions and business "faethods call attention 
to the next step which must be taken for the protection 
of the person and for securing to tirie individual what 
Judge Cooley calls the "right to be let alone!' Instanta-
neous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded 
the sacred precincts of private and domestic life and 
numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the 
23? 
predic t ion t h a t "what i s whispered in c lo se t shal l be 
proclairaed from the housetops ," 
In Olmstead -Olmstead and o thers had been convicted 
of v io l a t i ng the Prohib i t ion Act, and the evidence used 
against them, included several incrim.inating telephone 
conversat ions which the governm.ent o f f i c i a l overheard by 
wi re - tap ing . The Chief J u s t i c e Taft who by t h i s tim.e 
had becom.e Chief J u s t i c e , wrote the c o u r t ' s opinion a f f i r -
ming the convic t ions , Brandeis J . wrote h i s m.agnificient 
d i s s e n t : 
"The makers of our cons t i t u t i on 
under-took to secure condi t ions 
favourable to the pursu i t of 
happiness. They recognised the 
s igni f icance of m.an's s p i r i t u a l 
na tu re , of h i s feel ings and of 
h is i n t e l l e c t . They knew t h a t 
only a p a r t of the pa in , pleasure 
and s a t i s f a c t i o n s of l i f e a l l t o be 
found in m.aterial t h i n g s . They sought 
t o p r o t e c t Am.ericans in t h e i r b e l i e f s , 
t h e i r thoughts , t h e i r em.otions and 
t h e i r sensa t ions . They conferred, 
as against the governm.ent, the r i g h t 
to be l e t alone - the m^st comprehensive 
of r i g h t s and the r i g h t m.ost valued by 
c i v i l i s e d men. To p ro tec t t h a t r i g h t , 
every un jus t i f i ab l e in t rus ion by the 
Governm.ent upon the privacy of the 
i nd iv idua l , whatever the m.eqns 
employed, m.ust be deemed a v io l a t ion 
of the Fourth Amendment.,," 
In Wolf V. Colorado (1949) 338 US 25) Jus t i ce Frank 
fur ther observed: 
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"The security of one's privacy against 
arbitrary intrusion by the Police,,,, 
is basic to a free societyi It is 
therefore implicit in 'the concept of 
ordered liberty, and such enforceable 
against the States through the due Process 
clause. The knock at the door, whether 
by day or by night, as a prelude to a 
search, without authority of law but solely 
on the authority of the police, did not 
need the comm.entary of recent history to 
be condem.ned as inconsistent with the 
conception of human rights enshrined in 
the history and the basic constitutional 
docum.ents of English speaking peoples.,. 
We have no hesitation in saying that when 
a state affirmatively to sanction such 
police incursion into privacy it would run 
counter to the guarantee of the Fourth 
Am.endraent. 
'Experience should teach us to be 
m.ost on our guard to protect liberty 
when the Governm.ents purposes are 
beneficient. Men born to freedom are 
naturally alert to repel invasion of their 
liberty by evil m.inded rulers. The 
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in 
insidious encroachm.ent by m.en of zeal, 
well-m.eaning but without understanding" 
The truth is, of course, that no one can claim, that 
privacy can or should be absolute, the very fact of living 
in society involves som.e sacrifice of it, and there often 
a head long collusion between the individual's claim to 
privacy and highly prized social values such as freedom, 
of speech and expression .press and the m.edia and socially 
desirable objections such as enforcem.ent of the crim.inal law, 
23!) 
2*^  
efficient government and national security. " It is 
not possible, however, to give a simple answer to the 
question of the extent to which contemporary law gives 
or should give protection to the right of privacy. In 
its broadest sense, the interest involved is that of 
•being left alone? it was described by Justice Brandeis 
in Olmstead ^^as the right to be let alone -the most 
com.prehensive of rights and the m.ost valued by civilized 
man," In the context of Warren & Brandeis "the Right 
to Privacy" 1890 article, the claim was to be free from 
unwanted and unwarranted intrusion and disclosure, in 
27 Olmstead to be frc^ e from surveillance by clandestine ana 
unlawful wiretas. 
It has been said that in the Aro.erican context the 
most constitutional civil rights would be details of the 
28 
one true civil right, the right to Privacy. In Roe v, 
29 Wade the US Supreme Court held that a texas abortion law 
could not prohibit voluntary abortions during the first 
three months of pregnancy. While the m.ajority expressly 
25T Swantani Protection of Privacy (1974) 48 
Aust. L.J. 91 at P.92, 
26. 01m-stead v. United States (19 28) 277 US 438 at P.478. 
27. I b i d . 
28. Gross» The Concept of P r ivacv (1967) 42 HY ULR 34 
a t P . 44. 
29. Supra note 20. 
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r e s t ed i t s decision on the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to 
Pr ivacy, Jus t i ce alackn-iun de l ive r ing the opinion of 
the cour t , sa idi 
"The cons t i tu t ion does not e x p l i c i t l y 
mention any r i g h t of p r i v a c y . . . (hov/ever) 
the court has recognised t h a t a r i g h t 
of personal privacy or a guarantee of 
ce r t a in areas or zones of privacy does 
e x i s t under the c o n s t i t u t i o n . . . . This 
r i g h t of p r ivacy , whether i t i s founded 
in the Fourteenth Ariiendraent • s concept 
of personal l i b e r t y and r e s t r i c t i o n s 
upon the s t a t e a c t i o n . . . or the Minth 
ftmendment's reserva t ion of r i g h t s to 
the people, broad enough to encompass 
a woman decision whether or not t o 
term.inate her pregnancy . . . a s t a t e 
m.ay properly a s s e r t important r i g h t s in 
safe guarding h e a l t h , in m.aintaining 
medical s tandards and in p ro t ec t ing 
p o t e n t i a l l i f e . At some point in 
pregnancy these respect ive i n t e r e s t s 
becom.e s u f f i c i e n t l y com.pelling t o sustain 
regula t ion of the fac tors t h a t govern the 
abortion dec is ion . The Privacy r i g h t 
involved, t h e r e f o r e , cannot be said to be 
abso lu t e . " 30 
Ju s t i c e Blackm.un upheld Texas Prohibi t ion of Termi-
nation of pregnancy in i t s l a t e r s tages on the bas is of 
counterva i l ing soc ia l i n t e r e s t s . In Stanley v. Georgia^^ 
i t was held t h a t the s t a t e law could not c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y 
< .^p. Supra note 20 a t pp. 152 -154, 
31. Stanley v, Georgia (1969) 394 us 557, 
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reach in to the Privacy of a man's home and punish him 
for the possession of obscene f i lms. J u s t i c e Douglas 
32 
speaking for the court in Griswold v. Connecticut while 
dec la r ing the Connecticut s t a t u t e p roh ib i t i ng the use of 
contracept ive as uncons t i tu t iona l as a v io la t ion of a r i g h t 
t o privacy said t h a t spec i f i c guarantees in the B i l l of 
Rights had "penumbras"; the re were 'zones of pr ivacy ' 
c rea ted by the B i l l of Rights and by premises decided by 
the Suprem.e Court involving privacy elements. In h is 
concurring but in a separate judgement Jus t i ce Douglas 
sa id : 
"This r i g h t of privacy was ca l led by 
I-Ir. J u s t i c e Brandeis the r i g h t ' t o 
be a lone ' t h a t r i g h t includes the 
p r i v i l ege of an individual to plan 
h is own a f f a i r s for outside of areas 
of p l a in ly harmful conduct, every 
American i s l e f t to shape h i s own l i f e . 
as he th inks b e s t , do what he p leases 
dnd go where he p leases , "33 
Ju s t i c e Rehnquist, d i ssen t ing in Roe v. Wade questioned 
the majority Cour t ' s bas i s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e . 
He was of the view t h a t in Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe 
'^* '^ade what was in issue was the ind iv idua l s autonomy 
32. Griswold V. Connecticutt (1965)381 US 479. 
see also E isens tad t . v. Baird (1972) 405 US 438. 
33. Supra note 20 a t P . 213, 
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r a t h e r than h i s p r i v a c y . The l e a r n e d judge s a i d t h a t 
t he c o u r t in t h e s e c a s e s has been u s ing t h e term 'Pr ivacy* 
in a s t r a i n e d s e n s e , and t h a t what i s i n i s s u e i n c a s e s l i k e 
Griswold and Jane Roe i s t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s autonomy or h i s 
34 
i n t e r e s t in s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n r a t h e r than h i s p r i v a c y . 
However, t h e Yoxinger Comroittee proposed a narrow 
d e f i n i t i o n for p r i v a c y which i t saw as hav ing two main 
a s p e c t s i - one , freedom from i n t r u s i o n o n e s e l f , o n e ' s 
hom.e, family and r e l a t i o n s h i p s , t h e o t h e r , p r i v a c y of 
inform.at ion, t h e r i g h t t o determine f o r o n e s e l f how and t o 
what e x t e n t inform.ation about o n e s e l f i s comm.unicated 
35 t o o t h e r s . The 'w i re t a p p i n g ' has been d e s c r i b e d by 
J u s t i c e Holmes in Olm.stead as ' d i r t y b u s i n e s s ' and s a i d 
t h a t i t was a l e s s e r e v i l t h a t some cr im. ina ls should 
escape than t h a t governm.ent should p l a y an ignoble p a r t ? 
37 In a r e c e n t case of Whi te , ano the r d i s t i n g u i s h e d judge 
has s a i d t h a t " t h i r d p a r t y e l e c t r o n i c mon i to r ing s u b j e c t 
only t o the r e s t r a i n t of law enforcement o f f i c i a l s has no 
p l a c e in our s o c i e t y . The burden of gua rd ing p r i v a c y in a 
34. Swantoni Protec t ion of Privacy (1974) 48 
Austral ian LJ 91 at P, 99, 
35. Com.d. 5012 of 1972 a t PP. 10, 19. 
36. Q^qiBtead V. _Lia, (1928) 277 US 438 a t P . 470. 
37. US.V. Whit.R (1971) 401 US 745 . 
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rree socie ty snoulG not be on its citizens; it is the 
government that must justify its need to electronically 
eavesdrop. 
The electrononic surveillance devices developed in 
the world are so dangerous that they leave no aspect of 
numan life unconvered. Justice .iolmes has rightly des-
cribed wirestapping as 'dirty business' in Olmstead 
vi/ustice Home's dirty business concept has been seriously 
noticed by Justice brennan in Lopez who said that these 
electronic surveillance devices added a new dimension 
eavesdropping by making it more penetrating, more indis-
criminate / more truly abnoxious to a free society. 
The deep penetration of the electronic surveillance into 
privacy is present in Nixon's involvement in watergate 
38, iiupra note 3 at P. 790; See also Storey: Infringement 
of Privacy and its f<.emedies vl973) 47 Australian LJ 
498 at P. 50 9. "I do not reject the concept of a 
general right <»f privacy, but on the whole it is my 
opinion that invasion of privacy in the areas of 
unjustifiable acquisition of information and disclosure 
of information are better dealt within Separate 
legislation. This still leaves the area of invasion 
of solitude and in my opinion there is scope for a 
general right ox privacy designed to protect solitude 
and prevent intrusion upon the individual in circum-
stances where be might reasonably expect to be alone". 
39, Lopez V. Uo (1963) 373 Ua 427 at P. 466 
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scandle t h i s i s how the Chairman of the Senate Watergate 
Inves t iga t ing Comm.ittee expressed h i s concerned about the 
e l e c t r o n i c sxirveil lance. 
"Of-the two i s sues of crime and l i b e r t y 
t h a t have ar isen in the pas t decade, 
one of the most d i f f i c u l t has been 
the question of wire- tapping . I t i s , 
in the words of »^ustice Holmes ' d i r t y 
business* To eavesdrop on the p r iva te 
comm\inicatlons of the o thers offends the 
s e n s i b i l i t i e s of a l l but the most c a l l ous . 
Yet a s trong case e x i s t s for the use of 
e l e c t r o n i c in te rcep t ion in crime f ight ing 
and in National Secur i ty , Yet however 
d i s t a s t e f u l one m.ight find i t , the p re -va i l i ng 
opinion seems to be tha t eavesdropping i s 
necessary in Law enforcement; i t w i l l be 
conducted l ega l l y i f p o s s i b l e , but even 
i l l e g a l l y i f necessaryl' (40) The question 
before the Americans was; vJhether secxirity, 
pol ice and customs andother a u t h o r i t i e s 
should have power t o tap in cases involving 
na t ional secvirity and se r ious crim.e. A 
far - reaching and searching na t iona l debate 
both in the congress and in the nation was 
generated by the I I I Omjiibus crim.e Control 
and Safe S t r e e t s Act, 1968 - the m.ost 
comprehensives l e g i s l a t i o n . Both the President 
Lyndon^.Johnson and Attorney General, Ram.say 
Clark, expressed grave doubts about the Act, 
1968 and therefore the Attorney-General 
i n s t ruc t ed federal law o f f i ce r s not to 
exercise t h e i r powers under the law, saying 
t h a t he considered eavesdropping t o be"an 
invasion of pr ivacy , and he questioned both 
i t s eff icacy in Law enforcement and the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the Act, 1968,(41) 
In US V, UDSC(42) the m.ajoritv court of 
the US Supreme Court did not accept the 
government argument t h a t the use of wire- tap 
40. Foreword to Lapidus, Eavesdropping on Txial (1974) 
41. Supra note 39 at P .40. ^1^74;, 
42. (1972) 407 US 297, 
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and s u r v e i l l a n c e d e v i c e s was j u s t i f i e d 
for t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e n a t i o n a l 
s e c u r i t y a g a i n s t i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s 
which t h r e a t e n e d the use of fo rce and 
o t h e r i l l e g a l means t o a t t a c k t h e e x i s t i n g 
form of government. J u s t i c e Powel l speaking 
fo r t h e c o u r t s a i d , ••The p r i c e of lawful 
p u b l i c d i s s e n t must not be a d read of 
s u b j e c t i o n t o an unchecked s u r v e i l l a n c e 
power ," (43) 
In 1890 Warren and Brande is p l eaded t h e r i g h t t o 
P r i v a c y as a r i g h t e n f o r c e a b l e by i n d i v i d u a l s by p r i v a t e 
law of t o r t , ^ ^ When i t was pu t t o j u d i c i a l t e s t i t was 
h e l d t h a t t h e r i g h t t o p r i v a c y d id no t e x i s t as a l e g a l l y 
p r o t e c t e d , r i g h t . ' ^ ^ Thm Supreme Court of Georgia affirm.ed 
46 
the e x i s t e n c e of a r i g h t t o p r i v a c y . However, in 
Araerica any invas ion of t h e r i g h t t o p r i v a c y was recogn i sed 
as an a c t i o n a b l e t o r t , Brandeis J . in Olrostead he ld 
" the r i g h t t o be l e f t a l o n e " as a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y confe r red 
r i g h t and observed t h a t every u n j u s t i f i a b l e i n t r u s i o n by the 
Government upon the P r ivacy of t h e i n d i v i d u a l , whatever 
the means employed, must be deemed a v i o l a t i o n of t h e 
47 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
43 , Supra no te 3 a t P , 314. 
44, Samvel D, V^arren & Louis S r a n d e i s i 
4 Harvard Law Review 193 (1690)• 
45 , Robertson v . Roches te r Folding Box Co. 191 NY 538(1902) 
46, Paves i ch v . New England Li fe In su rance Co. 
(1905) 50 SE 6 8 . 
47 , Olmstead v . Uni ted S t a t e s (1928) 277 US 438, a t P .478 . 
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Thus what was conceived as right to be vindicated 
as an 'actionable tort' was raised by Brandels J. to 
the status of a constitutional right. In Griswold Douglas 
J. recognised the right to privacy as a fundamental 
personal right emanating from the "totality of the 
constitutional schem.e under which we live, within the 
48 penumbras of several fundaraental guarantees." 
A similar view was expressed by Justice Hathew in 
Gobinda that all brooding power of Police surveillance 
could not be granted to the police which urged perilously 
49 
non unconstitutionality. 
International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Article 17(1) no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with his privacy, fam.ily, hom.e or 
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation. 
(2) Every one has the right to the protection of the 
law against such Interference or attacks. 
48. Griswold V. Connecticuti (1905) 381 US 479. 
49. Ruth Gavison: Privacy and the limits of law.The Yale 
Law Journal Vol. 89 Mo.3 at P. 421/ January 1980. 
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The European convention on Human rights made a 
valiant attempt to tackle the new problem of privacy 
threatened by the electronic surveillance. Article 8 
of the convention runs: 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private 
and family life, his horae and his correspondence. ' 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority 
with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crim.e, for the 
protection of health or morals or for the protection 
of the rights and freedom.s of others. 
In developing the concept of privacy Mathew J. in 
Gobinda has reached that the wide reading of Regulations 
855 and 856 of the M.P. Police Regulations would lead to 
be the drastic inroads directly into the Privacy and 
indirectly into the fundamental rights. Therefore the 
learned judge has applied the rule of harmonious construction 
and-- held the M . P . Regulations valid. Hathew J. said that 
what is protected by Article 21 is the personal liberty 
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Which cannot be denied without j u s t , fa i r and reasonable 
procedure established by law. The M,P, Police Regulations 
having the force of law have validly deprived Gobinda of 
his personal l iber ty including his privacy. Nevertheless, 
while upholding the const i tu t ional i ty of the M.P. Police 
Regulations 14athew J, has unhesitatingly expressed his 
dislikeness to the continence of the Police Regulations 
and described them as ant i thes is to the democratic soceity. 
The learned judge has appended a note of caution in these 
words} 
"In t ru th , legal i ty apart , these 
regulations i l l -accord with the 
essence of personal freedoms and 
the s ta te will do well to revise 
these old Police Regulations .urging ^Q 
perilously near unconst i tu t ional i ty ." 
The Preambular purpose of our constitution i s that i t 
promises to assure the 'dignity of the individuali ^^ile 
stressing the r ight to privacy as a basis for the ensurance 
of the dignity of the individual and i t s autonomy Justice 
Mathew formulated a dominant t e s t known as the 'Compelling 
State i n t e r e s t ' through which the s ta te may have control 
over the man's privacy. Justice Mathew saidi "Assuming 
that the fundamental r ights expl ic i t ly guaranteed to a 
50. Supra note 8 at P* 1386. 
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citizen have peniam±>ural zones and the right to privacy 
is Itself a fundamental right, that fundamental right 
must be subjected to restriction on the basis of com.pe-
lling state interest," This shows that Justice Mathew 
has displayed his best judicial craftmanship by holding 
the • right to privacy* as a part of Personal liberty in 
Article 21 Justice Mathew has in an articulated manner 
determ.ined a broad nature and scope of the right to privacy. 
But the learned judge has not declared it as an absolute 
right as no right can be, has ligitimately and clearly 
advocated that the right to privacy m.ay be traram.eled by 
the 'compelling state interestJ The learned judge has 
further em.phasised the need of the reasonable restrictions 
legitimately required to be put in the enjoyment of the 
right of privacy are described under broad rubrics 'com.pe-
ll'ing state interest', 'countervailing interest', 
•superior interest' and 'compelling public interest!' 
Bugging or tapping the telephones or interception of 
the postalmalles under the Indian Telegraph Act 1885 and the 
Indian Post Office Act, 1861 is nothing but a violation of 
the privacy of a man as included in Article 21 of our 
constitution. The Indian Post Office (Am.endm.ent) Bill of 
1986 passed by both Houses of Parliament was not assented 
2sn 
by l-lr. Zaid Singh t h e then P r e s i d e n t of I n d i a when 
p r e s e n t e d in Janiaary 1987, Rex:ently-the Kamataka 
Chief M i n i s t e r 14r. R.K, Hegde r e s i g n e d from t h e p o s t 
Qv/lng up moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e t a p p i n g of t e l e p h o n e s 
51 
of p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s and o t h e r s in t h e S t a t e , The 
s p e c i a l I n s p e c t o r General of P o l i c e ( I n t e l l i g e n c e ) Bangalore 
o r d e r e d t h e i n t e r c e p t i o n of t e l e p h o n e s under t h e Indian 
Te legraph Act 1885 on 11 .7 .1988 .^^ 
While p a r t i c i p a t i n g in t h e d i s c u s s i o n r e l a t i n g t o the 
i n t e r p e p t i o n of Telephones of the p o l i t i c i a n s in Karnataka 
14r, Madhu Dandavate l e a d e r of t h e J a n a t a P a r t y in t h e 
Lok Sabha a n g r i l y s a i d i t d id not m a t t e r "whether my own 
governm.ent or t h e c e n t r e i s invo lved " he was ask ing 
53 t h e q u e s t i o n in t h e i n t e r e s t of c i t i z e n s r i g h t t o P r i v a c y , 
Recen t ly t h e wes tern world i s r e p o r t e d t o have been a f f l i c t e d 
by Acquired Imraxine Def ic iency Syndrome (AIDS) . Dr. Autar 
Singh P a i n t a l sugges ted t h a t t he only way t o p reven t the 
AIDS in t h i s count ry i s t o m.ake sex wi th f o r e i g n e r s a 
pena l o f f e n c e . Though t h e sugges t ion indeed novel ye t i t 
i s s t o u t l y r e j e c t e d by t h e law M i n i s t r y on t h e ground 
t h a t i t would v i o l a t e t h e c i t i z e n s ' Fundamental Right t o 
5 1 . The TjLmes of I n d i a , Mew Delhi August 1 1 , 1988 a t P , 1 . 
52 . The Tim.es of I n d i a , New Delhi August 9,1988 
5 3 . The Tim.es of I n d i a , New Delhi August 10, 1988 a t P , 1 
251 
Privacy.^'* J u s t i c e V.R, Krishna Iyer in h is own 
imrcitable way expressing his d ispleasure and d i s l i ke 
over the telephone tapping and descr ibing i t an invasion 
on the ind iv idua ls pr ivacy. Jus t i ce Iyer sa id , "If a 
Man's house i s h is c a s t l e , as i t i s , h i s privacy i s 
i n t e g r a l to his d ign i ty ; and pro tec ted p r iva t e conviiuni-
c a t i o n , save where grave r i s k to s t a t e secu r i ty i s at 
s t ake , i s a fundamental freedom." Holding the democrati-
sat ion of communication as a par t of open government 
J u s t i c e Iyer sa id ; 
"Human d i g n i t y , in te rpe rsona l intimacy 
and i n t e r d i c t on s t a t e au thor i ty to 
peep or pry i n to other peop le ' s 
pr ivacy, except in the r a r e s t of the 
r a r e cases c l ea r l y wri t in to the law, 
or i n t e g r a l to the worth l a rge r of the human person it 
the freedom which gives meaning to l i fe . ' " ' " 
The r i g h t to privacy has been heK as an i n t e g r a l 
pa r t of the fundam.ental r i g h t to l i f e and personal l i b e r t y 
under Ar t ic le 21 of the cons t i tu t ion in Maneka Gandhi, 
But no r i g h t i s abso lu te . Thus the r i gh t t o Privacy i s 
subject t o the reasonable r e s t r i c t i o n s . Therefore the 
Supreme Court held in Maneka Gandhi t h a t "a r i g h t to be 
B4. Sahay,S, "Encroachm.ent on Pr ivacy" , The Hindustan 
Tim.es New Delhi June 17, 1988, 
55 . V.R. Krishna Iye r , "Privacy i s hiom.an r ight" ,The lUndusfean 
Times, New Delhi , May 16, 1990. 
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fundamental has t o be an i n t e g r a l p a r t of a named 
fundamental r i g h t or has t o p a r t a k e of t h e same b a s i c 
56 
natxire and c h a r a c t e r as t h e naraed funamental r i g h t . " 
Thus, t he e l e v a t i o n of an a c t i v i t y n e c e s s a r y for t h e 
e x e r c i s e and enjoyment of a fundariiental r i g h t guaran teed 
by t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n t o the l e v e l of a fundamental r i g h t 
can be made only when i t i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t of a 
named r i g h t . I f an a c t i v i t y v;i thout which a fundariiental 
r i g h t cannot be en joyed , then i t would become an i n t e g r a l 
p a r t of a nam.ed fundamental r i g h t . In Haneka Gandhi the 
Supreme Court has e x p l a i n e d t h a t in t h e even t of such a 
r e c o u r s e , t h e r e w i l l be s e r i e s of e v e r expanding c o n c e n t r i c 
c i r c l e s in t h e shape of r i g h t s concomitant t o concomitants 
r i g h t s and so on l e a d i n g almost t o grotesque* r e s u l t s . * 
The Suprem.e Court has j u d i c i a l l y given t h e r i g h t t o 
p r i v a c y t o t h e Indian c i t i z e n s ' as an e s s e n t i a l i n g r e d i e n t 
of p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y . This s a n c t i f i e s man 's domest ic 
l i f e . Thus t h e very b a s i s of t h e r i g h t t o p r i v a c y i s t h a t 
a p e r s o n ' s home i s h i s c a s t l e . There is t h e r e f o r e no 
o f f i c i a l i n t e r f e r e n c e or i n t r u s i o n i n t o m.an's dom.estic 
56. Maneka Qandhi v . Union of indfa , AiR 1978 
SC 597 a t p p . 640 - 6 4 1 . 
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l i f e . Therefore the ind iv idua l has pe rsona l i ty and those 
th ings staiTsped with h i s persona l i ty b e / l r e e frora o f f i c i a l 
in te r fe rence except v/here a reasonable bas i s for in t rus ion 
e x i s t s . The r i g h t to privacy i s recognised in terms of 
home and premises, communication mat ters and against 
unwanted p u b l i c i t y and search and s e i z u r e . 
Though the American cons t i t u t i on does not provide any 
5 
provision for any r i g h t t o privacy yet Douglas J . in Grlswold" 
1965 discovered i t within the penumberas of several 
fundam-ental cons t i tu iona l guarantees l i k e the r igh t to 
assoc ia t ion in the f i r s t Amendment, Privacy of hom.e in the 
tjhird and fourth Amendments, personal privacy in the self-
incr iminat ion clause of the Fif th ARvendment and f i na l l y in the 
sjixth Amendment under which the people r e t a i n the residue 
ojf the r i g h t s not enumerated. In 1961 /larlan J . in his 
djissent in Poe v, Ullman condemned a s t a t u t e p roh ib i -
t|lng use of cont racept ives without the aid of r i gh t to 
privacy but by invoking the old Palko t e s t of bas ic values" 
" impl ic i t in the concept of ordered s o c i e t y , " 
Sf. ,c3rigvrpJ-pt V. gpnnecticut (X96S) 38i ITS 479. 
5^. (1961) 367 VS 497. 
5^. (1937) 302 US 319. 
2^1 
In developing the r i g h t to privacy Suprerije Court 
f%C\ 
r e l i e d on the American case of Hunn v, I l l i n o i s in 
which l i f e was defined as more than m.ere anim.al e x i s -
tence but the case was r e l a t e d t o economic 
regula t ion the Suprem.e Court advocated a Pol icy of 
' j u d i c i a l non- interference J This decision was overruled 
61 in Smyth v, Ames in 1898, The Indian Suprem.e Court 
6 2 
also r e l i e d on Wolf v. Colorado which r e l a t ed to 
adri i iss ibi l i ty of i l l e g a l l y obtained evidence was also 
overruled in Mapp v. Ohio in 1961. Our Suprem.e 
Court also r e l i e d on Roe v. Wade In which s t a t e law 
p r o h i b i t i n g aboirtion was Inval ida ted was a l so modified 
6*^  in Doe v. Bolton " in 1973 in which the period of 
pregnancy was divided in to three t r i m e s t e r and held t h a t 
there could be no in te r fe rence with abortion during the 
f i r s t trim.ester where mx>rality i s less ' , than the s t a t e was 
competent to regula te abortion to the ex ten t of com.plete 
p ro sc r ip t i on . Thus, Right to Privacy in Am.erica i s not 
unregvaated and can very well be regula ted on t )* ground 
60. (1877) 94 US 113. 
61. (1898) 169 US 466. 
62. wolf V. Oplorado (1937^ 302 ' US 319, 
63. Magp V." Ohio. " 
64. Roe V. Wade (1973) 410 US 13. 
65. Doe V. Bolton. 
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Of compulsive s t a t e i n t e r e s t . While r e g u l a t i n g the p r ivacy 
under t h e 'com.pulsive s t a t e i n t e r e s t ' s t a t e p rov ides i t s e l f 
w i th a powerfxil m.ean fo r c o n t r o l l i n g women's behaviour 
du r ing p regnancy , t h e r e b y , t h r e a t e n i n g wom.en's fundamental 
r i g h t s , Awoinan's r i g h t t o b o d i l y autonom.y in m.atters 
conce rn ing r e p r o d u c t i o n i s a p r o t e c t e d by t h e c o n s t i t u -
66 t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s of l i b e r t y and p r i v a c y . 
While conc lud ing t h e d i s c u s s i o n r e l a t i n g t o the n a t u r e , 
scope and importance of t h e '-.^raaLnated' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
fundam.ental r i g h t to p r i v a c y i t may be s a i d t h a t l i k e a l l 
o t h e r r i g h t s , i t i s not an a b s o l u t e r i g h t . The r i g h t t o 
p r i v a c y can t h e r e f o r e be r e g u l a t e d , r e s t r i c t e d by the 
'Compel l ing Star.e i n t e r e s t s , ' That i s t h e enjoyment of 
e x e r c i s e of t h e r i g h t t o p r i v a c y may be c u r t a i l e d away by 
t h e s t a t e on the ground of compel l ing p u b l i c i n t e r e s t I 
Mow t h e q u e s t i o n i s v,'hat i s t h e 'Com.pelling S t a t e i n t e r e s t * 
* has net been s p e l l e d out by J u s t i c e Mathew in Gobinda. 
I t means t h a t the ph rase 'Compell ing S t a t e i n t e r e s t ' has 
been l e f t unexp la ined and u n d e s c r i b e d . I t m.ay t h e r e f o r e 
by given c o l o u r from tiirse t o tim.e depending upon t h e 
circum.stances of each c a s e . 
66, Dawn '£, Johnsen , The Crea t ion of t h e F a t a l R igh t ; 
C o n f l i c t s wi th wom.en's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l R igh t s t o 
t i f e e r t y , P r ivacy , and equal p r o t e c t i o n Vol. 95 The 
Yale Law J o u r n a l 599 (January 8 6 ) , 
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In our context the question which s t r i k e s in our 
mind is» I s i t at a l l needed by us? The way we l i v e , 
behave Inadver tant ly depr ica tes the pr ivacy. We Indians 
are committed to openness. Our houses are open in every 
d i r ec t ion when m.ore than f i f t y percent population 
c i t i e s and 80% in v i l l a g e s l ive in Jhopar P a t t i e s and 
Jhuggies , without having any covered bathroom and l a t r i n e . 
The people including fem.ales take bath under a water hand 
pum.p or water tap in the c i t i e s , in a tank , pound or r i v e r s 
in the count rys ide . They ease them.selves on the open land. 
We are accustom.ed t o witness i t when we t r a v e l in the 
country, lioat of the dwelling houses do not have wooden 
doors what to t a l k about a secluded cosy, separate room 
as a p r iva te room.. The people both male and fem.ale take a 
holy dip in the holy r i v e r s in the gazing eyes of the people. 
There are nurnerous r e l i g i o n s Akharas of Naga Sadhus who 
walk down in the s t r e e t nakedly without any sm.allest piece 
of c lo th on hum.an sham.es and are being observed r e v e r e n t i a l l y 
by the e n t i r e m.en and wom.en. Even the people are not used 
to en te r in to other houses without knock. However, t h i s 
does not mean t h a t the privacy i s an a l ien to us . Insp i te 
of our openness and sim.ilar other h a b i t s , v/e do have 
privacy inherent ly in u s . Therefore, the value of the 
privacy has r i g h t l y been r e a l i s e d by the Suprem.e Court in 
Gobinda. 
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I t i s t r u e t h a t a majority of four Judges in Kharak 
Singh has out r i g h t l y re jec ted the claira of the r igh t to 
pr ivacy. But i t was Jus t i ce Subba Rao who in h is d i ssen t ing 
judgement has r e a l i s e d i t and has egni ted the flaro.e of 
privacy in Kharak Singh. The e n t i r e c r e d i t goes to 
Jus t i ce Hathew who by tak ing the Mashal (Torch) of the 
r igh t t o privacy ign i t ed by Jus t i ce Sul^;a Rao in Kharak 
Singh gave a f ina l sea l of j u d i c i a l recogni t ion to the 
r i gh t of privacy as an 'em.aoated fundamental r i g h t i I do 
not h e s i t a t e from quoting i4r, F. 3, , Narim.an, a senior 
lawyer of the Supreme Court who comiisented on the r i gh t of 
privacy a f t e r Gobinda. Mr. P,S, Nariman p r a i s e s the 
"dexterous j u d i c i a l s t ee r ing and mild under-statement" with 
which the court has "given the r i gh t t o privacy a foothold 
for the fundamental r i g h t s chapter" He also adm.ires the 
m.anner in which the court has given "the r igh t a new lease 
of l i f e " by "neatly s ide-s tepping the r a t i o of the l a rge r 
benchesi* l-Ir, Nariman fur ther observesi "The r i g h t of 
privacy had two rounds in the court - f i r s t before a bench 
of e ight then before a bench of 6?^ 
67. M.P. Sharm.a v. Sat ish Chandra. 1954,SCR 1077 
A eight Judge ( i n s t i t u t i o n a l Bench decided the case . 
68. Kharak Singh v. State of UP. AIR 1963 SC 1295; 
(1964; ISCR 333 A cons t i t u t i ona l Bench of s ix judges. 
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In bo th i t has been wPrs ted , I t cou ld not have su rv ived 
a t h i r d b o u t . I t was though t t h a t p r i v a c y as a fundarijental 
r i g h t had been b u r n t t o a c i n d e r . But t h e ashes of 
the l o s t freedom are e v e r smoulder ing . In Gobinda t h e 
69 
c h e r i s h e d r i g h t has r i s e n p h e n i x - l i k e from t h e ashes 
Let us t h e r e f o r e hope t h a t t he j u d i c i a l a c t i v i s m r e s u l t i n g 
i n t o t h e shape of t h e fundamental r i g h t of p r i v a c y w i l l n o t , 
a l s o , r i s e p h e n i x - l i k e t o reduce t h e r i g h t t o »smouldering 
a s h e s ' once a g a i n . 
Chandrachud C . J . whi le d e a l i n g w i th t h e pavement and 
slum d w e l l e r s in Olqa T e l l i s has d e p i c t e d the r e a l l i f e of 
our m.asses p r o v i d i n g no p l a c e for p i i v a c y in t h e fo l lowing 
words : 
"Those who have made pavements t h e i r 
hom.es e x i s t in t h e mJLdst of f i ^ t h 
and squa lo r which has t o be i^een 
t o be b e l i e v e d . Rabid dogs in s e a r c h 
of s t i n k i n g meat and c a t s in s ea rch of 
hungry r a t s keep them, company, ^hey 
cook and s l e e p where they e a s e , for 
no conveniences are a v a i l a b l e t o them . 
The i r d a u g h t e r s , come of age , ba the 
under t h e no i sy gaze of p a s s e r s by , UH 
vmmJLndful of t h e feminine sense of 
b a s h f u l n e s s . The cooking and washing 
o v e r , women p i c k l i c e from, each 
o t h e r s h a i r s . " (70) 
6 9 . Nariman, F,S.t (1977) XVII The Indian Advocate,76 
a t p p . 80 ,81 and 8 3 . 
'^^' Olga T e l l i s . v . BomJaav Munlcloal Corpora t ion AIR 1986 
SC 180 a t P . 183 . 
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I t i s t rue t h a t there i s no guaranteed r i g h t to 
privacy in our cons t i tu ion but e f f o r t s have been made 
to have read i t in Ar t ic le 21, In Kharak Singh, police 
surve i l lance was s t ruck down as uncons t i tu t iona l because -
an unauthorised in t rus ion in to a pe r son ' s hom.e... 
Thus, Kharak Singh includes the s anc t i t y of a man's home 
in the personal l i b e r t y of Art ic le 21. But Subba Rao's 
view expressed in Kharak Singh was more emphatic. Subba 
Rao J , included the r i g h t t o privacy in Ar t ic le 21. I t i s 
therefore c l ea r t h a t whereas Subba Rao J . c lo thes the 
individual l i b e r t y with the r i g h t t o p r ivacy , the majority 
view concedes the same to h is house. I t can therefore be 
said t h a t J u s t i c e Sxibba RaO*s view seem.s t o be m.ore cor rec t 
because the personal r i g h t in Ar t ic le 21 i s a r igh t tha t 
i s personal and not pe r t a in ing to such physical object 
l i ke a house. In Gobinda the Suprem.e Court u l t imate ly 
included r i g h t t o privacy in Ar t ic le 21 and held t h a t : 
"the r i g h t t o personal l i b e r t y , the r i gh t 
to move f r ee ly , and the freedom of 
speech crea te an independent r i g h t t o 
privacy as an emanation from them which 
one can cha rac t e r i s e as a fundaraental 
r i g h t . " 
Though a l l the aspects of the r i gh t to privacy were not 
gone through the court held tha t ' i t wi l l necessary to go 
2sn 
through a process of case by case developm.ent. • 
Therefore i t i s c l ea r t h a t surve i l l ance by dom.icilliary 
v i s i t s would always be unreasonable and r e s t r i c t i o n upon 
the r i g h t to pr ivacy. I t i s fur ther said t h a t assuming 
t n a t the privacy i s i t s e l f a fundam-ental r i g h t , tha t 
fundam.ental r i gh t m.ust be subject to r e s t r i c t i o n on the 
bas i s of compelling publ ic i n t e r e s t ; the procedure of 
sxirveillance i s reasonable having regard to the provisions 
of the Police r e g u l a t i o n s . The Suprem.e Court added t h a t 
"Dom.icialiary v i s i t s and p icket ing by pol ice sl^ould be 
reduced to the c l e a r e s t cases of danger to com/o.unity . 
secur i ty and not rout ine follow up a t the end of convi-
ct ion or re lease from, prison or at the whim, of the Police 
Of f ice r , " 
However,, the phrase of c l e a r e s t cases of 'danger to 
comjiiunitv s e c u r i t y ' smacks of Jus t i ce Holm.e's ' c l e a r 
ond present danger' which he propounded in connection with 
freedom, of speech in SchencK case while considering 
the v a l i d i t y of Espionage Act of 1917. I t was however, 
Brandeis J . who e l abora te ly explained the llolm.es t e s t in 
Whitney holding t h a t i I f there be tim.e, the reriiedy i s 
more speech and discussion unless the incidence of e v i l 
apprehend i s so im/ninent t ha t i t m.ay be fa l l before there 
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i s any opportunity for fu l l d i scuss ion . This t e s t of" 
iiw.inent danger has not worked e f f e c t i v e l y , more so in 
couping with the challenge of the soph i s t i ca ted subversive 
a c t i v i t i e s of organised t o t a l i t a r i a n and t e r r o r i s t s 
p a r t i e s . 
Keeping the primary duty of the pol ice and the l i f e 
and secur i ty of the conrffaunity in view the c l e a r e s t cases 
of 'danger to conuv.unity' should go and should therefore 
be l e f t to the d i s c r e t i on of the Pol ice to determine to what 
extent a criminal i s dangerous t o comraunity s e c u r i t y . 
71 In M.P. Sharma the Supreme Court has frpwned upon 
e leva t ing the r i g h t t o privacy to the s t a t u s of a fundaruental 
72 
r i g h t . In Pooran Mai The Supreme Court i t s e l f frowned 
upon such cons tu t i t i on holding tha t ne i the r by invoking the 
s p i r i t of our cons t i t u t ion nor by a s trange construct ion 
of any of the fundamental r i g h t s can we spe l l out the 
exclusion of evidence obtained on an i l l e g a l search.^"^ The 
Scope of the r i gh t to privacy has also been r e s t r i c t e d 
v i s - a - v i s search and s e i z u r e . 
1\* i-i.F. -'hc-jr.-ia, v. Satjsh Chandra..-ilR 1954, SC300. 
42. Pqpran Mai v. i^irector of Ina-oeo-Hnn. ^IH 1974 sc 343. 
73 . Meneka Gandhi v. union of India , :S£lU97e'sc 597. 
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In Haneka Gandhi the oUijreme Cour t accepted 
74 
J u s t i c e ^iubba Kao ' s view i n Kharak Singh t h a t the 
r i g h t t o ^^rivacy was a fundamental r i g h t . Fur the r an 
extreme view of t h e r i g h t t o p r i v a c y was taken by the 
75 
*^dhra n igh Cour t s^e^king in r . s a r e e t h a was over -
76 
r u l e d by t h e Supreme Court in Saroj Rani . 
74. Kiiarak Singh v. S t a t e of U.P.., ^ I . . 1963 SC 120 5 
75 . T. Sa ree tha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah; ^IK 19B3 .-li- 356 
76. s a ro j Rani v. Sudarshan Kximar; c^lR 1984 5C 1562 
CHAPTER V 
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 
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PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION ; ACCESS TO JUSTICE-
PART OF PERSONAL LIBERTY 
S i n c e Gopa lan much w a t e r h a s gone down unde r t h e 
Jamuna B r i d g e w i t h a l andmark j u d i c i a l p ronouncemen t 
made i n t h e a r e n a of P e r s o n a l l i b e r t y i n Maneka G a n d h i . 
I n Gopa lan t h e c o u r t gave a v e r y n a r r o w , c o n s e r v a t i v e , 
r e s t r i c t e d and p e d a n t i c meaning t o t h e word P e r s o n a l l i b e r t y 
u s e d i n A r t i c l e 21 b u t h a s g i v e n a m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l 
e x p a n s i o n t o t h e p h r a s e ' P e r s o n a l l i b e r t y ' i n Maneka 
G a n d h i . The e x p r e s s i o n ' p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y ' h a s now become 
a most c o m p r e h e n s i v e t e r m t o i n c l u d e i n i t s ambi t a l l 
v a r i e t i e s of human r i g h t s . I t means no a s p e c t of human 
l i f e i s l e f t u n c o v e r e d and u n t o u c h e d by A r t i c l e 21 of 
t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . With t h e r e s u l t t h e j u d i c i a l a t t i t u d e 
i n i t s mos t a c t i v i s t form h a s widened t h e h o r i z o n of 
' p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y ' e n s h r i n e d i n A r t i c l e 21 t h r o u g h t h e 
u s e of P u b l i c i n t e r e s t l i t i g a t i o n . I n a c a t e n a of Cases 
t h e Supreme C o u r t h a s u n f o l d e d t h e c r i p p l i n g t r a p p i n g s of 
p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y f a l l i n g u n d e r t h e c a t e g o r y of p u b l i c 
i n t e r e s t l i t i g a t i o n t h e r e b y b r u s h i n g a s i d e t h e o l d a r c h a i c 
1 . K.R. Shenoy V. U d i p i M u n i c i p a l i t y , AIR 1974 SC 2177 ; 
J . M . D e s a i V, Roshan Kumar, AIR 1976 SC 5 7 8 ; Ra t l am 
M u n i c i p a l i t y v . Vardh lcHand AIR 1980 SC 1622 ; S u n i l B a t r a 
V. D e l h i A d m i n i s t r a t i o n AIR 1980 SC 1579 ; Upendra Buxi v . 
S t a t e o f U . P . ; ( 1 9 8 1 ) T ' S c a l e 1137; S . P . Gupta v . P r e s i d e n t 
of I n d i a ; AIR 1982 SC 1 4 9 | P e o p l e ' s U n i o n fo r D e m o c r a t i c 
R i g h t s V. Union of I n d i a ; AIR 1982 SC 1 4 7 3 ; Bandhua Mukti 
Morcha v , u n i o n of I n d i a AIR 1984 3C 8 0 2 ; Kadra P a h a d i a 
V- S t a t e Ot B i h a r ; AIR~T981 SC939;Veena S e F T T v . S t a t e o^ 
Bihar;ATR19fl3 S C 3 3 9 ; S h e e l a B a r s e V . S t a t e of M a h a r a s h t r a 
AIR1983 SC378;Keer1a Chaudhrv v . S t a t e of M.P.AIR1984 SC1099 
Olga T e l L i s v . S t a t e of M a h a r a s h t r a AIR 1986 SC;Vard-.ra Ian 
V. Salem M u n i c i p a l i t y AIR 197J Mad.55 J GO — 
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outdated and outmoded Anglo-Saxon traditional rule of 
locus standi. An attempt has been made to see how the court 
has used this judicial technique to enable the right to life 
and personal liberty under Article 21 to safeguard the 
interest of the poor indigent, ignorant and illiterate 
individual — the focal attention of the preambular purpose 
of our constitution. 
Before dwelling straight away the effect of public 
interest litigation on Man's life and personal liberty 
under Article 21, it is better to know what public interest 
litigation is ? What is traditional principle of locus 
standi.7 
2 
In S.P. Gupta Mr. Mirdul, appearing on behalf of the 
Union Law Minister raised an interesting question of law 
relating to the maintenance of the writ petition on the 
ground that the petitioners had no locus standi to file 
writ-petitions. In American context the locus standi is 
known as 'standing in the the area of public law. In dealing 
with this question justice Bhagwati(with whom Gupta, Fazal, 
All, Desai, Pathak Venkataramiah Jj. concurred) has elabora-
tely discussed the law in this regard. Bhagwati J. observed: 
2. SP.Gupta V. President of India ; AIR 1982 SC 149 Popularly 
known as "Judges Ca3e"herein it is referred as judges case. 
Z;) 5 
"The traditional rule in regard to locus standi 
is that judicial redress is available only to a person 
who has suffered a legal injury by reason of violation 
of his legal right or legal protected interest by the 
impugned action of the State or a Public authority or any 
other person or who is likely to suffer a legal injury 
by reason of threatened violation of his legal right or 
legally protected interest by any such action. The basis 
of entitlement of judicial redress is person il injury to 
property, body, mind or reputation arising from violation, 
actual or threatened, of the legal right or legally protected 
interest of the person seeking such interest. This is a rule 
of ancient vintage and it arose during an Era when private 
law dominated the legal scene and public law had not been 
born."^ 
This ancient rule of locus standi was enunciated in 
4 England in Sidebotham ^ 1880)in which James, L.J. gave a 
definition of 'person aggrieved.' It was held that ' a 
person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal 
grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced 
which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully 
refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to 
something." In 1961 this James's theory was rejected by 
3. Supra note 2 
4. £x-parte Sidebotham(1880) 14 Ch.D.458 James L.J. in which 
the question was whether the appellant was a person 
aggrieved,'James LJ defined: 'A person aggrieved must be 
a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against 
whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully 
deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him some-
thing or wrongfully affected his title to something. 
2ri6 
5 Lord Denning MR in N, Jie who took a much more liberal 
view and held, "The words 'persons aggrieved are of wide 
import and should not be subjected to a restrictive 
interpretation. They do not include, of course, mere 
busybody who is interfering in things which do not concern 
him, but they do include a person who has a genuine grie-
vance becuase an order has been made which prejudicially 
affects his interest." 
The definition of 'Person aggrieved* given by James LJ 
had been approved by Lord Ssher in Re Reed Sown and 6t Co, 
1887. Therefore "a person aggrieved is a man who has been 
refused sometaing which he had a right to demand." In a 
numerous cases this rule of locus standi evolved in 
Sidebothair,. has been applied by the English courts to 
determine as to whether a person had a right to seek judicial 
remedy. According to this rule, it is only a man who has 
suffered a specific legal injury by reason of actual or 
threatened violation of his legal right or legally proctected 
interest who can bring an action for judicial redress. 
Bhagwati J. in Judges case has successfully carved out 
exceptions from the general rule of locus standi. In the 
first place a tax payer of a local authority is accorded 
standing to challenge an illegal action of the local 
g 
authority. As happened in K.R. Shinoy in which a tax 
5. The Attorney General of Gambia v. M Jie (1961) 
6. Id. at 634 
7. In Re Reed Bowen & Co. (1887) 19 QBD 174 
9* K.R. Shenoy v. Udipi Minj^cipality; AIR 1974 3C 2177; see 
also Vardarajan v. Saled'i. Municipality,AIR 1973 Mad.55 
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payer has questioned the action of the municipality in 
granting a cinema licence to a person. Secondly, if a person 
is entitled to participate in the proceedings relating to the 
decision making process culminating in the impugned decision 
he would have locus standi to maintain an action challenging 
the impugned decision. Thirdly, the statute itself may 
expressly recognise the local standi of an applicant, even 
though no legal right or legally protected interest of the 
applicant has been violated resulting in legal injury to 
him. As happned in J.M« Desai in which the court recognised 
a special interest of persons residing, or concerned with any 
institution such as a school, temple, mosque. Fourthly, section 
133 of Cr. P.C. empowers the Magistrate on receiving a report 
of a police officer or other information to make an order for 
remedying a puDlic nuisance. In Ratlam Municipality the 
Supreme Court recognised tne right of the local residents to 
move the Magistrate to order the Municipality to construct 
drain pipes to carry the filth conferred on them by section 
133 Cr.P.C. It is clear that the above exceptions are carved 
out of this strict rule of standing which requires that the 
applicant for judicial redress must have suffered a legal 
wrong of injury in order to entitle him to maintain an action 
for such redress must have suffered a legal wrong or injury 
in order to entitle him to maintain an action for such redress. 
9. J.M. Desai v. Roshan Kumar, AIR 1976 SC 578 
10. Ratlam Municipality v. Vardhi Chand, AIR 1980 SC 1622 
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This principle has also influenced the US Supreme Court 
which has in James Griggs Raines held that a litigant may 
only assert his, own constitutional rights or immunities and 
save in exceptional cases, no person can claim standing to 
vindicate the constitutional rights of a third party. 
Thereupon Justice Bhagwati said: 
"But it must now be regarded as well settled law 
where a person who has suffered a legal wrong or a legal 
injury or whose legal right or legally protected interes-
ted is violated, is unable to approach the court on account 
of some disability or it is not practicable for him to 
move the court for some other sufficient reasons, such as 
his sociality or economically disadvantaged position, some 
other person can invoke assistance of the court for the 
purpose of providing judicial redress to the person 
wronged or injured, so that the legal wrong or injury 
caused to such person does not go unredressed and justice 
is done to him." 
However, the concept of Public interest litigation draws 
its austen^Gs from order XXXII of CPC and Art.32 of our 
constitution in which the next friend or third party is 
entitled to bring an action in the name of an aggrieved 
person for judicial redress. So in case of a minor or a 
lunatic to whom a legal wrong or injury has been caused who 
on account of his disability arising from his minority 
cannot approach the court on his own. Any other person on 
1^* United States, v. James Griggs Raines,(1960) 362 US 17: 
4 L id. 2d 524, " —— -
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behalf of a minor may file an application. Similarly in 
case where a person is detained and is therefore not in a 
position to move the court for securing his release, any 
other person may file an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus challenging the legality of his detention. Of course, 
the court has ruled in a number of cases that a prisoner is 
entitled to address a communication directly to the court 
complaining against his detention and seeking release and if 
he addresses any such communication to the court, the 
Juperintendent of the prison . is bound to forward to the 
court and, in fact, there have been numerous instances where 
the court has acted on such conmunication received from a 
prisoner and treating it is an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus, called upon the detaining authority to Justify 
the legality of such detention and on the failure of the 
detaining authority to do so, released the prisoner. But 
since a person detained would ordinarilty be unable to 
communicate with the outside world, the law presumes that he 
will not be able to approach the court and hence permits 
any other person to move the court for judicial redress by 
12 filing an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Bhagwati J. 
having referred Barrows, emphasised the need and special 
conditions for making departure from the stict rule of locus 
standi and thus observed: 
12. Supra note 2 at P. ItiV 
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It may therefore now be taken as well established 
that where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a 
person or to a determinate class of persons by reason of 
violation of any constitutional or legal right or any burden 
is imposed in contravention of any constitutional or legal 
provision or without authority of law or any such legal 
wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and 
such person or determinate class of person is by reason of 
poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically 
disadvantaged position, unable to approach the court for 
relief, any member of the public can maintain an application 
for an appropriate direction, order or writ in the High Court 
under Aj-ticle 226 and in case of breach of any fundamental 
r 
right of such person or determinate class of persons, in this 
court under Aft.32 seeking judicial redress for the legal 
wrong or injury caused to such person or determinate cl^ss 
of persons, Wheraithecweakar sectiond'of the community are 
concerned, such as undertrial prisoners languishing in jails 
without a trial inmates of the Protective Home in Arga or 
Harijan workers engaged in road construction in the Ajmer 
District, who are living in poverty and destitution, who 
are baCely eking out a miserable existence with their sweat 
and toil, who are helpless victims of an exploitative society 
and who do not have easy access to justice. This court will 
not insist on a regular wr^t petition to be filed by the 
Public ^ i^rited individual espousing their cause and seeking 
relief for them. Thi§ court will readily respond even to 
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a better address by such individual acting pro bono 
publico.... Today a vast revolution i.e. taking place in 
the judicial process; the theatre of the law is fast changing 
and the problems of the poor are coming to the forefront. 
The court has to innovate new methods and devise new strategies 
for the purpose of providing access to justice to large 
masses of people who are denied their basic human rights and 
to whom freedom and liberty have no meaning. The only way in 
which this can be done is by entertaining writ petitions and 
even letters from public spirited individuals seeking judicial 
redress for the benefit of persons who have suffered a legal 
wrong or a legal injury or whose constitutional or legal 
right has been violated but who by reason of their poverty 
or socially or economically disadvantaged position are unable 
13 to approach the court for relief. 
Another situation may arise where the state or a public 
authority may act in violation of a constitutional or 
statutory oDligation fail to carry out such obligation^ 
resulting in injury to public interest or what may conven-
iently be termed as public injury as distinguished from 
private injury, who whould have standing to complain against 
such act or omission of the state or public authority ? Can 
any member of the public sue for judicial redress ? In 
answering these questions passed by Justice Bhagwati, in 
;his judgement, said: 
13. Supra note 2 at y, 18 9 
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If no one can maintain an action for redress of such 
public wrong or public injury, it would be disastrous for 
the rule of law, for it would be open to the state or a 
public authority to act with impunity beyong the scope of 
power or in breach of a public duty owed by it.,.. The view 
has therefore been taken by the courts in many decisions 
that whenever there is a public wrong or public injury 
caused by an act or ommission of the state or a public 
authority which is contrary to the constitution or the law, 
any member of the public acting bonafide and having sufficient 
interest can maintain an action for redressal of such public 
wrong or public injury. The strict rule of standing which 
insists that only a person who has suffered a specific 
injury can maintain an action for judicial redress is relaxed 
and a broad rule is evolved which gives standing to any 
member of the public who is not a mere busy-body or a 
meddlesome interloper but who has sufficient interest in 
14 the proceeding. 
So it is only by liberising the rule of locus standi 
that it has been possible to effectively police the carridors 
of powers and prevent violations of law. This what has been 
visualised by Schwartz and Wade that "if a plaintiff with a 
good, case; is turned away, merely bacause he is not sufficiently 
affected personally, that means that some government agency 
is left free to violate the law, and that is contrary to 
the public interest.""^^ 
14. Supra note 2 «it i^. 190 
15. Schwartz & HWR Wade, Legal Control of Government at p.354 
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Historically speaking the public interest litigation 
has its origin in America and over the years it has passed 
through various vicissitudes in America itself. It is not 
necessary to examine all the American Supreme Court decisions 
but it is sufficient to say that the strict requirement of 
legal interest has been watered down. However, in various cases 
the US Supreme Court seams to have reconciled and delegated 
this dynamic approach and has slightly restricted the expan- . 
sion of the judicial review through Public interest litigation. 
In England there have been remarkable developmenets in this 
area in recent time largely due to the dynamic activism of 
17 18 
Lord Denning who in McWhirter and Blackburn cases said 
that any member of the public having sufficient interest can 
maintain an action for enforcing a public duty against a 
statutory or public authority. Independent Broadc^^sting 
Authority McWhiter brought an action for injunction against 
the Broadcasting Authority to restrain it from telecasting 5 
film which did not comply with the statutory requirements, and 
the showing of which would t'terefore be illegal. Relying on 
Newspaper reports Mc Whiter said that the film offends against 
good taste and decency and is likely to be offensive to public 
20 feeling. Lord Denning considered the question whether Mcwhif^ 
has locus standi to bring the action when leave to bring a 
See also Cappellatti's book "Access to Justice" Vol.Ill at 
P.520;SA de Smith "Judicial Rgview of Administrative Action 
III Ed. At.P 403; 
16. Association of Data Processing Service V. William(1970) 
US 150 
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21 
relator action wes refused by the r^ ttorney General. Lord 
ijenning affirmatively said that i-.cWhiter has sufficient 
interest to bring the action since he had a television set 
for which iie had paid a licence fee and his susceptibility 
would be offended like that of many others, watching tele-
vision, if the film was shown in breach of the statutory 
22 
requirements. It may be noticed that in this case the 
duty which was sought to be enforced against broadcasting 
authority was one wnich the broadcasting authority owed to 
tne general public and not to any specific individual or 
class or group Oi individuals'. 
Justice Bhagwati said: "Vie would therefore hold that 
any member of the public having sufficient interest can main-
tain action for judicial redress for public injury arising 
from breach of public duty from violation of some provision 
of the constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such 
public duty and observance of such constitutional or legal 
provision. This is absolutely essential for maintaining the 
rule of law/furthering the cause of justice and accelerating 
23 
the pace of realisation of the constitutional objective, 
II • ! • nil • ! • 1 1 • • • • ! • ^ ^ — l — ^ l f — » ^ ^ i l ^ M ^ » Ni l ^ ^ — III I I 1 ^ — ^ — — • • • I I I M M W I • m m — I M • • • • I 1 « ^ M I I M » « ! • • • I I M I M M M •• I 1 1 1 ! 
17. United States v, William B, Richardson (1974) 418 US 166 
and warth v. Seldon (1974) 422 US 490; 
18. Reg. V. Greater London Council, Exparte Blackburn(1976) J 
r i l l . E .R . 184 . 
19 . (1973) I A l l E .R. 689 
2 0 . I d . a t p . 692 
21. n relator action is an action brought by the attorney 
General at the relation that is at the instance of soaie 
other person claifuin-^  an injunction or declaration or 
both in order to prevent some breach of law Jee HWR ^ /aae 
«.dministrative Miction ,lp 530-531 fifth Ed, 
22. Ibid, at P. 696 
23. authority (1973) I /^ ll. a.R. 689; 
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However/ a fear is sometimes expressed that if we 
keep the door wide open for any member of the public to 
enter the portals of the court to enforce public duty or 
to vindicate public interest/ the court will be flooded 
24 
with litigation. In Fertilizer Corporation Kamaqar Union 
The petitioners challenged the legality of the sale of cer-
tain plants and equipment of the Sindri Fertilizer Factory. 
The relief sought by the petitioner is that the respondents 
should be directed not to sell away the plant and equipment 
that they should be asked to withdraw the sale to sell and 
that the said decision should be quashed as being illegal 
and unconstitutional. Having relied on the Australian laws 
Reforms Commission. Justice Krishna Iyer observed; 
"The idle and tVhimsical plaintiff, a dilettante who litigates 
for a lark/ is a spectre which haunts the legal literature/ 
25 
not the court". • Justice Krishna Iyer has further added 
that "In a society wnere freedoms suffer from atrophy/ and 
activism is essential for participative public justice, 
some risks have to be taken and more opportunities opened 
for the public minded citizen to reply on the legal process 
and not be repelled from it by narrow pedantry now 
24. Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union v. . Union of India; 
rtIR 1981 SC 344. 
25, prof. K,E. 5cott; Standing in the iaupreme Court: i^ 
Functional r^alysis (iy73) at F, 86; See also the 
Australian law Reforms Commission. 
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surrounding locus standi," 
Neverthless, Justice Bhagwati hag appended a note of 
caution in judges case so that no one in the public 
particularly politicians should abuse this expanded rule 
of standing for ulterior and political purposes and 
observed: 
"But we must hasten to make it clear that the indi-
vidual who moves the court for judicial redress in cases 
of this kind must be acting in bonafide with a view to 
vindicating the cuase of justice and if he is acting for 
personal gain or private profit or out of political 
motivation or other oblique consideration, the court should 
not allow itself to be activised at at the instance of such 
person and must reject his application at the threshhold, 
whether it be in the form of letter addressed to the court 
or even in the form of a regular writ petition filed in 
court. We may also point out that aS a matter of prudence, 
ana not as a rule of law, the court may confine this 
stratjegic exercise of jurisdiction to cases where legal 
wrong or legal injury is caused to a determinate class or 
group of persons or the constitutional or legal right 
of such determinate class or group of persons is violated 
and as far as possible, not entertain cases of individual 
wrong or injury at the instance of a third party where 
there is an effective legal aid organization viln ich can take 
2 7 
care of such cases. 
^o. supra note Z at p..3b4 see also Dr.iJ.N. Jain on Standing 
ana Public Interest Litigation" 
2 7 / 
Justice Bhagwati has further cautioned against the 
misuse of the Public Interest Litigation in judges case. 
"But We must be care-ful to see that the member of 
the puD"! ic# who approaches the court in cases of this Kind, 
is acting in bonafide and not for personal motivation or 
other oblique consideration. The court must not allow it's 
process to be abused by politicians and others to delay 
legitimate administrative action or to gain a political 
objective." 
There after Bnagwati J. has described the nature of 
Public Interest litigation "as a fascinating exercise for the 
court to deal with public interest litigation because it 
is a new jurisprudence which the court is evolving^ a 
jurisprudence which demands juf-icial statesmanship and 
high creative ability. The frontiers of public law and 
expanding far and wide and new concepts ana doctine which 
will change the complexion of the law and v*i ich were so 
far as embedded in the wdmbii of the future, are begining 
to be born." 
2 7. S.P. Gupta V. President of India; AIR 1982 Sc 149 at 
p. 391. 
28. S.P. Gupta V. president of India; AIR 1982 SC 149 at 
P. 195 
29. Ibid. c 
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In Fertilizer Corporation of Kamagar Union 
Justice Krishna Iyer has described the Public interest 
Litigation as a part of the process of participants 
justice and 'standing' in civil litigation of that 
pattern must have liberal reception at the judicial 
doorsteps." Then after quoting Prof. K £. Scott's view 
mentioned in the Australian Law Reforms Commission 
Krishna I/er J. has further observed: If a citizen is 
no more than a way farer or officious intervener without 
any interest of concern beyond; vhat belongs to any one 
of the 660 million people of this country, the door of 
che court will not be a jar for him. But he belongs to 
an org-ini«»ation which has special interest, in the 
subject matter, if he has some concern deeper than.that 
of a busy-body, he cannot be told off at the gates, 
although whether the issue raised by him is justiciable 
may still remain to be considered." 
30, Fertilizer Corporation Kamaqcir Union v. 
Union of India; AIR 1981 SC 344 at P. 356 
27d 
Allowing access to the court under public interest 
litigation can not be stopped merely on the grounds 
31 
of the charge of opening floodgates of litigation. 
In Akhil Bhartiya Shoshit Karmachari Sangh "over 
ruling the objection Krishna Iyer J. said that whether 
the petitioners belongs to the recognized union or not, 
the fact remains that a large body of persons with a 
common grievance have approached t he court far an 
appropriate remedy. He held that the narrow concept of 
cause of action and person aggrieved and individual 
litigation is becoming obsolescent. 
34 In National Textile Workers Union The workers 
briefly stated that a petition far windig up a company 
is in which they are entitled to ask the court to 
implede them as parties in the winding up the petition 
or they have no locus standi at all so far as the winding 
up petition was concerned and they must helplessly watcn 
the proceedings at outsiaers though the result of winding 
up the petition may bring about terminations of tneir 
services and thus effect them vitally by depriving them 
of their means of livelihood. Justice Bhagwati held that 
workers had locus standi to appear and to be heard in 
the winding up petition. 
31; Supra note 25 at p. 355 
32. ABSK Sangha(Rlv.) v. Union of India;AIR 1981 SC2989 
33. supra note 256 at p-317 
34. National Textil,es workers v, P. •[<. i^ amokrishuan 
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Now the question is what is a. public interest ? 
Like Public Policy, the public interest is incapable 
of any definite meaning. Thus , it is a Hazy Sepctrum, 
slippary, treacherous and unruly horse. The term public 
interest, in Black Law Dictionary, means an interest in 
the most general term that can be employed to denote a 
right, claim, title or legal share in something." In 
35 Russel V. Wheeler the term public interest has been 
defined as: 
"Something in which the public, the community at 
large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest 
by-which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. 
It does not mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity, 
or as the interests of the particular localities which 
may be affected by the matters in question." 
However a broad test has been formulated tnat it is 
that "whatever furthers the general interest of the 
community, as opposed to the particular interest of the 
individuals, must be regarded as a public purposes" 
i5. io3 Colo 296 
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In Jeshinghbai Ishwarial Dhobi the Bombay High 
Court has explained the expression "interest of the 
general public" as a public security, public order and 
public morality." Therefore, the expression public interest 
is not capable of definite, precise definition and has not 
a rigid meaning. It can "only be defined by a process of 
judicial inclusion and exclusion. The public policy or 
public interest is therefore a principle of judicial 
interpretation founoed on the current needs of the 
37 
community. In Gherulal Preich the supreme court made 
the following observation about public policy: 
"Public Policy is an illusive concept; it 
has been described as unruly horse,* etc.... This doctrine 
of public policy is only a brancn of common, law. 
To know the true meaning and content of the term 
'Public Interest* what is desirable is to know 'Public 
Policy* This phrase public interest* has given rise to 
a new crop of litigation in the fair name of socio-
economic justice to tne poor,ignorant, illiterates and 
3^. Kmpprnr v. Jeshinohbai Ishwarial Dhoh^ ; S^Bombay 
LR 5*4; AIR x950 Bomb. 363 
37. Gnerulal Paraetch v. Mahadeo Maiya; AIR i959 SC 781 
E82 
indigent people. This litigation is Known as Public 
Interest Litigation. In this new found process of Liti-
fation is that the real victim on account of his helpless-
ness, poverty, ignorance illiteracy and other disabilities 
can not approach the court for its judicial relief and 
hence a third person having sufficient interest may knock 
the door of the court, i^ et us therefore know how far this 
process of litigation has enabled the court to expand 
the personal liberty in Article 21. 
38 in Prem Shankar a prisoner sent a telegram to 
a judge of the Supreme Court complaining of. forced hand 
cuffs on him and other prisowers- implicitly protesting 
against the humiliation and torture of being held in 
irons in public, back and forth, when as under.trials 
kept in custody in the Tihar Jain, they were being taken 
to Delhi courts for trial of their case. Petitioner was 
an under trial prisoners whose presence was needed in 
several cases making periodical trips between jail and 
Magistrates courts inevitable. Being in custody he may 
try to flee and so escort duty to prevent escape is nece-
ssary. Therefore the iron bars and handcuffs were 
inevitable. 
38 . Prem Shankar V. Delhi Administration; AIR 1980 Scl535 
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While tolerating the handcuffing in extreme 
circumstances Justice Krishna Iyer made an observation 
that "handcuffing is prima facie inhuman and, therefore, 
unreasonable, is over-harsh and at the first flush, 
arbitrary. Asent fair procedure and objective monitoring, 
to inflict 'irons' is to resort to zoological strategies 
repugnant to Article 21."^^ The learned judge has further 
deprecated the practice of handcuffing of the undertrial 
prisoners by saying that "to bind a man hand and foot, 
fetter his limbs with h.oops of steel, shuffle him along 
in the streets and stand him for hours in the court is to 
torture him, defile his dignity, vulgarise the society 
and foul the soul, of our constitutional culture." 
Then the Justice 'Krishna Iyer declared that "it can be 
laid down as a rule that handcuffs or other fetters shall 
not be forced on the person af an undertrial prisoner 
39. Supra note 38 at p. 1541; see also Article 5 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948; "No one, 
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, in human or 
degrading treatment or punishment," Article 10 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
"All persons deprived of their liberty shall be 
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent 
dignity of the human person". 
49. Supra note 38 at P. 1542 
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ordinarily.... Once we declare it a constitutional mandate 
that no prisoner shall be handcuffed or fettered routinely 
or merely for the convenience of the custodial or escort 
and we declare that to be the law implicit in Article 
21 which insists upon fairness, reasonableness anc| justice 
in the very procudure which authorise stringent deprivation 
of life and liberty."^^ 
42 
In Sunil Batra this writ petition originated in 
a letter by a prisoner, Sunil Batra to a judge of the 
Supreme court eomplaining of a brutal assault by a Head 
Warden on another prisoner, Prem Chand. In the instant case 
tra individual was a prisoner whose anus was allegedly pierced 
with a wardner's baton' and the institution was the Tihar 
Prison, right in the capital of the country and under the 
nose of the Home Ministry. This case was at once a symptom 
a symbol and a sign past vis-a-vis human rights in prison. 
While making a prefatory remarks Justice Krishna Iyer 
saidt rule of law meets with its Waterloo when the State's 
minions become law breakers and so the court as the sentinal 
of the nation and the voice of the constitution, runs down 
the violations with its writ and secures compliance with 
41. Supra note 38 at PP. 1542-1543 
42. Sun A 3 B^ t^r^ . V. Delhi Administration- AIR 1980 Sc 1579 
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human rights even behind iron bars and by prison 
wardens. Justice Krishna Iyer observed that the law 
is very much within the prisons walls which are built 
with stones of law. The learned Judge therefore said 
that "Prison houses are part of Indian earth and the 
Indian constitution cannot be held at bay by jail 
officials 'dressed in a little, brief authority,'When 
43 Part III is invoked by a convict. Thereupon Justice 
Krishna Iyer observed: 
Today, human rights jurisprudence in India has a 
constitutional status and sweep, thanks to Article 
21 so that this magna carta may well toll the knell 
44 
of human bondage beyond civilized limits 
whether inside or outside, a person shall not be 
deprived of his guaranteed freedom sense by methods 
45 
'right just and fair .... Thus it is now clear law 
that a prisoner wears the armour of basic freedom 
even behind bars and that on breach thereof by 
lawless officials the law will respond to his 
distress signals through 'writ' aid. The Indian 
43. Supra note 42 at P. 1583 
44. Supra note 42 at P. 1589 
4 5. Supra note S2 at P. 1590 
zu 
human has a constant companion- the court armed with 
the constitution. The weapon is habeas the power is part 
III .... So it is imperative, as implicit in Article 21, 
that life or liberty, shall not be kept in suspended 
animation or congealed into animal existence without the 
47 
freshening flow of fair procudure.... Every such afflic-
tion of abfidgement is an infraction of liberty or life in 
its wider sense and cannot be sustained unless Article 
48 21 is satisfied. 
In People's Union for Democratic RightsTAsiad Construction 
Workers) The petitioner, an organization formed for the purpose 
of protecting democratic right, addressed a letter to 
Mr. Justice Bhagwati. The letter was based on a report made by 
a team of three social scientists who were commissioned by 
the Peoples Union for Democratic Rights for the purpose of 
investigating and inquiring into the conditions under which 
the worker engaged in the various asiad projects were working. 
It was reported that the workers were not paid the minimum 
wage of Rs.9.50. per day. The middlemen was deducting Re.l/-
per day per worker and hence each workman was receiving in 
effects Rs.8/- per day. It amounted violation of the Minimum 
Wages Act 1948, 
46. Supra note 42 at P, 1591. 
47. Supra note 42 at P. 1593 
48. Supra note 42 at P. 1594 
49. People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India; 
AIR 1982 SC 1473. ^^ ^ f 
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The letter addressed to Justice Bhagwati by the 
Petitioner was converted into a proper writ petition 
through public interest litigation in order to ensure 
observance of various labour laws. Justice Bhagwati 
dealing with the petition said thaf'Public Interest 
litigation is intended to bring justice within the reach 
of the poor masses who constitute the low visibility 
50 
area of humanity." it is intended to promote and 
vindicate public interest which demands that violation 
of constitutional or legal rights of large number of 
people who are poor, ignorant or in.«i socially or economi-
cally disadvantaged position should not go unnoticed and 
unredressed," Therefore the learned judge has described 
public interest litigation as a "cooperative or 
Collaborative effrot on the part of the state or public 
authority and the court to secure observance of the 
constitutional Of legal rights, benefits and privileges 
conferred upon the vulnerable sections of the community 
52 
and to reach social justice to them." 
50. Supra note 4 9. at P. 14 76 
51. Supra note 49 at PP. 1476-77 
52 Supra note 49 at pp. 1477-78 
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Emphasising the need and importance of the Public 
interest litigation in our present socio-economic 
conditions Justice Bhagwati ensured the due observance:.of 
labour laws intended to ameliorate the working and living 
conditions of the poor, ignorant and illiterate workers 
and non-observance would invoke Article 21 of the 
Constitution. It is now well established that labour laws 
are intended to ensure basic human dignity to the workmen 
and if the workmen are deprived of any of these rights and 
benefits to which they are entitled under the provisions 
of any of the labour laws- socio-economic wftlfare legisld-
tion - that would clearly be violative of Article 21 of 
our constitution. 
53 In Bandhua Mukti Morcha the petitioner is an 
organisation dedicated to the cause of release of bonded 
labourers in the country. The petitioner made a survey of 
some of the stone querries in Faridabad district of Haryana 
near and close to the capital of our country and found that 
a large number of labourers driven by poverty, hunger and 
drought from Maharashtra, AP, MP, Orrisa, Bihar, Rajsthan 
and MP were working under 'inhuman and iintolerable 
conditions' and many of whom were bonded labours. These 
bonded labourers are, as Bhagwati J. described,"leading 
a life of bondage or dark bottomless pit from which in a 
53. g-indhua Mukti Morcha. v. UnJnn nf India; 
1984 Lab. IC 560 
cruel exploitative society, they cannot hope to be 
rescued." The petitioner therefore adderessed a letter 
to a judge of the Supreme Court on 2 5th February,1982 
pointing out the inhvunan conditions in the stone querries 
workers were working in Faridabad stone mines. However, 
the peritioner's letter was treated as a writ petition. 
Dealing with this petition Bhagwati J. has once again 
emphasised the nature and Importance of public interest 
litigation. The learned judge said thaf'public interest 
litigation is not in the nature of adversary litigation but 
it is a challenge and opportunity to the government and 
its officers to make basic human rights meaningful to 
the deprived and vulnerable sections of the community and 
to assure them social and economic justice which is the 
54 
signature tune of our constitution. After referring and 
55 
and relying on Francis Coralle Mallin and Asiad Const-
56 
ruction Workers Bhagwati J. observed? 
Articles 21,39 41 and 42 Of our constitution "ire 
minimum requirements which must exist in order to enable 
person to live with human dignity and no state r neither 
the central government nor any state government -has the 
right to take &ny action which will deprive a person of 
the enjoyment of these essentials. Since Directive 
Principles of the state policy contained in Article 39, 
54. Supra note 53 at PP 569 
55. Francis Coralie Mullin; AIR 1980 SC 849 
56. Supra note 49 a 
29.) 
41 and 42 are not enforceable in a court of law, 
it may not be possible to compell the state through 
the judicial process to make provision- for ensuring 
these essentials which go to make up a life of human 
dignity but where legislation is already enacted by 
the state investing their right to live with 
basic human dignity, with concrete reality and content, 
the state can certainly be obligated to ensure obser-
vance of such legislation, for inaction on the part of 
the state in securing implemention of such legislation 
would amount to denial of the right to live with human 
57 
dignity enshrined in Article 21 
58 In Neerja Chaudhary the writ petition was based 
on a letter dated 20th September,1982 addressed to a 
judge of the Supreme Court by the petitioner who was a 
civil rights correspondent of Statesman i-leading news-
paper in the country. This letter was treated as a writ 
perition and the court requested Mr. Govind Mukhoty 
learned advocate to file a regular writ petition in 
substitution of the letter and argue the case on behalf 
of the petitioner. The issue raised in this letter-
turned writ petition was the rehabiliation of those 
135 bonded.labourers identified and released by the 
order of the Supreme Court in the first week of March,1992 
5?, Supra note 53 at P. 570 
58. Neerja Chaudhary v. State of M.P.; 
AIR 1983 SC 1099. 
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In brief the petitioner averred that it was the 
obligation of the State Government to ensure rehabili-
tation of freed bonded labourers and its failure to 
provide such rehabilitation amounted to violation of the 
fundamental night of the freed bonded labourers under 
Article 21 of the constitution. 
Once again seizinfci the judicial opportunity 
Justice Bhagwati held; "It is the plainest requirement 
of Article 21 and 2 3 of the constitution that bonded 
labourers must be identified and released and on release 
they must be suitabley rehabilitated. The Bonded iiiabour 
System(Abolition) Act, 1976 has been enacted pursuant to 
the Directive Principles of State Policy with a view to 
ensuring basic human dignity to the ponded labourers and 
any failure of action on the part of the state government 
in implementing the provisions of this legislation would be 
the clearest violation of Article 21 apart from Article 23 
59 
of the Constitution." 
This is yet another Public Interest litigation in 
which Justice Bhagwati did not hesitate in declaring 
that the identification, released and rehabilitation of 
the freed bonded labourers are the plainest requirements 
59. Supra note 58 at P. 1106 
Z<iZ 
of Article 21 of the constitution which, if violated, 
would attract the provision of Article 21 which 
guarantees that no person can be deprived of his life 
or personal liberty except according to just, fair 
and reasonable procedure established by law. 
In Veena Sethi the writ petition arose out of 
a letter dated 15th January, 1982 addressed to Justice 
P.N. Bhagwati by the free legal aid committee, Hazaribagh 
which set the judicial process in motion and but for 
^ the letter which drew the attention of the court to 
the attrociously illegal detention of certain prisoners 
in Hazaribagh Central Jail for almost two or three decades 
without any justification whatsoever, these forgotten 
specimens of humanity languishing in jail for year behind 
stone walls and iron bars, deprived of freedom and 
liberty which are the inalienable rights of a human being, 
would have continued to remain in jail without any hope 
of ever walking out of its forbidding environment and 
breathing the fresh air of freedom. In the instant case 
some prisoners were arrested in connection with certain 
offences and were declared insane at the time of their 
trial and were put in central jail Hazaribagh so while 
some of them were declared sane no action for their 
release was taken. Thus, on account of the insanity and 
60. Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar;AIR 1983 SC339. 
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inaction on the part of the state of Bihar, some of 
the prisoners in the case were detained in prison 
for period ranging from 17 to 37 years. 
in dealing with this public interest litigation. 
Justice Bhagwati laid much emphasis on personal liberty 
and observed: "^ 'ersonal liberty is one of th-3 most 
precious rights of a human being and it cannot be allowed 
to be smothered by bureaucratic on judicial inadequacy 
or inefficiency."^^ The learned judge has further observed: 
"The cases of these prisoners disclose a shocking state 
of affairs involving total disregard of basic human 
rights. They constitute human affront to the dignity 
of man and it is surprising, indeed shocking to the 
conscience of mankind and that such a situation 
should prevail in any civilized society It is the 
solemn duty of the Supreme-.Court to protect and uphold 
the basic human rights of the weaker sections of the 
society, and it is this duty we are trying to discharge 
62 
in entertaining this public interest litigation." 
In Sheela Barse The writ petition was based on 
a letter addressed by Sheela Barss, a journalist 
complaining of custodial violence to women prisoners 
61. Supra note 60 at P. 343 
62. Supra note 61 at P. 34 0 
63. Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra; 
AIR 1983 SC 3 79. 
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Whilst confined in the police lock up in the city of 
Bombay. The petitioner stated that she interviewed fifteen 
women prisoners in the Bombay Central Jail with the 
permission of the IG Prisons.between 11 and 17th May,1982 
and five of them told here that they had been assaulted by 
the police in the police lock up. 
Dealing with this writ petition under Public Interest 
litigation Justice Bhagwati said that"legal assistance to 
poor or indigent accused who is arrested and put in 
jeopardy of his life or personal liberty is a constitutional 
imperative mandated not only by Article 39-A but also by 
64 Articles 14 and 21 of the constitution*" 
AS legal aid was made a directive principle by inserting 
a new Article 39-A in Part IV of the constitution through 
the constitution (42 Amendment) Act 1976 by tbe Parliament, 
To give effect and four real and practical content to the 
empty vessel of legal aid contained in Article 39-A Justice 
Bhagwati declared legal assistance as a constitutional 
mandate and made it part of personal liberty guaranteed by 
Article 21 of our constitution. 
In Kadra Pahadiya the case arose out of a:letter dated 
November 28/ 1980 addressed to the court by Dr. Vasudha 
64. Supra note 61 at P. 380 
65. Kadra Pahadiva v. state of Bihar; AIR 1981 3C939. 
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Dhagamwar, a researcher and social scientist working 
in the santhal Parganas of the state of Bihar. It 
represents utter callousness and indifference of 
our legal and judicial system to the under trial 
prisoners languishing in the jails. In this case four 
young boys lived in Pakud sub-jail in Santhal Parganas 
for a period of about eight years without their trial. 
They belonged to the, i: ah aria tribe. They were arrested 
on 26th November, 1972 and on i9th December,1972 and 
were between 18 and 22 years at the time of their arrest. 
The district judge recalled the case on 30th August, 1977 
in symbolic way bacause thereafter it never proceeded. 
It is a crying shame upon our adjudication system which 
keeps men in jail for years on end without a trial. 
Seizing the opportunity Justice Bhagwati reiterating 
the court's earleir view expressed in Husainara 'Chatoon 
that a speedy trial and legal aid are fundamental 
rights of an accused implicit in Article 21 of the 
66 
constitution. 
th^ right to speedy trial and legal aid have now 
become a fundamental rights as a part of personal 
liberty under Article 21 of the constitution. 
66. Supra note 65 at PP. 340-341. 
zas 
in Olaa Tellis^^ the present writ petitions amse 
out of the three petitions a journalist and two pavement 
dwellers and in another group of petititioners were slum 
dwellrs in Kamraj Nagar in Bombay who challenged the 
order of the Maharashtra Chief Minister A.R. Antulay 
dated July 13, 1981 who odered for the removal of hutments 
and dwellers from the city of Bombay, 
It was argued by the petitioner that the order was 
violative of Article 21 of the constitution. A batch of 
senior lawyers of the Supreme Court notably? Mr. jathmalani 
attacked the impugned order of the Chipf Minister with 
the misilp of Article 21 of the constitution on the 
ground that evicting a pavement dweller or slum dweller 
fron his babitat amounts to deprivina him of his right 
to livelihood which is comprehend in the right guaranteed 
by Article 21 which in effect ensures that no person shall 
be deprived of his life exceot according to fair, just 
and reasonable procedure. Elaborating the argument it 
was argued that the eviction of pavement and slum dwellf;rs 
would in a vicious circle,, to th^ deprivation of their 
employment, their livelihood and, therefore, to the 
right to life. 
67, Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 
1986 SC 180 the case is well known as Pavement and 
slum dwellers. 
2S7 
While relying on Justice Douglas's opinion delivered 
in Baksey^ Molding that "to work means to eat and it also 
mea^s to live" and using the Public Interest litigation 
as a judicial technique Chandrachud CJ. delivering the Court's 
opinion formulated-a question whether the right to life 
includes the right to livelihood. The learned Chief Justice 
said thflt "we see only one answer to that questioi?, namely 
that it does." The sweep of the right to life conferred by 
69 Article 21 is wide and far reaching." chandrachud CJ 
speaking for the court sa^d that the conclusion, therefore, 
in terms of the constitutional pi^ *jp:aseology is" that the 
eviction of the peritioners will lead to deprivation of 
their livelihood and consequently to the deprivation of 
life."^^ 
The voluminous decisional works done by the Supreme 
Court in its judicial activism under the new judicial bannar 
Public interest litigation have undoubtedly made the right 
to life and personal liberty guaranteed in Article 21 of th^ 
constitution is really a comprehensive, wide and sweeping 
fundamental right of the people. The cases came up before 
the Supreme Court under the Public interest litigation 
cover the most needy not needy, destitute not despite, 
neglected not dejected section of our S'^ ciety namely, the 
under trial prisoners(male and female) workers and the 
pavement and slum dwellers. 
68. Backsey v. Board of Regents(1954) 347 MP 442. 
The Public interest litigation is a new strategy 
72 
a strategic arm of the legal aid movement, is not in 
the nature of adv-ersary litigation but it is a challenge 
and an opportunity to the government and its officers to 
73 
make human rights meaningful and is collaborative and 
cooperative efforts of the court/ the government and the 
public spirited individuals acting under pro bono Publico 
for vindicating the human rights of those who have been 
denied on account of their poverty, ignorance and 
illiteracy. This new judicial strategy innovated by the 
Supreme court in a host of cases t<^ brina justice within 
the rearh of the poor masses - peripheral crust submurged 
in cogmire of poverty. 
74 * 
The right to speedy trial ' zJnf*. right of legal 
75 
assistance, • and the extension of the right to personal 
76 liberty inside the prisons and similar other rights 
have been declared as constitution-^l mandated fundamental 
rights implicitly included in Article 21 of the constitution 
69. Supra note 67 at P. 193 
70. Supra note 67 at P. 195 
71. Judaf»s case 
72 . Asiad Construction. Workers 
73. Bandhua Mukti Morcha 
74. K. .adla> Pah adiya 
75. ia>eela Barse 
76. Prem Shankar & Sun i l Ba t ra i i 
29 ;J 
The workers, whether in industries public and private, 
in agriculture or in construction works, have beenthe largest 
oeneficiaries. of the judicial works, done by the Supreme 
Court under the new devise of Puolic interest litigation. 
The right to live with basic human dignity has been held 
to have been part of the right to life andpersonal liberty 
under Article 21 of the constitution in Asiad Construction 
WorkTs and Bandhua Mukti Morcha. In Neerja Chaudhary the 
identification, rel^ a^se and rehabilitation h^ve been 
declared as components of the right to live with human 
dignity implicitJr/inclu'^ ed in the right to life uni^ sr 
Artcile 21 of the con««titution. 
Another important aspect of human life which has been 
infused to be part of the right to life in Article 21 by 
the Supreme Court in're. Sant Ram is the right to liveli-
hood. The constitutional Bench of Five Judges of the Suprem e 
Cour-t headed by the Chief Justice Chandrachud has declared 
that the right to livelihood is included in the right to 
life guaranteed in Article 21 in the Pavement and Slum 
Dwellers. 
To summarise the entire decisional work done by the 
Supreme Court under the Public interest litigaf^on exp=»nding 
the contours of personal liberty under Article 21 of the 
following judicially emanated rights h=*ve been declared 
as essential, parts of personal liberty-
3i)n 
— the right to speedy trial and l^ gal assistance. 
— the right to freedom from handcuffing and 
fettering 
— the right to live with human dignity 
— the right to livelihood. 
These are the most precious human rights and there 
fore h^ve rightly been declared as constitutional 
fundamental rights included in the right to life and 
personal liberty under Article 21 of the constitution. 
77 In Bihar legal Su^ jport Society the societv being 
a registered society having its aim and objective to 
support the poor and disadvantaged sections of the community 
to fight for their constitutional and legal rights through 
the process of law. The question raised in the special 
leave petitions again^ st refusal of bail or anticipatorv 
bail should be listed immeduately or not is a question 
which falls squarely within the administrative jurisdiction 
of the Chief Justice. In dealing with this question Chief 
Justice P.N. Bhagwati said: " The strategy of public 
interest litigation has been evolved by this court with 
a view to bringing justica within the easy reach of the 
poor and the disadvantaged sections of the community. 
This court has always shown the greatest concern and 
77. Bihar Legal Support Society, New Delhi v. The Chief 
Justice of India, AIR 1987 SC38 ' 
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.^ .Oxity for the welfare of the large masses of people 
in the country who are livina a life of want and desti-
tution, misery and suffering and has become a symbol of the 
hopes and aspirations of millions of people in the 
country" 
In a series of Public interest litigations petitions 
of the Supreme court has expressed its great concern and 
n^^ x-ity on the highly pollution of the water of the river-
78 ganaa at Kanpur. M.C. Mehta , who is a social worker has 
urged upon the court through public interest petition to 
direct the leather tanneries of Kanpur not to discharge 
their trade effluents into the river Ganga without putting 
retreatment plant. Justice Venkatramiah has therefore 
directed 29 leather tanneries at Jajmau at Kanpur to stop 
the running of their tanneries either directly or indirec-
ly ihto the river Ganga without subjecting the trade 
effluents to a retreatment process by setting up prirm ry 
7° treatment plants as approved by the state water Board 
created under the water(Prevention and control of Pollution 
Act, 1974. 
80 In M.C. Mehta • Justice Venkataramiah directed the 
Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika-^to take immediate steps tc prevent 
the pollution of the river Ganga whose water at Kanpur 
is not fit for drinking, batning and fishing purposes. 
78. M-C. M^ y^ i-.^  V. Union of India; AIR 1987 SC 1037 
79. Supra note 38 at P. 1046 
80. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India; AIR 1987 SC 1115 
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The court has directed the Nagar Mahapalika to take 
immediate steps to increase the size of the seawers,to 
construct sufficient number of public latrines and urinals, 
to prevent the throwing corpeses and semi-burnt corpes 
into the river Ganga. 
In these two petitions filed by Mr. M.C. Mehta under 
Public Interest litigation not as reparian owner but as a 
person interested in protecting the lives of the people who 
make use of the water flowing in the river ganga. 
While directing the tanneries to stop the discharge 
of their trade effluents without subjecting it to the 
retreatment plant both Venkataramian and K.N , Singh JJ. 
constituting the court's Bench were conscious enough about 
the economic losses resulted out of the closure of the 
leather tanneries. But keeping the greater damage casused 
by the highly polluted water of Ganga at Kanpui in view 
Justice Venkataramiah sai^ ^ that just like an indusrrv which 
cannot pav minimum wages to its workers cannot be 'allowed 
to exist a tannery which cannot set up a primarv treatment 
plant cannot be permitted to continue to be in existence for 
the adverse effect on the public at large which is likely 
to ensure by the discharging of the trade effluents from the 
tannery to the river Ganga would be immense' and it will 
outweigh any inconvenience that may be caused to the management 
and the labour employed by it on accounts of its closure."®^ 
81. Supra note 78 at p. 1045 
Id2 
Justice K..N. Singh while respectfully agreeing with every 
word of what Venkataramiah J. has said in his order 
observed: "We are concious that closure of tanneries mav 
bring unemployment, loss of revenue, but life, health and 
82 
ecology have greater importance to the people." 
Before the present euphoria of the 'Public interest 
litigation' or 'social action litigation' the civil 
procudure code and the writ of habeas corjjus a represanta-
tive suit under civil procudure code could be filed. Thus 
it is well recognised-_that in the case of a writ of habeas 
corpus, where it is not possible for the person illegally 
detained to move the court himself, the application mav be 
moved by a related person or a 'friend'. Similarly, when the 
person whose legal right is adversely affected is unable to 
sue because of some disability, such as in the case of a 
minor or a person of unsound mind, a suit may be brought 
83 by the "next friend" in a represantative capacity. Where 
a several persons have the same interest in the subject 
matter one or more of such persons may with the permission 
of the court, institute the suit on behalf of or for the 
§4 
benefit of all persons .so interested. i^ the case of a 
public nuisance or other wrongful act affecting or likely 
to effect the pubiic, a suit for a declaration and injunc-
tion or for such other r-elief as may be appropriate in the 
82.Supra note 78 at P. 1048 
83. C.P.C.O. XXXII 
84. ]^. , 0, 1, r. 8. 
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circumstances of the case may be brought by the advocate-
General or with the permission of the court, by two or 
more persons even though no special damage has been caused 
to such persons by reason of such public nuisance or other 
wrongful act. 
Inaugurating a two day ^11 India Law Seminar organised 
by the Bar Council of nndhra Pradesh, the former Chief 
Justice and the Vice-President of India on M, hidayatullah 
expressed his displeasure over the fanfare with which the 
Public interest litigation is made widely publicised. i'he 
former Vice-President noted that Public Interest litigation 
was reruge behind which jurists often sought shelter to 
attract momentary attention of media and called the judge-
ments as "landmarks" Mr. Hidayatullah wordered how such 
landmark judgments could be delivered almost everyday these 
days. 
The Judges who hold ^^ublic interest litiv^aLions close 
to their hearts, i-ir. Hidayatullah asked wh;;' they did not 
evince the same kind of interest in abolishing court fees 
and making court procedures less cumbersome, which could 
86 
nave really promoted the public interest. 
dii. oee also j. 268 of the Indian Perial Code defines "ijublic 
nuisance" as an act or an illegal omission "which cdases 
any comirion injury, danger or annoyance to the public or 
to the people in general who dwell or occupy oroperty in 
the vicinity, or which must necessarily cause* inj ury, 
obstruction, danger or annoyance to ;.,ersons who may lidve 
occasion to use any public right." 
86. Indian Express, New Delni 11.10.86 
:^ ;)5 
In an interview, i-ir, Bhagwati said " 1 am 
laying aown the reins of office with great satisfaction 
I nave been able to open new dimensions of judicial process 
making justice available to destitutes and deprayed people 
87 
of the country". 
When Bhagwati CJ was asked to comment on the appre-
hensions about the 'Public Interest Litigation' said,"it 
will not die. It has great future because of the people's 
support, i-ioreover, once the plant has been germinated and 
nourished and nurtured, it can never die. It is bound to 
grow," 
Lamenting and lambasting on those who c r i t i c i s e d 
the publ ic i n t e r e s t l i t i g a t i o n Bhagwati CJ. having quoted 
Gandhiji said "whenever there i s a new idea, people f i r s t 
repudia te i t , c r i t i c i s e i t and then accept i t . Public i n t e -
r e s t l i t i g a t i o n i s a new concept which i s unorthodox and 
unconventional and t o t a l l y d i f f e ren t from the inher i t ed 
^nglo-iiiaxon concept". Therefore, i t i s bound to evoke oppo-
s i t i o n . That i s t rue with any innovative idea, "he said 
adding "the human mind i s so accustomed to treading tne 
beaten path tha t i t not prepared to depart from i t . --ina 
there fore , the c r i t i c i s m , " On the c r i t i c s Bhagwati C.J. said, 
"the c r i t i c i s m i s a t the hands of those who are steeped in to 
the .uiglo-^axon mould of thinking ana wno are s t i l l l iv ing 
in a .vorld of t h e i r own t o t a l l y divorced from r e a l i t y " . 
Without naK.ing the c r i t i c s Bhagwati c . j . said there 
Tf ""l^ J^"" l • '^? "^ ^^ ^^ ^ ^^^^^ri ^^ ^ ^^°^^ at the 8 / , I'fte Times of I n d i a , '^ew D e l h i , ^ 1 , i:j.Bb 
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public Interest Litigation " but they should 
notice that large number of people in India accepted it 
and applauded it, these so called critics do not know that 
the entire concept of Public Interest litigation has evoked 
admiration by lawyers, jurists, social activets and 
intellectuals in India and from South Asia, Sotath East Asia 
South Africa, Africa and so much so UK and USA." While 
describing the real nature of the Public interest Litigation 
Shaqwati C.J. said; 
Public interest Litigation is not an advisory character 
but it is meant to make human rights and fundamental rights 
meaningful. Nor is it a channgenge to the governments, but 
it provides an opportunity to the government to carry out 
its constitutional and legal ogligations towards the common 
and deprived man," Mr, P.N. Bhagwati who laid down the office 
of the Chief Justice of India on December 20, 1986 felt the 
PViblic Interest Litigation would grow like a big banayan 
tree with branches and roots all ov^r the country, despite 
the opposition to it by 4rm chair critics." 
In his first public appejrnace after assuming the 
office of the Chief Justice and ppeaking at the valediccory 
function of silver jubilee celebrations of the Bar Council 
88 
of India. Mr, Pathak said th=»t the Supreme Court had in 
recent years found it necessary to affirm PIL because of the 
increasing demand for justice and aware ness of human rights. 
88. The Times of India, New Delhi 1.1.1987 
.^ l)/ 
Without sacrificing its flexible character and utility 
R.3. Pathak CJ declared that Public Interest Litigation 
had not stay but, he added, it mav be time to lav down some 
broad norms and principles of it without sacrificing its 
flexible character. 
"The need arises, "Mr. Pathak said, "because a mystice 
appears to have surrounded this Jurisdiction. It is desirable 
to analyse the concept, to evaluate its degree of success 
and to put it on a firmer constitutional footing. Public 
Interest Litigation cannot be put into straight Jacket, but 
it is certainly amenable, as all judicial proceedings should 
be to the observance of certain principles— Principles 
whifch will promote and guarantee its healthy development 
without retarding its effectiveness as a vehicle of justice." 
While di'spelling misgivings and doubts about the 
PIL Pathak CJ said: "It is only proper to dispel the 
misgivings of those who feel that PIT. is the'unruly horse' 
which will unsettle public faith in the administration of 
justice as well as to remove the fears of those who 
apprehended that this chapter ia the court's iurisdiction is 
drawing to a close," 
CHAPTER VI 
WORKER'S RIGHT 
:^c)8 
WORKER'S RIGHT AND PERSONAL LIBERTY 
The judicial activism, setforth in Maneka Gandhi 
infused a new life otherwise into lifeless personal liberty 
contained in Article 21 of the constitution, which ensures 
that no person shall be deprived of- his life and personal 
liberty except according to procedure established by law. 
Since thereafter the right to life and personal liberty has 
assumed a greater significance and importance. Its ambit and 
scope has been expanded into multi-dimensional ways covering 
all aspects of human life. The Supreme Court has enriched the 
contents of the right to life and personal liberty enshrined 
in Article 21 of our constitution. It is no longer remains a 
mere guarantee against the physical restriction. The life is 
something more than the animal existence. Since man by nature 
is dynamic and hence real and practical contents has to be 
poured into the right of life and personal liberty guaranteed 
in Article 21 by each generation. 
The workers in our present set up are the back bone of 
our agro-industrial development. It is therefore the duty of 
the society to lookafter the workers. The socioeconomic wel-
fare of the workers is the prime object of the labour legisla-
i- Akneka Gandhi v. Union of Tndi. AIR 1978 SC 597. 
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tions. In fact, they are not laws but welfare legislations. 
However, labour laws have received a serious judicial attention 
only in Asiad Construction Workers . Due to the Progressive 
judicial attitude of the Supreme Court, the workers have been 
elevated to the higher plane. For this. Justice P.N, Bhagwati, 
the retired Chief Justice of India, deserves all praise and 
credit. The learned Chief Justice shall go down in the annals 
of the judicial system as a crusador, a champion of the poor, 
ignorant and illeterate common man, a pointer of.legal aid* 
legal literacy, public interest litigation and above all the 
judicial activism. It is he who has given a new dynamic content 
to the expression 'Personal liberty' used in Article 21 of the 
constitution. It is he who has judicially recognised the right 
3 
to live with human dignity included in the right to life and 
personal liberty in Article 21 of the constitution. 
As we know that the preamble of our constitution has 
promised 'socio-economic justice* and assured the 'dignity of 
the individual*. These sonorous lofty constitutional ideals 
cannot be achieved unless the workers are assured of their 
wages. These wages under the Minimum Wages and Payment Wages 
Acts are nothing but to enable the workmen to satisty their 
daily needs and requirements. It is the societal obligation to 
2» People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India. 
AIR 1982 SC 1473. 
3. Francis Mullen v. Union Territory of Delhi. AIR 1981 SC 
746; Upendra Buxl v. State of U.P. (19877"3 Scale 1137. 
no 
provide work and its adequate return to the invisible sub-
humans. Because if the workers constituting the bulk of our 
society, do not get their due return of their labour would be 
denial of basic human rights. This is precisely and exactly 
4 
what was involved in Asiad Construction Workers . 
In Asiad Construction Workers a public spirited organi-
sation formed for the purpose of protecting, safeguarding and 
if case arises vindicate the democratic rights of the people 
at the proper and appropriate forum particularly the courts. 
With this purpose in view the People's Union for Democratic 
Rights brought a writ petition by way of Public Interest liti-
gation in order to ensure observance of labour legislations in 
relation to workmen employed in the prestigious construction 
project connected with the IX Asian Games. The PUDR addressed 
a letter to Justice Bhagwati based on the report made by a 
three-man team commissioned by it for the purpose of investi-
gating and inquiring into the conditions under which the workmen 
engaged in the various Asiad Projects were working. The letter 
was treated as writ petition and the notices were issued to the 
Union of India, DDA and the Delhi Administration. 
It has already discussed the need, significance and 
importance of the Public interest litigation in a separate 
chapter and therefore it is not desirable to repeat what has 
^' Wogker^)!'^^ ^"^"^" referred as Asiad Const.rnrfinn 
ni 
been done there. Nonetheless, highlighting the utility of 
Public interest litigation in relation to the workers' wel-
fare Justice Bhagwati said that 'it is intended to promote and 
vindicate public interest which demands that violations of 
constitutional or legal rights of large number of people who 
are poor, ignorant or in a socially or economically disadvan-
taged position should not go unnoticed and unredressed 
If the sugar barons and the alcohol kings have fundamental 
right to carry on their business and to fatten their purposes 
by exploiting the consuming public, have the 'chamars' belong-
ing to the lowest strata of society no fundamental right to 
earn an hdnest living through their sweat and toil. The for-
mer can approach the courts with a formidable army of distin-
guished lawyers paid in four or five figures per day and if 
their right to exploit is unheld against the government under 
the label of fundamental right, the courts are praised for their 
boldness and courage and their independance and fearlessness 
are applauded and aclaimed. But, if the Fundamental Right of 
the poor and helpless victims of injustice is sought to be 
enforced by public interest litigation, the so-called champions 
of human rights frown upon it as waste of time of the highest 
court in the land, which according to them, should not engage 
itself in such small and triffling matters. Moreover, these 
self styled human right activists forget that civil and politi-
cal rights, priceless and invaluable as they are for freedom 
and democracy simply do not exist for the vast masses of our 
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people. Large numbers of men, women and children who consti-
tute the bulk of our population are today living a subhuman 
existence in conditions of abject poverty, utter grinding 
poverty has broken their backed their sapped moral fibre. 
5 
They have no faith in the existing social and economic system . 
Describing the task of restructuring the social and eco-
nomic system so that the social and economic rights become a 
meaningful reality for the poor and lowly sections of the 
community is of the legislature and the executive, but mere 
initiation of the socio-economic rescue programmes would not be 
enough yet this gigantic task requires the public spirited 
social activists to make, the programmes effective. Thus, 
'Public interest litigation', said Bhagwati, J.' is essentially 
a co-operative or collaborative effort on the part of the peti-
tioner, the state of public authority and the court to secure 
observance of the constitutional or legal rights, benefits and 
privileges conferred upon the vulnerable sections of the 
community and to reach social justice to them' . Therefore, 
Bhagwati J. observed that 'It is only the moneyed who have so 
far held the golden key to unlock the doors of justice. But, 
now for the first time the portals of the court are being 
thrown open to the poor and the downtrodden, the ignorant and 
the illiterate and their cases are coming before the courts 
7 
through public interest litigation' . 
5. .SiUJUfiLnote 2 at PP. 1476-1477 
6. Supra note 2 at PP. 1477-1478 
7. S.upra note 2 at P. 1485. 
n3 
In the instant case the Government of India had embarked 
upon various constructions, which were taken up in collabora-
tion with the Delhi Administration, Delhi Development Authority 
and New Delhi Municipal Corporation. These authorities engaged 
contractors for the purpose of carrying out the construction 
work of the projects. They were registered as the Principal 
employers who engaged Jamadars. These jamadars brought the 
labourers from Rajashthan, U.P. and Haryana at the rate of 
Rs. 9.25 per day. But the Jamadar was deducting Rs. 1/- per 
day per workman. Thus the contention was that the workers 
were not paid Rs. 9.25 per day as the minimum wage fixed for 
workers employed on the construction and they were exploited 
by the contractors and the jamadars. It was also alleged that 
the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 was violated as women were 
discriminated as they were paid Rs. 7/- per day and remaining 
Rs, 2.25 per day per female workers was taken by the Jamadars. 
The report of the team of three social scientists on which the 
writ petition was based set out various instances of violations 
of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the Equal 
Remuneration Act, 1976, the Employment of Children Act, 1938, 
the contract labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, the 
Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Con-
ditions of Service) Act, 1979 and Article 24 of the constitution. 
The life and personal liberty guaranteed in Article 21 
of the constitution has acquired a new dimension in 
:^14 
Mafneka Gandhi and received i^ ts most expansive interpretation 
in Francis Coralic Mullin wherein the SC has held that 'the 
right of life guaranteed under this Article is not confined 
merely to physical existence or to the use of any Faculty or 
limb through which life is enjoyed or the soul communicates 
with outside world but it also includes within its scope and 
ambit the right to live with basic human dignity and the state 
cannot deprive any one of this precious and invaluable right 
because no procedure by which such deprivation may be effected 
Q 
can even be regarded as reasonable fair and just' . 
Thus, relying on Maneka Gandhi and Francis Cgaxajie Mullin. 
Justice Bhagwati said that the rights and benefits conferred 
on the workmen employed by a contractor under the provisions of 
the contract labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and 
the Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and 
Condition of Service) Act, 1976 are clearly intended to ensure 
basic human dignity to the workmen and if the workmen are 
deprived of any of these rights and benefits to which they cv^ 
entitled under the provisions of these two pieces of social 
welfare legislations, that would clearly be a violation of 
Article 21 by the Union of India, the DDA and Delhi Administra-
tion which, as principle employers, are made statutorily 
responsible for securing such rights and benefits to the 
Workmen. 
8. Supra note 2 at P. 1485 
2lr^ 
Precisely, the question, in the instant case, was : what 
is a forced labour? Is this expression wide enough to include 
every conceivable form of forced labour? What is the true 
scope, and meaning of the words "forced labour'? The word 
•beggar' used in Atricle 23 is not a word of English language 
but an Indian and is therefore incapable of adefinite and pre-
cise definition. It is a form of forced labour under which a 
man is compelled to work without any remuneration. 
Molesworth describes 'beggar' as 'labour or service 
exacted by a government of person in power without giving 
remuneration for it' . Therefore, 'beggar" may clearly be des-
cribed as labour or service rendered by a person under compul-
sion without any remuneration. Relying on S. Vasudevan , 
Justice Bhagwati said that 'Article 23 strikes at forced 
labour in whatever farm it may manifest itself, because it is 
violative of human dignity and is contrary to basic human 
values' 
•Beggar' or forced labour of any kind has been internatio-
12 
nally condemned . 
9. See also Wilson's Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms. 
10. S. Vasudevan v. S.D. Mittal. AIR 1962 Bom. 53. 
11. Supra note 2 at P. 1487. 
12. See Convention 29 The International Labour Organization 
Article 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights: 
Article 8 of the International Convenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1966. 
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Rejecting the argument that inadequacy of remunneration 
paid to a person in return of his labour or service does not 
attract the provision of Article 23 Justice Bhagwati, getting 
inspiration from Maneka Gandhi's liberal judicial attitude, 
said: 
'We do not think it would be right to place on the language 
of Article 23 an interpretation which would emasculate 
its beneficient provisions and defeat the very purpose of 
enacting them. We are clear of the view that Article 23 
is intended to abolish every form of forced labour. The 
words 'other similar forms of forced labour are used in 
Article 23 not with a view to importing the particular 
characteristic of 'beggar' that labour or. service should 
be exacted without payment of any remuneration but with a 
view to bringing within the scope and ambit of that 
Article all other forms of forced labour and since 'beggar' 
is one form of forced labour, the constitution makers used 
the words 'other similar forms of forced labour* 
Every form of forced labour 'beggar' or otherwise, is with 
in the inhibition of Article 23 and it makes no difference 
whether the person who is forced to give his labour or 
service to another is remunerated or not. Even if remu-
neration is paid, labour supplied by a person would be hit 
by this Article, if it is forced labour, that is labour 
supplied not willingly but as a result of force or compu-
lsion ,13 
13. Supra note 2 a t PP. 1487-1488. 
^\1 
Entering into service of person by another person cannot 
be deemed to have concluded by way of will and free consent and 
thus, the poor workman cannot be forced by compulsion of law 
to continue to labour or serve the employer. This is what has 
14 
be-en observed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bailey v. Alabama 
in connection with the 13th Amendment. Justice Hughes deliver-
ing the court's majority opinion proceeded to explain the 
scope and ambit of the expression involuntary servitude' in the 
following words: 
•The plain intention was to abolish slavery of whatever 
name and form and all its badges and incidents, to render 
impossible any state of bandage to make labour free by 
prohibiting that control by which the personal service of 
one man is disposed of or coerced for another's benefit, 
15 
which is the essence of involuntary servitude' 
In the instant case the impugned law prohibiting a person 
from entering a contract in writing for the purpose of any 
service and obtains money or other property from the employer 
without refunding the same and refuses to perform such service. 
In dealing with his State of Alabama legislation Justice Hughes 
speaking for the court observed .- 'The fact that the debtor 
^^' of\^hi ui?t^H ii\'' ^% "-^ ^ ^ ^- ^^^' Thirteenth Amendment 
H L ! TMO^+J States Constitution which inter alia provi-
des: Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall 
15. Bailey v. Alabama, 55 Law Ed. 191 
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contracted to perform that labour which is sought to be 
compelled does not withdraw the attempted enforcement from the 
condemnation of the Statute. The full intent of the constitu-
tional provision could be defeated if through the guise of 
contracts under which advances had been made, debtors could be 
held to compulsory service. It is compulsion of the service 
that the statute inhibits, for when that occurs. The condition 
of servitude is created which would not be less than involun-
tary because of the original agreement to work the indebtedness 
The contract exposes the debtor to liability for the loss due 
to the breach, but not to enforced labour' 
Taking cue from this American Supreme Court's judgement 
Justice Bhagvyati observed: 'It is therefore clear that even if 
a person has.contracted with another to perform service and 
there is consideration for such service in the shape of liqui-
dation of debt or even remuneration, he cannot be forced, by 
compulsion of law or otherwise, to continue to perform such 
service, as that would be forced labour within the inhibition 
of Article 23. This Article strikes at every form of forced 
labour if it has its origin in a contract voluntarily entered 
into by the person obligated to provide labour or service. The 
reason is that it offends against human dianitv to compel a 
^Peonaae'%nw\.i ^ ' See also the distinction between 
Courrin this case? ""^  performance made by the US Supren 
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person to provide labour or service to another if he does not 
wish to do sOf even though it be in breach of the contract 
entered into by him. There should be no serfdom or involuntary 
servitude in a free democratic India which respects the dignity 
of the individual and the worth of the human person. Moreover, 
in a country like India where there is so much poverty and un-
employment and there is no equality of bargaining power, a 
contract of service may appear on its face voluntary, but it 
maydnreality, be involuntary, because while entering into the 
contract, the employee by reason of his economically helpless 
condition, may have been faced with Hob.son's choice, either to 
starve or to submit to the exploitative terms dictated by the 
powerful employer Article 23 therefore says that no one 
shall be forced to provide labour or service against his will, 
even though it be under a contract of service'. 
Dealing with the mode of forced labour Justice Bhagwati 
said ; What Article 23 prohibits is 'forced labour' that is 
labour or service which a person is forced to provide and ' 
•force' Which would make such labour or service 'forced labour' 
may arise in several ways. It may be physical force which may 
makes a person to provide labour or service to another or it 
may be force exerted through a legal provision such as a provi-
sion for imprisonment or fine in case the employee fails to 
provide labour or service or it may even be compulsion arising 
from hunger and poverty, want and destitution. Any factor which 
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deprives a person of a choice of alternatives and compels him 
to adopt one particular course of action may properly be 
regarded as 'force' and if labour or service is compelled as a 
17 
result of such 'force* it would be forced labour . Where a 
person is suffering from hunger or starvation when he has no 
resources at all to fight disease or to feed his wife and 
children or even to hide their nakedness, where utter grinding 
poverty has broken his back and reduced him to a state of help-
lessness and despair and where no other employment is available 
to alleviate the regour of his poverty, he would have no choice 
but to accept any work that comes his way, even if the remune-
ration offered to him is less than the minimum wage. He would 
be in no position to bargain with the employers, he would have 
to accept what is offered to him. And in doing so he would be 
acting not as a free agent with a choice between alternatives 
but under the compulsion of economic circumstances and the 
labour or service provided by him would be clearly 'forced 
labour*, There is no reason why the word 'forced' should be 
read in a narrow and restricted manner so as to be confined only 
to physical or legal 'force' particularly when the national 
chaK'ter, its fundamental document has promised to build a new 
socialist republic where there will be socio-economic justice 
for all and everyone shall have the right to work, to education, 
and to adequate means of livelihood the constitution has 
17. §iij2ra_note 2 at P. 1489. 
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a social purpose and an economic mission and therefore every 
word or phrase in the constitution must be interpreted in a 
manner which would advance the socio-economic objective of the 
constitution.... The word 'force' must therefore be construed 
to include not only physical or legal force but also force 
arising from the compulsion of economic circumstances which 
leaves no choice of alternatives to a person in want and com-
pels him to provide labour or service even though the remune-
ration received for it is less than the minimum wage. We are, 
therefore, of the view that where a person provides labour or 
service to another for remuneration which is less than the 
minimum wage, the labour or service provided by him clearly 
falls within the scope and ambit of the words 'forced labour' 
under Article 23. Such a person would be entitled to come to 
the court for enforcement of his fundamental right under 
Article 23 by asking the court to direct payment of the minimum 
wage to him so that the labour or service provided by him 
ceases to be 'forced labour' and the breach of Article 23 is 
remedied'•^®. 
The fundamental rights contained in Articles 17, 23 and 24 
are available to the workers whether working in State or 
private individuals establishments and thus are enforceable 
against individuals and the State as well. Inspite of this, it 
is the constitution obligation of the State to ensure the 
18. Supra note 2 at PP. 1489-1490 
nz 
observance of these fundamental rights and the labour laws 
enacted for the benefit of the working class. The state there-
fore cannot get away with this constitutional obligation merely 
on the ground that the workmen are the employees of a private 
employer. Because the over all responsibility of the enforce-
ment or observance of laws is on the state. This constitutional 
duty of the state assumes greater importance and significance 
when it relates to the poverty striken sections of our society 
who cannot wage a legal battle against a strong and powerful 
opponent. Therefore, it is the ultimate and sole constitutional 
duty of the state to see that socio-economic laws enacted for 
the larger benefits of the poor, ignorant and illiterate masses 
should not be violated either in its own employment or in the 
private person's employment. These deprived vulnerable sections 
of our people should not be left at the mercy of the rich and 
fatten people who exploit them like anything. To protect and 
safeguard the interest of the helpless, hapless and hopeless 
persons of the society is prime duty of the state under our 
constitutional set up. It is within this view Justice Bhagwati 
has in Asiad Construction Workers floated an idea for the 
proper, effective and efficient enforcement of labour laws which 
runs as follows: 
We may add that whenever any construction work is being 
carried out either departmentally or through contractors, 
the government or any other governmental authority includ-
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ing a public sector corporation which is carrying out 
such work must take great care to see that the provisions 
of the labour laws are being strictly observed and they 
should not wait for any complaint to be received from the 
workmen in regard to non-observance of any such provisions 
before proceeding to take action against the erring 
officers or contractors but they should institute an 
effective system of periodic inspections coupled with 
occasional surprise inspections by the higher officers in 
order to ensure that there are no violations of the pro-
visions of labour laws and the workmen are not denied the 
rights and benefits to which they are entitled under such 
provisions and if any such violations are found immediate 
action should be taken against defaulting officers or 
contractors' 
So what is suggested is a 'watch dog' committee or used 
Justice Bhagwati's phrase 'Ombudsmen' to supervise the observa-
nce of human laws like labour laws meant to mitigate the socio-
economic hardships of the people. This is not new but an old 
methodology already provided in these laws known as 'labour 
welfare officers' whose only statutory duty is to see the wel-
fare of the workers but instead they are busy in their own 
welfare. However what is new in it is the judicial reinforce-
ment impetus and the-judicial insistence on the 'periodical 
19. Supra note 2 at P. 1492. 
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and occational surprise inspections by the higher officers in 
order to ensure the observance' of labour laws. Further more, 
'the immediate' action should be taken against defaulting for 
contractors' if found guilty of violating these labour laws 
again must be described as the great judicial concern for the 
working class. This is the minimal which must be done by a -
responsible government in a welfare society like ours. The 
whole judicial credit goes to Justice Bhagwati who has don? a 
sJcy 
lot for those neglected builders of the/scappers buildings for 
the first time in this public interest litigation writ petition. 
20 Bandhua Mukti Morcha the case came up before the Supreme 
Court by way of Public interest litigation by the Petitioner -
an organisation dedicated to the cause of release of bonded 
labourers in the country. The bonded labour system is not new 
but is as old as our country is. It has degenerated into 
inhuman conditions. The system constitutes an ugly and shameful 
feature of our national life. Tracing out the historical 
reasons for the growth and perpetuation and horrible inhuman 
description of the system of bonded labour,Justice Bhagwati 
said : 
•This system based on exploitation by a few socially and 
economically powerful persons trading on the misery and 
suffering of large numbers of men and holding them in 
bondage is a relic of a feudal hierarchial society which 
20. ^gg^^^^^Mukti Morcha v. Union of India. AIR 1984 SC 802, 
ivoH Lab. IC 560. 
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hypocritically proclaims the divinity of man but treats 
large masses of people belonging to the lower rungs of the 
social ladder or economically impoverished segments of 
society as dirt and chattel. The system...., is totally 
incompatible with the new egalitarian socio-economic order 
which we have promised to build and it is not only an 
affront to basic human dignity but also constitutes gross 
and revolting violation of constitutional values,.... 
They are non-beings, exiles of civilizations, living life 
worst then that of animals, for the animals are atleast 
free to roam about as they like and they can flunder or 
grab food whenever they are hungry but these out castes 
of society are held in bondage, robbed of their freedom 
and they are consigned to an existence where they have to 
live either in hovels or under the open sky and be satis-
fied with whatever little unwholesome food they can manage 
to get, inadequate though it be to fill their hungry sto-
maches. Not having any choice, they are driven by poverty 
and hunger into a life of bondage a dark bottomless pit 
from which, in a cruel exploitative society, they cannot 
21 hope to be rescued* . 
The makers of our constitution were well aware of this 
inhuman cruel exploitative pernicious practice of bonded lab-
our. The bonded labour system has therefore been constltution-
21. Supra note 2D at P. 563. 
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ally prohibited by incorporating Article 23 which prohibits 
•traffic in human beings and beggar and other similar forms 
22 
of forced labour' . Though the constitution came into force 
on 26th January, 1950, yet no serious effort has been made to 
minimise if not eliminate, the bonded labour by our represen-
tative and responsible government constitutionally mandated to 
lookafter the welfare of the people particularly the weaker 
sections. It was only in 1976 the Parliament enacted the 
Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act with a view to abolish 
this age old socio-economic evil practice and to prevent the 
exploitation of the economically handicapped masses of our 
country. Considering the ugly in-human practice of bonded 
labour as a blot on our national life. Justice Bhagwati said: 
•It is absolutely essential - we would unhesitatingly declare 
that it is constitutional imperative - that bonded labourers 
must be identified and released from the shackles of bondage 
so that they can assimilate themselves in the main stream of 
civilised human society and realise the dignity, beauty and 
23 
worth of human existence* 
The facts'giving rise to the writ petition are ; The peti-
tioner made a survey of some of the stone querries in Faridabad 
district near Delhi and found that a large number of labourers 
from Maharashtra, M.P., U.P. and Rajsthan who were working 
22. Article 23 of the Indian Constitution says: 
23. Supra note 2Q at P. 564. 
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in these stone querries under 'inhuman and Intolerable condi-
tions* and many of whom were bonded labourers. The petitioner 
therefore addressed a letter to one of judges of the Supreme 
Court on 25th Feb. 1982 pointing out that in the stone mines 
of Faridabad, a large number of labourers were languishing 
under abject conditions of bondage for about ten years, and the 
petitioner gave the names of 11 bonded labourers who were from 
village Asartha, Barmer District of Rajasthan, 7 bonded labour-
ers who were trom village Bharol District Jhansi of U.P. and 23 
bonded labourers who were from village Barodia, Bhanger of 
District Sagar, M.P. and 14 bonded labourers from Lalitpur in 
U.P. 
The inhuman, intolerable, inhospitable and inhabitable 
conditions in which these stone workers were working were 
narrated by the petitioner in the letter of 25th Feb. 1982 
addressed to the judge of the Supreme Court the summary of 
which is as follows: 
There were cases of fatal and serious injuries caused due 
to accidents while working in mines while dynamiting the 
rocks or crushing the stones. Due to stone dust pollution 
many a valuable lives are lost and others are suffering 
from T.B. and other diseases,. No medical aid is provided. 
No cases are registered against the mine owners. About 
75 workers are suffering or have suffered due to non-imple-
mentation of the safety Rules. 
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The inter-state Migrant workmen's Act 1979 is being most 
flagrantly violated in these mines. The inhuman and inhoBjbiti-
able conditions are that these stone mines workers were without 
any residential accomodation - not even a thatched roof to fend 
against the icy winds and winter rain or against the scorching 
heat in midsummer, with scanty clothing, with very impure and 
polluted drinking water accumulated during rainy season in the 
ditches, with absolutely no facilities for schooling or child 
care, braving all the hazards of nature and pollution and ill 
treatment, these thousands of sons and daughters of Mother 
India epitomise the 'wretched of the earth'. 
On top of all these forms of exploitation is the totally 
illegal system of 'Thekedars', middlemen who extract 309» of 
the poof miner's wages as their illgotten commission (Rs. 20 
out of Rs. 60 wages) or per truck load of stone ballest). The 
trucks are invariably oversized in some cases they doubt the 
prescribed size of 150 Sq. feet but payment remains the same. 
The hills are dotted with liquor vends - legal and illegal. 
Murder and molestation of women is very common. 
The petitioner in the end prayed that a writ be issued for 
proper enforcement of these provisions of the constitution and 
statute with a view of ending the misery, suffering and help-
lessness of these victims of most inhuman exploitation'. 
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The letter dated 25th Feb. 1982 was treated as a writ 
petition and on 26th Feb. 1982 the Supreme Court issued notices 
and appointed two advocates as commissioners to visit two stone 
mines Godhakhor and Rakkapur in Faridabad and to interview each 
of the persons whose name were mentioned on 27th and 28th Feb. 
1982 and to make a report to the court on or before 2nd March, 
1982 pursuant to the court order, M/s, Ashok Srivastawa and 
Ashok Panda visited the stone mines, carried out the assign-
ment and submitted the report to the court on 2nd March, 1982. 
The report said that the workers interviewed told them that 
they were not allowed to leave the stone quarries. They did 
not have even pure water to drink but were compelled in most 
cases to drink dirty water from the nallah and were living in 
Jhuggies with stones piled one upon the other as walls and 
straw covering the top, which did not afford any protection 
against run and rain. A few of them were suffering from 
Tuberculosis and injuries without any compensation. There were 
no medical educational facilities. In mine No. 8 in Godhakhor 
the condition of Jhuggies were worse which were made of straw 
only workers were living without clothe.*, and were shivering 
from cold and the children were moving without any cloth. In 
stone quarries Lakkarpur the workers were living in pitiable 
condition in Straw Jhuggies without any protection against sun 
and rain and with drinking water available only from the barsati 
Nallah. However, the report ended by observing that these 
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workmen 'presented a picture of helplessness, poverty and 
extreme exploitation at the hands of moneyed people' and they 
were found leading a most miserable life and perhaps leasts and 
animals could be leading more comfortable life than these help-
less labourers'. 
The court also appointed Dr. Patwardhan of IIT Delhi to 
carry out a socio-legal investigation with a view to improving 
the living conditions for the workers working in the stone 
quarries. Dr. Patwardhan submitted his report in a short time. 
The report is comprehensive, well documented socio-legal study 
of the conditions in which the workmen engaged in stone quarries 
ana stone crushers live and work and has made various construc-
tive Suggestions for the purpose of improving living conditions 
of these workmen. 
While disposing the preliminary objection relating to the 
maintainability of the writ petition Justice Bhagwati relying 
on Francis Coralie Mullin said : 
'It is the fundamental right of every one in this country, 
assured under the interpretation given to Article 21 by this 
court in Francis Mullin to live with human dignity, tree from 
exploitation. This right to live with human dignity enshrined 
in Article 21 derived its life breath from the Directive Princi-
ples of State Policy and particularly clauses(e) and (f) of 
Article 39 and Articles 41 and 42 and atleast, therefore, it 
m 
must include protection of the health and strength of workers, 
men and women, and of the tender age of children against 
abuse, opportunities and facilities for children to develop in 
a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, 
educational facilities, just and humane conditions of work and 
maternity relief. These are the minimum requirements which 
must exist in order to enable a person to live with human dig-
nity and no state - neither the Central Government nor any 
State Government - has the right to take any action which will 
deprive a person of the enjoyment of these basic essentials. 
Since the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in 
Clauses (ej and U ) of Article 39, Article 41 and 42 are not 
enforceable in a court of law, it may not be possible to compel 
the State through the judicial process to make provision by 
statutory enactment or executive fiat for ensuring these basic 
essentials which go to make up a lite of human dignity but 
where legislation is already enacted by the state providing 
these basic requirements to the workmen and thus investing 
their right to live basic human dignity, with concrete reality 
and content, the state can certainly be obligated to ensure 
observance of such legislation, for inaction on the part of the 
state in securing implementation of such legislation would 
amount to denial of the right to live with human dignity 
enshrinted in Article 21^"*. 
24. SuEira_note 20 at P. 570. 
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Citing and heavily relying on Asiad Construction Workers 
Justice Bhagwati said : 
'The state is under a constitutional obligation to see that 
there is no. violation of the fundamental right of any 
person, particularly when he belongs to the weaker sections 
of the community and is unable to wage a legal battle 
against a strong and powerful opponent who is exploiting 
him. The Central Government is therefore bound to ensure 
observance of various social welfare, and labour laws 
enacted by Parliament for the purpose of securing to the 
workmen a life of basic human dignity in compliance with 
25 
the Directive Principles of State Policy ' 
Though the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Bhagwati 
has expressed its utter disgust and dislike over the perpetua-
tion of the bonded labour system in Asiad Construction Workers 
yet the same was raised in Bandhua Mukti Morcha. However, in 
Asiad Construction Workers the payment of minimum wages to the 
workers engaged in the construction of various prestigious 
project was directly involved in and not the bonded labour 
system. But in Bandhua Mukti Morcha the very system of Bonded 
labour was questioned. Therefore, the legal utility and effi-
cacy of the bonded labour system Act 1976 was dealt with in 
detail by the Supreme Court. The impugned legislation was 
enacted with a view to giving efrect to Article 23 which aims 
2b. Supra note 2.0' at P. 570. 
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to prohibit traffiking in human beings and beggar and other 
similar forms of forced labour. The Act was brought in force 
from 25th Oct. 1976 and has been in force and if properly and 
effectively implemented, it should have by this time brought 
about complete identification, freeing and rehabilitation of 
bonded labour. But as official, semi-official and non-official 
reports show, we have yet to go a long way in wiping out this 
outrage against huminity. 
Agreeing with the legal definition of a bonded labourer 
and disagrreing with the formal rigid and legalistic approach 
in the matter a socio-economic legislation like the Bonded 
Labour System Act 1976 Justice Bhagwati said that a bonded 
labourer can never stand upto the rigidity and formalism of the 
legal process due to his poverty, illiteracy and social and 
economic backwardness and if such a proced.ure were required to 
be followed, the State Government might as well obliterate this 
Act from "the Statute book^^'. Brushing aside the legal defini-
tion of a bonded labourer given in the Act 1976 Bhagwati J. 
said that 'whenever it is shown that a labourer is made to 
provide forced labour, the court would raise a presumption that 
he is required to do so in consideration of an advance or other 
economic consideration received by him and he is therefore a 
27 bonded labourer '. Thus, keeping the aim of the Act in view 
Justice Bhagwati did not hesitate in fixing the constitutional 
26. Sycia note 20 at P. 585 
27. Ibid, at P. 585. 
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and statutory obligation on the state in this regard when the 
Thrust of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition; Act 1976 is 
against the existence its continuance in any torm and the state 
government is constitutionally mandated to lit the poor and 
downtrodden people out of their socio-economic backwardness 
the Government - Centre and the State - cannot be permitted to 
repudiate its obligation to identify, release and rehabilitate 
the bonded labourers. It is the legal, constitutional and 
moral obligation of our democratic government to see that 
'beggar' or 'forced labour' as constitutionally prohibited under 
Article 23 and in giving effect to it the Parliament enacted 
the Bonded Labour System (.Abolition; Act 1976 should not exist 
in any form. It is an age old evil practice considered as a 
'black spot' on the face of our Mother India whose sons and 
daughters are submerged in it as inhumans and sub-humans. 
Once again the question of identification, release and 
rehabilitation of the Bonded Labourers was brought before 
Bhagwati J. in the form of Public interest litigation in 
Neerja Choudhary and the question of rehabilitation of the 
bonded labourers was involved. When 135 bonded labourers work-
ing in the stone quarries in Faridabad were found as bonded 
labourers within the meaning of the Bonded Labour System 
(Abolition; Act, 1976 were released from bondage by an order 
made by the Supreme Court in March 1982. Thereupon these freed 
28. Neeria Choudhary v. State of M.P.. AIR 1984 SC 1099* 
man 
wa 
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bonded laoourers were brought back to their respective villages 
in Bilaspur of the State of M.P. with a promise of their rehabi-
litation by the Chief Minister. This issue of rehabilitation 
of freed bonded labourers is based on a letter dated 20th Sep-
tember 1982 addressed to one of the judges of the Supreme Court 
by the petitioner who is a civil Rights Correspondent of States-
a leading newspaper in the capital of India. The letter 
s treated as a writ petition and on the request of the court 
Mr. Govinda Mukhoty filed a regular writ petition in substitu-
tion of the letter. 
The petitioner urged in his writ petition that it was the 
obligation of the State Government to ensure rehabilitation of 
freed bonded labourers under the provisions of the Bonded 
Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 and its failure, to provide 
such rehabilitation assistance amounted to violation of the 
fundamental right of the freed labour-
ers under Article 21 of the constitution. The petitioner 
therefore prayed that the State Government be directed to take 
steps for the economic and social rehabilitation of the freed 
bonded labourers who were released as a result of the order 
made by the Supreme Court in March, 1982. 
29 
Referring, quoting and relying on Bandhua Mukti Morcha 
relating to the identification of the Bonded Labourers, Justice 
29. .aiiPIia note26 at P. 1103. 
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Bhagwati said that whenever it is found that any workman is 
forced to provide labour for no remunerations or nominal remu-
neration, the presumption would be that he is u bonded labourer 
unless the employer or the State Government rebuts such presump-
tion. This is the test to identify bonded labourers laid down 
in Bandhua Mukti "Moreha . and has been reaffirmed in Neena 
Choudhary* 
While expressing hope and trust in the State Government 
that it will carry out the suggestions and recommendations 
relating to the identification, releasing and rehabilitation of 
bonded labourers Justice Bhagwati suggested that the Officers 
charged with such a great task shall be inspired by idealism 
with their enthusiasm undiminished minds untrammelled and 
hearts unpolluted by all kinds of pressures. In the last,Justice 
Bhagwati in Neer1a observed ; 
'It is the plainest requirement of Articles 21 and 23 of 
of the Constitution that bonded labourers must be identi-
fied and released and on release, they must be suitably 
rehabilitated. The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 
1976 has been enacted pursuant to the Directive Principles 
of State Policy with a view to ensuring basic human dig-
nity to the bonded labourers and any failure on the part 
of the State Government in implementing the provisions of 
30. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India. AIR 1984 SC 802 
at P. 827 
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this legislation would be the clearest violation of Article 
. 31* 21 apart from Article 23 of the Constitution 
In Saniit Rov^^. the question of Bonded Labourers was 
raised who were engaged in Drought relief work undertaken by 
the Rajasthan P,W,D, For the construction of Madaganj, Harmara 
road. The petitioner addressed a letter to one of the judges 
oi the Supreme Court with a view to bring into his notice of the 
violation of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The petitioner was 
the Director of the Social work and hesearch Centre operating 
in Tilonia Village in Ajmer in Rajasthan. The PWD fixed Rs.7/-
per worker per day with out specifying any particular quality 
of work to be done by the workers. Subsequently, the norm of 
the worK was fixed. A gang of 20 workers headed by a person 
known as Mate was employed and the work done by them was measu-
red every fortnight and if the work was found below the pres-
cribed norms the wages were deducted. For about 20 to 30 female 
workers approached the petitioner so as to secure the fixed 
wages. The State of Hajsthan took shelter behind the Rajsthan 
hamine Relief Works Employees (Exemption from Labour Laws) Act, 
1964 and argued that construction of Road was undertaken as a 
relief work and was therefore exempted from the labour laws. 
Relying on Aslad Construction Workers and defining the 
bonded labourers Justice Bhagwati said the State cannot under 
31. Supra note 28 at P. 1106 
32. Saniit Rov v. State of Rajasthan. AIR 1983 SC 328. 
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the guise of helping these affected persons exact work of 
utility and value from them without paying them the minimum 
wage. 
33 In Salal Hydro Project ,the case arose out of letter 
based on Indian Express dated 26th August, 1982 was addressed 
by the People's Union Democratic ^ i^ghts to Justice D.A. Desai. 
The letter was converted into a writ petition. The Salal 
Hydro Electric Project is a power project undertaken by the 
Government with a view to increasing the generation of electric 
power in the country by utilising the waters of river Chenab. 
In dealing with Salal Hydro Project Workers Justice Bhagwati 
held it as hazardous employment if a child below the age of 14 
years is employed in it would be violative of Article 24 of the 
constitution. Belying on Asiad Construction Workers Justice 
Bhagwati said that 'wages due to the workmen employed by the 
'piece wages' or sub-contractors must therefore be paid directly 
to the workmen without the intervention of thekedars , and no 
deductions can be made from the wages on account of any advances 
alleged to have been made by the Khatedars to the workmen^*^' . 
35 In Mukesh Advani , addressed a letter to one of the 
judges of the Supreme Court on September 23, 1982 annexing 
thereto a cutting from Indian Express dated September 14, 1982 
AIR 1984 SC 177. 
'34. Supra note33 at PP. 183-184 
35. Mukesh Advf^ ni v. State of MP. AIR 1985 SC 1363. 
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depicting the horrid plight of the bonded labourers working 
in stone quarries at Raisan in M.P. In this case Justice 
Desai reminded that State of its obligation under Articles 
38, 41, 42 and 43 with a view to protect the poor and needy 
and unprotected workmen who are unable to negotiate on terms 
of equality and who may accept any terms to stare off hunger 
and destitution. It is the State which must interpose between 
these two unequals to eschew exploitation 
After tliese invaluable decisional works done under Public 
interest litigation what appears is that the plight of the 
bonded labourers has improved a lot. It has certainly sensi-
tised and concientised the thick skinned bureaucratic machi-
nery of the government charged with the constitutional mandate 
to lookafter the welfare of the poor and downtrodden sections 
of our people. But there is a lot to be done in this regard. 
For example, in the construction and tunnelling a water tunnel 
37 barrages and power houses from Uttarkashi to Tehri Garwal at 
least 200 to 300 workers are working at each site out of which 
70?i were unskilled migrant workers from MP, Andhra and Karnataka 
and Kerala. There workers were lured to Rs. 400-500 as advance 
and then were brought at the site. The deaths are common due 
to starvation, capsising of trucks, electrocution, digging of 
tunnel and constructing of barrages and no compensations are 
36. Supra note 35 at P. 1367 
37. At the instance of the Supreme Court Mr. R.C. Aqarwal. 
Sub-Judge, Tehri Garhwal submitted a 100 page report 
about the working conditions of workers. Indian Express 
Bombay, Oct. 15, 1985. 
34.1 
paid to the dependants of the deceased. 
The Cumulative legal effect of these decisions is that 
the rights and benefits intended to be conferred upon the 
working force were denied due to the official negligence, care-
lessness and recklessness were made effective due to the sheer 
labour of the PUDR, Social Workers and journalists and the 
Supreme Court. Seizing this judicial opportunity the Supreme 
Court made concerted efforts to give effect to these laws. 
The right to live with dignity held as part of personal 
liberty under Article 21 of the constitution in FrancilsCoralie 
Mullin reaffirmed in Asiad Construction Workers and subsequen-
tly in Bandhua Mukti Morcha. The judicially emanated 'right to 
live with dignity' was further carried forward and expanded so 
as to emanicipate the bonded labourers from their bondage in 
Bandhua Mukti Morcha. Neerla Choudharv. Mukesh Advani and 
Salal Hydro Project Workers. Even the dissemenation of rights 
and benefits under the various labour laws has also been 
emphasised in Bandhua Mukti Morcha. Justice Bhagwati has, in 
Asiad Construction Workers. Bandhua Mukti Morcha. Sanjit Roy 
and Salal Hydro Project Workers, left no stone unturned to 
assert all his judicial authority in giving what is due to the 
workers* under the Labour Laws. Due to his burning heart and 
zeal Justice Bhagwati has declared identification, release and 
rehabilitation of the bonded l;.hourers as the consti t.uf inn^ i 
Ui 
duty whose failure shall be violative of Article 21 of the 
constit^ution. In achieving the constitutional goal the 
'dignity of the individual' set forth in the preamble, funda-
mental rights, Directive Principles and the rights and bene-
fits provided by the various labour laws. The journey that 
we have undertaken for their realisation is long and difficult, 
A lot has to be done. What Justice Bhagwati has done in these 
cases is that he has awakened the insensitive people respon-
sible for implementing them towards the poor ignorant and illi-
terate. Inspite of the judicial wisdom exercised and utilised 
in its most activist forjm there are innumberal sons and dau-
ghters of the Mother India whom our forefathers under the 
leadership of Gandhi - Nehru - Azad have freed from British 
Slavery are living as inhumans or subhumans. Justice Bhagwati's 
views expressed in Neeria Choudharv can be mentioned here even 
if it amounts repetition because it may go on reminding the 
State, the Court, the Press ana the people about their duty 
towards the lowliest among the low and the weakest amr.n(j'^^ ^^^^ 
entitled to lead a human life in a civilized society - Justice 
Bhagwati expressed : 
'We wonder how these out - casts of humanity, forgotten by 
their fellow-being and neglected, by their government, 
must be eking out their daily existence ; how they must 
be feeding the hungry bellies of their children and how 
2M 
they must be covering the shame of their wives. These 
unfortunate human beings for whom life is». long unceasing 
rigel with no resources except perhaps a forlorn hope, 
who cannot even cry for help because they know that it 
will be a cry in the wilderness which no one will hear and 
who drag on their earthly existence in the hope that one 
day death will relieve them from their misery and suffer-
ing, today ask the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary 'what have you done for us; have we not a right 
to live with human dignity and share with all you the 
fruits of freedom and development or are we consigned to 
a life of slavery and starvation where we see before our 
eyes the emaciated bodies of our children with hollow 
cheeks, sunken eyes and shrivelled bodies withering away 
and dying' 
38. Supra note 28 at P. 1106. 
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RESTITl/riON OP CONJUGAL RIGHTS -A ilATRIHONIAL REI-IEDY 
For t h e f i r s t t i m e t h e p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y u n d e r 
A r t i c l e 21 of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n h a s been i n v o l v e d in t h e 
h u s b a n d - w i f e p r i v a t e domain in S a r o j R a n i . An a t t e n t i o n 
2 
of t h e Supreme Cour t was drawn t o S a r e e t h a i n which 
P . A . Choudhary J , of t h e Andhra P r a d e s h High Cour t 
d e s c r i b e d t h e remedy of r e s t i t u t i o n of c o n j u g a l r i g h t s 
c o n t a i n e d i n S. 9 of t h e Hindu M a r r i a g e Act a s s a v a g e and 
b a r b a r o u s remedy v i o l a t i n g t h e r i g h t t o p r i v a c y and hum.an 
d i g n i t y g u a r a n t e e d by A r t , 21 of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
In T . S a r e e t h a . a c i v i l R e v i s i o n P e t i t i o n was f i l e d 
by S a r e e t h a a w e l l known a c t r e s s o f t h e Sou th I n d i a n Screen 
a g a i n s t o r d e r of t h e Sub- Judge Cuddapah p a s s e d p u r s u a n t 
t o t h e p e t i t i o n f i l e d by one Venka ta S u b b a i a h , The p e t i -
t i o n e r a t t a c k s S,9 of t h e Hindu M a r r i a g e Act on t h e 
p e t i t i o n e r ' s r i g h t s g u a r a n t e e d u n d e r A r t , 21 of o u r 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . T r a c i n g o u t t h e h i s t o r i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t of 
rem,edy of c o n j u g a l r i g h t s J u s t i c e Choudhary s a i d t h a t 
1 . ^ a r o j RanJ v . S u d a r s h a n Kum.an. AIR 1984 SC 1562 . 
2 , T. S a r e e t h a v , T. Venka t a S u b b a i a h , A I R 1983 AP 356 , 
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the "Br i t i sh Indian cour ts wrongly equated the E c c l e s i a s t i -
cal rule of t h i s matrimonial remedy with equity, good 
conscience and j u s t i c e , thcDughtlessly imported t h a t rule 
in to our country and b l ind ly enforced i t am.ong the Hindus 
and the Muslims." Order 21 rule 32 of the GPC speaks 
of a decree granted for r e s t i t u t i o n of conjugal r i g h t s as 
a decree of spec i f i c perforro.ance of r e s t i t u t i o n of conjugal 
r i g h t s . Conjugal r i g h t s connote two ideas (a) the r igh t 
which husband and wife have t o each o t h e r ' s socie ty ? 
(b) m.arital i n t e r cou r se . Thus Choudhary J . observed: 
"But the purpose of a decree for 
r e s t i t u t i o n of conjugal r i g h t s in the 
p a r t as i t is in the presen t remains 
the sam.e which i s to coerce through j u d i c i a l process the unv/illing par ty 
to have sex against t h a t person consent 
and free w i l l with the decree holder . 
There can be no doubt t h a t a decree of 
r e s t i t u t i o n of conjugal r i g h t s thus 
enforced offends the i n v i o l a b i l i t y of the 
body and the mind subjected to the decree 
and offends the i n t e g r i t y of such a person 
and invades the mar i ta l pr ivacy and . 
dom.estic in t imacies of such a pe r son . " 
S, 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act i s l i a b l e to be s truck 
down as v io l a t i ve of the guarantee of l i f e , personal 
l i b e r t y , hur.ian d igni ty and decency guaranteed in Art, 21 . 
3. Supra note 2 at p . 367. 
4. gupra note 2 at p . 365. 
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J u s t i c e Choudhary has s t renously t r aced out the 
j u d i c i a l work done in regard to the development of the 
Pr ivacy-digni ty aspect of the personal l i b e r t y guaranteed 
in Art . 21 of the c o n s t i t u t i o n , The learned Judge has 
r e f e r r ed , quoted and r e l i e d on F i e l d ' s views in Hunni v^ 
5 6 
I l l i o n i o s ^ . J u s t i c e Brandies ' s in Olrc.stead, the majority 
n 
and nvinority views in Kharak Singh, and Ju s t i c e Mathew»s 
Q 
in Gob in da and held t h a t the remedy of r e s t i t u t i o n of 
conjugal r i gh t v i o l a t e s the r igh t t o privacy enshrined in 
Art . 21 and the individual d igni ty mentioned in the 
Preamble of our c o n s t i t u t i o n . The learned Judge has said 
t h a t nothing can concievably be more degrading to human 
d ign i ty and monstrous to hurftan s p i r i t than to subject a 
9 
person by the long arm of the law t o a pos i t i ve sex ac t . 
As the r e s t i t u t i o n of conjugal r i g h t s has been described 
by Lord i terscbell in 1897 as a "barbarous remedy" 
Choudhary J . sa ld i "In the process of making such a 
fa tefu l choice as to when, where and how i f at a l l she 
should beget , bea r , de l ive r ^id rea r a c h i l d , the wife 
cons i s t en t with her human d i g n i t y , should never be excludedi 
Conception and de l ivery of a ch i ld involves two most 
5. Ju s t i ce f i e l d ' s opinion in l-lunn v. Illinois (1877) 
24 L. Ed. 17 at P. • 
6. Jus t i ce Brandies d i s sen t ing opinion in Olmstead v. 
United S ta tes (1927) 277 US; 72 L. Ed, 9^4: 
7. Kharak Sinoh v. State of up; 1963 SC 1295, 
®» GQt?inda v. State of l^, AIR 1975 SC 1378. 
9 . Supra note 2 at P.366. 
10. Russel V. Russel (1897) A.C, 395. 
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int imate use of her body" Concluding the reasons 
for declar ing S,9 of the Hindu Marriage Act as 
v i o l a t i v e of Art , 21 of the Const i tut ion Choudhary 
J . sa idt 
"A decree for r e s t i t u t i o n of conjugal 
r i g h t s c o n s t i t u t e s his g rosses t form 
of v io l a t i on of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s r igh t 
t o pr ivacy . I t denies the woman her free 
choice whether, when and how her body i s 
t o become the vehicle for the procreat ion 
of another human being, A decree for 
r e s t i t u t i o n of conjugal r i g h t s deprives a 
wom.an o f . con t ro l over her choice as to 
when and by whom the various p a r t s of her 
body should be allowed t o be sensed. 
The wom.an loses her cont ro l over her m.ost 
intim.ate decis ions c l e a r l y . Therefore, 
the r i gh t to privacy guaranteed by Art, 21 
i s f l ag ran t ly v io la ted by a decree of 
r e s t i t u t i o n of conjugal r i g h t s , " ^ 
Jus t contrary t o what has been held in T. Sareetha 
by P.A, Choudhary J , of the Andhra High Court, Jus t i ce 
A, B, Qohatgrl of the Delhi High Court has in Harvider 
Kaur held t h a t See. 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act does 
not v i o l a t e Art, 21 of the Indian Cons t i tu t ion , In 
Harvinder Kaur J u s t i c e Rohatgi ^^s var iab ly refuted 
Jus t i ce Choudhary's argiim.ents in support of his view tha t 
the rem.edy of r e s t i t u t i o n of conjugal r i g h t s v io l a t e s 
Art, 21 . The learned Judge sa id i 
11 . Ib id . p ,366. 
12. Supra note 2, at P.357, 
13. Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Sinah, AIR 1984, Delhi 66. 
U1 
"Choudhary J ' s over emphasis on sex 
i s the fundamental fa l lacy in h i s 
reasoning, lie seems to suggest t h a t 
r e s t i t u t i o n decree has only one purpose, 
t h a t i s , t o compel the unwil l ing wife 
to have sex with her husband" • • • 
The remedy of r e s t i t u t i o n alms at cohabi-
t a t i o n and consortium, and not merely a t 
sexual i n t e r cou r se . To say t h a t r e s t i t u -
t i on decree "subjects a person by h is long 
arm of the law to a pos i t i ve sex ac t" i s 
t o take the grosses t view of the m.arriage 
i n s t i t u t i o n . The r e s t i t u t i o n decree does 
not enforce sexual i n t e r c o u r s e " , . . . . I t 
i s a fa l l acy to think t h a t the r e s t i t u -
t ion of conjugal r i g h t s c o n s t i t u t e s 
"the s t a r k e s t form of governmental invasion" 
of "m.arital pr ivacv" as Choudharv J, seems 
to t h i n k . " 3:4 
Ju s t i c e Rohatgi has de l i n i a t ed the very purpose 
under l i es in the rem.edy of the r e s t i t u t i o n of conjugal 
r i gh t s* 
"The lead ing idea of S,9 to m.y m.ind, 
i s to preserve the m.arriage. The 
outs tanding fact i s t h a t the husband and 
wife are l i v i n g a p a r t and heading 
leading t h e i r own separate l i v e s . « . S,9 
i s a m.eans of saving the m.arriage. I t 
can be t h a t the earning spouse com.es 
on the r i g h t path and a broken hom.e i s 
r e b u i l t . , , , I t i s the pol icy of the 
Act t h a t the p a r t i e s should l i v e toge the r . 
Living apart i s the very a n t i - t h e s i s of 
l i v i n g toge ther as socie ty i s the a n t i -
t h e s i s of separa t ion . The pol icy of the 
Act i s to a s s i s t in the m.aintenance of 
14. Supra nnrt-e 1 at P. 70. 
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marriages o ther than those reduced to a 
mere s h e l l , , . They are l i v i n g in a s t a t e 
of separa t ion . They are l i v i n g as two 
u n i t s r a t h e r than one. Two separate 
households are c rea ted . So they are 
t r e a t e d as l i v i n g apart unless they are 
l i v i n g with each other in the same 
m.atrimonial home," ^5 
While expla ining the avowed purpose of S, 9 of the 
Hindu Marriage Act Ju s t i c e Rohatgi said* 
"In the scheme of the Act the r e s t i -
t u t ion decree i s a stepping stone to 
the more ser ious s tep of d ivorce . 
The Indian Legis la ture be l i eves t h a t 
there should not be a sudden break 
of the m.arriage t i e . I t i s a passage 
or passpor t t o divorcee, i t be l ieves 
in r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . I t be l ieves th.at 
cooling off per iod i s not only des i rab le 
but e s s e n t i a l . This i s why i t allows 
husband and wife to come toge ther t o the 
conjugal f o l d , , , S, 9 i s a provis ion 
designed t o encourage," 16 
While upholding the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a l i d i t y of S,9 of 
the Hindu Marriage Act Jus t i ce Rohatgi advocated tha t the 
cold p r i n c i p l e s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law should not be allowed 
to po l lu t e dom.estic comirtunity of husband and wife based on 
mutual love and affect ion and observed: "Introduction of 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law in the home i s most inappropr ia te . I t 
i s l i k e introducing a bul l in a Ch.ina shop. i t wi l l prove 
15. Xd. at P, 70. 
16. Supra note 9 at p , 73, 
u^ 
to be a ru th l e s s dest royer of the marriage i n s t i t u t i o n 
and a l l t h a t i t s tands for . In the privacy of the home 
and the married l i f e ne i the r Art, 21 nor Art. 14 have any 
p l a c e . In a s ens i t i ve sphere which i s of once m.ost i n t i -
mate and de l i ca t e the in t roduct ion of the cold p r inc ip le s 
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law wi l l have the e f fec t of weakening 
the m.arriage bond . . . The int roduct ion of cons t i t u t i ona l 
law in to the ordinary dom.estic r e l a t i o n s h i p which should be 
obviously as far as poss ib le pro tec ted from, p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
of t h a t kind. The "dom.estic comj-nunity" does not r e s t on 
con t rac t s sealed with s ea l s and sea l ing wax. Nor on const i-
t u t i o n a l law. I t r e s t s on best kind of m.oral consent which 
17 
uni ted and produces " two-in-oneship," 
^'^ Sarol Rani a tv;o judge Bench cons i s t ing of S. 
l-Iurtaza Pazal Ali and Sabyasachi Wukherjee. JJ has 
allowed the counsel for the per i t ione ' r t o convasse an 
argtur.ent which was not convassed in the cour t s below. 
Jus t i ce Sabyasachi Mukherjee having considered the views 
of the s ingle judge of the Andhra High Court expressed in 
Sareetha and t h a t of learned s ingle Judge of Delhi ItLgh 
Court passed in Harvinder Kaur. speaking for the court 
17. Supra note 13 at P .75, 
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h a s , w i thou t s l i g h t h e s i t a t i o n , p r e f e r r e d and l e a r n e d 
h e a v i l y on the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a l i d i t y of S. 9 of the 
Hindu Marriage Act , t h e views of t h e l e a r n e d s i n g l e 
judge of the Delhi High Cour t . J u s t i c e Sabyaschi Mukherjee 
has e x p r e s s e d h i s i n e i b i l i t y t o accep t Choudhary J . views 
t h a t S.9 of the Act i s v i o l a t i v e of Ar t . 21 of t h e 
IB C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
J u s t i c e Sabyaschi Mukherjee has undoubtedly shown h i s 
j u d i c i a l wisdom and indomi tab le courage by swinging the 
j u d i c i a l pendulum in favour of J u s t i c e R o h a t g i , Delhi High 
Court v/ho has ve ry ably and e f f e c t i v e l y r e b u t t e d J u s t i c e 
Choudhary 's judgem.ent p regnan t w i th m.ischief. Coinciden-
t a l l y , t h e wrong done by J u s t i c e Choudhary in Sa ree tha 
on 1.7.1983 has been undone by J u s t i c e A.B. Rohatgi on 
1 5 . 1 1 . 1983 in Harvinder Kaur and J u s t i c e Sabyasachi 
Mukherjee on 8 , 8 . 1984 in Sarol Rani in a qu ick success ion 
w i th in a span of an y e a r . 
What appears from, the judgment of J u s t i c e Choudhary 
in Sa ree tha h i s over o b s e s s i o n , overem.phasis and ove r -
r e a c t i o n and s u b j e c t i o n of Sa ree tha t o Venkata Subhaiah. 
For J u s t i c e Choudhary, t h e rem.edy fo r r e s t i t u t i o n of 
18. _Supra no te 1 a t PP. 1567 - 1568. 
conjugal r i g h t s i s nothing but the f o r c i b l e , unwil l ing 
contpulsion or wife to "have sex with the husband". What 
would have been the react ion of the Jbarned judge, if the 
remedy for the r e s t i t u t i o n of conjugal r i g h t s had been 
resor ted by our ordinary woman ? Jus t i ce Rohfetgi has 
r i g h t l y j u s t i f i e d the u t i l i t y by saying t h a t i t enables the 
e r r i n g husband-wife to resolve t h e i r d i f f e rences . The 
purpose of the r e s t i t u t i o n of conjugal r i g h t s i s the 
"reunion" of "two-in-oneship" and not merely "sexual 
intercoursei* I t i s one of the purposes of m.arriage and 
not an end in a l l . Therefore, Ju s t i ce Rohatgi ' s e labora-
t ion of ' c o h a b i t a t i o n ' and 'consortium.' as the m.ain aim. of 
the r e s t i t u t i o n of conjugal r i g h t s i s r e a l l y a j u d i c i a l 
craftm.anship. Viewing the r e s t i t u t i o n of conjugal r i gh t s 
in i t s r ea l pe r spec t i ve . Jus t i ce Sabyasachi Wukherjee has 
done nothing except t o express h is ca tegor ica l preference 
for Jus t i ce Rohatg i ' s views and thus has ha l ted the m.enacing 
advancement of the co ld , d t i ed and l l f l e s s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
p r i n c i p l e s and declared the domestic comj-o.unity of ' P a t i -
Patne ' as a ' p roh ib i t ed a rea ' for them. If we want to 
survive as an ancient na t ion , The "Parivar ik Jiwan" of our 
country i s a m.ust. I t i s our own Indian Life which has 
withstood as a rock against a l l dangers, i t i s s t i l l capable 
to survive only i f we should not adopt the outm.oded. 
r^z 
rejected, degected western civilization based on artificial 
equality. If we want to preserve our rich cultural heri-
tage and to show the world a path of peace, progress and 
prosperity both material and spiritual -the preservation 
of our Indian Parivarik Jiwan is a must -regarded as the 
sole basis of our survival. 
CHAPTER VIU 
PRISONER'S RIGHTS 
(i) LEGAL AID- RIGHT TO CONSULTATION, RIGHT TO FIRST APPEAL 
(ii) SPEEDY TRIAL 
(iii) RIGHT TO BAIL 
(iv) SOUTARY CONFINEMENT- BAR FETTERS, USE OF THIRD DEGREE 
METHODS, HAND-CUFFING, HIGH VOLTAGE LIVE-WIRE 
(v) DEATH SENTENCE- DELAY IN EXECUTION, HANGING BY ROPE 
(vi) ARREST UNDER CIVIL LAW 
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LfaGAL AID IS AK INTEGRAL PART Of PEHSOx^ AL LIBERTY 
UNDER ARTICLE 21 
The need to ^^ rovide free legal aid or service to a 
poor, ignorant and illi$:erate and those who socially and 
economically constitute the low visibiility of our society 
was felt duriny the dark days of the emergency between 
June 1975- January 1977. It was a time when the late prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi faced the most politically hostile 
atmosphere in the country. It was an era when she was domi-
nated and encircled completely by the socalled communists 
both inside and outside the parliament. To contain this 
popular resentment and to justify the imposition of the 
emergency rirs. Gandhi indulged into some populistic measures 
in the name of socio-economic programme. The legal aid was 
one of such measures and to concretise it, the same was 
inserted in Part IV, of the constitution as one of the Direc-
tive principles. It was therefore a parliamentary effort 
to impose a constitutional obligation on the State to provide 
free legal aid to the poor masses. It would have remained 
a paper right but for the supreme court which gave teeth 
and claws to it in several cases. Exploiting the Judicial 
opjjortunity to the extent the judges of the Supreme court 
could here, theJ have really done a commendable judicial 
service by emphasising the need and importance of the free 
legal aid as well as by reminding the state and its agencies 
S^ssLnT!^^ ""^  ^  ^ ^^^ °' ^ ^" ^"^^ °^ " ^ ^^ Magistrates and S,^ ssion Judges whom the persons appear. 
:i:i4 
Before analysing the judicial work done by the 
Supreme Covirt of India on legal aid, it seems to be 
proper and appropriate to see bow and in what way it 
had acquired legal necessity in America, Right to legal 
aid is not a new thing but is a late arrival legal jargon in 
India. It had been very much popular in the decade of 
thirties in America. 
It is therefore necessary for us to mention the 
judicial thoughts laid down in .across the Atlantic Ocean 
1 
Gideon , Bowel1 and Hamlin cases by the American Supreme 
Court. 
In Gi<^ *»Qn Black J., observed; 
Not only these precedents but also reason and 
reflection reguire us to recognise that in our adversary 
system of criminal justice, any person held into court, who 
is too poor to hire a lawyer can not be assured a fair 
trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to 
us to be an obvious truth Governments, both State and 
Federal c[uite properly spend vast sums of money to esta-
blish machinery to try defendents accused of crime. Lawyers 
to prosecute are everwhere deemed essential to protect the 
public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there 
are few defendents charged with crime few Indeed, who fail 
to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present 
their defences. That Government hires lawyers to prosecute 
«^ Gi<^ eon V. Wainwrjqht a963) 372 US 335; 9 L Ed 2d 799 
a:i5 
and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend 
are the strongest indications of the widespread belief 
that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities , not 
liixuries. 
The philosophy of legal aid as an inalienable 
element of fair trial is evident from Mr, Justice Brennan's 
well known words* 
"Nothing rankles, more in the human heart than a 
brooding sense of injustice. Illness we can put up with. 
But injustice makes us want to pull things down. When 
only rich can enj oy the law, as a doubtful luxury, and the 
poor, who need it most, can not have it because its expense 
puts it beyond their reach, the threat to the continued 
ejcistence of free democracy is not imaginary but very real, 
because democracy's very life depends upgn making the 
machinery of justice so effective that every citizen abail 
i»9li9X%-^ •'^^^•'^^^^ ^y its impartiality and fairness".^ 
Justice Douglas has also spelled out the philosophy 
3 
of free legal «j|.d in nis judgement handed down in Hamlin 
wnich is worth quoting: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases of 
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard 
2, Legal Aid and legal Education, p. 94 
u f i b f i ^ r g d l r L T ' " " "• Raymond Hamlin (1972) 407 
1^56 
by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman 
has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. 
If charged with crime/ he is incapable/ generally/ of 
determining for himself whether the Indictment is good or 
bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left 
witnout the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a 
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence/ or 
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. 
He lacks both..the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare 
his defence/ even thougn he has a perfect one. He requires 
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him without it/ though he be not guilty, he faces 
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to 
establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelli-
gence/ how much more true is it of the ignorance or illite-
rate or those of feeble intellect. 
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may 
not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in 
some countries but it is in ours. From the very beginning 
our state and national constitutions and laws have laid 
great emphasis on proced\iral and substantive safeguards 
designed to assure fair trials before tribunals in which 
every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble 
ideal can not be realised if the poor man charged with crime 
has to face his accuses without a lawyer to assist him".^ 
4. sui >ga^ notfe ,3 ' 
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The whole philosophy of legal aid seems to be based 
on what has been depicted in Hamlin that "the more serious 
the likely consequences* the greater is the probability that 
a lawyer should be appointed". Thus, in America* Powell* 
Gideon and Hamlin have strengthened that the counsel for 
the accused in the more serious cases which threaten a person 
with imprisonment is regarded an essential component of the 
administration of criminal justice and as part of procedural 
fair-play. This is because layyer participation is ordinarily 
an assxarance that deprivation of liberty will not be in 
violation of the due process of law. 
There is widespread insistence on the free legal 
assistance to be provided to the helpless and socio-econo-
mically disabled people all over the world. The world forum, 
known as United Nations through its specialistic agencies 
and its couunittees and commissions* has not lagged behind 
in securing the rights of the poor, ignorant and illiterate 
by concluding international conventions and covenants. The 
DM in its beginning passed the Universal i^ eclaration of 
Human Rights 1948 which in its Art,8 ensures every person 
accused of an offence the right to be tried by the competent 
national tribunal. Similarly Art, 14(3)(d) of the Inter-
national covenant on Civil and political .Ughts 1976^ secures 
5. Hamlin, 32 L Ed 2d 530 at P .554 
6. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art.8;"Everyone 
has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national 
^^^^Con^^y.^S?^ violating the Fundamental rights granted 
Cha^lr igSf " °'' ""^ law".see also Art. 1 of the UN 
7. Art.14(3) (d) of the International covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights guarantees to everyonej"the right to be 
35)5 
to every accused that he shall be tried in his presence 
and shall defend himself in person or through his own 
legal counsel engaged by or provided by the State. Taking 
insp4ration from these international covenants to which our 
country is one of its signatories as well as to fulfil the 
•social justice' pledged to the people by the people through 
their national parchment known as the Constitution of India, 
the Parliament inserted new Art. 39-A in Part IV which spe-
fies Directive Principles of State Policy. 
As far back as Magna Charta ( 1215 /^ J) when the barons 
of England met on the meadow of Kunnyraede and crystallised 
their rights against king John, he granted that:-
To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny or 
8 
delay right or justice. 
The very concept of free legal aid is based on the 
"farma paupris" made available to both suitors and defenders 
in English through Rules of Court. In 1914 under the new 
scheme of Uules of court the litigants in the Supreme Court 
tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person 
or thiiough legal assistance of his own choosing; to be 
informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of his 
right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him in 
any case where the interests of justice shall require, 
and without payment by him in any in such if he does not 
have sufficient means to pay for it". 
8. 40 of the Magna, Carta 1215:"Nulli Vendemus, nulli nega-
bimus, aut differences, rection aut justitiance" 
See also Article 6(3) of the European Convention on Hum 
an Rights. 
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the court and observed that legal aid has unfortunately 
been regarded as of very minor importance" and it was 
of the view that -
"the rendering of legal aid to the poor litigant 
is not a minor problem of procedural law but a question 
of a fundamental character*'. 
The Commission made recommendation of its own but urge 
upon the acceptance of the recommendation of the PN Bhagwati 
Committee. The Government of Gujarat appointea justice 
EKL Bhagwati in June 1970 to consider the grant of legal 
aid to the poor who submitted the report on 15th august 
1971 which was comprehensive innovative and contained a 
new and creative meaning of legal aid and seeds and roots 
of the whole development of legal aid programme. The 
governinent of India appointed a ccanmittee under the Chair-
manship of Justice Krishna Iyer on 27th October 1972 who 
submitted its report on 27th May 1973 called "Processual 
Justice to the People", Again on 19th May 1976 appointed 
the "Committee on Juridicare" consisted of Justice PN 
Bhagwati and Krishna Iyer submitted its interim Report in 
^pril 1977 suggesting a draft National Legal Aid Services Bill 
followed by its final Report on August 31, 1977. As a sequel 
to the uur-ii.'Jcab=re Committee Report the Government of India 
appointed with PH Bhagwati as its Chairman called the 
Committee for implementing Legal Aid Scheme (CIL AS) on 
n^ 
of England were entitled to receive free legal assistance 
and 1942 as a result of Rules reform the service Divorce 
Department was established. In May 1944 Lord Rusheliffe 
ccMTunittee submitted its report which diade the British 
Parliament to enact Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, The 
UK Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949 has been replaced as Legal 
Aid 1976. The free legal aid scheme has been applauded 
as the greatest revolution in legal system in England by 
Lord Denning MR vrtio opines* "Since the second world war 
the greatest revolutionJin .the .law has been the system of 
legal aid. It means that in many cases, the lawyer's fees 
and expenses are paid for by the State and not by the party 
concerned". 
In Amcrican-aeglrjAld aebr Smith, the father of the 
Legal Aid founded the Boston Legal Aid Society 1914 and 
published his views in a book "justice and the poor" 
In 1926, Chief Justice Taft also dealt on the importance 
of legal Aid. The Johnson Administration enacted the 
Economic opportunity Act 1964 leading to more Financial 
Legal Aid in 1974 the legal services Corporation has been 
established. 
On voluntary basis the Bombay legal Aid society 
done a lot. The State of Bombay appointedPN. Bhagwati as 
a Chairman of the legal Aid on March 23, 1949. The Bhagwati 
Committee submitted its report on Oct. 31,1949. The 14th 
Law Commission Report 1958 also emphasised the access to 
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26th September 1980. 
9 
In MH Hoskot the petitioner, a Reader in the 
iaurashtra University/ claims to be a Ph.D. of Karnataka 
University. He approached a block-maker of Bombay,placed 
an order to prepare an embossing seal in the name of the 
Xarnataka University and forged a letter of authority 
perporting to have been signed by the Personal Assistant 
to the V.G, of the said University authorising him to get 
the seals made. This project counterfiet Degrees had its 
object the concoction of certificates of degrees by the 
Karnataka University, A degree hungry community like 
ours offers a happy hunting ground for professionals in 
the fine Art of fabricating academic distinctions. Any 
way/ the petitioner's misadventure was intercepted 
before it could fulfil its object because Dabholkarthe 
Bombay block-maker was too clever a customer. He gave 
pre-emptive information to the police leading to the 
un-arthing in time of the criminal schemer He was 
arrested/ prosecuted and was held guilty of the grave 
offences under IPC, The Sessions Court showed liniency 
and sentenced him till the rising of the Court. In appeal 
the High Court dismissed the appeals and imposed rigorous 
imprisonment for three years, 
8^, For further study about the legal aid programme See 
"Perspective on Legal Aid-A Comparative survey edited 
by Frederick H. Zenhans,1979. 
9. n.ri.Hoskot V. State of Maharashtra/ AIR 1978 SC 1548 
nz 
In dealing with the issue of free legal service 
invalved in the instant case Justice Krishna Iyer after 
referring the Anglo-American the philosophy of legal aid 
and decisional work observed: In short, it is the wrap 
and woof of fair procedure in a sophisticated/ legalistic 
system plus lay illiterate indigents a plenty. The 
Indian socio-legal milieu makes free legal service/ at 
trial and higher levels/ an imperative processual piece of 
criminal Justice where deprivation of life or personal 
liberty hangs in the judicial balance". The learned judge 
emphasising the need and importance of the free legal service 
11 
has described" Art, 39-A as an interpretative tool for A£t.21. 
In the same breath Justice Krishna Iyer saids "If a prisoner 
sentenced to imprisonment, is virtually unable to exercise 
his constitutional and statutory right of appeal/ inclusive 
of special leave to appeal/ for want of legal assistance, 
there is implicit in tne court under Art. 142 read with 
Articles 21 and 39-A of the Constitution/ power to assign 
coxinsel for such imprisoned individual'for doing ccanplete 
justice*. This is necessary incident of the right of 
appeal conferred by the Code and allowed by Art, 136 of the 
Constitution, The inference is inevitable that this is a 
State's duty and not Government's charity". "^^ 
10. - • Supra note .1-3 
11. • Ibid, ._., ' 
12. i Ibid.. .ot, .-si 
3-i3 
Therefore what has been expanded by Justice Krishna Iyer 
in Hoskot is that one right to appeal in a criminal case 
is included in Art. 21. He has further said (i) the 
service of a copy of the judgment to the prisoner in time 
to file an appeal and(ii)provision of free legal services 
to a prisoner who is indigent or otherwise disabled from 
securing legal assistance are State responsibilities 
under Art. 21. 
13 
In Husainara KhatoonI Justice Bhagwati dealt with 
the under trials issue and said : " free legal service 
is an inalienable element of reasonable, fair and just* 
procedure for without it a person suffering from economic 
or other disabilities would be deprived of the opportunity 
for securing justice. The right to free legal services 
is, therefore, clearly an essential ingredient of 'reasonable 
fair and just' procedure for a person accused of an offence 
and it must be held implicit in the guarantee of Art, 21. 
This is a constitutional right of every accused person 
who is unable to engage a lawyer and secure legal services 
on accoxint of reasons »uch as poverty, indigence or in-
comrnxinicac- situation and the State is under a mandate to 
provide a lawyer to an accused person if the circumstances 
of the case and the needs of justice so required provded 
of course the accused person does not object to the provi-
14 
sion of such lawyer." 
13. Husainara Khatoon^v. state of Bihar, AIR 1979. SC 1369 
j^^ Supra .note .13 sac p. 137.4 . 
m 
Using the judicial opportunity that knocked the 
doors of the Supreme Court and refenlng the famous words 
of Justice Brennan and Lee man Abbot depicting the legal 
system in relation to affluent American society.Justice 
Bhagwati did emphasised the need of free legal services 
to the poor, ignorant and illiterate and recommended that 
it is high time that a comprehensive legal service programme 
is introduced in the country. That is not only a mandate 
of iqual justice implicit in Article 14 and right to life 
and liberty conferred by Article 21, but also the canpul-
15 
sion of the constitutional direction embodied in Article 39-A" 
Free legal service at the cost of public money has 
been declared as part of the right to life and personal 
liberty in Art. 21 as well as a Constitutional mandate 
under Art. 39A which must be discharged by the Government 
both Central and States based on Parliamentary Republicanism 
committed to the welfare of the people. 
15, Supra note 13 . Art, 39-A 
Inserted by the Constitution (Forty-second *^endment) 
Act 1976 S,9 (W.e.F.3,1,1977) Art, 39-A; The State shall 
secure that the operation of the legal system promotes 
justice, on a basis of equal opportunity and shall ,in 
particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legis-
lation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that 
opportunities for securing justice are not denied to 
any citizero by reason of economic or other disabilities 
u^ 
16 
In Khatri the blinded prisij^lers were produced 
-i^: •;. 
before the Judicial Magistrate and when the remand orders 
were passed the blinded prisoners were without any compe-
tent legal representative. This was justified on the 
ground that none of the blinded prisoners had asked for 
it. Sven the Judicial i*iagistrate did not enquire from 
the blinded prisoners produced before him whether they 
wished to avail of the legal representation at the State 
expenses. Dealing with this violation of the judicially 
emanated right to legal aid in Art, 21 and relying on 
17 
Husainara Khatoon Justice Bhagwati has reiterated and 
amplified the right to free legal aid thus: 
"In right to free legal services is clearly an 
essential ingredient of reasonable, fair and just procedure 
for a person accused of an offence and it must be held 
impli^' in the guarantee of Article 21 and the state is 
under a:' constitutional mandate to provide a lawyer to an 
accused person if the circumstances of the case and the 
needs of justice so requirei", provided of course the 
accused person does not object to the provision of such 
18 
lawyer". The question as to what stage of judicial pro-
ceeding the lawyer should be provided to the person accused 
of an offence. It is elementary that the jeopardy to his 
16. Khatri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1981 SC 928 
17. supra note ,. _i3 ' 
18. Supra note, "fS"^  
3li6 
personal liberty arises as soon as a.person is arrested 
and produced berore a i«iagistrate/ for it is at that stage 
that he gets the first opportunity to apply for bail and 
obtain his release as ( also to resist remand to police 
or jail custody). In dealing with this question Justice 
Bhagwati said: 
That is the stage at which an accused person needs 
competent legal advice and representation and no procedure 
can be said to be reasonable* fair and just which denies 
legal advices and representation to him at this stage. 
•de must, therefore, hold that the State is under a consti-
tutional obligation to provide free legal services to a. 
JjJfclgant accused not only at the stage of trial but also 
at the stage when he is first produced before the magistrate 
l9 
as also when he is remanded from time to time". 
Taking the poverty, ignorance and illitracy 
in the instcAt case that the blind prisoners did not ask 
for the legal representation into account Justice Bhagwati 
directed the Magistrates and Sessions Judges in the country 
to inform every accused who appears before them and who is 
not represented by a lawyer on account of his poverty or 
indigence that he is entitled to free legal services at 
20 
the cost of t^e ^tate". Nevertheless Justice Bhagwati did 
19. Supra note 16 
20. ^md. , ' / 
3fi7 
not blind the State constitutionally to provide free 
legal services to all accuseds but made it available to 
those who have not been arrested in connection with cases 
involving offences such as economic offences or offences 
against law prohibiting prostitution or child abuse and 
the like* where society may require that free legal 
21 
services need not be provided by the State. 
i<lGnT TO COi'^SULTATION; 
22 
m ii'rances Coral ie Mull in the petitioner was a 
British national/ was attained in the Central Jail* Tihar 
under an order dated 23rd tiov, 1979 issued under Sec. 3 of 
the Co fEPOSA whilst she was in detention. She experienced 
considerable difficulty in having interview with her lawyer 
sister and daughter aged about five years. She was permitted 
to have interview with her daughter only once in a month. 
Even Francis coralie's lawyer could not have interview with 
her because procedure was inconvenient. There upon the 
petitioner filed a wait petitive under Art. 32 of the 
Constitution in the Supreme Court. The petitoner challenged 
the validity of sub clauses (i) and Cli) of clause 3 Cb) of 
the conditions of Detention order as violative of Articles 
14 and 21 of the Constitution. 
21. Supra note 16 
22. Supra note 1 at 754 
u?. 
Holding sub-clause (ii) of clause (3) as violative 
of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution Justice Bhagwati 
delivering decision on behalf of the Supreme Covurt said: 
iVhen an under trial prisoner is granted the facility of 
interviews with relatives and friends twice in a week 
under Rule 559A and a convicted prisoner is permitted to 
have interviews with his relatives and friends once in a 
week under Rule 550# it is difficult to understand how 
sub-clause (ii) of clause (3) (b) of the conditions of 
detention order which restricts the interview only to once 
in a month in case of a detenue can possibly be regarded 
as reasonable and nonarbitrary/ particularly when a deteisi^ ne 
stands on a higher pedestal than an under trial prisoner 
or a convict". The learned judge declared-
i 
" The right of a detenu to consult a legal 
adviser of his choice for any purpose 
not necessarily limited to defence in a 
criminalpproceeding but also for securing 
release from preventive detention or filing 
a writ petition or prosecuting any claim 
or proceeding, civil or criminal is obviously 
included in the right to live with human 
dignity and is also part of personal liberty 
and the detenu can not be deprived of this 
right nor can this right of the detenu be 
interfered with except Inaccordance with 
reasonable/ fair and Just proceedure esta-
blished by a valid law."23 
23. Francis corali Mullin v. Union territory of Delhi, 
AIR 1981 SO 746 
:^ i)9 
24 
In suKh Das the appellants and fo\ir others were charged 
in the court of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Debang 
Valley/ Anin, iQ!9i|aichal Pradesh for an offence under S.506/ 
34 of the IPC on allegation that the appeJtiants threatened 
HS Kohli, Asstt. Engineer CPWD with a view to compelling 
him to cancel the transfer orders of the appellants passed 
by him. The appellants were not represented by any lawyer 
since they were admittedly unable to afford legal repre-
sentation on account of their poverty. They could not be 
able to examine 7 witnesses in their defence since they 
were far away. The result was that the appellants were 
convicted of the offence under s. 506 of the I.P.C. 
The appellants went to the High Court in appeal 
against the Judgment of the trial court. It was contended 
that the appellants were not provided free legal aid for 
their defence and the trial was therefore vitiated. While 
upholding the conviction of the appellants the High Court 
observed that though it was undoubtedly the right of the 
appellants to be provided free legal assistance, the appel-
lants did not make any request to the A.D.C, praying for 
legal aid and since no application for legal aid was made 
i>y thero, "it could not be said in the facts and circumstances 
of the case that failxire to provide legal assistance vitiated 
the trial". 
24, Snkh Das v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh,AIR 
1986 SC 991 
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Before the Supreme Coxirt the question wasjwhether 
an accused who on account of his poverty is unable to 
afford legal representation for himself in a trial involving 
possibility of imprisonment imperilling his personal 
liberty/ is entitled to free legal aid at State cost and/ 
whether it is obligatory on him to make an application 
for legal assistance or the Magistrate or the Sessions 
Judge trying him is bound to inform him that he is entitled 
to free legal aid and inquire from him whether he wishes 
to have a lawyer provided to him at State cost; if he is 
not so informed and in consequence he does not apply for 
free legal assistance and as a result he is not represented 
by any lawyer in trial and is convicted/ is the conviction 
vitiated and liable to be set aside. 
While relying on and referring his earlier views 
25 26 27 
expressed in Husainara / Hoskot and Khatri Justice Bhagwati 
said "it may therefore now be taken as settled law that free 
legal assistance at state cost is a fvmdaniental right of a 
person accused of an offence which may involve Jeopardy to 
his life or personal liberty and this fundamental right is 
implicit in the requirement of reasonable/ fair and justprocee. 
dure prescribed by Article 21," 
25. ' jSupranote _13 
26. I Supra note 9 _ 
27. .Supra note 16 
25, Supra note 24 
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In dealing with the question is it obligatory for 
an accused to apply for free legal assistance failing which 
trial may lawfully proceed without legal representation and 
referring that since 70/i of the people in rural areas are 
illiterate and do not know their rights and benefits con-
ferred on them by law Justice Bhatgwati said that "It is 
this absence of legal awareness which is responsible for 
the deception, exploitation and deprivation of rights and 
29 
benefits from which the poor suffer in this landi' It is 
due to this the poor do not know what to do. They do not 
know how to anticipate legal troubles and to approach the 
lawyer for legal advice. They have become hopeless, helpless 
and lead a inhuman, miserable and tolerate every kind of 
inhuman cruelty as a mute person. It is because of these 
reasons the awakening legal awareness amongst tne poor has 
been recognised as a principal item of the legal aid in the 
country to promote legal literacy. Keeping the poverty, 
ignorance and illiteracy of the poor in view it is mockery 
to expect them to ask for free legal aid. -^^ hile relying 
on Khatri Justice Bhagwati ruled that "the Magistrate or 
ti:ie Sessions Judge before whom an accused appears must be 
held to be under an obligation to inform the accused that 
if he is unable to engage the services of a lawyer on account 
of poverty or indigence, he is entitled to abtain free 
legal services at the cost of the State", "^"^  
*^ *^ f^ci^ d- at p. 993 
30. ou;^ ra note 24 
211 } 
It is the Judicial duty of every Magistrate and 
Sessions Judge in the country to inform every accused 
appears before him that if he is unable to have a legal 
representative in his defence the State will provide 
the same at it own cost. It snail remain operative so 
long as the legal literacy does not become popular and the 
poors are not aware of their rights* benefits and privileges 
enacted by the Constitution and the legislations. Since 
the Additional Deputy Commissioner failed to discharge his 
judicially emajaated duty laid down in Khatri by the Supreme 
Court to inform the appellants that they were entitled to 
free legal assistance and whether they wanted a lawyer to be 
provided to them at the State cost. The result was that 
the appellants remained unrepresented by a lawyer and the 
trial ultimately resulted in their conviction. Justice 
Bhagwati held the conviction in violation of the fundamental 
right of the appellants under Art. 21 and the trial must 
accordingly be held to be vitiated on account of a fatal 
constitutional infirmity, and the conviction and sentence 
31 
recorded against the appellants must be set aside". 
The"right to consult lawyer" or tne "right to legal 
aid" is judicially emanated right and has been made an 
integral part of the right to personal liberty in Art, 21 
of the Constitution, If a person accused of an offence 
unable to obtain the legal services or a competent lawyer of 
31. Ibid. 
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his choice on account of his poverty, ignorance and 
illiteracy, it is the Constitutional mandate of the 
State under Article 21/ 38 and 39A to provide the same. 
It is the duty of the magistrate and sessions Judges all 
over the coxmtry to inform the accused that the State can 
provide the lawyer of his choice at its own .cost it he is 
unable to have the same. The right to legal assistance 
commences the day the accused is produced before the Magis-
trate or when he is remanded to custody Police or judicial. 
ifihea he applies for bail and which is peisisted . The right 
to legal assistance commences with the production of an accused 
before the magistrate after his arrest and ends with the 
ending of his trial. Further one appeal against his con-
viction is part of the fair procedure. The legal aid also 
includes the supply of the transcript of the copy of the 
judgment to the accused by the State authorities. Since 
the aim of legal aid contained in Article 39-A is to enable 
socially and economically disadvantaged people to secure 
justice therefore legal literacy is implicitly/ included in 
the legal aid. Because due to the utter poverty, ignorance 
ana illiteracy the Indian masses are suffering. To make these 
unfortunate lot aware about their constitutional and statutory 
rights and benefits the legal literacy is inevitable as it 
has been emphasised by Justice P.N. Bhagwati in Bandhva 
m 
Mukti Morcha and Khatri and Sukh Das . This is what 
has been described by Justice Chinnappa Reddyj "There 
can not be any effective legal aid service without a 
32 
massive national programme of legal literacy." 
32. Justice Chinnappa Reddy: Socialism^ Constitution 
and Legal Aid Movement in India, AIR 1986 (Jour) i 
talk by him on August 10, 1985 at Jodhpur on the 
eve of Foundation Day of the Rajasthan Cha^^er of 
the Indian Association of Lawyers, Jodhpur, 
TJS 
The right to a speedy trial was argued as implicitly 
iiicluded in the right to life and personal liberty guaran-
1 
teed by u^rt, 21 of the Constitution in riusalnara in v/hich 
ic was disclosed that aii alarmingly large number of men, 
women, and children, were awaiting trial by the courts in 
bihar Jails. These unfortunate, under trials forgotten 
specimens of humanity, deprived of their freedom, incarce-
rated in jails for such a long period of time without trials 
law has become for them an instrument of injustice and they 
are helpless and despairing victims of the callousness of 
the legal and judicial system. 
In Husainara I it was pointed out that the under 
trials in Bihar jails suffered a lot on account of the 
long, inordinate aelay of their trial in the courts of law. 
opeeay tricil, as we know, is the essence of criminal justice 
and there can be no doubt that delay in trial by itself 
2 
constitutes denial of justice. More so in those cases where 
one or the parties to the lis happens to be the otate. 
In /America, speedy trial is one of the constitutional 
rights of the citizens. rne sixtn u^nendinent to the Uo 
Constitution proviues taat in all criminal proceedings the 
!• Husainara Khatoon I v. otate of Bihar, nlii 1979 SC 1360 
2' l^id«/ at p. 1365 
21i 
3 
accused is entitled to speedy and public trial. As we 
know that the Constitution of India does not guarantee 
specifically neither public trialrpr a speedy trial as 
a matter of fundamfental right to the accused persons. 
However, the broadest and widest interpretation given 
to the content of the right of personal liberty under 
Art. 21 in Maneka Gandhi. It implicitly includes in 
its ambit the right to speedy trial. 
Justice Bhagwati observed: 
" NOW obviously procedure prescribed by law 
for depriving a person of his liberty can 
not be reasonable, fair or just unless that 
procedxire ensures a speedy trial for deter-
mination of the guilt of such person. No 
procedure which does not ensure a reasonably 
quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, 
fair or Just* and it would fall foul of Art. 
21. There can therefore, be no doubt that 
speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean 
reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral 
and essential part of the fundamental right ^ 
to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21". 
5 
I^ Husainara II the writ petitions of the under 
trial prisoners came XJ^ for decision before the Supreme 
Court as directed by it on 26th February, 1979. The 
question of speedy trial was raised again in this 
wrdt petition. Lack of financial resources cannot be 
allowed to deny the constitutional guarantee to the 
3,The sixth Amendment of the US Constitution rvinsj"In all 
criminal prosecutions,the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial".See also Article 3 of the 
European convention on Human Rights runs:"Every one 
arrested or detained-shall be entitled to trial within 
a reasonable time or to release pending trial." 
4.Supra note 1 at p. 1365 
5. Husainara Khatoon v. state of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1369 
rri 
eitizens in this country. This view was supported by 
6 
the American cases. In Rhem the American Supreme Court 
said "The law does not permit any government to deprive 
its citizens of constitutional rights on a plea of 
poverty. It is also augmented by Justice Blackmum in 
7 
Jacksoni "Human considerations and constitutional re-
quirements are not* in this day/ to be measured by 
dollar considerations....." 
rtfter referring the US Supreme Court decla;rations 
made in Rhem and Jackson and relying on Husainara I 
Justice Bhagwati emphasised, 'speedy trial* as an essen-
tial ingredient of Art. 21 and observed: 
"It is the constitutional obligation of the 
State to devise such a procedure as would ensure speedy 
trial to the accused. The State cannot be permitted 
to deny the constitutional right* of speedy trial to 
the accused on the ground that the State has no ade-
quate financial resources to incur the necessary expen-
diture needed for improving the admii^lstratir* .a^ d JLudi-
cial apparatus with a view to ensuring speedy trial,... 
The State can not avoid its constitutional obligation 
to provide speedy trial to the accused by pleading 
financial or administrative inability. The State is 
6. Rhem v. Malclm, 377 F Supp. 995 
7, Jackson v. Bishop. 404 F Supp, 2d, 571 
21 (^  
under a constitutional mandate to ensure speedy trial and 
whatever is for this purpose has to be done by the State. 
It is also the constitutional obligation of this court, as 
the guardian of the fundamental rights of the people, as*. 
a sentinal on the qui vire, to enforce the fundamental 
right of tJve accused to speedy trial by issuing the necessary 
directions to the State which may include taking of 
positive action, such as augmenting and strengthening the 
investigative machinery, setting up new courts, building 
new court houses, providing money, staff, and equipment, to 
the courts, appointment of Judges and other measures cal-
g 
culated to ensure speedy trial," 
9 
in Champa Lai,Justice Chinnappa Reddy has in his own 
way, dealt with the causes of delay in criminal trial 
holding that "delay is a known defence tactic", said that 
a fair trial implied a speedy trial but a delayed trial 
.11 
was not necessarily an unfair trial. Where a poor, illete-
rate accused suffers a lot on account of the delaying 
tactics of the ^ prosecuting agencies. Justice Chinappa Reddy 
speaking for the court said: 
"In such situations, in appropriate cases, we may 
rea ily infer an infringement of the right to life and 
liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. 
8. ,Supra note, 5 L^ _ . 
9. otate of Maharashtra v. Champalal, AIR 1981 SC 1675 
10. Ibid./ at p. 1676 
11* Xbid., at p. 1677 
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Denial of speedy trial may witn or without proof of 
something more lead to an inevitable inference of prejudice 
and denial of justice. It is prejudice to a man to be 
detained without trial. It is prejudice to a man to be 
denied a fair trial, A fair trial implies a speedy trial \l. 
The right to speedy trial does not now mean only Husainara 
13 
right to reasonably expeditious trial but a speedy trial 
14 
must also mean a fair trial. It is/therefore,clear that vhere 
the right to speedy trial is invoked/ these must be 
cxirastances entitling the court to raise a presumption that 
15 
the accused has been prejudiced". When such circumstances 
are demonstrated/ the court will have jurisdiction to "quash 
16 
the conviction on the grouad of delayed trial only", 
whar is the remedy if a trial is unduly delayed? In the 
United States/ where the right to a speedy trial is a cons-
titutionally guaranteed right, the ddnial of a speedy trial 
has been held to entitle an accused person to the dismissal 
of the indictment or the vacation of the sentence. Having 
17 
referred strunk v. United States / Justice Chinaappa Reddy said. 
"But in deciding the question whether there has been a 
denial of the right to a speedy trial the court is entitled 
to take into consideration whether the defendent himself 
was responsible for a part of the delay and whether he was 
prejudiced in the preparation of his defence by reason of 
13, Ibid,/ at p. 1677 
11: cC^?a?raf'?678*° '^^^^ "i^i-vol.26 aiLI(1983)90 at 94 
15. Ibid, 
16. Ibid, 
17. atrunk v. United states (1973) 73 Law Ed. 56 
33.1 
the delay. The coxurt is also entitled to take into 
consideration whether the delay was intentional caused 
by over-crowding of the court's Docket or understaffing of 
18 
the Prosecutors. The question whether the delay was un-
justified shall be decided by the court having regard to 
the circvunstances of the case. Consequently/ no hard and 
fast rule could be laid down because of the peculiar nature 
of the subject matter. Thereafter the learned judge has 
laid down the whole thing in relation to the delayed trial: 
"While a speedy trial is an implied ingredient of 
a fair trial/ the converse is not necessarily true, A 
delayed trial is not necessarily an unfair trial. The 
delay may be occasioned by the taetic or conduct of the 
accused himself. The delay may have caused no prejudice 
whatsoever to the accused. The question whether a convic-
tion should be quashed on the ground of delayed trial 
depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. If 
the accused is found to have been prejudiced in the conduct 
of tajLs defence and it could be said that the accused had 
thus been denied an adequate opportunity to defend himself, 
the conviction would certainly n^ve to go. But if nothing 
is shown and there are no circumstances entitling the court 
to raise a presumption that the accused had been prejudice. 
There will be no Justification to quash the conviction on 
the ground of delayed trial only, " "^^ 
18, sugra note 9 ^^ PP 1677-78 
•^ y. Ibid.. at p. 1678 
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20 
In Vatheeswarao., the petitioner was the arch 
villian of villainous piece and was the brain behind 
a cruel conspiracy to impersonate customs officers. 
The death sentence was very rightly imposed in January, 
1975. Before his conviction he was a prisoner under 
remand for two years. Since his conviction in 1975 he 
has been kept in solitary confinement. The petitioner 
therefore contended that to take away his life after keep-
ing him in jail for ten years« is a gross violation of 
the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 21 of the 
Constitution, 
Justice Chinnappa Reddy observed* 
"The fiat of Art.21, as explained is that 
any procedure which deprives a person of 
his life or liberty must be just,fair and 
reasonable. Just, fair and reasonavle 
procedxire implies a right to free legal 
services where he cannot avail them. It 
implies humane conditions of detention, pre-
ventive or punitive. 'Procedure established 
toy law' does not end with the pronouncement 
of sentence; it includes the carrying out 
o£ sentence."21 
While relying on his own ruling "a fair trial 
implies a speedy trial "laid down in Champalal Justice 
Chinnappa Reddy delivering the court's opinion said 
"It implies a right to a speedy trial" and held that 
"prolonged detention to await the execution of a 
sentence of death is an unjust, unfair, and unreasonable 
procedure,and the only way to undo the wrong is to quash 
the sentence of death".^^ 
20. T .V.Vatheeswaran V. S t a t e of Tamil Nadu,AlR 1983 SC 361 
^^» -^upra n o t e 20 a t 366 
^2« I b i d . 
ni 
The right to speedy trial has also been allowed 
to enter in the area of minor offences punishable 
under IPC. In a recent case of ,o»Guin the complaint was 
filed in the court of the chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 
Calcutta by one Mahintra Narayan Chowdhry Operation Manager 
Of the Grindlays Bank Ltd. against the twelve appellants 
for offences punishable under S. 341, IPC and S.36 AD of 
the ranking Regulation Act, 1949 said to have been com-
mitted by them on Oct. 31, 1977. The appellants alleged 
to have obstructed sr. G. Vaidya from Law fuiliyieet^rtng the 
premises of the branch of the Bank at 41, Chawringhee Road 
and had obstructed the business of the bank punishable 
under 3. 147 IPC. After trial the Chief Metropoliton 
wagistrate by his judgement dated June 27, 1978 acquitted 
all the appellants. Against this acquittal the Bank went 
to the High eourt in appeal. The Calcutta High Court set 
aside the judgmen* of the Magistrate and remanded the case 
for retrial. 
Having gone through the case Justice Venkataramiha 
delivering the Court's opinion said thafit was/not just 
and proper for the High Court to have remanded the case 
for fresh trial after six years" and expressed his dis-
pleasure that "the pendency of the criminal appeal for six 
years before the High Court, .is itself a regretable feature 
of this c^se, " 
2 3. S.Guin V. Grindlavs Bank Ltd.^AIR 1986 SC 286 
However, without reaffirmation or reiteration 
of what has been said by Justice Bhagwati in Husalnara I 
and Husainara I.& Justice Chinnappa Reddy in Champalal 
and vatheeswaran that the right to speedy trial is a 
part of personal liberty in Art. 21, Justice Vendetara:miha 
has set aside the High Court order for retrial of the 
appellants and recorded the reasons therefor. The learned 
judge was of the view that -the High Court should have 
dismissed the appeal even if it had disagreed with the 
acquittal by the trial court having regard to the inordi-
nate delay of nearly six years that had ensued after the 
judgement of acquittal, the nature and magnitude of the 
offences alleged to have been committed by the appellants 
and the difficulties that may have to be encountered in 
securing the presence of witnesses in a case of this 
nature nearly 7 years after the incident," 
Therefore, the learned judge terminated the pro-
ceedings in order to meet the ends of justice hoping that 
it would bring reconciliation between the management and 
the employees. The judicial approach demonstrated, is 
the best pragmetlc approach to reduce, if not elimi^ nate 
delayed Justice. 
24 
In Kaqhublr Singh once again the right to a speedy 
trial was raised. A two judge Bench of the Supreme Court 
neacted by Justice 0. Chinnappa Ready has reaffirmed the 
24. Kaghublr oingh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 149 
'^i^ 
Court's view by r e i t e r a t i n g i t s e a r l i e r r u l i n g s handed 
down in Husainara Khatoon I , Cha/npalal Shah and Kadi a 
Pahadiva c a s e s . vVhile deal ing with the i s s u e Chinappa 
Heddy J . speaking for the court has s ta ted the c o u r t ' s 
p o s i t i o n in the fo l lowing words: 
"The constitutional positionals now well settled 
that the right to speedy trial is one of the dimensions 
of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed 
25 
by nrt. 21 of the constitution." After referring Indian, 
26 27 
/unerican and English decisions Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed 
"several questions arise for consider. Was there delay? 
How long was the delay? Was the delay inevitable having 
regard to the nature of the case, the sparse availability 
of legal services and other relevant circumstances? was 
the delay reasonable? Was any part of the delay caused 
due to causes beyond the control of the prosecuting and 
defending agencies? Did the accused have the ability and 
25. Indian decisions referred arex Husainara Khatoon I v. 
state of Bihar (1979) I SCR 169; AIR 1979 SC 1360 
Per Bhagwati & Koshal JJ), Kadia Pahadiva v, state 
of Bihar, AIR 1981 SC 939 ( Per Bhagwati and A.P.Sen JJ) 
Kadia Pahadiva II v. State of Bihar,AIR 1982 SC 1167 
I Per Bhagwati & Era J. J.J.) and s'tate of Maharashtra v. 
Charopalal Punlali shah, AIR 1981 SC 1675 (Per Chinnappa 
Reddy, AP Sen and Baharul Islam J J,). 
26. American decisions referred ares Stru'nk v. United 
TliTff ioS^ui sL^"" ^ ^- '^'' and-HriJir v.-WiHg^T 
^^' o"^^f^ decision referred isj Bell v. Director of 
Public Prosecutions Jamica (1985r 2 Ail! I.1^ gfs 
"iiS 
opport\inity to assert his right to a speedy trial? 
was there a likelihood of the accused being prejudicial 
in his defence ? Irrespective of any likelihood o:f 
prejudice in the conduct of his defence, was the very 
length of the delay sufficiently prejudicial to the 
accused? Some of these factors have been identified in 
Barkar v. wlngo (supra). A host of other questions may 
arise which we may not ba able to readily visualise just 
now. The question whether the right to a speedy trial 
which forms part of the fundamental right to life and 
liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 has been infringed is ulti-
mately a question of fairness in the administration of 
justice even as 'acting fairly' is of the essence of the 
principles of natural justice. (In re.H.K. 1967(1) All. 
EU 226) A 'fair and reasonable procedure' is what is 
contemplated by the expression 'procedure established 
28 
by law' in Art. 21 (Maneka Gandhi)", 
29 
In Husalnara Khatoon I the court declared that 
Art.. 21i confers a right to speedy trial. Justices Chlnnappa 
Reddy, A.P. Sen and Baharul Islam participated at one 
stage or the other in Husalnara Khatoon cases reiterated 
the court's holding in Husalnara Khatoon I that reasonably 
expeditious trial is an integral and essential part of the 
fundamental right .'to life and liberty enshrined in Art.2l!" 
28. Supra,note ?:A • ~ 
?^' Husalnara Knatoon I v. State of Bihar. AIR 1979 SC i360 
^°* ^^ate ox Maharashtra v. Champalal Shah> AIR 1981 
SC 1675 at P. 1677. 
U'^ 
Justice Chinnappa Reddy speaking for the court made it 
clear that the denial of "a speedy trial may with or 
without proof of something more lead to an inevitable 
inference of prejudice and denial of justice. It is pre-
judice to a man to be detained without trial. It is pre-
31 judice to a man to be denied a fair trial". The learned 
Judge has further buttersed his theory by saying that "a 
fiar trial implies a speedy trial."^^ Though the right 
to a speedy trial was the J^ ery basis in Champalal yet it 
was placed on more firmer place than what it would have . 
in Husainara Khatoon cases on account of its interminable 
nature. In Champalal what was demonstrated was that the 
court as a whole accepted the interpretation of Art, 21 as 
33 
conferring a right to a reasonably expeditious trial. 
The delay in trial is not only caused by the defence 
but is also "caused by the tardiness and tactics of the 
prosecuting agencies". The learned Judge has in Champalal 
said that trials are "over delayed because of the indiffe-
rence and somnolence or the deliberate inactivity" of poose-
cuting agencies resulting into gross deprivation of liberty 
of the poverty-struck," 'dumb' accused persons "Too feeble 
to protest.• Due to the long incarceration of pre trial 
period "the accused is seriously jeopardized in the conduct 
of his defence with the passage of time'. The court speaking 
31. Ibid. ~ — 
32. Ibid. 
33. Id. at 1677-78. 
34. Id. at 1677 
n'^ 
through Chinnappa Reddy J, reached to the inescapable 
result that in such situatious " we may readily infer an 
infringement of the right to life and liberty guaranteed 
"35 by Article 21 of the Constitution. 
In Raghubir Singh Justice Chinnappa Reddy has once 
again reaffirmed and reiterated what the learned judge 
has already held in Champalal regarding to the right to 
speedy trial as was interpreted by Justice Bhagwati in 
Husainara Khatoon. Making the constitutional position 
of the right to a speedy trial clear Chinnappa Reddy,J., 
said that "the right to speedy trial is one of the dimen-
sions of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaran-
36 
teed by Art. 21 of the Constitution, After referring 
Husainara Khatoon I Kadra Pahadiya I and Kadra pahadiya II, 
^^^ Champalal Justice Chinnappa Reddy identified several 
37 
questions and expressed his human inability to visualise 
other questions in this regard. But Justice Chinnappa 
Reddy has further broadened, widened and expanded the con-
tours of the right to a speedy trial by holding that 
whether the right to speedy trial has been infringed is 
ultimately a question of fairness in the administration of 
justice even as acting fairly' is of the essence of the 
35. Ib id . 
36. Supra n o t e i A a t p. 154-155 
37. Ib id , a t pp. 154-155. 
principles of natural justice and a fair and reasonable 
procedure is what is contemplated by the expression 
38 . 
'procedure established by law' in Art. 21. 
In Vatheeswaran Justice Chinnappa Reddy held that 
"prolonged detention to await the execution of a sentence 
of death is an unjust unfair and unreasonable procedure 
and the only way to undo the wrong is to quash the sen-
tence of death'. In S. Giun the court speaking through 
Justice Venkataramaiah did not hesitate to extend the arms 
of the right to a speedy trial to the minor offences. 
Justice Venkataramiah has expressed his strong displeasure 
over the opening of the trial of the accused after six 
years of the criminal appeal disposed by the High Court, 
It is now well established that the right to a 
speedy trial is an integral part of the right to life and 
liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the constitution. The 
question whether the right to a speedy trial has been 
infringed has to be determined in the light of the cir-
cumstances of each case and by probing the questions iden-
tified by Justice Chinnappa Reddy in Raghvibir Singh, 
The right to a speedy trial was recognised in 
Husainara Khatoon I by Justice Bhagwati, Justice^ Chinnappa 
Reddy expanded the ambit of the 'right to a speedy trial' 
38, Ibid, at P, 184-185 
2^\] 
by calling it as 'right to a speedy fair trial* in 
Ghampalal. Further, Justice Chinnappa Reddy advanced 
the right to a speedy trial means trial through a fair 
and reasonable procedure as contemplated by the procedure 
established by law contained in Art. 21 of our Consti-
tution, The court has held that a speedy trial is an 
39 
implied ingredient of a fair trial. 
prof. Buxi has formulated the following proposi-
tions to be demonstrated by*;those who claim the violation 
of Art. 21 on the basis of Ghampalal; 
(1) The trial has been unreasonably delayed/ that is, 
more than usual time has been taken or that the 
trial has taken inordinately long time, 
12) Accused has not contributed to the time consximp-
tion by recourse to any strategem to delay inves-
tigati<bn or judicial proceedings. 
(3) The accused has been, as a result of proposition 
(1) , prejudiced in the conduct of his defence and 
has been thus denied an adequate opportunity to 
defend himself. 
(4) Owing to prosecution somnolence or long per iods 
of time taken by the t j ^ a l j u d i c i a r y i t s e l f , the 
t r i a l has not even begun. 
39, iiiampalal a t 1678 
40, 
^"^^^":^J^®7.^ew vojL.ii CULR Jime !987f p f ? 0 9 ^ ^^^^^ 
n:\ 
The relief in cases whete prepositions (1) to 
(3) are established is quashing of the conviction. The 
relief where proposition (4 ) is established is quashing 
of the proceedings. Propositions (1) to U) are products 
of Ghampalal; Proposition C4) arises as a joint or 
41 
combined e f f ec t of Champalal and Hussainara. 
42 
In a s e r i e s of f ive cases* the Patna High Court 
speaking through J u s t i c e Sandhawalia/ C.J. has dea l t 
with the importance of the speedy and expedi t ious t r i a l 
of the offences. The learned chief j u s t i c e of the Patna 
High Court held the ndrrendous delay extending beyond a 
decaae in a cr iminal t r i a l on a c a p i t a l charge would 
v i o l a t e the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantee of a f a i r , j u s t 
and reasonable procedure guaranteed by A r t i c l e 21. The 
learned judge has without s l i g h t h e s i t a t i o n upheld the 
r i g h t t o speedy publ ic t r iaJ , as p a r t and parce l of 
rurt icle 21, 
41, I b i d . / a t 95 
42, S ta te of Bihar v. Ram Paras Ahir (1985 Cr.L,J ,}584) , 
Sta te of Bihar v. Maksudan Singh/AIK 1986 Pat , 38), 
Madheswari Dhar Singh v. S t a t e of Bihar (AIR 1986 
pat 32*4) , Sxjtrya Nafain Singh v. Sta te (AIR 1987 Pat. 
219), i^urao Baitha v. S ta te (AIR 1987 Pa t . 274 ) . 
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Right to Bail ( Article 21) 
1 
In G. Narasirohulu/ Justice Krishna Iyer, as a 
chamber judge* has made a fruitful remarks which throws 
light on the legal importance of bail provided in the criminal 
law. The learned judge said: "Bail or Jail?" - at the pre> 
trial or post<-conviction stage - belongs to the blurred area 
of the criminal justice system and largely hinges on the 
hunch of the bench* otherwise called judicial discretion. At 
the outset* while dealing with judicial discretion in granting 
bail or jail the learned judge has judged it on the anvil of 
constitutional culture. The questions to grant bail or deny 
it* is and must be based on the constitutional values of 
liberty* justice and public safety. Thus* the granting of 
bail should be adjudged on the basis of personal liberty under 
Article 21* Justice Krishna Iyer observed: 
"i^ ersonal liberty, deprived when bail is 
refused*is too precious a value of our 
constitutltoal system recognised under 
Article 21 that the crucial power to 
negate it is a great trust exercisable* 
not casual]y but judicially with lively 
cono«pn for the cost to the individual 
and the community. To glamorize impre-
ssionistic orders as discretionary may* 
on occasions* make al.lltlgatlve gamble 
decisions of a ftindamental right. After-
all* personal liberty of an accused or 
convict Is fundamental* suffering lawful 
eclipse only in terras of 'procedure 
established by law*. The last four words 
of Art. 21 are the life of that human 
right,2 
!• G. ^<arasimhulu v. Pviblic Prosecutor, A. F. .AIR *1978 SC 427 
2. Supra* i>i. 1, at p. 430 
3;J2 
3 
In Kashmira Singh, the appellant was convicted 
by the Sessions Court for an offence under Section- 323. IPC and 
sentenced to suffer six months' rigorous imprisonment. 
There was a charge against the appellant for an offence 
under s.302 of the IPC by the Sessions Court and hence the 
State preferred an appeal against his order of acquittal 
to the High Court. The High Court allowed the Criminal 
appeal and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life. 
The appellant's bail application was rejected on 10th 
January, 1^75. Since the appeal did not reach hearing for 
a long time, the appellant preferred anotner application for 
bail. 
Now, the common practice in the Supreme Court as 
also in the many of the High Courts has been not to release 
on bail a person who has been sentenced to life imprisonment 
for an offence under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The 
question before the court was whether the practice should be 
departed from and if so, in what circumstances? In dealing 
with this question Justice Bhagwati justified the departure 
from the common practice of not releasing a sentenced person 
from the jail custody on the ground that his appeal would 
be disposed of within reasonable time. This is what Justice 
Bhagwati has observed: 
3. Kashmira Sinah v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 2147 
3yj 
"The practice not to release on bail 
a person who has been sentenced to 
life imprisonment was evolved in the 
riigh Courts and in this court on tne 
basis that once a person has been 
found guilty and sentenced to life 
imprisonment/ he should not be let 
loose# so long as his conviction and 
sentence are not set aside* but the 
underlying postulate of this practice 
was that the appeal of a person would 
be disposed of within a measurable 
distance o£ time* so that if he is 
ultimately found to be innocent* he 
would not have to remain in jail for 
an unduly long period. The rationale 
of this practice can have no applica-
tion where the court is not in a posi-
tion to dispose of the appeal for five 
or six years. It would indeed be a 
travesty of justice to keep a person 
in jail lor a period of five or six 
years for an offence which is ultimately 
found not to have been committed by him. 
Can the coxirt ever compensate him for 
his incorceration which is found to be 
unjustified".4 
However, while granting bail to the appellant and making 
departure from the common practice not to release a convict 
dn bail. Justice Bhagwati saidt 
"It is*therefore, absolutely essential 
that the practice which this court has 
been following in the past must be 
reconsidered to hear the appeal of an 
accused within a reasonable period of 
time. The court should ordinarily 
unless there are cogent grounds for 
acting otherwise, release the accused 
on bail in cases where special leave has 
been granted to the accused to the appeal 
against his conviction and sentence".5 
4. Supra n. 3 SC 2147 at pp. 2148-49 
5. Supra n. 3 at p, 2149 
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In Babu Singh , the petitionees w§re charged with an 
offence of murder \inder Sec. 30 2, IPC but were acquitted by 
the Sessions Court as early as November 4« 1977. The state 
successfvilly appealed against the acquittal and the High Court, 
reversing the findings of the Sessions Court held all the 
petitioners guilty and sentenced them all to life-imprisonment. 
It was pronounced on I'iay 20,1977. On September 7, 1977 the 
application for bail was rejected. The second application 
was filed in the Supreme Court while considering the second 
bail application the two factors shoiild be taken into consi-
deration namely that all the petitioners were the male members 
of the family and all were in jails thus their defence in the 
court was jeopardised. Secondly* there was nothing against 
during their bail period indicated to show that they were 
threatening any one in the village or thwarting the life of 
the community or the course of justice. Further when the 
High Courc entertained the appeal# the State did not press 
for their custody for apprehended absconsion or menace to 
peace and j ustice. 
The bail, therefore, is hinged on the hunch of the 
bench known ds expression of judicial discretion. That is 
when bail shall be granted or refused depends on the judicial 
discretion. There is no guideline before the judge when and 
how the bail should be granted or refused. In dealing with the 
question what 'judicial discretion'is in the context of bail? 
6, Babu Singh v. state of U.P.. AIR I97ft gr ^97 
:^^f) 
Benjamin Cardozo saids 
"The judge, even when he is free, is still 
not wholly free. He is not to innovate at 
pleasure, tie is not a knight errant roaming 
at will in pursuits of his own ideal of 
beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his 
inspiration from consecrated principles. He 
is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to 
vague and unregulated benevolence. He is 
to exercise a discretion informed by tradi-
tion, methodiaed by analogy, disciplined by 
system and subordinated to the premordial 
necessity of order in the social life. Wide 
enough in all conscience is the field of 
discretion of that remains".7 
Lord Camden also expressed the same yiews on judicial 
discretion in the bail context that "the discretion of a 
judge is the law of tyrants* it is always unknown,it is diffe-
rent in different men, it is casual, and depends upon Consti-
tution, temper and passion. In the best it is often times 
caprice, in the worst it is every vice folly and passion to 
g 
which human natixre is liable...." 
Judicial discretion, therefore, is "inescapable silent 
ccHiunand o£ our judicial system* reposed in our Judges. They 
should therefore remember what Lord Mansfield said in Tinlav 
v, Jobby that 'discretion, when applied to a cort of justice 
means should discretion guided by law. It must be governed 
by rule, not by humor, it must not be arbitrary, vagjiB and 
fanciful, but legal and regular",^ 
V. "The Nature Of Judicial Process", Yale University Press(1921) 
8.1 Bovu.Law Diet. Rawles' III Revision,p,855-quoted in Judicial 
discretion- National College of the state Judiciary,RLO, 
^^J®^^*P* if ^ *3UOted in G.Narasimhulu ,AIK 1978 SC 427 at p. 431 
and Babu Sxnah. AIR i9iQ sC 527 at p. 52 9. 
• ^^^^?!f^f?^^° ^ o^^ Wansfield 14 NW 146, Se4 AIR 1978 SC 42^ 
and AIR 1978 SC 527 at 529, o CA- *^ 
n^ 
so what emerges out of the above two authoritative 
quotations is that the judicial discretion must be exercised 
not in opijosition to, but in accordance with, established 
principles of law,"^^ Further, there are two factors namely, 
the 'nature of the charges' and the 'nature of the evidence' 
must be considered by the judge while exercising his judicial 
discretion in the matter of bail of an accused. It is, 
therefore, necessary and desirable to enquire into the ante-
cedents of a man who is seeking bail, VJhile Lord Corapbell 
C.J, concurred Coleridge J, amplified and described the 
priorities as follows; 
I do not think that an accused party is 
detained in custody because of his guilty, 
but because there are sufficient probable 
grounds for the charge against him as to 
make it proper that he should be tried, and 
because the detention is necessary to ensure 
his appearance at trial ... It is a very 
important elements in considering whether 
the party, if admitted to bail, would appear 
to take his trial; I tnink that in coming 
to a deterifiination on that i:>oint three ele-
ments will generally be found the most 
important: the charge the nature of the evi-
dence by which it is imported, and the pxinishment 
to which the party would be liable if convicted".11 
The right to ball shall be regulated on the basis of 
evidence about the criminal record of the accused. Laying 
emphasis on it Justice Krishna Iyer observed; 
10. -S"P^ ca^ t:^ te_ J at P. 431 and Supra, note 6- at P, 529 
11. The Granting of Bail, Modern Law Review, Vol. 81 
January, 1968 pp. 50-51. 
2\\1 
"The significance and sweep of Art.21 
make the deprivation of liberty a 
matter of grave concern and permissible 
only when the law authorising it is 
reasonable, even handed and geared to 
the goals of commxinity good and state 
necessity spelt out in Art* 19 ••. 
Reasonableness postulates intelligent 
care and predicates that deprivation 
of freedom by refusal of bail is not 
for punitive purpose but for the bi-
focal interests of justice to the indivi-
dual involved and society affected".12 
After referring the Vera Foundation's Manhatten Bail 
project due to which the monetary sviretyship is loosing 
ground in America, Justice Krishna Iyer observed: 
"It makes sense to assume that a man on 
bail has a better chance to prepare or 
represent his case than, one remanded in 
custody. And if p^ublic justice is to be 
promoted, mechanical detention should be 
demoted ••• The considerable public 
expense in keeping in custody where no 
danger of disappearance or disturbance can 
arise, is not a negligible consideration. 
Squally, important is the deplorable 
condition, verging on the irhuman, of our 
sub-jails, that the unrewarding cruelty 
and expensive custody of avoidable incar-
ceration makes refusal of bail unreasonable 
and a policy favouring release justly 
sensible",13 
It has been rightly said that "Public justice is 
central to tne whole scnerae of ball law. Thus , conditions 
/aay be hung around bail orders, not to cripple but to pro-
tect such is the holistic jurisdiction and humanistic 
12. .a^ x^ * note I at p. 433 and -.u,..l uuce o at p. 531 
13. Ibid. at p. 433 and Ibldi. n^ 531 
u^ 
orientation involved by the judicial discretion correlated 
14 
to the values of our Constitution. Holding bad character 
and prospective misconduct of the accused as relevant and 
admissible factors in considering the bail application^ 
Justice Krishna Iyer observed: "Bad record and police pre-
diction of criminal prospects to invalidate the bail plea 
are admissible in principle but shall not stampede the court 
15 into a complacent refusal". 
In the ultimate analysis of bail and its ramificaticois 
Justice Krishna Iyer said: 
"The delicate light of the law favours 
release unless countered by the negative 
criteria necessitating that course. 
The corrective instinct of the law plays 
upon release orders by strapping on to 
them protective and curative conditions. 
Heavy bail from poor man is obviously 
wrong. Poverty is society's malady and 
sympathy, not sternness, is the judicial 
response." 16 
17 
In Moti Ram the monetary and regional aspect of the 
bail came under attack. Moti Ham was directed by the Chief 
Judicial >iagistrate to produce surety of Rs. 10,000/- of his 
own district. The poor mason could not do so. The petitioner 
approached the Court praying for the modification of the 
original order to the extent that he could be released on 
furnishing surety to the sum of Rs. 2000 or on executing a 
personal bond. 
14. I b i d . 
15. Ib id 
16. Ib id 
17. Moti i^aia v . ;atate of u . p *^^i< 1978 SC 1594 
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t h i s aspect of criminal law by using t h e i r j u d i c i a l 
Craft - manship with the help of 'poverty jur i sprudence ' 
IJOW the comniulative r e s u l t of the Supreme Cour t ' s dec i -
sions handed down in I^arasimahulu, Kashmira Singh, Babu 
Singh and Moti Ram i s t h a t the b a i l should o rd ina r i ly 
be granted to the under t r i a l or convicted pr i soners 
unless i t i s not countered by the Sta te necessary and 
soc ie t a l i n t e r e s t s . 
4.) 2 
SOLITARY CQNFIt.Ei'lENT 
1 I" 
In Sunil Batra I the two petitioners - Batra andSobhraj-
One Indian and another French/ one under death sentence and 
the other facing grave charges* share in two different shapes/ 
the slings and arrows of incarceratory fortvine/ but instead of 
submitting to what they described as shocking Jail injustice/ 
challenged/ by separate writ petitions, such traumatic treatment 
as illegal and argued that sections 30 and 56 of the Prisons 
i^ ct/ 1894 were violative of Articlesl4/ 19 and 21 of the 
Constitution, The specific questions before the court were: 
whether the solitary confinement of a death convict and 
keeping an ^  under trial prisoner in iron bars violate the 
right to life and personal liberty in Art, 21 of the Constitution, 
It was argued that the petitioner was kept in solitary con-
finement soon after his conviction in a murder case by the 
sessions Judge awarding him capital pxonishment under S. 30 of 
the Prisons Act 1894, It was xirged that S. 30 of the Prisons 
Act did not empower the Prison authorities to place the prisoner 
in solitary confinement. The Jail authority can not arrogate to 
1, Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration/ AIR 1978 SCJL675 
S,30 of the Prisons Act 1894 reads: 30 (1) Every Prisoner 
under sentence of death shall/ immediately on his arrival 
in the prison after sentence/ he searched by/ or by order 
of , two Jailor and all articles shall be taken from which 
the Jailor deems it dangerous or inexpedient to leave in his 
possession. 
(2) Every such prisoner shall be confined in a cell apart 
fro.li all other prisoners* and shall be placed by day and by 
night under the charge of a guard", 
lA, Charles oobraj v. supdt. gentral Jail, Tihar 
«i.^  197a JC lbl4 
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itself the power to impose such a pxinishment under the 
garb of giving effect to sub-section(2) of S, 30. In any 
event it was contended that if sub S.(2) of S.30 of the Act 
is to be construed to* mean that it authorises prison autho-
rities to impose solitary confinement it is violative of 
Arts.l4,19,20 and 21 of the Constitution. By imposing soli-
tary confinement on a convict there is total deprivation of 
camaradire amongst co-prisoners# comingling and talking and 
tnus offends Art. 21. The Attorny General without adopting 
any dogmatic approach urged that the S. 30 of the Act does 
not empower the jail authorities to impose solitary confine-
ment, but it merely permits statutory regregation for safety 
of the prisoner in prisoners' own interest and instead of 
striking down the pfovision we should adopt the course of 
adopting of so reading the section as to denude it of its 
ugly inhuman features. 
Abhoring the continuance of inhvunan solitary confinement 
in our democratic life Justice Desai speaking for the court 
said : It may be conceded that solitary confinement has a de-
grading and dehujnanising effect on prisoners. Constant and 
unrelieved isolation of a prisoner is so unnatural that it may 
breed insanity. Social isolation represents the most destruc-
tive abnormal environment. Results of long solitary confinement 
are disastrous to the physical and mental health of those 
subjected to it. It is abolished in U.K. but it is still 
retained in USA".^ 
1. Sunil Batra I, AIR 1978 SC 1675 at P. 1728 
4i)4 
In dealing with the legal validity of S,30 of the 
Prisons Act Justice ^esai said that "it must be made clear 
that sub i>ec, (2) of S, 30 does not empower the prison autho-
rity to impose solitary confinement, in the sense in which 
the word is vinderstood in paragraph 510 of Jail Manual, upon 
a prisoner under sentence of death. Sections 73 and 74 IPC 
leave no room for doubt that solitary confinement is by 
itself a substantive punishment which can be imposed by a ccmrt 
of law. It cannot be left to the whim and caprice of prison 
authorities". While referring sub-clauses (8) and UO) of 
S. 46 of the Prisons Act Justice Desai described the nature 
of confinement of a death convict under s, 30 of the Act and 
observed! 
Sub s. C 2 )of 3.30 merely provides for confinement of a 
prisoner under sentence of death in a cell apart from other 
prisoners and he is to be placed by day and night under the 
charge of a guard. Such confinement can neither be cellular 
confineinent nor separate confinement anu in any event ic 
cannot be solitary confinement. In our opinion, sub-sec.(2) 
of S.30 does not empower the Jail authorities in the garb of 
3. Sunia? Batra I, AIR 1978 SC 1675 at P. 1728 
S.46 of the Prisons Act S\ib CI. (8) separate confinement for 
any period not exceeding three months; 
Explanation- Separate confinement means such confinement witl 
or without labour as secludes a prisoner from commuhicaticMi 
with, but not from right of,other prisoners, and allows him 
not less than one hoxir's exercise per deem and to have his 
meals in association with one or more other prisoners; 
(10} Cellular confinement for any period not exceeding 
fourteen days: 
Explanation:Cellular confinement means such confinement 
with or without labour as entirely secludes a prisoner from 
c<xnmunication with, but not from right of, other pri8<mers. 
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confining a prisoner under sentence of death, in a cell 
apart from all other prisoners* to impose solitary confine-
ment on him. Even jail discipline inhibits solitary confine-
ment as a measure of jail punishment. It completely nega-
tes ^•^  any suggestion that because a prisoner is under sen-
tence of death therefore, and by reason of that consideration 
alone, the jail authorities can impose upon him additional 
and separate punishment of solitary confinement. They have 
no power to add to the punishment imposed by the court which 
additional punishment could have been imposed by the court 
itself but has in fact been not be imposed. Upon a true 
construction, sub S.(2) of S,30 does not empower a prison 
authority to impose solitary confinement upon a prisoner under 
4 
sentence of death". 
The question, therefore, is: who is a prisoner under 
a sentence of death? who can be kep in a separate cell right 
from the time of the Sessions Judge awards death sentence till 
the sentence is finally executed? While discussing this 
question Justice Desai said: 
"The expression^' priseder .yoder sentence of death" in 
the context of sub Sec, (2) of S, 30 can only mean the prisoner 
wnose sentence of death has become final, conclusive and 
indef4a.sible which can not be annulled or voided by any judicial 
or constitutional procedure. In other words, it must be a 
4, Sunll Batra, AIR 1978 SC 1675 at P. 1729 
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sentence which the authority charged with the duty to 
execute and carry out must proceed to carry out without 
intervention from any outside authority". The learned judge 
6 
has further relied on Sindhi and observed that "the prisoner 
can be said to be under the sentence of death only when the 
death sentence is beyond judicial scrutiny and would be 
operative without any intervention from any other authority. 
A'ill then tne person who is awarded capital punishment cannot 
be said to be a prisoner under sentence of death in the 
7 
context of S. 30 s\ib. S, C2) ". 
Rejecting the attack on S.30 sub.S. (2) of the Prison 
Act on the ground of Art, 21 Justice Desai said: Personal 
liberty of the person who is incarcerated is to a great extent 
curtailed by punitive detention. It is even curtailed in 
preventive detention. The liberty to move/ mix mingle/ talk 
share conpany with co-prisoners/ if substantially curtailed/ 
would be violative of Article 21 unless the curtailment has 
the backing of law. Sub.S. (2) of S. 30 establishes the 
procedure by which it canbe curtailed but it must be read 
subject to our interpretation. The word 'law' in the expres-
sion procedure prescribed by l)aw' in Article 21 has been 
interpreted to mean in Maneka Gandhi that the law must be right, 
5. Sunil Batra/ AIR 1978 SC 1675 at P. 1730 
6. State of Maharashtra v. sindhi/ AIR 1975 SC 1665 in which 
it was held that trial cannot be deemed to have concluded 
till an executable sentence of death is passed by a compe-
tent". See also Abdul Aziz v. State of Karnataka/AIR 1977 
7. Sunil Batra/ AIR 1978 SC 1675 at 8 ^ ^^®^ 
4,}'? 
Just and fair, and not arbitrary^ fanciful or oppressive. 
Otherwise it would be no procedure at all and the require-
ment of Art. 21 would not be satisfied. if it is arbitrary 
it would be violative of Art. 14 . Once 5. 30 (2) is read 
down in the manner in which we have done* its ainoxious ele-
ment is erased and it cannot be said that it is arbitrary or 
that there is deprivation of persogial liberty without the 
Q 
authority of law". 
9 
In Kishojp Singh the question of solitary confinement 
came up before the supreme Court for its scrutiny justice 
10 11 
iCrishna Iyer relying on aunil Batra I and Sunil Batra II 
gave a new judicial impet.:^ s by emphasing that violation of 
Art. 21 as interpretedl>y this court in its recent decisions^ 
12 
if repeated, will be vis^ Lted with more serious consequences". 
Since Justice Kjrishna Iyer has delivered the court's 
opinioxi in Sunil Batra II and Ki shore Singn and separate but 
concurring opinion in Sunil Batra I.Let us therefore know how 
the learned judge has de<ilt with the question of solitary 
confinement of a prisoner under sentence of death in prisons. 
In dealing with the nature of power conferred on the Suprin-
tendent of Prisons S, 30(2) Justice Krishna Iyer said in sunil 
Batra I; "Section 30(2) / understood in the correct setting, 
8. Sunil Batra I, AIR 1978 SC 1675 at P. 1732 
9. Ki shore Singh v. State of Ralasthan/ AIR 1981 SC 625 
10. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC 1675 
11. Stinil Batra v, Delhi Administration, AIR 1980 SC 
12. Ki shore Singh, AIR 1981 sC 625 
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plainly excludes any trace of severity and merely provides 
for a protective distance being maintained between the 
prisoner iinder death sentence and the other prisoners, 
although they are accommodated in che same cell and are 
allowed to ccxnmunicate with each and for all other practical 
purposes continue community life". An analysis of the 
provisions of the Penal Code and of the Prisons Act yields 
tne clear in£er«nce that S,30(2) relates to separation 
13 
without isolation, keeping apart without close confinement". 
i>iscu8sing the nature of power in 5.366(2} Cr.p.C. and fftsm 
40 Justice Krishna Iyer saidt "This 'safe keeping' in Jail 
custody is the limited jurisdiction of the Jailor, 
convict is not sentenced to imprisonment. He is not senten-
ced to solitary confinement. He is a guest^ i^n custody, in 
the safe keeping of the host jailor until the terminal hour 
of teriE'5trial farewell whisles, him away to the falter. 
This is trusteeship in the* hands of the Superintendent, not 
imprisonment in the true sense. Sectons 366(2) Cr.p.C. 
(Jail custody) and i'orm 40 ( safety to keep) underscore the 
concept.... Batra, and others of his ill # are entitled to 
every creature comfort and cultural facility that cc»npas-
sionate safe keeping implies. Bed and pillow, opportunity 
to commence with hximan kind, worship in shrines, if any,games, 
books, newspa^^ers, waiting material, meet-i'j family members,and 
13. ounil Batra , AIR 1978 SC 1675 at P. 1702 
4.59 
all the good things of life, so long as life lasts and 
prison facilities exist .... safe custody does not mean 
deprivation»isolation» banishment from the lanten banquet 
of prison life and imfliction of travails as if guardianship 
were best fulfilled by making the word suffer near-insanity,,. 
so, S, 366C2) Cr.P.C. forbids any act which disrupts the man 
in his body and mind. To preserve his flesh and crush his 
spirit is not safe keeping, whatever else it be. 
Neither the Penal code ncr the Criminal Procedure 
Code lends validity to any action beyond the needs of safety 
and any deprivation, whatever the reason, has not the autho-
rity of law. Any executive action which spells infraction 
of the life and liberty of a human being kept in prison 
precincts, purely for safe custody , is a challenge to the 
basic notion of the rule of law - unreasonable, unequal, 
arbitrary and unjust". 
In dealing with the issue who is under a sentence of 
death Justice Krishna Iyer saidt It follows that during the 
pendency of a petition for mercy before the State Governor or 
the President of India the death sentence shall not be executed. 
Thus, until rejection of the clemency motion by these two high 
dignitaries it is possible to predicate that there is a self 
14. Sunil Batra. AIR 1978 SC 1675 at P. 170 3 
Section 366 (2) Cr.P.C, reads: The court passii^ g the sen-
tence shall commit the convicted person to jail custody 
under a warrant". Form 40 ranss "This is to authorise and 
require you to receive the said (Prisoner's name) into 
your custody in tae said jail, together with this warrant, 
and him there safely to keep until you shall recieve the 
fur'ther warrant or order of this covirt, carrying into effect 
the order of the said court". 
4 in 
executary death sentence* Therefore^ a prisoner becomes 
subject to a self-working sentence of death only when the 
clemency application by the prisoner stands rejected. Of 
course/thereafter, section 30(2) is attracted ... 
The conclusion inevitably follows that Batra, or* 
for that matter, others like him can not be classed as 
persons 'under sentence of death' . Therefore, they canBOt 
be confined apart from other prisoners. Nor is he sentence 
to rigorous Imprisonment and so can not be forced to do ^ ard 
labour. He is in custody because the court has, pending 
confirmation of the death sentence, commanded the prison 
Authority to keep the sentencedin custody* 
The writ petition filed by Sunil Batra was heard by 
tne Supreme Court included the writ of Charles Sobhraj who 
was languishing in Central Tihar Jail as an under trial 
prisocer. He was a foreigner arreased on 6th July 1976 and 
on 15th July 1976 he was served with an order of detention 
under s,3 of the MJS Act 1971. His allegation was that ever 
since he was lodged in Tihar Central Jail he was put in bar 
fetters and the fetters were retained continuously for 24 
hours or day and the uncontroverted fact is that since his 
detention he was put in bar fetters till this co\irt made an 
order on 24th February 1978 recording an assurance on behalf 
of the respondents given by the learned Additional solicitor 
general that the bar fetter shall be removed forthwith for a 
period of 14 days except when the prisonei?^^€aken from the 
1 ! 
prison to the court and back and also when the 
petitioner was taken for the purpose of an interview 
but if the interview is in the cell no such bar fetters 
shall be put. Thus from July 1976 to February 1978 the 
petitioner was kept in bar fetters. However the Supe-
rintendent of Tihar Central Jail in his affidavit dated 
5th September 1977 set out the gory details of the cri-
minal activities of the petitioner. The petitioner was 
of extremely desparate and dangerous nature whose pre-
sence was needed by Interpol and therefore, it had been 
considered necessary to keep him under fetters while in 
jails. It was lastly said that the prisoners have no 
fundamental freedom to escape from lawful custody and, 
therefore, they can not complain against precautionary 
15 
measures which impede escape from the prison. 
The petitioner contended that Sec.56 of the Prisons 
Hct so far as it conferred unguided, uncanalised and 
arbitrary powers on the Superintendent to confine a pri-
soner in irons was ultra vires Acts 14 and 21. The neces-
sity to put iron bar fetters on a criminal in jail 
arises out of his character and propensities. 
15. S. 56 of the Prisons Act 1894 reads:"whenever the Superin-
tendent considers it necessary (with reference either to 
the State of the Prison or the character of the prisoners) 
for the safe custody of any prisoners that they should be 
confined in irons, he may, svibject to such rules and 
instructions as may be laid down by the Inspector General 
with the sanction of the State Government so confine them," 
412 
Thus there are two basic considerations in the context 
of prison description namely the security of the Prison and 
safety of the prisoner. The purpose of a. 56 of the Prison 
Act is based on the objective of the Act itself namely 
safe custody of the Prisoner, Taking inspiration and help 
1.6 
inconstruing D, 56 Justice Desai referred Procunier case 
in which the American Supreme Court said: "The identifiable 
government interests at stake in this task are the preser-
vation of internal order and discipline, the maintenance 
of institutional security against escape or unauthorised 
entry, and the rehabilitation of the prisoners". 
Having seen a bar fetter and its use demonstrated 
in the Cj\irt Justice iJesai speaking for the Court concluded 
tnat "bar fetters to a very considerable extent cxortail, 
if not wholly deprive locomotion which is one of the facets 
of personal liberty — — • Bar fetters make a serious inroad 
on a limited persosnal. liberty which a prisoner is left 
with and, therefore, before such erosion can be justified 
1'7 it must have the authority of law". The learned judge 
has further declared that S.56 of the Act does not confer 
any unbridled,ujiiguided and uncanalised discretionary power 
upon the ^uprintendent because the power to put bar on a prisoner 
must be exercised in the light of the nature of the prisoner, 
and the safe custody of the prisoner, 
16, Procunier case (1974) 40 L Ed 2d 224, 
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Affirmatively «3ru«tice Desal said; Now, putting 
bar fitters for an unusually long period without due 
regard for the safety of the prisoner and the security of 
the Prisoner would certainly be not justified under S.56. 
Thus it was declared that S.56 did not violate Art, 14, 
21 of the Constitution. 
HAND CUfflUG AND FETTERING ; 
18 
In Prem Shankar the petitioner was an vinder trial 
prisoner whose presence was needed in several cases, making 
periodical trips between jail house and magistrates courts 
inevitable. Being in custody he might try to flee and so 
escort duty to prevent escape was necessary. The petitioner 
sent a telegram to one of the judges of the Supreme Court 
that Inspite of Sunll Batra hands were forced on him and 
others. This would have been Ignored by him and others 
but the guarantee of human dignity forming part of our 
constitutional culture would be violated. The question 
before the court was: can the custodian fetter the person 
of the prisoner, while in transit, with irons, may be haod 
cuffs or chains or bar fetters? To put it in a different 
way how to adjust the need of the custodial conditions 
and basic human dignity within the parameters of Part III 
of the Constitution. 
'^^ Prem Shankar v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1980 SC 1535 
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Declaring the prevention of escape of an undertrial 
in public interestT^f-easonable just and can not by itself 
be castigated Justice Krishna IJer saidj "surety» the com-
peling claims of secxirity the prisoner from fleeing and 
protecting his persouality from barbarity have to be har-
monised",^ Then the learned judge observed that "to bind 
a man hand and foot, fetter his limbs with hoops of steel 
shuffle him along in the streets and stand him for hours 
in the courts is to toruture him, defile his dignity, vul-
garise society and foul the soul of our constitutional 
culture , Further it has been declared tnat "no prisoner 
shall be hand-cuffed or fettered routinely or merely for 
the convenience of the custodian or escort and we declare 
that to be the law".,,. It is brutalising to handcuff a 
20 person in public and so is unreasonable to do so". 
iiaking handcuffing and bar fettering an objective and 
nofi subjective decision of the escorting officer Justice 
Krishna Iyer said that even in extreme circumstances hand-
cuffs have to be put on the prisoner the escorting authority 
must record reasons so doing so because this is implicit 
in Art, 21 which ihri';Ht3=" upon fairness , reasonableness and 
justice in the very procedure which authorises stringent 
deprivation of life and liberty",^^ 
19. jupra note 1 at p. 1541 
20. Supra note 1 at p. 1542 
21. Supra note 1 at p. 1543 
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In junil GuDta^thc three petitioners were arrested, 
abused, beaten and taken to the court of 1st class Judicial 
Magistrate, woshangabad by handcuffing them. 
The brief facts of the case are that all the three 
petitioners were social workers and members of Kisan Adivasi 
Sangathan, Kesala', A school teacher was not attending the 
school for the last one and halt years. In spite of, several 
complaints lodg'ed against tne teacher, the authorities did 
not pay any attention in this regard. On July 27/28, 1988,the 
petitioner alongwith the large number of tribal women and 
children staged a peaceful "Dharna" in front of the officer 
of Block Education Officer, Kesala demanding appointment of 
two regular teachers in the schools located in the tribal 
hamlets. They were assured in writing that inquiries would 
be made and action would be taken. But to the petitioners 
dismay, they were charged for an offence punishable under 
section 188 IPC that they obstructed the public servants io dis-
charge of their public functions. 
The petitioners argued that they were working for 
the welfare of the weaker sections and downtrodden people in 
a peaceful manner but they were inhumanly treated against all 
norms of decency by the police in utter disregard of the 
repeated and consistant mandates of the Supreme Court and in 
utter violation of their Fundamental Rights guaranteed under 
Articles 14,19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 
In Prera Shanker Shukla, Krishna Iyer, J. speaking 
for himself and Chinappa Reddy, J. made the following 
observation (p. 537, para 22) s 
"Those who are inured to handcuffs and bar fetters 
on others may ignore this grievance, but the guarantee of 
human dignity, which forms part of our constitutional culture, 
and positive visions of Articles 14,19 and 21 spring into action 
when we realize that to manacle man is more than to mortify him; 
it is to dehumanize him and,therefore,to violate his very person-
hood, too often using,the mask of •dangerousness' and security" 
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In Kishor Singh , the question of putting fetters on 
prisoners was raised. The petitioners in the Central Jail 
Jaipur sent a telegram ito the Supreme Court praying that 
they be liberated from fetters in terms of the law 1 ^a down by 
the Supreme Coxort in Sunil Batra I. While /u-iQ >ofa'-.)Sttoil 
Batral Justice Krishna Iyer said: This court has frowned 
23 
upon handcuffs save in the rarest of rare cases where secu-
rity will be seriously Ijeopardised unless iron restraint is 
necessarily clamped on the prisoner ,,., Of course, we do 
not place any absolute ban but insist that only in extreme 
cases oi compelling necessity for security of other prisoners 
24 
or against escape can such fettering be resorted to". 
Reading incongruously old/ archaic/inhvimane and undemo-
cratic Prison Rules with Art. 21 of the Constitution Justice 
Krishna Iyer directed all the State Governraents in general 
and the Government of Hajasthan in particular to bring them 
in tune with the democratic temper of our constitution. The 
learned judge has further directed that the State Government 
s 
should convert the rulings of the Supreme Court laid down in 
25 26x, 27 
Sunil Batra 1/ Sunil Batra II/Rakesh Kaushik into Prisons 
Rules so as to improve Prison Administration. Emphasising 
the humanising aspect of Art.21 Justice Krishna Iyer observed; 
22. Kishor Singh v. State'of Ralasthan, AIR 1981 SC 625 
23. Kishor Si'SghT. . AIR 1981 SC 626 at p. 628 
24. Kishor Singh, AIR 1981 SC 626 at 630 
25. Sunil Batra , AIR 1978 SC 1675 
26. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Adminstration^ AIR 1980 SC 1579 
27. Rakesh Kaushik. 1980 SC C (Crj) R^A 
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"Human dignity is a dear value of our constitution 
not to be bartered away for mere apprehensions entertained 
by jail offici4is... After all, human rights are as much 
28 
cherished by the State as by the citizen". 
In «eltemasn itein, an advocate practicing in Delhi was 
arrested on the charge of a criminal offence and was taken 
to the Covirt of the metropolitan Magistrate at Delhi in 
handcuffs. 
In view of Prem Shanker Sukla, it was urged that the 
union government and Delhi Administration should have issued 
necessary instructions to. the police authorities with regard 
to the circumstances in which an accused, arrested in a cri-
minal case, could be handcuffed or fettered* 
The Attorney General of India, K. Farasaran fairly 
considered that it was for the union of India to issue neces-
sary instruction in this behalf to all the State Governments 
and tne Governments of Union Territories. 
Venkataramiah speaking for the court directed the 
union government to frame rules or guidelines as regards the 
circumstances in which handcuffing of the accused should be 
resorted to inconfirmity with the judgment of this court and 
to circulate them amongs the all StateGovernments and the 
Governments of the Union Territories, P. 1769. 
^®' j^s^o'^ Singh, AIR 1981 SC 626 at p. 630 
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The learned Judge has made his order time 
bound that is the Union Government shall freroe rules 
and guidelines regarding the use of handcuffing and 
bar~fetters with three months. 
In Bhim Singh# Chinappa Reddy# J, expected 
from police officers to have greatest regard for personal 
liberty of citizens and thus observed: 
" Police officers who are the custodian 
of law and order should have the 
greatest respect for the personal 
liberty of the citizens and should 
not flout the laws by stooping to 
such bizarre acts of lawlessness. 
Custodians of law and order should 
not become depredators of Civil 
liberties. Their duty is to protect 
and not to abduct." 
41 i) 
installation of High VolT^ aae live wire on the Jail Walls ^Article 21) 
1 
In Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik a group of three writ petitions 
was filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution in the Supreme Court. 
i.11 the petitioners sought the relief against the two things: 
vl) that the armed police guards posted around the jail should be 
removea ana, U) that the live wire electrical mechanism fixed 
on top of the jail wall should be dismantled. 
In dealing with the petitioners relief that the armed 
police guards posted around the jail should be removed. Chandra-
chud J. ( as he then was ) speaking for the court said: 
"Though,therefore, under our Constitution 
the right of personal liberty and some 
of the other fundamental freedoms are 
not to be totally denied to a convict 
during the period of incarceration, we 
are unable to appreciate that the peti-
tioners have been deprived of any of 
their fundamental rights by the posting 
of police guards immediately outside 
the jail".2 
In t h e sartie way t h e c o u r t has d e a l t wi th t h e l e g a l i t y 
of t he e r e c t i o n of high v o l t a g e l i v e w i r e s on t h e j a i l s , t he 
c o u r t , speaking through Chandrachud J . a f t e r d e t a i l i n g out t h e 
whole scheme of t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of t h e l i v e w i r e , upheld i t 
by saying t h a t "whatever be t h e n a t u r e and fextent of t h e p e t i -
t i o n e r s ' fundamental r i g h t t o l i f e and p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y , they 
nave no fundamental freedom t o escape from lawful cus tody . 
I . . a _ B h u v a n Mohan P a t n a i k v . S t a t e of A. P . I Q7a ^ o n . . 
2 . Supra n . l a t p . 2095 ~~ 
m 
rherefore, they can not complaint of the installation of 
the live wire mechanism with which they are likely to come 
3 
into contact only if they attempt to escape from the prison". 
The court justified the installation of a high 
voltage live-wire on the walls of the Jail on the grounds 
that the prisoners have neither constitutional nor legal 
rigats to escape fran the lawful custody. The state is cons-
titutionally obligated to take effective measures in order to 
ensure the safe custody of the prisoners and to prevent their 
escape from the prison. Further an electrician has been 
appointed to inspect the whole mechanism of live wire and to 
warn the prisoners about the dangerousness of mechanism. How-
ever, the court hinted on an idea that if action has been 
taken affecting the citizens fundamental rights is liable to 
be struck down if the action has been taken without the autho 
rity of law. In the instant case Chandrachud J, (as he then 
was) said: "The installation of the high voltage wires lacks 
a statutory basis and seems to have been devised on the 
strength of departmental instructions are neither 'law' 
within the meaning of Art. 13 (3) (a) nor are they 'procedure 
established by law' within the meaning of Article 21 of the 
Constitution". But the court has made it clear that "no 
person, not even a prisoner, can be deprived of his 'life 
•personal liberty' except according to procedure established 
by law". 
' or 
3. Supra n, l at P. 20 97 
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Though the court has dismissed the writ petitions 
yet it has certainly amplified the right to life and 
personal liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Constitution, 
The conclusion wnich comes out of it is that whatever is 
to be done to tae individual must be done in accordance 
with the procedure established by law. Secondly, the 
installation of live wire as a preventive measure, 
does not offend Art, 21 of the Constitution but must be done 
under the authority of law enacted by the legislature. The 
departmental instructions are neither 'law' under Art.13 (3) (a) 
nor 'procedure established by law under Art. 21 of the 
Constitution. 
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Dtj^j:H SENTENCE Ai\iJ T.xE K I G H T TO LIFi:; AND Pi:.RSQ:.AL LIBERTY; 
The p u r p o s e of t h i s p a r t i s n o t t o examine t h e 
r e a s o n s f o r t h e a b o l i t i o n and R e t e n t i o n of d e a t h s e n t e n c e 
b u t t h e p u r p o s e i s t o know w h e t h e r t h e c a p i t a l p u n i s h m e n t 
v i o l a t e s l i f e and p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y g u a r a n t e e d by A r t . 21 of 
o u r C o n s t i t u t x o n , The d e a t h s e n t e n c e p r e s c r i b e d by o ,302 
IPC h a s been c h a l l e n g e d i n a s e r i e s of c a s e s on t h e g round 
of A r t . 21 of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . L e t u s / t h e r e f o r e , s e e 
now f a r and i n wha t manner t h e Supreme C o u r t h a s d e a l t w i t h 
t h e i s s u e . I t i s t r u e t h a t t h e Supreme C o u r t h a s t h w a r t e d 
a l l t h e e f f o r t s made t o r e a d S. 302 IPC i n v i o l a t i o n of 
A r t . 21 of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , However , t h e Supreme C o u r t 
h a s d e f i n i t e l y r e f u s e d t o b r i n g t h e d e a t h s e n t e n c e w i t h i n 
t h e p r o h i b i t e d zone of A r t - 21 of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . 
L e t u s , t h e r e f o r e , s e e w h e t h e r d e a t h s e n t e n c e unde r 
S. 30 2 IPC v i o l a t e s A r t r 21 and i f n o t why. 
De l ay i n e x e c u t i o n of d e a t h p e n a l t y i s x in ju s t , u n f a i r 
and u n r e a s o n a b l e p r o c e d u r e p r e s c r i b e d by law w i t h i n t h e 
r i g h t t o l i f e and p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y u n d e r A r t . 21 of t h e 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . T h i s i s s u e was r a i s e d i n V a t h e e s w a r a n The 
p e t i t i o n e r was condemned t o d e a t h by t h e t r i a l c o u r t on 
2 0 . 1 2 . 1 9 7 6 who was t h e b r a i n b e h i n d t h e c o n s p i r a c y t o 
i m p e r s o n a t e Custom. O f f i c e r s p r e t e n d t o q u e s t i o n u n s u s p e c t i n g 
V i s i t o r s t o t h e c i t y of Madra s , a b d u c t them on t h e p r e t e x t of 
^' "''"' ^^^^^-^^^^^£^5 V. S t a t e J o O ^ i r NidII7-AlR 1983 SC 361 
iZ'i 
interrogating them, aaministerin^ sl.apln9 Fill= " the 
unsuspectia, victim, steal their cash ana jewels and 
finally murder them. He -as kept in remana for two 
years. The peititioner on the basis of Sueil_Batra 
Claimed that to taKe away his wife after keeping him in 
4*- id nni- lawful to hang a man. jail for two years or it is not iawrux 
Before Vateseewaran the Supreme Court in a number 
of cases the delay in the execution of death sentence or 
life imprisonment has been used to grant relief to the 
accused either by converting the death sentence into life 
imprisonment or by reducing the life imprisonment, in 
Pi^^e_Dusadh'the Federal Court took into consideration the 
Circumstances that the appellant had been awaiting the exe-
cution o. death sentence for over a year to alter the sen-
tence to one transportation for life. 
in Ediaa Anamma'Krishna Iyer and Sarkaria JJ observed: 
"the ^ rcoding horror of hanging which has been haunting the 
prisoner in her condemned cell for two years had "ameliorative 
impact" and was a factor of human significance in the sen-
tencing conduct". In Lalla oingh Gupta and Kailasam JJ 
while expressing their judicial affirmation in favour of 
death sentence upheld that the sessions Judge was perfectly 
in order in imposing the sentence of death. Both the 
learned judges thought that as the offences had been committed 
2. Piare Dusadh v. Emperor^ AIR 1944 FC 1. 
3. Ediga Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh,AIR 1974 SC 799 
«^ State of U.P. V. Lalla Singh, AIR 1978 SC 368 
aM 
more than six years ago* the ends of justice did not 
require the death sentence to be confirmed. In Bhaqwan 
Bux aingh the sentence of death was committed to imprison-
ment for life by Murtaza Fazal Ali and Kailasam JJ having 
particular regard to the fact that the sentence of death 
had been imposed more than two and a half Jrears ago. In 
6 
Sadhu Singh Sarkaria and Chinnappa Reddy JJ, took into 
account the circumstances that the appellant was under 
spectre of the sentence of death for over three years and 
seven months to alter the sentence of death to one of 
7 
imprisonment for life. In Sahai Fazal Ali, Banarul Islam 
and Varadarajan JJ while holding that the murders were 
extremely gruesome, brutal and dastardly, nonetheless dec-
lined to pass the sentence of death on the ground that more 
than eignt years had elapsed since the occurrence. 
Taking inspiration and support from Ediga Anamma» 
Lalla oinqh, Bhagwan Bxxx Singh, Sadhu Singh and Sahai 
Justice Chinnappa Reddy brought the delay in execution of 
death convict within the expanded contours of personal 
liberty Under Art. 21 of the Constitution. The learned Judge 
observed: 
5. Bhagwan Bux Singh v. State of U.P.. AIR 1978 SC 34 
6. sadhu Sinqh V. state of U.P.. AIR 1978 SC 2506 
7. State of U.P,. V. Sahai, AIR 1981 S.C. 1442 
4r.i 
" Prison walls do not keep out Fundamental Rights, 
A person under sentence of death may also claim Fundamental 
Rights. TheFiat of Article 21, as «xplained is that any 
procedure which deprives a person of his"life or liberty 
must be just, fair and reasonable. Just , fair and rea-
sonable proced\ire implies a right to legal services where 
he cannot avail thera. It implies a right to speedy trial. 
It implies humane conditions of detention, prevent!vp or 
punitive. Procedure established by law does not end with 
the pronouncement of sentence; it includes the carrying 
out of sentence. That is as far as we have gone so far. 
It seems to us but a short step, but a step in right direc-
tion, to hold that prolonged detention to await the execu-
tion of sentence of death is an unjust , unfair and unrea-
sonable procedure and the only way to undo the wrong is to 
8 
quash the sentence of death," 
While dealing with the issue as to what may be con-
sidered prolonged delay so as to attract the constitutional 
provisions of Art. 21 against the execution of a sentence 
of death. Justice Chinnappa Reddy described it as a " tick 
question", then proceeded to lay down the law in this 
regard as follows: 
"We think that delay exceeding two years in the 
execution of a sentence of death should be considered suf-
ficient to entitle the person under sentence of death to 
invoke Art,21 and demand the quashing of the sentence of 
e.-i^ aliiae^ Maiian, AIR 1983 SC 361 at p.~366 
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death". Thereu^ o^n the learned judge substituted the 
sentence of imprisonment for life in place of the sentence 
of death. 
What can be deduced from Chinnappa Reddy's judgement 
in Vatheeswaran is that the speedy trial is implicit in 
the right to trial which has been held as part of the right 
to life and personal liberty guaranteed by '^urt. 21 of the 
Constitution. The right to speedy trial does not merely 
mean the trial of the case or does not end. as Justice 
Chinnappa Reddy said, with the pronouncement of sentence, 
it includes the execution of sentence. Therefore, the unjust, 
unfair and unreasonable dehumanising delay in the execution 
of the sentence of death offends the convict's life and 
personal liberty under Art. 21 of the Constitution. 
IC 
In Vatheeswaran Justice Chinnappa Reddy's holding 
that delay exceeding two years in the execution of the sen-
tence of death has been overruled by the three Judge Cons-
11 
titutional Bench of the Supreme Court in Sher Singh. 
^'^ Sher Singh the petitioners, Sher Singh, Surjit Singh 
and Kuldeep Singh were convicted under S. 30 2 IPC read with 
S, 34 IPC and were sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge, 
sangrur on Nov, 26 , 1977, The riigh Court of Punjab and 
riaryana reduced the sentence and imposed on Kuldip Singh to 
"91 Vatheeswaran, AIR 1983 SC 361 at p. 367 
0^» T.V. Vatheeswaran v. state of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1983 sc 361 
11, Sher Singh v. State of Pum'ab, AIR 1983, SC 465 
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life imprisonment and confirmed the death sentence imposed 
on Sher Singh and Siorjit Singh on July 14, 1978, The ques-
tion which came up before the court for its consideration 
was whether a delay exceeding two years in the execution 
of a sentence of death must be considered sufficient for 
setting aside that sentence? This was the law laid down in 
Vatheeswaran by Justice Chinnappa Recidy on February 16, 1983. 
The question which arose for determination in Vatheeswaran 
was formulated by Chinnappa Reddy, J., who spoke for the 
court rvins as follows: 
But the question is whether in a case where after 
the sentence ot death is given, the accused person is made 
to undergo inhuman and degrading punisnment or .here the 
execution of the sentence is endlessly delayed and the 
accused is made to suffer the most excruciating agony and 
anguish, is it not open to a court of appeal or a court 
exercising writ jurisdiction, in an appropriate proceeding, 
to take note of the circumstance when it is brought to its 
notice and give relief where necessary? 
Courts are never powerless to do justice, that is to 
say, to ensure that the processes of law do not result in 
undue misery, suffering or hardship. Thus, even after the 
fin.l confirmation of death sentence, justified when imposed 
Its execution , m the circwnstances of the case, is not 
justified by reason of the unduly long time which has elapsed 
m 
since the confirmation of that sentence by the Supreme 
Court, In such situations and in appropriate cases the 
death sentence has been substituted by the life imprison-
ment by reason of supervening circumstances, Chandrachud 
C.J, has agreed with the minority view expressed by Lord 
12 
Scarman and Lord Brightman in Noel Riley, Thereupon Chandra-
chud C.J, proceeded to state the court's agreement with 
the basic and broad issue decided by Justice Cljinnappa Red^y 
in Vatheeswaran in the following words* 
" rt prisoner who has experienced living death for 
years on end is* therefore, entitled to invoke the juris-
diction of this court for examining the question whether 
after all the agony and torment he has been subjected to, 
it is just and fair to allow the sentence of death to be 
executed. That is the true implication of Art, 21 of the 
Constitution and to the extent, we express our broad and 
respectful agreement with our learned Brethern in their 
visualization of the meaning of that article. The horizons 
of rvTt, 21 are ever widening and the final word on its corrvs 
pectus shall never have been said. So long as life lasts, 
so long shall it be the duty and endeavour of this court to 
give to the provisions of our constitution a meaning which 
will prevent human suffering and degradation. Therefore, 
Art. 21 is as much relevant at the stage of execution of the 
12. Moel Kiley v. Attorney General. 1982 Cr.Law Review 679 
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death sentence as it is in the interregnum between the 
imposition of that sentence and its execution. The essence 
of the matter is that all procedure, no matter what the 
stage, must be fair, just and reasonable. It is well esta-
blished that a prisoner cannot be tortured or subjected to 
unfair or inhuman treatment. It is a logical extension of 
the self-same principle that the death sentence, even if 
justifiably imposed, cannot be executed if supervening evefits 
make its execution harsh, unjust and unfair, i\rt, 21 stands 
like a sentinal over human raisery, degradation and oppression. 
Its voice is the voice of justice and fair play. That voice 
can never be silenced on the ground that the time to heed to 
its imperatives is long since past in the story of a trial. 
It reverberates through all stages - the trial, the sentence, 
13 the incarceration and finally, the execution of the sentence". 
While expressing his respectful disagreement with 
Justice Chinnappa Reddy's rule that "delay exceeding two years 
in the execution of a sentence of death should be considered 
sufficient to entitle the person under sentence of death to 
invoke Art. 21 and demand the quashing of the sentence of 
death" laid down in Vatheeawaran, Chandrachud G.J. proceeded 
to record reasons for his disagreement. The learned Chief 
Justice saids 
One has only to turn to the statistics of the disposal 
Of cases in the High Court and the Supreme Court to appreciate 
13. ^ner •^ingh, AIR iy83 3C 465 at ^P. 2170-471 
an 
that a period far exceeding two years is generally taken 
by those courts together for the disposal of matters 
involving even the death sentence. Very often, four or 
five years elapse between the imposition of death sentence 
by the sessions court and the disposal of Special Leave 
Petition or an Appeal by the Supreme Court in. .that matter, 
rhis is apart from the time which tne President or the 
Governor, as the case may be, takes to consider petitions 
filed under Article 72 or Article 161 of the Constitution 
or the time which the Government takes to dispose of appli-
cations filed under sections 432 and 433 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. It has been the sad experience of this 
that no priority whatsoever is given by the Government of 
India to the disposal of petitions filed to the President 
under Art. 72 of the Constitution. Frequent reminders are 
issued by this court for an expeditious disposal of such 
petitions but even then the petitions remain \indisposed of 
for a long time. Seeing the petition for reprieve on commu-
tation is not being attended to and no reason is forthcoming 
as to why the delay is caused, this court is driven to com-
mute the death sentence into life imprisonment out of a sheer 
sense of helplessness and frustration. Therefore, with 
respect, the fixation of the time limit of two years does not 
seem to us to accord with the common experience of the time 
normally consumed by the litigative process and the proceedings 
before the executive. 
14. Sher Singn, ^IR 1983 SC 465 at p. 471 
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While saying that death sentence should not* as 
far as possible/ be imposed but in the rare and exceptional 
class of cases wnere in the sentence is upheld/ Chandrachud 
G,J. said that the judgement or order of this court ought 
not to be allowed to be defeated by applying any rule of 
thumb. The learned Chief Justice speaking for the court 
stated: 
There are several other factors which must be taken 
into account while consiaering the question as to whether 
the death sentence should be vacated. A convict is undoub-
tedly entitled to pxxrsue a n remedies lawfully open to him 
to get rid of the sentence of death imposed upon him and 
indeed, there is no one/ be he blind/ lame, starving or 
suffering from a terminal illness/ who does not want to 
live.,.. Therefore/ it is understandable that a convict 
sentenced to death will take recourse to every remedy which 
is available to him under the law, to ask for the comjiiuta-
tion of his sentence, even after the death sentence/ is 
finally confirmed by this court, by dismissing his Special 
Leave Petition or Appeal, But/ it is/ at least/ relevant 
to consider whether the delay in the execution of the 
death is attributable to the fact that he has resorted to 
a series of untenable proceedings which have the effect of 
defeating the ends of justice. It is not uncommon that a 
series of review petitions and writ petitions are filed in 
this court to challenge judgements and orders which have 
432 
assumed finality* without any seeming justification stay 
orders are obtained in those proceedings and then, at end 
of it all, comes the argiiraent that there has been prolonged 
delay in implementing the judgment or order. We believe that 
the coiart called upon to vacate a death sentence on the 
ground of delay caused in executing that sentence must find 
why . delay was caused and who is responsible for it. If 
this is not done, the law laid down by this court will becane 
an object of ridicule bypermitting a person to defeat it by 
resorting to frivolous proceeding in order to delay its 
implementation. And then the rule of two years will become 
a handy tool for defeating justice. The death sentence shovad 
not, as far as possible,be imposed. But, in that rare and 
exceptional class of cases wherein that sentence is upheld 
by this court, the judgement or order of this court ought not 
to be allowed to be defeated by applying any rule of thumb. 
Finally, and that is no less important, the nature 
of the offence, the diverse circumstances attendant upon it, 
it is impact upon the contemporary society and the question 
whether the motivatloiP'and pattern of.^ the crime are such as 
are likely to lead to its repitition, if the death sentence 
is vacated, are matters which must enter -Anto the verdict 
as to whether the sentence should be vacated for the reason 
that its execution is delayed. The substitution of the death 
sentence by a sentence of life imprisonment can not follow 
by the application of the two years formula, as a matter of 
"quot irrat demonstradxim", ^ ^ 
15. sher jingh, AIH, 1983 C 465 at p. 472 
in 
Ghandrachud C.J. has not in the last hesitater to 
suggest that "self imposed rule should be followed by the 
executive authorities rigorously/ that every such petition 
shall be disposed of within a period of three months from the 
date on which it is recieved. Long and interminable delays 
in the disposal of these petitions are a serious hurdle in 
the dispensation of justice and indeed, such delays tend to 
shake the confidence of the people in the very system of 
. .. 16 Justice", 
Thus these two judgements have made the speedy trial 
under Art. 21 of the constitution to cover all matters Incon-
nection with pretrial, during and after trial of a criminal 
case:- The speeay trial and expeditious trial does not only 
mean the ending of the trial but it also mean the execution 
of the sentence of an accused. Therefore Sher Singh has not 
only reaffirmed Vatheeswaran but has certainly made an advance-
ment from whftt has been said in Vatheeswaran. Ghandrachud C,J. 
in Sher Singh has -r-- rightly disagreed with the Justice Chinappa 
Reddy's rule of "delay exeeding two years in the execution of 
a sentence of death. The reasons given in support of the dis-
agreement are reasonable, justified and logical. If the hard 
and fast rule of two years delay is accepted, then the Judicial 
process would be treated as an instrument of defeating the 
justice. Therefore the chief justice was right in saying 
chat "the rule of two years willbecome a nandy tool for defeat-
ing justice". Similarly he was right xn reiterating the judicial 
16. Sher Singh , AIR 1983 5 G 465 at P. 473. 
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view that the death sentence should not, as far as possible, 
be imposed. But should be imposed, as has been said, in 
the "rarest;;of rare cases". Therefore the chief justice has 
in keeping the dignity and authorityJ.of the judiciary, autho-
ritatively said that "Once the sentence is upheld by this 
court, the Judgmenet or order of this court not to be allowed 
to be defeated by applying any rule of thumb". To minimise, 
if not elixninate the delay, tne court speaking. Through its 
chief justice Chandrachud, has made the right to speedy 
trial a bulwork by suggesting that the executive on its own 
should dispose of the petition fijjed under .articles 72, and 
161 of the constitution under sections 432 and 433 within 
"a period of three months" from the date of its receipt. 
Holding the speedy trial as part of the right of life and 
personal liberty guaranteed by /urt. 21 of the Constitution, 
the delay in execution of death sentence except according to 
reasonable fair and Just procedure established by Law would 
be destructive of the right itself. Now the delay in execu-
tion of the sentence of death therefore is nothing but inhuman 
and degrading. It is the non-execution of the death sentence 
with just, fair and reasonable procedure prescribed by law 
is violative of the right to live with human dignity as held 
^" ^^ancies coralietnullin. it is well established that the 
right to life and personal liberty under Art. 21 operates 
both outside and inside the j_xi as Justice Chinappa Reddy 
said "prisons walls do not keep out Fundamental Rights." 
43^ 
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In Mithu the question which arose for consideration 
was whether section 303 of the Indian Penal Code infringes 
the guaranteed contained in article 21 of the constitution. 
The court has in dealing with this question, deilt 
with the purpose behind its enactment and the efforts made 
in the post-independant India to delete the old, abnexious 
and draconian law. There are two provisions in theilndian 
Penal Code prescribe death sentence for the murder which are 
sections 302 and 303, But in the S, 30 2 IPC life imprison-
ment and the death sentence is the maximum, The life impri-
sonment is the rule and the death sentence is an exception, 
Further the judge has an alternative to impose death sentence 
and that too after hearing arguments as to whether the death 
sentence should or should not be imposed upon the accused. 
Under 3, 30 3 IPC the sentence of death is the rule and the 
maximum. The judge has no option except to impose the death 
sentence. Regarding hearing about the death sentence it is 
enough to say that it is only a formality. The section 30 3 
IPC therefore takes away the discretion of the Court to 
impose a lessor sentence and makes the sentence of death 
mandatory. 
The legislative purpose of S. 30 3 IPC was that the 
life imprisonment was not sufficient to act as a deterrent 
and the convict was hardened enough to commit a murder while 
17. Mithu^v. state of' Punjab.Aik i4«:i ^ Al^ 
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serving that sentence,the only punishment which he there-
fore deserved was death. The severity of this legislative 
judgement accorded with the deterrent and retributive 
theories of punishment which then held sway. The reformative 
theory of punishment did not have role to play when the Cr. 
P.C. was enacted. The purpose with which S. 303 lEC enacted 
was to prevent assaults by the indigenous breed upto the 
wni e officers. Because in those days, jail oxficials were 
foreigners, mostly English man, and,alongwith other provisioos 
which were specifically designed for the members of the ruling 
class. In its 42nd Report 11971) the law commission of 
India has observed in para 16.17 That "the primary object of 
making the death sentence mandatary for an offence under 
this section seems to be to give protection to tne prison 
staff."^® 19 
The argument advanced to attack on S. 30 3 IPC was 
that it was wholly unreasonable and arbitrary and thereby, it 
violated Art. 21 of the Constitution. Since the procedure 
by which S. 303 IPC authorised to deprivation of life was 
unfair and unjust, the section was unconstitutional and thus 
should be struck down which the supreme court did it. The 
Supreme Court has inter alia formulated certain issues; Is 
a law which provides for the sentence of death for the offence 
of raxirder, without affording to the accused an apportunity to 
18. s. 30 2 IPC Punishment for murder - "whoever commits murder 
shall be pxxnished with death, or imprisonment for life, 
and shall also be liable to fine'*, 
19. 3. 30 3 IPC Punishment for murder by life convict - "who-
ever, being under sentence of imprisonment for life, 
commits murder, shall be punished with death". 
«7 
show cause why that sentence should not be imposed, just 
and fair? Secondly* is such a law just and fair if, in 
the very nature of things* it does not require the 
court to state the reasons why the Supreme penalty is 
called for ? Is not it arbitrary to provide that what-
ever may be the circumstances in which the offence of 
murder was cOTvnitted, the sentence of death shall be 
20 
imposed upon the accused? 
Explaining the role of motives whicn undoubtedly 
motivates a man to commit a murder, Chandrachud, C,J, said: 
"In a given case the motive which operates on the mind 
of the offender is not known or is difficult to discover. 
But, by and large, murders are committed for any one or 
more of a variety of motives which operate on the mind of 
the offender, whether he is under a sentence of life 
imprisonment or not. Such motives are too numerous and 
varied to Enumerate but hate» lust, sex,jealousy, gain, 
revenge and a host of weaknesses to which numan flesh is 
21 
subject are common motives for the generality of murders." 
Keeping the aim and object of S. 303 IPC in view the 
learned chief justice Illustrated two problems by projecting 
the two life convicts in which murders are committed by 
life convicts within jail and murders which are committed 
by lif^ convicts within jail and murders-which are committed 
by life, convicts: outside the jail, while they are on parile 
2 i.t\ 
or. -baii. The court illustrated and observed. 
20. 42nd Report Law commission of India(1971)at P. 239 
21. Hithu , AIR, 1983 SC 473 at p. 478. 
2i^. Ibid. 
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Indeed* a crime cowwi^t^d by a convict within the jail 
while he is vmder the sentence of life imprisonment* may. 
in certain circumstances* demand and deserve greater consi-
deration understanding and sympathy than the original 
offence for which be was sentenced to life imprisonment. A 
life convict may be driven to retaliate against his systematic 
harassment by a Warder who habitually tortures* st^ ^^ res* and 
humaliates him. If the act so results in the death of a 
warder* tne crime may not amount to mxirder because none of 
the exceptions mentioned in j. 300 may apply. The question 
whether it is reasonably provide that a life convict who 
has committed the offence of a murder in these circumstances 
must necessarily be sentenced to death and an apportunity 
denied to him to explain why the death sentence should not 
be imposed upon him >i life convict may be provcbked 
gravely but not suddenly * or suddenly but not gravely enough* 
by an insinuation made against his wife's chastity by another 
inmate of the Jail. If he commits the murder of the insinuation 
the only sentence which can be imposeci upon him under S. 30 3 
is the sentence of death. The question is* whether it is 
reasonable to deprive such a person* because he under a 
sentence of life imprisonment when he committed the offence 
of murder* from an opportunity to satisfy the court that he 
acted under the pressure of a grave insult to .his wife and should 
not therefore.-be sentenced to death. 
a:jsi 
The other class of cases in which, the offence 
of murder is committed by a life convict while he is on 
parole or bail may now be taken up for consideration. 
A life convict who is released on parole or bail may dis-
cover that taking undue advantage of his absence a neigh-
bour has established illicit intimacy with his wife. If he 
finds theiia in an amorous position and shoots the seducer on 
the spot , he may stand a fair chance of escaping from the 
charge of murder, since the provocation is both grave and 
sudden. But if,on seeing his wife in the act of adultery he 
leaves the house, goes to a shop, procures a weapon and returns 
to kill her paramour, there would be evidence of what is 
22 
called mens rea, the intention to kill". 
Noting the nature of 3. 303 IPC Chandrachud C.J,said: 
Equity and good conscience are the hall marks of 
Justice. The mandatory sentence of death prescribed by S,303, 
with no discretion left to the court to have regard to the 
circxjmstances which led to the commission of the crime is a 
relic of ancient history. In tne times in which we live, that 
is the lawless law of military regime, V/e, the people of 
India, are pledged to a different set of values. For us,law 
ceases to have respect and relevance when it compels the dis-
pensers of justice to deliver blind verdicts by decreeing that 
no matter toat the circumstances of the crime,the criminal 
shall be hanged by the neck until he is dead ". ^"^  
22, Mithu, AIR 1983 SC 473 at p. 478 
23. Mithu, AIR 1983 SC 473 at P. 479 
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Having dealt with the reasons against the con-
tinuance of 3, 303 in the IPC elaborately Chandrachud C.J. 
discussed the steps taken by the Government to delete it 
from the IPC. In its 3b the Report on capital punishment 
the law commission considered in paragraphs 587-591 the 
question of prescribing a lesser sentence for the offences 
under sections 302 and 303 of the IPC. The commission 
at one stage was of the view tnat the section should be 
amended so as to limit its applicatioti to cassis in which 
a person sentenced to life iii.prisonment for the offence of 
murder commits again a murder but the law connmission in 
para 591 of the 42nd Report 1967 pressed its unwillingness 
against the amendment of 5. 30 3 IPC. 
In its forty second report on the Indian Penal 
Code published in June / 1971 considered S. 30 3 IPC in 
June 1971 and found it that the section be am^ded. Ulti-
mately the law commission did not recommend any change 
since it is "very rarely applied". There upon the 
Government introduced an Amendment Bill on December 11/ 
1972 in the riajya Sabha but the Bill was referred to the 
Joint Committee of the Parliament which held 97 sittings. 
The Committee suggested a new clause 125 in the Bill for 
ommitting s. 30 3 IPC . The report of the Joint Committee 
was presented to the Rajya Sabha on January 29, 1976 and 
thus the Indian Penal Code /Amendment) BilltxLII-B) of 1972 
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was introduced. But what was proposed by the parliament 
was disposed by the ballot box. Soon after the mid-term 
poll the bill was never reviewed. The only snage in the 
passing of the Bill has been that it was reviired and put 
to vote, section 30 3 was destinied to die at the hand of 
the court. On a consideration of the various circumstances, 
Chandrachud C.J, delivering tne court's opinion held* we are 
of the opinion that section 303 of the Penal Code violates 
the guarantee of equality contained in AXticle 14 as also 
the tight conferred by Art, 21 of the Constitution. 
Justice Chinnappa Reddy concurring with his lord the 
Chief Justice of India described the section 30 3 of the Penal 
Code as follows: 
"Section 303 Indian Penal Code, is an anachronism. It 
is out of time with the March of the times. It is out of 
time with the rising tide of human consciousness. It is out 
of tune with the philosophy of an enlightened constitution 
like ours. It particularly offends Art. 21 and the new juris-
prudence which has sprung.around it ever since the Bank 
M»tionalization case freed it from the con-^ ines of Gopalan",^'^ 
25 
In i^ ilip i<um°r Sha^ma' the same jud-icial tun» Justice 
Sarkaria, in hi- concurrina ludomont des-^ ribed the vast sweep 
of 303 H<: by saying tnaf'the section is Draconian in severty, 
relentness and inexorable in operation". 
24. i-.lthu , AIR 1983 SC 473 at P. 483 
^^* i^-lJ-P Kumar Sharma v. State of .LP-^AIR 1976, SC 133 
4 4 2 
The Supreme Court deserves credit for having done 
commendable judicious service by obliterating the draconian/ 
anachronistic and colonial law from the Penal code. It is 
true that S. 30 3 of the Penal Code goes against the demo-
cratic temper based on rule of law and natural justice. The 
Supreme Court has done what the parliament has failed to do. 
It has been, rightly remarked by the Chief Justice "what was 
proposed by the Parliament was disposed of by the ballot box" 
but the supreme court came in rescue of both the Parliament 
and the Executive by striking down the past legacy of the 
British Raj, 
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HANGING CONVICT BY ^ OPE - IF VIOLATIVE Of ARTICLE 21 Of THE 
CONSTITUTION; 
Yet another attempt has been made in the instant 
case to get S, 302 IPC prescribing death sentence declared 
unconstitutional under Art. 21 of the Constitution. However 
this time the abolitionists have mounted an attack on S.354C4) 
of the code of criminal procedure which prescribes the mode 
of execution of the death sentence. When the attack on S.30 2 
IPC was judicially failed in Bachan Slnqn in which the 
Supreme Court speaking through Justice Sarkaria ruled that 
the normal sentence for murder is life imprisonment and that 
the sentence of death can be imposed in a very exceptional 
class of cases described as 'The ratoBst of rare cases', the 
abolitionists concentrated their efforts on the mode of 
execution of the death sentence prescribed in S.364(4) of 
Cr.p.C. 
1 
In Deena a futile attempt was aiade to persuade the 
court to strike down the death penalty unconstitutional in 
view of Art. 21 of our constitution. But the anomaly of the 
case expressed by the Chief Justice Chandrachud who delivered 
the judgment said"If we were to accept the argument of Shri 
Garg, the imposition of death sentence would become an exer-
cise in futility. Pass the sentence of death if you may but, 
it shall not be executed in any manner under any circumstances. 
1. Deena v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1155 
4 4 4 
A constitution so carefully conceived as ours cannot 
2 
be construed to produce such a startling result". 
In the light of this observation made by the Chief 
Justice let us see why he had upheld the execution of 
3 
death sentence under S. 354 Cr.P.C, 
i^r. K,K. Garg* the learned counsel for the peti-
tioner xirged that even if it may be lawful to impose'the 
death sentence in an exceptional class of cases, it is 
impermissible to execute that sentence even in those cases, 
since it is inhuman and cruel to take human life under any 
circumstances, even under a decree of a coxirt. That is the 
fvmdamental premise of the petitioner•s contention. It was 
urged that the method prescribed by Section 354(5) of the 
code for executing the death sentence is inhuman, barbarous, 
and degrading and therefore that method can not be employed 
for executing the death sentence. It was urged that it is 
the constitutional obligation of the State to provide for 
a humane and dignified mode of executing the death sentence, 
which will not involve torture or cruelty of any kind. It 
was argued that if the State failed to discharge that obli-
gation, no death sentence could be executed,howsoever justi-
fiably might have been imposea. The code of criminal pro-
cedure prescribed only one method of executing the death 
sentence namely, by hanging and if that method violated the 
mandate of Art. 21, the sentence, might remain unexecuted, 
'^•..^ '^ ''^ ^^ ""'^ ^^ S) of the Code of criminal Procedure provides; 
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since the court could not substitute any other method of 
execution for the only method prescribed and envisaged by 
lavj. Finally it was argued that the burden was on the State 
to prove that the methods of execution of the death sentence 
prescribed by o. 354 (5) of the code was a humane and civilised 
method and that it did not involve pain, cruelty or degradation 
of any kind. This was just and fair always fell on the State. 
Therefore, it was not for the petitioners to show that any 
other methods of executing the death sentence would be less 
painful, cruel or degrading. 
Before embarking ypon the determination of^these issues 
4nvoXy«d in the instant petitions Ghandrachud C.J. speaking 
for the court made some remarks at the outset: 
These arauments require carefu.1 consideration, un-
influenced by the circumstances that the demand by those who have 
been find guilty of subjecting their victims of uncivilised 
and inhumane acts involving great torture and suffering". The 
reason given in support of his view is that "we are concerned 
to ensure due compliance with constitutional mandates this is 
why beca.use the learned Chief Justice said "Justice has to be 
done dispassionately in accordance with the constitutiOinal 
attitudes whether it is a murderer or a smuggler who asks for 
it. Law can not demand its pond of flesh."* 
The learned solicitor general has raised a preliminary 
Objection on the ground that the question which is sought to be 
argued by the petitioners is concluded by the judgement ren-
dered by a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in 
4. ^eena v. Union of India, AIK, 1983 3 3C 1155 at p. 1163 
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Bachan Singh , I t i s urged that since the question i s not 
resintegra , i t i s not open to the pet i t ioners to ra ise it* 
nor indeed any reason or jus t i f i ca t ion for the court to 
entertain i t . Learned counsel for the pe t i t ioners led by 
i^ ir. ii.K. Garg, answered th i s objection by contending that 
the only question which arose in Bachan Singh was whether 
i t i s const i tut ional ly permissible to prescribed the sentence 
of death. Therefore Mr, Garg urged that the question as 
regards the va l id i ty of section 354(5) of the code of Criminal 
Procedxare was neither argued in Bachan Singh nor considered 
by the coxort while describing the Solicitor General's objection 
substantial ly tenable Chandrachud CJ did not accept i t . In 
Bachan Singh , the intention of the arguments advanced and 
sxobstantially adopted by the Aboli t ionists was that execution 
by whatever means and for whatever offence i s cruel/ inhuman 
and degrading punishment by which i s obviously meant 'execution 
of death sentence*. While considering the issue whether the 
impugned l imi t of the provision in S.302 Penal Code* Contravens 
Art. 21 of the Constitution Jus t ice Sarkaria* who spoke for 
the Court concludes; 
Under the successive Criminal Procedure Codes 
which have been in force for about 100 years 
a sentence of death i s to be carried out by 
hanging, in view of the aforesaid const i tu-
t ional postulates by no stretch of imagination 
can i t be said that death penalty under s,302 
Penal Code, ei ther per se or because of i t s 
S S S r i ? " ^^ hanging const i tutes an. unreasonable, 
cruel or unusual punishment. By reason of the 
same consti tut ional p a s t u l a t e s / i t cannot b r L i d 
44'i 
that the framers of the constitution 
considered death sentence for mvirder 
or the prescribed traditional mode of 
its execution as a degrading punishment 
which would defile the "dignity of the 
individual" within the contemplation of 
the preamble to the Constitution",5 
Justice Bh.agwati dissenting from the majority consi-
dered the question of. the constitutional validity of 
the death sentence* both from the substantive and the procedural 
points of view the learned judge remarked that "the worst time 
for most of the condemned prisioners would be the last few 
hours when all certainty is gone and the moment of death is 
6 known. 
After extracting the quotations frc* Destoyevsky's 
traumatic experiences Justice Bhagwati observed: There can be 
no stronger words to describe the utter di.sparity and inhumanity 
of death sentence* After making this observations Bhagwati J. 
proceeds thus: 
"The physical pain and suffering which 
the execution of the sentence of death 
involve is also no less cruel and inhuman. 
In India, the method of execution followed 
is hanging by the rope. Electrocution or 
application of lethal gas has not yet taken 
its place as in some of the Western coun-
tries. It is therefore with reference to 
execution by hanging that I must consider 
whether the sentence of death is barbaric 
and inhuman as entailing physical pain and 
agony. It is no doubt true that the Royal 
Commission on capital Punishment 1949-53 
found that hanging is the most humane method 
of execution and so also in Ichikawa V. Japan 
(wide David Panmick on "Judicial Review of 
death penalty (p.73) the Japanese Supreme Court 
5. Bachan oingh v. State of Punjab,AIR 1980 998 at p. 930 
6. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab,AIR 1982 SC 1335 at p. 1346 
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held that execution by hanging does not 
corrosuondent to cruel punishment innibited 
by Art, 36 of the Japanese Constitution, 
But whether amongst all the methods of 
execution,hanging is the most humane or in 
the view of the Japanese Supreme Court 
hanging is not cruel punishment within 
the meaning of Art. 36 one thing is clear 
that hanging is undoubtedly accompanied by 
intense physical torture and pain",7 
Thereafter Justice Bhagwatf quoted the 
description of hanging given by Warden Duffy 
of San Quentin* a high security prison in 
<<nerica with brutal frankness in lurid details 
and then concluded that "the execution of 
sentence of death by hanging does involve 
intense physical pain and suffering through 
it may be regarded by some as more humane 
then electrocution or amplication of lethal gas."8 
Both the majority and minority in Bachan Singh 
have considered the question of the validity of death sentence 
both from the substantive and procedural points of view. But 
the validity of the execution of death sentence by hangiijg by 
rope provided in S. 354(5) Cr.P. was neither raised squarely 
by the petitioners in Bachan Singh nor considered by the 
Supreine Court. Thejrefore the Supreme Court speaking through 
Chandrachud C,J, did not accept tne preliminary objection 
raised in Deena on the ground that the constitutional validity 
of hanging by rope under S. 354 (5) Criminal Procedure was 
not directly and sxibstantially in issue in Bachan Singh. The 
majority view of the court holding the death sentence cons-
titutionally valid touched the mode of execution of death 
sentence incidently not directly and substantially in Bachan 
ginqh , 
7. Sachdn Singh , AIH 1982 SC 1335 at P. 1346 
8. Bachan Singh. AIR 1982 SC 1335 at p. 1347 
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^t ter having exhaustively quoted 3arkaria,J . and 
Just ice Bhagwati's observations regarding the mode of 
execution of death sentence in Bachan Singh , Chandrachud 
C.J. proceeded to say. "The question which the pet i t ioners 
have raised in these writ pe t i t ions i s important not only 
trom the legal and consti tutional j-,oint of view. I t will 
not be proper to side-track that question and refuse to 
examine i t fully because of tne incidental consideration 
which i t received in Bacha" Singh.^fter naving heard the 
a*^auments» Chandrachud^ C.J. observed "in a 
aemocratic s'^cietv leaislatures#not courts are constituted 
to respond to the moral values of the people. But the 
function of the leqialature ends with providing what i t 
considers to be the best method of executing the death 
sentence. "But asserting the ludicial power said Chandra-
chud CJ where tne function of the le^ls"'ature ends, the 
function of the iudiciarv begins. I t i s for the courts to 
decide upon the const i tu t ional i ty of thejn the method pres-
cribed bv the le- ' i s la ture for impleme'^tinq or executinq a 
sentence. ..hether that method confers to the dic ta tes of 
the consti tution i s a ma-»-ter not on"'v s"bject t^ judicial 
ieview but i t const i tutes a legitimate pa'-t of the ludicial 
function, we respect the judgment of the people's represen-
ta t ive to be extent, but only to the ext*»nt that as a matter 
of policy thev considered thai- the methoa of hangina provided 
by sec. 354(5) of the code i s the l eas t objectionable method 
fo. executing th« death sentence. But wha^  tne policy 
4:in 
iudgments of the legislatxire leaves outstanding for the 
court's consideration is the question whetner the parti-
cular method prescribed by law for executing the death 
sentence is in consonanc* with the constitution. Our 
task will end with pointing out why, if at all the method 
at present provided by law is contrary to the mandate of 
the constitution even if it be less objectionable than 
any other commonly accepted method of executing the death 
sentence. We will not legislate by directing that since, 
if at all the provision contained in S.3B4 (5) is unconsti-
tutional the death sentence imposed upon the petitioner 
shall be executed by the method of electrocution or gas 
chamber or lethal injection or shooting guillotive and the 
like. Nor can we direct as convassed by Shri Khurshid that 
the petitioners be temporarily blinded. That would be 
legislating. To pronounce upon the constitutionality of a 
law is not legislating if such pronouncement involves the 
9 
consideration of the involving standards of the society". 
Having given the most anxious consideration to the 
question Chandrachud CJ come to the conclusion that "the 
latate has discharged the heavy buraen which lies upon it 
to prove that the method of hanging prescribed by iec.354^5) 
of the code of criminal procedxire does not violate the 
guarantee contained in Article 21 of the Constitution. The 
material before us shows that the system of hanging which is 
9. Deena v. Union of India, AIR 1983 3C 1155 at P, 1173-74 
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now in vouge consists of a mechanism which is preliminary 
to the act of hanging are quick and simple and they are 
free from anything that would unnecessarily sharpen the 
poignancy of the prisoner's apprehensions. The chances 
of an accident during the course of hanging can safely 
be excluded. The method is quick and certain means of 
executing the extreme penalty of law. It eliminate the 
possibility of a lingering death, unconsciousness super-
vens almost instantly after the process is set in motion 
and the death of the prisoner follows as a result of the 
dislocation of the verteberate. The system of hanging as 
now used/ avoids to the full extent of chances of strangu-
lation. vAiich results on account of too short a drop or 
of decapitation which results on account of too long a 
drop. The system is consistent witn the obligation of 
the State to ensure that the process of execution is 
conducted with decency and decorum with-out involving de-
r-radation or oruetality of any kind," 
Chandrachud CJ further observed: 
"At the moment of final impact when life becomes 
extinct some physical pain would be implicit in the very 
process of the ebbing out of life. But the act of hanging 
would causes the least pain imaginable on account of the 
tact that death supervens instantaneously. Imaginable 
because in the very nature of things. There no purvirous 
who can give first hand evidence of the pain involved in 
10. Deena/ AIR 1983 1155 at; p. 1185-1186 
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the execution of a death sentence. Dead men tell no tales. 
The question as regards the factor of pain has therefore 
to be judged on the basis of scientific investigations and 
by applying the test of reason. The conclusion that the 
system of hanging is as painless as is painless as is 
possible in the circumstances that it causes no greater 
pain then any t)ther known method of executing the death 
sentence and that it involves no barbarity, torture or degrada-
tion is based on reason supported by expert evidence and 
the findings of modern medicine. 
Chandrachud CJ goes on to hold: 
"On the question of pain involve in a punishment 
the concern of law has to be ensure that the various steps 
which are atrendant upon or incidental to the execution of 
any sentence more so the death sentence do not constitute 
punishment by themselves. If a prisoner is sentenced to 
death it is lawful to execute that punishment and that only, 
de can n^t be subjected to humiliation,torture or degrada-
tion before the execution of that sentence, not even as 
necessary steps in the execution of death sentence. That 
would amount to inflicting a punishment on the prisoner 
which does not have the authority of law. Humaness is the 
half mark of civilised laws, tffierefore, torture, brutality, 
oarbarity, numiliation and degradation of any kind is 
impermissible in the execution of any sentence. The process 
of hanging does not involve any of these directly, indirectly 
¥yi 
or incidentally. Accordingly we hold that the method 
prescribed by Sec. 354(5) of the Code of Criminal 
procedure for executing the death sentence does not 
violate the provision contained in Article 21 of the 
constitution." 
In dealing with the question that it is inhuman 
to kill under any circumstances even under a judgment of 
a court and therefore, no death sentence can be executed 
at all by means fair or foul, Chandcachud CJ who spoke for 
the Court said: 
"If it is lawful to impose the sentence of death 
in appropriate cases, it would be lawful to execute death 
sentence in an appropriate manner. 
Article 21 undovibtedly has as much relevance on the passing 
of a sentence, as on the manner of executing it. Therefore 
two fold consideration has to be kept in mind in the area 
of sentencing. Substantively the sentence has to meet the 
constitutional prescription contained especially in 
Articles 14 and 21 . Procedurally the method by which the 
sentence is required by law to be executed has to meet 
the mandate of Article 21. The mandate of Article 21 is 
not that the death sentence shall not be executed but that 
it shall not be executed in a cruel, barbarious or degrading 
manner. 
11. Deena, AIR 1983 SC 1155 at p. 1186 
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In Attorney General the Attorney General Mr. K, 
P^rasaran filed an application against the judgment of 
the Rajasthan High Coxirt. The High Covurt ordered that 
the death sentence be executed by public hanging at the 
stadium or Ramlila ground of Jaipur after giving wide-
spread publicity , Through the media of the date/ time 
and place of such execution. However the High Court by 
its order dated 11th Dec.* 1985 directed that the execu-
tion of death sentence should be carried out "in terms of 
the procedure provided in the rules mentioned in the Jail 
Wannual only unless by that time any amendment is made in 
the Rules." 
In dealing with this application filed by the 
Attorney General Justice Bhagwatl observed, "We would like 
to make it clear that the execution of death sentence by 
public hanging would be a baibarious practice clearly 
13 
violative of Art. 21 of the constitution." The learned 
Chief Justice further observed: We have no doubt that the 
expectation of the bench that an amendment might be made 
in the liules providing for public hanging is bound to belied 
The direction for execution of death sentence by ^ublic 
hanging is to our mind unconstitutional and we may make 
it clear that if any jail Mannual were to provide public 
Hanging we would declare it to be violative of Art. 21 of 
the Constitution",^* 
^^' ^^^^- at p. 468 
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The High Court was worried about the increasing 
crime of bride burning and therefore ordered that the 
death sentence imposed should be executed by public hanging 
so that the prospective criminals should not dare to 
commit the bride burning. But the High Court modified its 
earlier order and directed that the death sentence imposed 
should be carried out in terms of the Jail Mannual. Because 
the death sentence imposed either would not have been carried 
out or would have been carried out inviolation of Jail Mannual, 
The death sentence if executed would have violated Art. 21 
of the Qonstitution which after Menaka Gandhi means that the 
deprivation of life or personal liberty should be in accor-
dance with the just fair and reasonable procedvire. The exe-
cution of death sentence by public hanging as ordered by 
the High Court would have been unjust, uniair and unreasonable 
procedure- Therefore the learned chief justice has rightly 
pointed out that the High Court had not changea its order 
for public hanging because it was barbaric but the Jail 
Mannual Rules did not provide for chat or the public nanging, 
x'ne-e too juaicial deliveries made in Deena and 
Attorney general of India have been in connection with the 
mode of execution of death sentence. In Deena the execution 
of death sentence by hanging by rope has been considered 
as less cruel, painful barbaric and degradation, iiowever 
some physical pain is implicit in execution of death sentence 
by nanging by rope. But that pain is in the process of the 
eloing out of life. It has been rightly held by the Chief 
aftfi 
Justice Chandrachud that the system ofi Jianging is a pain-
less as is possible in the circumstance that it causes no 
greater pain than any other known method of executing the 
death sentence and that it involves no barbarity torture 
or degradation whatever torture pain barbarity and inh\iraan 
degradation is due to the death sentence declared as consti-
tutional in Art. 21 in Bachan Singh - If the death sentence 
lawfully imposed may lawfully be carried out. On pain extra-
pain torture* cnuelty may be inflicted upon merely because 
he is a condemned prisoner, A convicted prisoner should not 
be treated dead before his death. So long he is alive he 
is a dignified numan being and deserves humane treatment 
within stonewalls of jail by the jail officials. The fxinda-
mental rights lander Article 14,19 and 21 of our constitution 
are tnere to help him whicn ne carried ... , .,..n\ -i-:^.!' -- ti : i 
and does not leave them outside the iron gate of the jail. 
The abolitionists therefore have lost another judi-
cial battle before the Supreme Court to and thus could not 
be able to convince the court about the inhuman barbaric way 
of hvunan killing in this civij,ised democratic society. 
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments 
dates back to the Magna Carta tnough it was adopted in the 
English ijeclaration of xiights in 1988. The purpose of this 
enactment was to check barbarous pianishment3 which were common 
during the regime of the Starts like Pillary disemblowing 
decapitation ana drawing and quartering. 
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i-or the first time the arrest under Civil Law was 
raised as an violative of Article 21 of the Constitution in 
1 
P. Oovindii Halai. The petitioner was the sole proprietor 
of a business carried on in the name and style of Indestro 
3ales and Service Co. at No. 50-52 Lohar Chawl Street in 
Bombay. He was assessed to income -tax for the years 1943-44 
to iy47-1948 and 19bl-52 by the ITO at and te. 40,178,40, The 
assessee having failed to pay up the amount of tax the ITO 
on tht 10th April , 1951 issued to the Additional Collector 
of Bombay a recovery certificate under Sec.46(2) of the 
Income Tax Act. On the 1st Feb. 1954 the Additional Collector 
Bombay issued a demand notice on the assessee for payuient of 
the Tax. As no payment was made the Additional Collector 
attached the goodwill and tenary rights in the premises by a 
warrant of attachment issued on 24th warch 1954. The sale 
was held on 25th February, 1935 fetching a price of 8s.33000 
and which was confirmed on 30th March 1955, The sale pro-
ceeds not being sufficient to satisfy the assessed tax the 
Additional Collector on 7th June, 1955 issued a notice vinder 
Sec. 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act , 1876, requiring 
the assessee to appear before him on 16th June,1955 and show 
cause why he should not be apprehended and confined to civil 
jail in satisfaction of the certified demand. Having failed to 
^' .^ s^hotafft Govindji Halai v. B.M, DesalWl955) 2 ^R d87 
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appear before the Additional Collector, he was arrested 
on 1st July,1955. Thereupon the Petitioner filed an 
application under Article 226 to the oombay High Court on 
8th July/1955 complaining against the arrest and praying 
for the writ of Habeas Corpus and for the production and 
release. A Bench of High Court issued and discharged the 
rule on 24th August, 1956. Thereafter the petitioner had 
advanced two main contentions. 
1, That S. 46 (2) of the Income Tax Act under which 
the ITO issued the recovery certificate to the Additional 
Collector of Bombay was void, under Article. 13 (i; of the 
Constitution in that if offended Article 21 and Article 14 
of the Constitution; 
2, That S. 13 of the Bombay Land Revenue Act, 1876 under 
which warrant of arrest was issued by the Additional Collector 
was void under Article 13 (2) of the Constitution as the same 
2 
was repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution, 
In dealing with the question that S. 46(2) of tne 
Income Tax Act violates Article 21 of the Constitution, b,ii, 
^as Acting C.J. speaking for the court while relying on 
^' oii?^^^ °^ ^ ® Income Tax Act 1922 provides:The Incom- Tax 
Officer may forward to the Collector a certificate under his 
signature specifying the amount of arrears due from an asses-
ofi^H ^"^'^^ specified therein as if it were an ar^Sarl 
of land revenue. 
4 f) )i 
3 
A-j aib j inyn s a id : 
"^s long as those sec t ions stand no 
complains can be made of infringement 
of rort icle 21 , for those two sect ions 
c o n s t i t u t e a procedure es tab l i shed by 
law. i t i s only i f those sec t ions are 
void t h a t the question of v io la t ion of 
the fundamental rifiht under Ar t i c l e 21 
can a r i s e a t a l l . " 4 
5 
In abrahim the respondent had been arrested on 1st 
June, 1^54 in pursuance ot" a warrant issued on 10th inarch, 
1954 by tae Collector of Malabar under S.48 Madras Zievenue 
recovery Act, 1864. The Income tax arrears due from the 
assessee were Rs. 70,000 for years 1943-48, 1945-46 to 1948-49. 
A demand certificate was issued to the assessee under S. 46(2) 
Income Tax Act. The Collector proceeded under S. 48 of th • 
Act to issue a warrant of arrest against the respondent in 
consequence of which he was arrested and lodged in central 
Jail Cannanore. 
A two judge Bench consisting of Mack and Krishnaswamy 
of the Madras Hign Court heard a writ of Habeas Corpus under 
Sec. 491 ,Cr.t-.c. and allowed the petition and ordered the 
petitioners be set at liberty and held his arreat as an 
illegal. The Madras High Court did not test the constitu-
tional validity of the impugned Act on the anvil of article 21 
3. State of Punjab V. Ajaib Singh (1953> SCR 254, 
4. Supra note 1 
5. Col lector of iialabar v. a. £brahim,fiIR 1957 3C 688 
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of the Constitution. But Krishnaswami J, in his view held 
section 48 of the Act in-valid to the extent that it 
afforded no opportunity to the arrested persons to appear 
before the Collector by himself or through a legal practi-
tioner of his choice. 
In the instant case the contention raised was; 
whether Sec. 48 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act or s, 46(2) 
of Income Tax Act or both offended Article 21 of the Consti-
tution, vv'hile relying on Gopalan Justice Imam said: the 
personal rights guaranteed by sub clauses (a) to (g) of 
/irricle 19(1) are in a way dependent on the provisions of 
article 21 just as the right guaranteed by sub-clause (f) of 
Article 19(1) is siobject to Article 31. 
6 
In Ebrahim Hajee Justice Jafar Imam rejected the plea 
of the assessee that the axrest was by way of punishment 
and held that it was only a coercive process used for reco-
vering arrears of tax. The learned judge observed: 
" There is not a suggestion in the entire section that 
the arrest is by way of punishment for mere default. Before 
the Collector can proceed to arrest the defaulter, not 
merely must the condition be satisfied that the arrears 
can not be liquidated by the sale of the property of the 
defaulter but the Collector shall have reason to believe 
that the defaulter is wilfully withholding payment or has 
been guilty of fraudulent conduct in order to evade payment. 
6. Ibid ^  
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When dues in the shape of money are to be realised by the 
process of law and not by voluntary payment, the element 
of coercion in varying degrees must necessarily be foiind 
at all stages in the mode of recovery of the money due. 
The coercive element, perhaps in its severest form is the 
defaulter pay his dues. When the Collector has reason to 
believe that withholding of payment is wilful, or that the 
defaulter has been guilty of fraudulent conduct in order to 
evade payment, obviously^ it is on the supposition that the 
aefaulter can make the payment, but is wilfully withholding 
it/ or is fraudulently evading payment. In the Act there 
are several sections (e.g. Ss. 16, 18 and 21) which prescribe, 
in unambiguous language, punishment to be inflicted for 
certain acts done. It is clear, therefore, that where the 
Act intends to impose a punishment or to entirely different 
to that to be found in Section 48. We are of the opinion , 
therefore, that where an arrest is made under section 48 
after canplying with its provisions, the arrest is not for 
any offence comraitteed or a punishment for defaulting in any 
payment. The mode of arrest is no u.ore than a mode for 
7 
recovery of the amount due," 
If the property itself is taken lawfully under Art. 31, 
the right to hold or dispose of it perishes with it and 
Article 19(1) cannot be invoked^ Likewise, if life or 
7* Id. 
iU 
personal liberty is taken away lawfully under Art :cle 21, 
no question of the exercise of fundamental rights under 
Article 19^1) (a) to (g) can be raised- UnJer Article 21 
"procedure established by law" means procedure enacted by 
law made by the State, that is to say, the Union parlia-
ment or the legislatures of the States," 
Applying the stated position of the right to life 
and personal liberty in Article 21 of the Constitution, to 
the instant case. Justice Imam speaking for the Covirt held 
that neither Section 48 of the Act nor Section 46(2) of 
the Indian Income Tax Act violates Articles 14, 19, 21 and 
9 
22 of the Constitution, 
The reason given by Justice Imam in support of 
his view is that procedure for arrest prescribed by Sec,48 
of the Hadras Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 and Section 46(2) 
of the Income Tax Act was a valid procedure enacted by the 
State and hence could not be allowed to claim any of the 
Fundamental Rights mentioned in Article 19(1} of the 
Constitution. 
10 
In Ram Naravan it is alleged that the petitioners 
had committed default in payment of che tax payable by them 
lander the U.P. Sales Tax Act and warrants of arrest had 
either been issued or were about to be issued by the concerned 
®' Q^3.1ector of ..alabar v. E, Ebrahim; ^Ik 1957 SC 68t 
at p. 690. 
^' ^Bid., v^lii 1957 SC 688 at p. 691 
10. Kam tJaravan v. State of U.P., AIR 1984, SC 1213 
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Revenue Officers for the arrest and detention of the 
petitioners in the course of the recovery proceedings, 
section 8 Of the U.P. Sales Tax provides a legislative 
scheme for the recovery of tax or money due from a dealer. 
The amount of tax assessed shall be collected under sub-
section 6 Of section 8 of the Act as arrears of Land Revenue, 
under Section 33 of the Act the assessing authority may send 
a certificateof demand to the Collector which includes 
Additional collector under his signature specifying the 
sum due. The Collector has the pov*er under the Revenue 
Recovery Act 1890 and CPC 1908. Under Sections 279 and 281 
of the UPZA and Land Revenue Act the revenue may be recovered 
by way of any modes including the arrest and detention. The 
UPZ Abolition and Land Revenue Act contains a long process 
of arrest and detention which may be used to coerce or 
compel a defaulter to pay the revenue*. 
It was contented that the process of arrest and 
detention of a defaulter in the course of the recovery 
proceedings is opposed to Articles 14,. 19(1} (d} and 21 of 
the Constitution. It^  was further argued that the procedure 
is arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair. The petitioners 
have in support of their contention relied on Article 11 
of the international Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
11 
and Jolly George Verghese. 
11, Jolly George Verghese v. Bank of Cochin; AIR 1980 
3C 470. 
4 n 4 
12 
Placing his heavy reliance on Govindji Halai 
13 
Lbrahim Hajee and 54th Law Commission Report 1974 
Justice Venkataramiah speaking for the court held; On 
a careful consideration of the submission made before 
us we are of the view that the impugned procedure con-
tained in tne UrZ^^LR net and Rules 147 and 251 of the 
Rules made therexinder is not violative of articles 14, 
19a) Cd) and 21 of the Constitution".^^ 
12. aupra note 1 
13. Supra note 5 
14. - Supra note 10 
Article 11 of the International Covenant for 
Civil and Political Rights reads: "No one 
shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of 
inaoiiity to fulfil a contractual obligation", 
See also Paras 1-E 12, 13 and 14 of the 54th 
Report of the Law Commission/ 1973. 
CHAPTER IX 
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION 
4f)S 
RIGirr TO COl^ENSATION 
The q u e s t i o n t h a t i s t o be i n v e s t i g a t e d in t h i s 
p a r t i s whether t h e r i g h t t o ge t corrspensation i s a pari : 
of Pe r sona l l i b e r t y in Ar t , 21 when i t i s taken away 
o the rwi se than by way of r e a s o n a b l e , f a i r and j u s t 
p r o c e d u r e . Can t h e c o u r t o r d e r t h e S t a t e t o pay compen-
s a t i o n t o t h e v i c t i m s whose p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y has been 
v i o l a t e d in t h e l i g h t of t h e dynamic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
j u r i s p r u d e n c e in fused in t h e o t h e r w i s e i n s i p i d . , language 
of A r t i c l e 21 ? 
In K h a t r i t h e q u e s t i o n of compensation cam.e up for 
d e c i s i o n before t h e Supreme Cour t , Mrs, I l ingorani appear ing 
on beha l f of t h e b l i n d e d under t r i a l p r i s o n e r s contended 
t h a t t h e l i a b i l i t y t o compensate a person depr ived of h i s 
p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y , otheirwise than in accordance wi th 
p rocedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law i s im.p l ic i t in A r t i c l e 21 . 
She argued t h a t t h e p r i s o n e r s were depr ived of t h e i r 
e y e s i g h t by t h e P o l i c e o f f i c e r s a c t i n g on beha l f of t h e 
S t a t e and s i n c e t h i s c o n s t i t u t e d a v i o l a t i o n of t h e 
^' ^J^u'ism—^^-^^"^^' ^^ ^^^^ ^^ 2^® ordered 
iU 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t under Art. 21, the State was 
l i a b l e to pay compensation to the bl inded p r i s o n e r s . 
The contention was rebut ted by I4r, K.G, Bhagat counsel 
for the State of Bihar who contended t h a t i t was not 
yet e s t ab l i shed t h a t the bl inding of the p r i soners was 
done by the Police and t h a t the inves t iga t ion was in 
progress and he fur ther urged t h a t even if b l inding was 
done by the Pol ice and there was v io l a t i on of the c o n s t i -
t u t i o n a l r i gh t enshrined in Ar t i c le 21, the State could 
not be held l i a b l e to pay corripensation to the persons 
wronged. 
t 
. 2 The l i a b i l i t y to pay compensation r a i sed m Khatri 
was postponed for the next hearing by Jus t i ce P.M. Bhagwati 
but the learned judge posed ce r t a in quest ions of grave 
cons t i t u t i ona l iruportance. What r e l i e f can a court give for 
v io la t ion of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r igh t guaranteed in 
Ar t ic le 21 ? If l i f e or personal l i b e r t y i s v io la ted 
otherwise than in accordance with procedure e s t ab l i shed by 
law, i s the court he lp less to grant r e l i e f to the person 
who has suffered such deprivat ion ? 
2, Supra note 1 at P. 930. 
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in Khatri^ a writ pet i t ion under Art. 32 was fi led 
by under t r i a l s for the enforcement of t he i r fundamental 
right under Art. 21 on the allegation that they were 
blinded by the police officer e i ther at the tixo.e of the i r 
arrest or after t he i r arres t whilst in police custody. 
The sole question raised in th is pet i t ion f i led under 
Art. 32 was that whilst in police custody the pet i t ioners 
were blinded by the police personnel acting as 
off ic ia ls of and on behalf of the State and in violation 
of the fundamental r ight guaranteed under Art. 21 and for 
t h i s violation the State was l i ab le to pay compensation 
to them. The Attorney General who at one stage appeared on 
behalf of the State contended that even if the pet i t ioners 
were so blinded, the s ta te was not l iable to pay compensa-
tion to tVie pe t i t ioners f i r s t , because the State was not 
consti tut ionally or legal ly responsible for the acts of the 
Police Officers, outside the scope of the i r power or 
authority and the blindings of the undertrlal prisoners 
effected by the police could not, therefore, be said to 
constitute violation of the i r fundamental right under 
Article 21 by the State and Secondly even if there was 
3. Khatri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1981 SC 1068 ordered 
on 10,3.1981. 
afiH 
violation of the fundamental right of the pet i t ioners 
under Article 21 by reason of the bindings effected 
by the Police o f f i c i a l s , there was on a true constructions 
of tha t Art ic le , no l i a b i l i t y on the State to pay 
com.pensation to the pet i t ioner . Though the questions 
raised by the Attorney-General of India were of const i-
tut ional importance yet he could not persuade the court to 
accept them. While dealing with the question of payment 
of com.pensation Justice Bhagwati threw som.e insights 
into doubts arose out of the arguments of the Attorney-
General of India and then observed: 
"If an officer of the State acting 
in his off ic ia l capacity threatens 
to deprive a person of his l i f e or 
personal l iber ty without the autho-
r i t y of law, can such person not 
approach the court for injuncting 
the s ta te from, acting through such 
officer in violation of his fundamental 
r ight under Article 21? Can the State 
urge in defence in such a case tha t i t 
i s not infringing the fundam.ental r ight 
of the pe t i t ioner under Article 21, 
because the officer who i s threatening 
to do so i s acting outside the law and 
therefore beyond the scope of his 
authority and hence the State i s not 
responsible for his action? Would th i s 
not make a m.ockery of Article 21 and 
reduce i t to nu l l i ty , a m.ere rope of 
sand for, on th i s view, if the officer 
acting according to law there would 
ex-concession is be no breach of 
Article 21 and if he i s acting without 
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author i ty of law, the State would 
be able to contend tha t i t i s not 
responsible for h i s ac t ion , and 
therefore there i s no v io l a t ion of 
Art ic le 21, So also i f the re i s 
any thereatened invasion by the State 
of the Fundamental r i g h t s guaranteed 
under Ar t i c le 21 , the p e t i t i o n e r who 
i s aggrieved can move the court under 
Ar t ic le 32 for a wr i t in junct ing such 
threa tened invasion i f there i s any 
continuing action of the State which i s 
1J» v io la t ion of the Fundamental Right 
under Ar t i c le 21 , the p e t i t i o n e r can 
approach the cour t under Ar t ic le 32 
and ask for a wr i t s t r i k i n g down the 
continuance of such ac t ion , but where 
the act ion taken by the State has 
already reso r t ed in breach of the 
Fundamental Right under Ar t ic le 21 by 
depr iva t ion , of sorae limb of the 
p e t i t i o n e r , worild the p e t i t i o n e r have 
no remedy under Ar t ic le 32 for breach 
of the Fundam.ental Right guaranteed 
to him? Would the court perm.it i t s e l f 
to becom.e he lp less spec ta tor of the 
v io la t ion of the Fundamental Right 
to him. and has given for enforcem.ent 
of h is Fundamental Right, the cour t 
can not give him. any r e l i e f . " 4 
In the i n s t a n t case twenty four under t r i a l p r i soners 
were blinded by the pol ice o f f ice rs whi ls t in pol ice 
custody. The Sta te Government has in exercise, of i t s 
power under Section 3 of the Indian Police A:;t, 1861 
d i rec ted i-lr. t . N . singh to inves t iga te in to cases of 
b l inding of u n d e r - t r i a l p r i soners in pol ice custody. 
4. Suprg note 3 at P. 1074, 
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l-lr, L.N, Singh submitted h i s r epor t s ind ica t ing as 
to how in what manner and by whom the twenty four under 
t r i a l p r i soners were bl inded made by him. in public 
i n t e r e s t and in discharge of h i s o f f i c i a l duty. These 
r epor t s were subm.itted between January 10 to January 20, 
1981 and som.e of them, were m.ade even a f te r January 20, 
and the l a s t was subm.itted on 27th January, 1981, 
However, the question r e l a t i n g to the l i a b i l i t y to 
pay compensation in case of deprivat ion of a fundam.ental 
r i gh t to l i f e and personal l i b e r t y of a person under 
Ar t ic le 21 was r a i sed in Khatri" but was not decided by 
Jus t i ce Bhagwati on 14.1,1981 and was postponed for the 
next hear ing . When the issue was again ra ised in Khatri 
the learned judge expressed h i s ser ious doubts arose in 
his m.ind out of the two argvunents advanced by the 
Attorney-General but did not say anything about the payment 
of com.pensation except pronouncing h i s views on the relevancy 
of the repor t of Ito. L, N. Singh subm.itted on the po in t . 
7 
In Rudul Sah the p e t i t i o n e r went to the Supreme 
Court on November 22, 1982 under Ar t ic le 32 and asked the 
5. Supra note 1. 
6. Supra note 3. 
7. Rudul_Sah_v. State of Bih^ r^, AIR 1983 SC 1086 
i . 
the cour-t for h i s re lease on the ground t h a t h i s 
detent ion in the j a i l was i l l e g a l . Because he was 
acqui t ted by the cour t of sess ions , of Muzaffarpur, 
Bihar on June 3 , 1968, The p e t i t i o n e r was re leased 
only on October 16, 1982 a f t e r more than 14 years . The 
p e t i t i o n e r prayed t h a t he be granted reimbursement 
expenses incurred in h is medical t rea tment , e x - g r a t i a 
payment for h i s r e h a b i l i t a t i o n and compensation for h is 
i l l e g a l detention in J a i l for over 14 years . The J a i l o r 
Muzaffarpur Central J a i l f i l ed h i s a f f idav i t on April 
16, 1963 and the p e t i t i o n cari-je up for hearing on April 
26, 1983 but was adjourned for August 1983, 
In dealing with t h i s question Chandrachud C,J, speaking 
for the court observed* 
"Art icle 21 which guarantees the r i g h t to 
l i f e and l i b e r t y wi l l be denuded of i t s 
s ign i f i can t content i f the power of t h i s 
court were lim.ited to passing orders of 
re lease from i l l e g a l de ten t ion . One of 
the t e l l i n g ways in which the v io l a t ion 
of tha t r ighc Can reasonably be prevented 
and due compliance with the* mandate of 
Ar t ic le 21 secured, i s to muled i t s 
v i o l a t o r s in the payment of monetary 
compensation. Administrative 
leading to f l agran t infringements of 
fundam.ental r i g h t s cannot be correc ted 
by any o ther m.ethod open to the j ud i c i a ry 
to adopt. The r i g h t to compensation i s some 
p a l l i a t i v e for the unlawful ac t s of i n s t u -
men ta l l t i e s which act in the nam.e of publ ic 
i n t e r e s t and which present for t h e i r 
47 9 
protection the powers of the State 
as a shield. If civilization is not 
to perish in this country as it has 
perished in some others too well 
known to suffer mention, it is nece-
ssary to educate ourselves into 
accepting that, respect for the rights 
of individuals is the true bastion 
of democracy. Therefore, the State 
must repair the damage done by its g 
officers to the petitioner's rightsi' 
Having emphasised the constitutional importance of the 
right to life and personal liberty guaranteed in Article 21 
and the need to educate the State agencies to show respect 
for the rights of individuals, Chandrachud C.J. directed 
the State of Bihar to pay the petitioner Rs, 30000/- in 
addition to the sum of Rs.SOOO/- already paid by it. 
This shows that the imposition of paym.ent of monetary 
compensation, as said by Chandrachud C.J., is only way to 
prevent unreasonable, unfair and unjust violation of the 
precious human rights of life and personal liberty, 
enshrined in Article 21. Therefore, the liability to pay 
compensation lies on the State if it deprives the citizen 
of his life or personal liberty otherwise than by fair, 
just and reasonable procedure prescribed by law under 
Article 21 of the constitution. The right to get monetary 
com.pensation in loss of his life or personal liberty is 
.note 7 at p. 1089. 
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nothing but only " P a l l i a t i v e " which could never 
recompensate as the l o s s of eyesight of twenty four 
u n d e r t r i a l p r i s o n e r s . But the " p a l l i a t i v e measures" 
devised by the Supreme Court in Rudul Sah could be an 
e f fec t ive and potent check on the insens i t ive inhuman 
pol ice force in the land of Gandhi-Nehru-Azad who would 
d e s i s t from, trampling the c i t i z e n s ' m.ost cherished 
fundam.ental r i g h t to l i f e and personal l i b e r t y contained 
in Ar t ic le 21 of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . This i s yet another 
landrp.ark decision del ivered in the area of Personal Liberty 
by the Supreme Cour-t. 
9 In Sebastian M. Ifonqrav the p e t i t i o n e r was a student 
of M.A, in P o l i t i c a l Science in Jawaharlal Nehru Universi ty, 
New Delhi belonged t o Naga comjRunity and ha i led from. 
Mcuiipur f i l ed the Writ Pe t i t i on under Ar t ic le 3 2 of the 
cons t i t u t ion c a l l i n g upon the respondents to produce 
iir. C. Daniel, a former Naik Subedar of Manipur Rif les and 
at the re levan t time Head Master of Junior High School, 
Huining, Ukhrul East D i s t r i c t Manipur State and Mr.G.Paul, 
Assis tant Pastor of the Bapt is t Church in Huining v i l l age 
who were whislee away on March 10, 1982 from Huining to 
Phungrei camp and detained by the Officer-in-Charge of 
21st Sikh Regiment. Since t h e r e a f t e r t h e i r whereabouts 
9 . S e b a s t i ian_M._Hongray v. Union of Ind ia . AIR 1984 SO 571. 
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were not known to any person. I t was not proved beyond 
doubt by the respondents t h a t the detenus were re leased 
by the 21st Sikh Regim.ent on March 11, 1982 at 11.00 A.M. 
Jus t i ce Desai de l ive r ing judgement of the cour t cam.e to 
the conclusion t h a t Daniel and Paul a f t e r t h e i r a r r e s t 
never l e f t the Army camp on March 11 , 1982, Thereafter 
the learned judge diirected t h a t the proper wri t of habeas 
corpus under Ar t i c le 3 2 be f i l ed and comm.anded the respon-
dents t o produce Daniel and Paul before the court on 
December 12, 1983, 
10 In Sebastian M. itonqrav the r igh t to l i f e or 
personal l i b e r t y under Art ic le 21 of the cons t i t u t ion 
was not involved d i r e c t l y by the p e t i t i o n e r yet the wri t 
of habeas corpus under Ar t ic le 32 was f i l e d in the Supreme 
Court for the production of C, Daniel and C. Paul taken 
in to arm.y custody by the Jawans of the 21st Sikh Regim.ent 
on March 10, 1982 and were never l e f t the said Phungrei 
cam.p t h e r e a f t e r . On the bas i s of the a f f i dav i t s and 
averrcsents f i l ed in the court Jus t i ce Desai in Sebastian M. 
Hon gray under the suspicious circum.stances came to the 
conclusion t h a t the sa id detenus never l e f t the army cam.p, 
10. Sebastian H. Honorav v. Union of India.AIR 1984 SC 26. 
11 . Supra note 9 . 
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In cont inuat ion of the main judgement and d i rec ted 
the respondent on Uovernber 14, 1983 to produce G, Daniel 
and C» Paul on Decerrixjr 12, 1983, The respondents 
have fa i led to produce the detenus and f i l e d the re turn 
as mandated by law. Thereafter the issue was taken up 
and decided on April 23 , 1984. Jus t i ce Desai came to the 
conclusion t h a t there was a wilful diobdience to the wri t 
of habeas corpus and misled the cour t hy p resent ing a 
d i s t o r t e d version of f ac t s not borne out by the records . 
I t was thus well e s t ab l i shed t h a t the respondents have 
comm.itted c i v i l contempt by t h e i r wilful disobedience to 
the w r i t . 
Since the c i v i l contempt i s punishable with imprison-
ment as well as f i ne . In the given case the court had 
imposed ne i the r im.prisonm.ent nor fine but d i rec ted the 
respondents to pay Rs. 1 l ac to each of the two women 
whose husbands were talcen into custody and k i l l ed into 
12 fa l se encounters . 
Thus the i n s t a n t case has ne i t he r dea l t with the r igh t 
to l i f e or personal l i b e r t y in Ar t ic le 21 nor had dea l t 
12. Sebn^tlf^n M. Hongray v. union of m ^ l ^ , 
AIR 1984 SC 1026 at P. 1028, 
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with the l i a b i l i t y of paym.ent of compensation to the 
victirns or t h e i r dependents. But the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
importance of the decision i s tha t keeping the t o r t u r e , 
i l l treatm.ent and agony and the ca l lousness shown to the 
l i f e of C, Daniel and C, Paul taken in to army custody 
by the Jawans of the 21st Sikh Regim.ent in Phwngrifi camp 
the Suprem.e Court speaking through Jus t i ce Desai has 
acted in i t s bes t j u d i c i a l m.anner by d i r ec t ing the respon-
dents t o pay Rs, 1 l ac t o each of two women in order to 
wipe t e a r s from t h e i r bleeding eyes on account of t h e i r 
husbands' i l l e g a l dea ths . 
13 In Bhim. Singh a raemJ^er of the Jariu?.u & Kashm.ir 
State l e g i s l a t i v e assemijly incurred the wrath of the State 
government headed by G.M. Shah, the then Chief Minister 
who was bent upon preventing the p e t i t i o n e r from attending 
the Session of Legis la t ive AssemiDly scheduled to m.eet on 
11th September, 1985, The p e t i t i o n e r was suspended from 
the Assembly on August 17, 1985 which was stayed by the 
lagh Court on 9th and 10th September, 1985 he was proceeding 
from. Jammu to Srinagar was a r re s t ed at about 3,00 A,M, 
(on 10th) at a place ca l l ed Qazi Kund 70 Ktos awav from. 
13. Bhim. Singh v. State of J & K AIR 1986 SC 494. 
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Srinagar and was taken away by the Po l i ce , When the 
whereabouts of the p e t i t i o n e r was not known and a l l 
e f f o r t s to t race him proved f u t i l e , h i s wife Jayaraala 
f i l e d the wri t p e t i t i o n in the Suprerrse Court. However, 
the p e t i t i o n e r was produced before and re leased on ba i l 
by the learned A, Sessions Judge of Jammu on 16th September, 
1985. On 20th September, 1985 the p e t i t i o n e r f i l ed a 
supplementary a f f idav i t s t a t i n g m.ore fac t s in addit ion to 
what had already been s t a t ed by h i s wife in the p e t i t i o n . 
Having gone through the fac t s leading to the r i s e of 
the present wr i t p e t i t i o n Ju s t i c e 0, Chinnappa Reddy 
speaking for the comrt deprecated, and expressed h is u t t e r 
despleasure over the highhandedness of the Police autho-
r i t i e s used in dealing with the personal l i b e r t y of no less 
than an e lec ted represen ta t ive of the People, The way and 
the manner in which the p e t i t i o n e r was deprived of h i s 
personal l i b e r t y under Ar t ic le 21 as well as prevented froro. 
discharging h i a du t i e s as a member of the Vidhan Sabha 
makes us to thirlk are we l i v i n g in a Parliamentary dem.o-
c r a t i c Raj? Or are .we l i v i n g in an au toc ra t i c Raj of Hari 
^ingh of Jar.^u & Kashmir, This i s what has been observed 
by Jus t i ce Chinnappa Reddyi 
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"We can only say that the Police 
Officers acted in a most high handed 
way. We do not wish to use stronger 
words to condemn the authoritarian *> 
acts of the police. If the personal 
liberty of a l^ ember of the Legis-
lative Assembly is to be played with 
in this fashion, one can only wonder 
what may happen to lesser mortals Police 
Officers who are the custodians of law 
and ord«5r should have the greatest 
respect for the personal liberty of 
citizens and should not flout the laws 
by stooping to such bizarre acts of 
lawfulness. Custodians of Law and 
order should not become depredators 
of civil liberties. Their duty is to 
protect not to abducti' 14 
15 
In Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights the facts 
leading to the filing of the writ petitions are as 
follows: Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights an organi-
sation said to be committed to the upholding of fundamental 
Right of Citizens has filed the writ petition under Art,32 
of the Constitution. It was alleged that on 19th April 
1986, 600 to 700 poor peasants and landless people m.ostly 
belonging to the backward classes had collected for holding 
a peaceful meeting within the com.pound of Gandhi Library 
in Arwal, a place within the District of Gaya, in the State 
of Bihar, Without any previous warning by the police or 
14. SUEHa note 13 at P. 499. 
-^* Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights v. State of 
Bihar. AIK 1987 sc ^^s. ^ i 
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any provocation on the pa r t of the people who had so 
c o l l e c t e d , the Superintendent of Pol ice reached the 
spot with Police force , surrounded the gathering and 
opened f i r e as a resvilt of which several people were 
injured and at l e a s t 21 persons including chi ldren died. 
The p e t i t i o n e r had i n t e r a l i a , prayed t h a t the Court 
should d i r e c t the State to pay ful l and proper com.pen-
sat ion to the victim.s - r e l a t i o n s of the dead and to the 
people who were injured by pol ice f i r i n g . 
While speaking through Ranganatha Hisra J . (as he then 
was) the Court d i rec ted t h a t "without prejudice to any 
j u s t claim, for compensation t h a t m.ay be advanced by the 
r e l a t i o n s of the victim.s who have died or by the injured 
persons them.selves, for every case of death comipensation 
of Rupees twenty thousand and for every injured person 
com.pensation of Rupees five thousand sha l l be paidl' ^^ 
Coming to the conclusion tha t "the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
r i g h t s of Bhim. Singh were v io la ted with impunity" and 
therefore Ju s t i c e Chinnappa Reddy f e l t the need to 
r e c t i f y the wrong done to the p e t i t i o n e r by su i tab ly 
16. Supra note 15 at p . 356. 
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and adequately compensating him. By asserting the 
judicial right, to award monetary com.pensation now well 
17 
established on account of Rudul Sah and Sebastian M. 
ttonqray^^ Justice Chinnappa Reddy said that the peti-
tioner has been arrested and imprisoned with mischievous 
or malicious intent and that his constitutional and legal 
right/rights were invaded, the m.ischief or malice and the 
invasion may not be washed away or wished away by his being 
set free,"^^ and considering it an appropriate case, 
awarded him a sum of Rs.SO.OOO/- to the petition. 
20 In C. Ramakonda Reddy the division bench of the 
Andhra High Court speaking through Justice Jeevan Reddy 
handed down a landmark decision in which the conflict 
between the concepts of "sovereign power or function" and 
"personal liberty" are dealt with. The question for 
determ-ination before the court was whether the state was 
liable to pay compensation when an under-trial prisoner 
in jail lost his life due to failure or neglect of its 
o f f i c e r s t o perform t h e i r d u t i e s . The s t a t e as usua l 
17T Supra note 7 . 
18. Supra note 12. 
19. Supra note 13 a t P . 499, 
V. S t a t e of A.p. 1989 AP 235; 
R a j i v Gandhi v . Union of I n d i a AIR i989 Mad, 205. 
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defended the negligent act of its officers by taking 
shelter under the old and archaic doctrine of sovereign 
inuTiunity. Since the prisoner was put in jail in 
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law which 
was in exercise of sovereign function and, therefore, 
the State was under no obligation to pay compensation. 
It was held that the State could not avail of the 
defence of inimunity of sovereign functions. The theory 
of sovereign function does not clothe the state with the 
right to violate the fundamental right to life and 
liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 and no such exception can 
be read into it by referring to Article 300 (1). An 
undertrial prisoner though deprived of his liberty by 
virtue of sovereign function is still entitled to the 
protection of life. Therefore the suit for compensation 
against the State would be maintainable. It is necessary 
to ensure that the State officials do not act with gross 
negligence and do not abuse their powers to the detrim.ent 
of life and liberty of citizens. Concept of sovereign 
power is not therefore, an exception to the right to life. 
21 
In Sunil Gupta the question before the court was 
whether petitioners on being arrested were subjected 
to torture ana treated in a 
21 , Suni l Gupta v . S t a t e of M.P.(1990) 3 SCC 119. 
n 
degrading and inhuro.an manner by handcuffing and 
parading them through the public thorough fare during 
t r a n s i t to the cour t in u t t e r d isregard to the judica l 
mandates in a nxomber of decisions of the Suprerne Court 
and whether they were e n t i t l e d for com.pensation. 
Briefly speaking, the p e t i t i o n e r Sunil Gupta and 
Raj Marain were soc ia l workers and m.embers of Kisan 
Adhiwasi Sangatahana Keshala, HPshangabad. 
The piet i t ioner alongwith a number of chi ldren and 
t r i b a l women staged a peaceful 'Dharna* in front of the 
Office of Block Education Off icer , Keshala demanding 
appointm.ent of two regular teachers in the school located 
in the t r i b a l Hamlets. '^hey were assured by the Assistant 
D i s t r i c t Inspector of School t ha t he would take necessary 
action in t h i s regard but to the p e t i t i o n e r u t t e r dism.ay, 
the loca l pol ice i n i t i a t e d criminal proceedings against 
them under sect ion 186 I .P .C . a l leg ing t h a t they 
obst ructed publ ic servants in discharge of t h e i r publ ic 
funct ions . Thereupon, they were a r r e s t e d , abused, beaten 
and taken to the cour t by handcuffing. The f i r s t c l ass 
Jud ic ia l Magistrate convicted the p e t i t i o n e r s and sentenced 
them, to undergo sim.ple im.prisonm.ent of one m.onth. 
iU 
The p e t i t i o n e r s argued t h a t they were working 
for t he welfare of the weaker sec t ions and downtrodden 
people in a peaceful manner,were inhuro.anly t r e a t e d 
against a l l norriis of decency by the pol ice in u t t e r 
d is regard of the repeated and cons i s ten t rc.andates of the 
Suprem.e Court and fundamental Rights of the p e t i t i o n e r s 
under Ar t i c l e s 14, 19 and 2^ were i s o l a t e d . 
While s trongly 'condemning* the conduct of the p o l i c e , 
the Supreme Court observedi 
" I t i s most painful t o note tha t 
the p e t i t i o n e r s n o . l and 2 who staged 
•Dharna* for publ ic cause and 
vo lun ta r i l y submitted themselves for 
a r r e s t and who had no tendency t o 
escape had been subjected to humilia-
t ion by being handcuffed which act 
of the scotes par ty (was) against a l l 
norms of decency and which i s in u t t e r 
i so l a t i on of the p r i n c i p l e underlying 
Ar t i c le 21 of the cons t i t u t i on? 
This approach of the Supreme Court i s based on what 
Ju s t i c e Krishna Iyer observed in Prem Shankar Shukla^^ 
who em.phasized t h a t handcuffed should not be used as a 
matter of rout ine but only in the ' r a r e s t of the rare 
cases ' and when the person was "d i spe ra t e" , "roudy" or 
22. Ib id . 
23. Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Adri-'.inlstration (AIR 1980 SO 1535) . 
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24 involved in "non bailable offence 1' 
Justice Krishna Iyer has laid much emphasis on the 
prohibition of handcuffing by making an observationi 
"The guarantee of human dignity 
which forms part of our consti-
tutional culture, and the positive 
provisions of Articles 14, 19 and 21 
spring into action when we realized 
that to m.anacle man is more than to 
modify him, it is to dehumanize him, 
and, therefore, to violate his very 
personhood, to often using the m.ask 2c; 
of 'dangerousness* and security,... 
The learned Judge has further observed 1 
"Handicuffing is prim.a facie 
Inhuman and, therefore, unreasonable, 
is overharsh and at the first flush, 
arbitrary Absent fair procedure and 
objective monitoring, to inflict 
'irons* is to resort to Zoological 
strategies repugnant to Article 21.,.. 
To prevent the escape of an under-
trial is in pxiblic interest, reasonable, 
just and can not by itself be castigated. 
But to bind a m.an hand and foot, fetter 
his limbs with hoops of steel, shuffle 
him. along in the streets and stand him. 
for hours in the courts is to torture 
him, defile his dignity, vulgarise society 
and foul the soul of our constitutional 
culture, " *^o 
24. Id. at 1541. 
25. Id. at 1536, 
26. Id. at 1541 -42. 
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While referring and relying on the views of 
Chinappa Reddy in Bhim Singh,^the Supreme Court directed 
the government of M.P, to take appropriate action against 
the erring police party for unjustly, unfairly and 
unreasonably humiliating and handcuffing the petitioners 
without deciding as to whether the petitioners were 
entitled to claim adequate compensation. The petitioners 
were advised to take appropriate action against the erring 
police party. 
Thus, once again the Supreme Court failed to demonstrate 
its judicial courage by declaring the 'Right to Compensation' 
as a part of personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 as 
a 'preventive m.easure' to prevent the state instrum.entali-
ties from, playing With the m.sn's personal liberty, 
28 
In iVs inderpurl General S tore . the p e t i t i o n e r s 
a l l belonging t o Sikh Comraunity suffered losses in the 
unfortunate Gomjriunal r i g h t s which took place in the c i t y 
of Jammu on 13th January 1991, 
I t i s adm.itted t h a t the comm.unal r i o t s broke out 
in the c i t y of Jamm.u due to the al leged act ive connivance 
27, (AIR_1986SC 494). 
^^* '^iR IstTlc^'llT''^''^ ^ o r e , v Union of India 
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of A n t i - n a t i o n a l and s o c i a l e l e m e n t s r e s u l t i n g i n 
i n j u r i e s , d e a t h s of hxjinanbeings and l o s s e s t o t h e 
p r o p e r t i e s . 
29 30 
Having c i t e d and r e l i e d on O lga t e l l l s , 14.C. H e h t a . 
31 
and Bhlm S i n g h . J u s t i c e R, P . S e t h i s a i d t 
"(W)hen l i f e and p r o p e r t y , a s d i s c u s s e d 
h e r e i n a b o v e , i s t a k e n away by any 
i n d i v i d u a l o r o r g a n i z a t i o n , a d u t y c a s t 
upon t h e S t a t e r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e w i l l of 
p e o p l e t o c o m p e n s a t e ti"ie v i c t i m , by 
g r a n t i n g a d e q u a t e c o m p e n s a t i o n . The 
m.onarch ia l r u l e h a s t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
from, d e m o c r a t i c s e t up and t h e s t a t e 
can n o t s h i r k i n i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o 
p r o t e c t t h e l i f e , l i b e r t y , and p r o p e r t y 
of t h e c i t i z e n s on t h e i r f a i l u r e t o 
p r o t e c t t h e l i f e , l i b e r t y and p r o p e r t y 
of t h e c i t i z e n s , S t a t e i s u n d e r a 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n t o c o m p e n s a t e 
t h e v i c t i m , a d e q u a t e l y ! ' 32 
I f we m.ake a c o r r e c t a p p r e c i a t i o n on t h e j u d i c i a l 
a p p r o a c h on t h e ' R i g h t t o C o m p e n s a t i o n ' a d o p t e d by t h e 
Suprem.e C o u r t and t h e High C o u r t s i n t h e c a s e s , one can 
d e f i n i t e l y r e a c h t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e High C o u r t s 
h a v e gone m.uch a h e a d of t h e Suprem.e C o u r t . O n e f a i l s t o 
u n d e r s t a n d a s t o why t h e Suprem.e Cour t i n S u n i l Gupta 
h a s f a i l e d t h e c i t i z e n s by n o t h o l d i n g t h e ' R i g h t t o 
C o m p e n s a t i o n ' a s s u c h J u s t i c e Ch inappa Reddy in 
2 9 . Qlga T e l l l . ? v . Bom.bay M u n i c i p a l O o r p o r a t i o n (AIR 1986SC180) 
3 0 . M,c , i t eh ta V. IJninn of I n d i a (AIR 1997 SC 1086) 
31. Supra note 13. 
32. Supra note 27 at P. 14 
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Bbimslnqh s a i d t h a t "In a p p r o p r i a t e c a s e s we have 
t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o compensate the v i c t i m by awarding 
s u i t a b l e monetary com.pensation. The phrase a p p r o p r i a t e 
34 
c a s e s , has been i n d i c a t e d by Bhagwati , C.J , in H. C. l-tehta 
who p o i n t e d out t h a t t h e in f r ingement of t h e Fundamental 
Right must be g r o s s and p a t e n t , t h a t i s , i n c o n v e r t i b l e 
35 
and e x f a c i e g l a r i n g . • Can anyone say t h a t Suni l Gupta 
i s no t an ' a p p r o p r i a t e c a s e ' and in which t h e abus ing , 
b e a t i n g , handcuf f ipg , i s not a g ro s s p a t e n t and i n c o n v e r t i -
b l e inf r ingement of r i g h t t o p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y which does 
not shock the consc ience of the c o u r t when i t i s p o i n t e d 
out t h a t Sunil '^upta^ has shaken t e r r i b l y the consc ience 
of the Court which the c o u r t has i t s e l f adm.itted t h a t i t 
f e l t ' d i s t r e s s e d ' , the way in which t h e r e sponden t cam.e 
forward t o e x p l a i n t h e conduct of handcuff ing the 
p e t i t i o n e r s . 
Gone are the days when Suprem.e Court became 
s a t i s f i e d by awarding exem.plary c o s t s when i t was rudely. 
(Shaken by t h e g r o s s - s o l a t i o n of the p e r s o n ' s l i b e r t y 
33 . Supra note 13 a t 499, 
3* . Supr^ note 29. 
35 . I d . a t 1091, 
36, Supra note 20 a t 128. 
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as i t did in Rudul Shah. Bhim Singh and Sebar-ti an. 
These cos t s are nothing but puni t ive darc.ages in 
substance though not in form.^'^ Now the time has come 
when the Supreme Court must leave i t s untennable, 
incons i s ten t and incoherent approach. 
I t i s , t h e r e fo re , suggested tha t the Supreme Court 
should now, abandon i t s 'hide and s eek ' , below had below 
co ld ' and obse le t ing approach and must adopt a c l ea r 
c a t ego r i ca l and unambiguous j u d i c i a l approach towards 
the personal l i b e r t y by holding 'Right to Compensation' 
as a ' p o t e n t i a l weapon* to stop the a r b i t r a r y invasion of 
the r i g h t to l i f e and personal l i b e r t y guaranteed by 
Art ic le 21. 
The 'Right to Compensation' i s now well e s tab l i shed 
a f t e r Rudul Sah. Bhim.singh. M.C. I4ehta, Even the Andhra 
High Court speaking through Jus t i ce Jeevana Reddy now 
in the Supreme Court in Rama Konda Reddv and the J & K 
High Court speaking through J u s t i c e R.P. Sethi in 
IVs Inder Puri General Stores have held the r i g h t to 
37. S.N. J a i n , "Itoney Compensation for adminis t ra t ive 
wrongs through Art. 32, 25 J . I . L . I . 188 (1983), 
see also P .S . Jalswal & Nishtha Ja i swal , ' Right to 
Personal Liber tv and handcuffing ' - Som.e observa-
t i o n s ' , 33 J . I . L . I 246 (1991). 
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Compensation as an in t eg ra l par t of the r i g h t of l i f e 
and personal l i b e r t y ' under Ar t ic le 21 of the Const i tu t ion . 
I f the vict ims of the State b r u t a l i t i e s have been compensa-
ted e i t h e r by imposing exam.plary cos t s by the Court or the 
e x - g r a t i a and lump sum. am.ounts are m.ade a v a i l a b l e , the 
probing question i s ; What did prevent the Supreme Court 
in Sunil Gupta to hold the Right to Compensation as an 
e s s e n t i a l Par t of Ar t ic le 21 of the Const i tut ion ? 
If the Court as the guardian of the c i t i z e n s ' r igh t s 
want to the r igh t to l i f e and personal l i b e r t y as a l l 
pervassive and embracing as i t has held in Haneka 
ijandhi i t m.ust sharpen the t e e t h and claws of Art. 21 
by holding the ' r i g h t to compensation* as i t s indispensable 
par t as Chinappa Reddy J , has said t h a t in appropriate 
cases the court has the Ju r i sd i c t i on to com.pensate 
the victim by awarding su i t ab le m.onetary com.pensation. 
If the Supreme Court has , as an Apex Court, fa i led to 
r e a l i s e the com.pensatory remedy as the only j u d i c i a l device 
to prevent the p o l i c e - the notorious agency of the State -
from, dehum.anising and de f i l i ng the d ign i ty of Indian 
m.asses, the enjoym.ent and exercise of the r i g h t to l i f e 
and l i b e r t y would rem.ain cUsvetude or d e a d - l e t t e r or as 
observed by Bhagwati J . , (as he then was) a Paper 
4^)3 
parchment, a 'teasing illusion and a promise of unreality. 
NOW the time has come when the right to compensation 
is a must otherwise the life liberty of the citizens are 
•not safe as when the authority.-dignity and honour of the 
3Q , 
judiciary"'' is not safe, who cares about the common man s 
dignity. 
38, R. Gandhi v. Union of India. AIR 1989 
Mad. 205 at P. 214. 
39. Delhi Judicial Service Association. Tis Hazari 
Court V. State of Gulrat AIR 1992 SC 2176. 
CHAPTER X 
RICH IT TO EDUCATION 
4:11 
x<IGHT TO EDUCATION 
1 
In Miss Mohlni J a i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Bench of the 
Supreme Cour t c o n s i s t i n g of Kuldip Singh and R.M. Sahai J J . 
ha s d e c l a r e d a t ' r i g h t t o educa t ion f lows d i r e c t l y from 
r i g h t t o l i f e ' . ^ 
This judgment of the Apex Court is of the farreachlng 
constitutional importance. The 'Right to education' is yet 
another off shoot of the personal liberty guaranteed by 
rort. 21. The right to education is yet another judicially 
emanated or precedentkl right* conferred upon the citizen 
of our great country. 
The brief facts of the instant case are:-.that Mohini 
Jain a resident of Meerut was informed by the Management of 
Sri Sidharatha Medical College / Agalokote Tunikur in the 
State of Karnataka that she could be admitted to the I'lBBS 
coucse in j|||fi-.«tt8slon coomienoing February March 1991. 
According to the management she was asked to deposit Rs. 60#000/-
as the tution fee for the first year and fxirnish a bank 
guarantee in respect of the fee for the remaing years of the 
MBBS course. The petitioner's father informed the management 
that it was beyond his means to pay the exorbitant annual fee 
of Rs,60,000/- and as a consequence she was denied admission 
to the medical college. 
1. 7^fs^^o^^»i Jain v. State of Karnataka & oth^ r., JT 1992 
\^J S.C. 292 
2. Subra note 1 at p. 299 
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After hearing learned counsel for the parties the coort 
formulated inter alia the question: Is there a 'right 
to education* guaranteed to the people of India under 
the Constitution? If so, does the concept 'capitation 
fee' infracts the same? 
After having cited the prearabular purposes and the 
relevant Articles namely 21, 38, 39 (a) and Cf),4l and 
3 ' 
45 of the Constitution, Justice Kuldip Singh admitted 
that the Constitution of India does not specifically 
guarantee 'right to education* but it makes it 'obligatory 
for the State to provide education for its citizens* . 
3. Art.21."No person shall be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty except according to procedure established by law". 
Art.38(1)"The State shall strive to promote the welfare of 
the people by accuring and protecting as effectively as 
it may a social order in which justice, social,economic 
and political,shall inform all the institutions of the 
national life. 
(2) The State shall, in particular, strive to minimise 
the inequalities in income,and endeavour to eliminate in-
equalities in states, facilities, in income, .. 
. . . _ , L „ and oppor-
tunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst 
groups of people residing in different areas or engaged 
in different vocations. 
Art:. 39. "The State shall, in particular, direct its policy 
towards securing-
(a) that the citizens,men and women equally,have the right 
to an adequate means to livelihood; 
(f) that children are given opportunities and facilities 
to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of ^eedom 
and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected 
against exploitation and abandonment". 
Art. 41_"The State shall, within the limits of its economic 
capacity and development, make effective provision for securing 
tne-. .right to work, to education and to public assistance 
t^A''tn^L^L'^^^^''^^''^'J^'^ *9®' sickness and disablement, ana in other cases of undeserved want". 
-^Ci*45.«The State endeavour to provide,within a period of 
4. supra note 1 at 297 y««is. 
4^)3 
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While emphasing the Importance of'ri^^t to education' 
Kuldlp Singh J. has candidly said that "the objectives 
flowing from the preainble cannot be achieved and shall 
remain on paper unless the people in this are educated". 
The learned Judge goes on to add that "the three pronged 
justice prcxnised by the preamble is only an illusion to 
6 
the teaming - million who are illiterate". 
Undoubtedly the focul point of our Constitution is 
the 'individual' which assxires his 'dignity' without which 
the whole constitution edifice would be a dead letter 
document i.e.de'^ '^old of any Importance. It is the indi-
vidual' was is, in fact, the'soul' or spirit' of our 
7 
Constitution. Therefore 'the dignity of man is inviolate' 
which is prime object recited in the preamble of our 
condition. An Individual can not maintain his dignity 
without the education which is an instrument with which 
he secxires his dignity, status in the society and can 
exercise and enjoy his rights guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. Appropriately Kuldlp Singh J.said that "it Is 
primarily the education which brings forth the dignity 
of a man". The learned Judge has farther observed,"An 
individual cannot be assured of human dignity unless his 
personality is developed and the only way to do that is to 
educate him". 
5. Ib id . 
6. Ibid . 
7. Supra note 1 a t 298 
8. Ib id . 
9. Ib id . 
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Culliag the theme of his judicial approach 'Right 
to education "aa •« 43art jof Article 21 of our Constitution 
Justice Kuldlp Singh heavily relied on Francis Coralig 
10 11 
Mull in and Bandhua Hukti Morcha so as tct'ead it as an 
essential, inseparable and integral part of the 'right 
to live with human dignity*. TheSupreme Court has held 
in iTrcjncis Coral ie Mull in that "the right to life includes 
the right to live with human dignity and all that goes 
along with it"..^^ Reaching at the cul-minating point of 
his judicial theme after having travelled a long judicial 
journey Kuldip Singh J. observed: 
"Right to life" is the compendious expression 
for all those rights which the courts must 
enforce because they are basic to the dignified 
enjoyment of life. It extends to the full 
range of conduct which the individual is free 
to pxirsue. The right to education flows directly 
from right to life. The right to life under 
Article 21 and the dignity of individual cannot 
be assured vmless it is accompanied by the right 
to education"' 
Xhe 'rignt to education' has taken at least six 
years to join the company of the judicially emanated 
rights since it figxired in the Bapuli Educational Associa-
tioa 1986 in the Karnataka High Court, what happened 
^" *^® Bapuli & Educational Association was the legality 
of the Karnataka Educational Institution (Prohibition of 
capitation Fee) Act 1984 was in question. 
lu. francjg uoralie MulUn v. The Administrator.irnir>n 
Territory nt nfa^ H^  MQa,^ . ^^ p ^^^ " 
^^' Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and other.s 
12. Supra note 1 at 299 (1984; 2 SC R 67 
13. BaBHli^gducatlonal Assiciation v. _3tate.AIR 1986 Kanat-
iiiS 
Justice Rama Jois has inter alia observed: 
"Therefore liberty of every kind necessary to 
live as human beings and to ensure alround development 
of one's personality are included in the expression 
personality are included in the expression personal 
liberty used in Art. 21. The right of individual to have 
and / or to impart education is one of the most valuable 
and sacred rights". 
ihus 'right to education' as a part of the 'right 
to life' guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Constitution is the 
result of the continuous process of the judicial activism 
set forth in Haneka Gandhi . The rig^t.. to life and per-
sonal liberty has been receiving the attention of the Apex 
Court, The right to life thus seems to be unending resor-
voire of men's rights which can be included in it as its 
parts. Justice Kama Jois iss of the view that "liberty of 
every kind necessary to live as human beings is included 
in the expression personal liberty used in Art. 21." 
Justice Kuldip Singh described 'right to life' as a compen-
dious expression' which Includes in its ambit the right to 
education. 
It is an undelliibl©. truth that " a man without 
education is equal to animal". It is also a fact that 
life under .urticle 21 of our constitution is something more 
4i)6 
than the animal existence. Life therefore does not only 
mean to live like a slave or sub-human beings but is to 
live with human dignity. Keeping this factual reality 
in view it can be said that both life and education ;»u6t 
coext^ 't * Both are essential for each other. Therefore 
the supreme Court has done a commendable job by displaying 
its judicial craftmanship by reading 'right to education* 
into the right to life as guaranteed by Art. 21 of the 
Constitution. 
However t^ ie Supreme Coxirt's ruling right to education 
laid down in Mohini Jain requires deeper analysis in its 
all ramifications. It is a matter gf great pride and 
satisfaction that the judiciary, with its craft and graft 
judicial process, has been enriching right to life and 
personal liberty enshrinad in Art. 21 vrtiile conferring the 
right to education upon the citizens by expanding the 
right to life the supreme court has not taken care about 
the enforcement of the right itself. The right to educa-
tion has come into existence in a medical case what would 
happen if the governments- . fails to provide medical edu-
cation? still the medical education is a costly affairs 
in the country. Still Indian masses are deprived of the 
good medical facilities. As the court has itself accepted 
the Mudaliar Commission Report which does not favour more 
doctors in orr.er to maintain the standard respect, costly 
uri 
and as a demanding- prof a aaion. If it is so hov» the 'right 
to medical education' can be exercised and enjoyed by 
the common man. Because the economic constraints do not 
allow the government to open and run medical colleges 
any more. 
Though the Supreme Co\art has taken inspiration from 
>irticle 45 which enjoins upon the State to provide free 
and compulsory education for all children until they 
complete the age of fourteen years. This should have 
been done in January, 1960. Had it been so, it would 
have placed us on a higher pedastal. It would have reduced 
the indicsnce of child labour and illiteracy. We are paying 
attention to the adult education and the child labour. 
Now these days both the Government and tixa press are busy 
in paying much attention to the child iaboui:. Day in and 
day out the report relating to the mxj^loit^tXoa of child 
laboxur is coming out in the newspapers by way of investi-
gatory journalism. The horrible hnd inhiunan conditions in 
which children are forced to work in carpet industry of 
Varanasi and Mirzapur, glass works of Firozabad, match 
work of Sivakasi are exposed by the press. But the most 
surprising and the painful thing is that no report talks 
about the free and compulsory education for children. If 
the government has implemented Art. 45 in time, the both 
child labour and illiteracy would have certainl- coxiie dowx: 
to the level of negligible position. But; alas, children 
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are not the voters of the government and are serving to 
the elite/ politicians and bureaucrats as their dcxnestic 
servants. 
t^ hereas the Government is draining out the public 
excheq[uer aimlessly towards the adult education programme 
in which neither the programme officer nor the adults 
are interested. The poverty stricken illiterate masses 
after day's hard work do not have either the physical or 
the mental capacity to attain the adult education classes 
in the night. Of course/ the adult education programme 
benefits only those who are educated/unemployed people. 
Had this money intended to use in the adult education 
programme been directed towards providing free and compul-
sory education for all chi2>dren of 14 years/ it would have 
helped us in prohibiting the child labour and increasing 
the literacy level in the country. If na Judicial action 
can be taken against the government for not providing free 
and compulsory education, enjoined upon the State by Art.45 
what recovirse would be open to the people against the state 
for creating conditions in which 'right to education' could 
be enjoyed by the Indian masses notably poor illiterates 
and ignorants. 
'Right to work* used in Art. 41 was discussed during 
the Janata Oal government but before something could have 
been done the U.P, government ireAt out of office. Now,nobody 
4^d 
talks about it. Like right to work/ the right to edu-
cation held in Mohini Jain would also remain a ' mere 
part right' like all economic rights specified in right, 
part IV known as conditional and dependent upon the eco-
nomic capacity of the State, Therefore the right to edu-
cation is nothing more than the 'delusive hope' which 
would never achieve its reality. It would be nothing more 
than the 'pious hopes' as the government has expressed its 
utter helplessness to open more and more medical colleges. 
iMevertheless the Supreme Court has been playing 
its role as the guardian of the people's rig-it's by inter-
preting the constitution liberally. By including 'right to 
education' in the armoury of the 'right to life' and 
personal liberty it has shar^ .en the teeth and claws of 
article 21 of the Constitution. 
The exercise and enjoyment of fundajdental rights, 
parliamentary democracy and the governance of the country is 
not possible without the people's participation. The people's 
adequate and effective partici^^ation is meaning without edu-
cation. The'dignity of the individual', right to life', right 
to speech', right to vote,'right to participate in democratic 
son 
institutions and the governance of the country need 
a proper education. It is the constitutional mandate 
oc the State to provide educational facilities and 
opportunities for the citizens to develop their perso« 
nality according to their owu ways and wishes* If the 
State fails to create the conditions conducive to the 
enjoyment of the fundamental rights^ the'right to life'# 
'right to live with human dignity' and the constitutional 
pledge to assxire the 'dignity of the individual' would 
remain the will-o'-the wisp. 
CONCLUSION 
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A decade (1975-85) in which the panoramic review of the 
Supreme Court's decisional work on personal liberty has been 
made started with a discrodant note of the imposition of Inter-
nal emergency in June 1975 placing the citizens* life and 
liberty at the sweet mercy of a Police man and ended with the 
declaration of the right to live with basic human dignity and 
the right to livelihood. 
The life and liberty is the most basic human rights amply 
protected and guaranteed in Article 21 of the constitution 
unfort-unately it is this most cherished human right which 
becomes the first casualty of the state. The Police and 
paramilitary forces brutally and rudely trampled and vio-
lated. Still colonial era is roosting the lot. Inspite 
of the democratic society with constitutional culture 
human rights are considered as the most stumbling block in 
the maintenance of 'Law and order' and 'Unity and integrity' 
of India. Still the situation is : the police and human 
rights appears to be the antithesis of each other. Nie-
ther trust each other. 
It is alleged that the police can not effectively maintain 
'Law and Order' on account of the human right. The 
f- 1 J 
*) u u 
problem of terrorism or insurgency can not be controlled 
effectively in view of the human rights. Therefore* the 
'Human Rights'/Law and Order' and 'Unity and integrity' 
are posed as contradictory and incompatible to each other, 
uuring emergency of June 1975 to Karch 1977 tne life and 
personal liberty faced and passed through the difficult 
days or danger in our constitutional life. 
In Maneka Gandhi, the majority judges barring 
Justice Kailasam had given the personal liberty widest 
amplitude, so as to include within its ambit everything. 
It is now having large sweeping and all pervasive and 
embracing reach. The Supreme Court has also done away 
with the conservative, pedantic and too narrow legalistic 
approach and has adopted wide, liberal and dynamic broad 
approach, so as to cover a variety of rights which go to 
constitute the personal liberty of a man. 
Even the meaning of 'law' as used in <^ rticle 21 
has been given a wide meaning. The 'law' as meant and 
construed in Gopalan is'state-made law' or 'state-enacted 
law' now it means and includes in its meaning and concept 
'aule of Law' and the 'principles of l>iatural Justice'. 
These principles being unqualified and unenactea by any 
law making body are now well rooted in our legal structure. 
They provide a kind of guidance and help to the court in 
the dispensation of justice and therefore, the 'Rule of 
Law' has been declared as a basic structure of the 
5'33 
Indian constitution in Indira Nehru Gandhi. 
The court has very emphatically and unambiguously held 
that the 'procedure established by law' does not only mean the 
procedure prescribed by the law as enacted by the legislature 
but it also means a 'reasonable, just and fair' procedure pres-
cribed by law. This judicial approach of the supreme court 
about Article 21 appears to be taken with the dismantl-
ing the doctrine of exclusivity' adopted by Supreme Court in 
Gooalan (1950). The doctrine of exclusivity is that each Article 
is in itself a 'self-code' and are 'mutally exclusive'. Further 
the judges in Maneka Gandhi allowed the entry of American 'due 
process clause' into Article 21 through back door. Clan-desti-
mely, the Supreme Court has read the 'due process' clause into 
•procedure established by law' by adding the adjectives like 
•reasonable', 'just' and 'fair'. Because the court is the final 
interpreter of the constitution and the law and not the legis-
lature. Therefore, the deletion or substitution of the 
'procedure established by law' by 'due process' was beyond the 
judicial power. As we know, the amendment of the constitution 
belongs to the parliament. 
It has also achieved the above stated purpose by combining 
.. ^ .• , together 
Articles 14, 19 and 21 and which^constitute a 'golden triangle' 
of the Indian constitution. The law which authorises the detain-
ing authority to deprive the individual of his life and liberty 
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must satisfy the requirements of Articles 14, 19 and 21. 
They have now become the touch-stone to determine the reasona-
bleness, justness and fairness of the law. 
Taking cue from Maneka Gandhi. Supreme Court in it^ sub-
sequent decisions take the right to life and personal liberty 
nter-
ave 
to its logical height. To give wide, liberal and broad i 
pretation to the language of Article 21^ ihe criminals Y 
provided ample and fertile grounds for which the nation ajs a 
whole shall ever remain indebted to them. 
In M.H. Hoskot. the right to legal aid and first appeal 
have been held as part of personal liberty. Even non-supply 
of the copy of the judgement to the accused amounts the depri-
vation of personal liberty under Article 21. It is, therefore, 
incumbent on the state to give legal aid, free of cost to the 
illiterate, ignorant and indigent litigants. And if, the 
state fails to do, it would be .violation of Article 21. 
The right to speedy - trial has also been treated as 
part of personal liberty under Article 21 in Hussainara 
Khatoon's cases. Bail not Jail is part of personal liberty, 
the using of third degree methods, ill-treatment to the pri-
soness, using iron fetters and keeping in solitary confinement 
and handcuffing, all have been described as inhuman unless the 
criminals are dangerous and have the tendency to escape. 
5 its 
It has been possible because the entry of fundamental 
rights has been allowed inside the big iron gates of the Jails. 
Purpose is to humanize the police and the Jail authorities and 
the prisoner's do have the right to live and enjoy his personal 
liberty inside the Jails as a human being. 
The^right to livelihood' has been declared as an essential 
ingredient of the life in Olaa Tellis and S.^ dan Singh known as 
Pavement dwellers and Footpath hawkers respectively. The court 
is of the view that without means of livelihood life becomes a 
hell. Without means of life man's survival is not possible. 
It has, therefore, been riqhtly held that the right to liveli-
hood is implicitly included in the right to life and personal 
liberty. 
The 'right to travel abroad' with all its necessories 
like 'right to passport* and to have a reasonable and sufficient 
foreign exchange, all have been treated as essential part of 
the personal liberty under Article 21. 
In Kharak Sinah and Govind. the 'right to privacy' was 
indepth argued and discussed. But, the court has^ for the 
reasons known to it, riot categorically declared the 'right to 
privacy' as an essential part of personal liberty under Article 
21. The 'right to privacy' may be treated as deemed'part of the 
personal liberty. We hope that if the present judicial trend 
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continues under Article 21, the days are not f-.r off when the 
supreme court in its first opportunity would unhesitatingly 
declare tHe 'right to privacy' as.essential part of the 
'personal liberty*. 
ex^ansiOii: or the « x. i 
The/horizons of personal liberty as guaranteed by Article 
21 has been possible on the ground of 'public interest litiga-
tion'. The traditional concept of the right to file case has 
been side-tracked and relegated to the background so far as the 
right to personal liberty under Article 21 is concerned. So, 
the traditional rule of locus standi is that the man must have 
suffered loss or damage caused to his body or property or have 
an interest then he has an access to the court. This rule 
retards the ever increasing and exp-nsive growth and develop-
ment of the personal liberty, if followed. Because, the poor 
illiterate, ignorant and indigent Indian masses have no means 
to reach the corridors of seat of justice in this country. 
Therefore, the court has treated the letters addressed to the 
court as a full fledged writ petitions for the purpose of 
Article 21. Further, the court has encouraged by its judicial 
attitude, the public spirited m-.n, the social activities and 
the social action group to get the judicial attention in order 
to sensitize and conscientises the pachy-der-ma-tous state 
authorities. Thus the court has opened new v.^ stas of personal 
liberty by and with the, help of 'public interest litigation' 
which in turn itself has become the part of personal liberty. 
In Rudul Shah. Bhim Singh and Suneel Gupta, the Supreme 
Court has accepted the necessity of admitting the 'right to 
compensation' into the ever increasing family of right to per-
sonal liberty under Article 21. Though, the court has imposed 
monetary compensation which are pallia-tive measures or by way of 
exemplary costs. However, if the court wants that the life and 
personal liberty should not be raped by the state authorities, 
then the 'right' to compensation' must be categorically declared 
as a part of personal liberty so as to prevent the state instru-
the 
mentalities , from/violation of personal liberty and making them 
accountable to the public. Because the stage has reached where 
the dignity and personal liberty of an M.L.A, and judicial 
officer is not safe what to talk about the dignity and liberty 
of a common and ordinary man. 
The workers have been able to have the 'judicial, atten-
tion^of the highest court of the land in mitig-ating their hard-
ships and in releasing themselves out of the slavery and 
bondage. In Asiad construction wnri^ or.:, Supreme Court has held 
that the workers QO have the'right to live with human dignity.' 
Without sufficient and timely payment of wages, it is difficult 
for the workers to live with human dignity. The Supreme Court 
has tried its best to remove the bonded labour system from the 
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face of India by way of identification, release and 
rehabilitation of bonded labourers under the Bonded 
Labour (Abolition) Act, 
In r. caareetha,' Jhe Andhra Court speaking through 
justice Choudhary has declared the restitution of conjugal 
rights as violative of Article 21. In Harvinder Kaur, 
Justice a.B. Rohatgi of the uelhi High Court has expressed 
his total unwillingness to agree with what justice 
Chaudhary of Andhra High Court has said about the resti-
tution of conjugal rights in T. Sareetha. The Supreme 
Court caught in a dilemma how and in what way, to resolve 
the sensitive issue of conjugal rights vis-a-vis personal 
liberty under Article 21 in Saroj Rani. The Supreme 
Court has displayed its judicial wisdom by accepting the 
views of Justice Rohatgi of ijelhi High Court and rejected 
of Justice Chaudhary; while dealing with tne necessity 
and desirability of the institution of marriage which is 
nothing but'two-in-oneship', the court has wisely 'halted 
the menacing advancement of cold^ dried and lifeless 
constitutional principles* in the domestic life of the 
individuals. This Judicial a^ p^roach of the Supreme 
Court is entirely in consonance with the spirit and 
philosophy of the personal liberty under Article 21. 
5ii9 
The so called judicial activism involving the 
legal craftin^ ^hd graftiny of the Supreme Court in 
order to expand the contours of j.jersonal liberty into 
multi-dimensional aspects was due to the criminals -
undertrial or convict - the black or hated humanity of 
our society. After Maneka Gandhi/ right to legal aid 
and the supply of the copy of judgment and the right 
to first appeal were declared as an integral part of 
personal liberty under Article 21 in ii.H. Koskot. 
In the three cases of Hussainara Khatoon, the 
Supreme Court declared right to legal aid and speedy triil 
as ^ art of ^^ ersonal liberty. In Sunil Batra I and 11, 
cun^ulatively dealt with tiae inhuman treatment and tortu-
ring meted out to the prisoners. In Babu Singh, right to 
bail has been accepted as part of personal liberty. In 
Kishori Singh and Prem Shankar Shukla, torturing,handcuffing, 
bar-fettering, have been restricted or prohibited. 
In Jolly George Jacob, Civil detention has been 
declared anathema to personal liberty. 
rne Supreme Court has declared 'uight to Education' 
as an essential ingredient to personal liberty. The 
judgement of the court, if taken in true constitutional 
perspective, can be said to be a good law. But if we 
closely scrutinize and apply our sharp incisiveness than 
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it can be said without slight hesitation that the 
'Right to Education* judicially given to the Indian 
masses would still remain a 'teasing illusory'. Like 
all other airective principles/ 'i%iynt to Education' 
oerore its declaration should have been economically 
examined carefully. 
In tnt ultimate analysis, it can therefore be 
said on the basis of cycloramic review of the supreme 
Court's judicial activism commencing from i^ ianeka Gandhi 
to Mohini Jain that the Supreme Court has tried its best 
to restore the j..ersonal liberty under Article 21 of the 
Constitution to its pristine position. In shivakant 
Shukla/ right to personal liberty had been judicially 
emasculated by undermining its constitutional importance 
which was an immense loss to the citizens. Those who 
constituted the majority opinion of the Supreme Court 
in Shivakant Shukla became the most active, progressive 
and liberal advocates of the personal liberty after the 
lifting of the emergency in i-iarch, 1977. The Judges of 
the Supreme Court felt it necessary to enrich the con-
tents and contours of the right to personal liberty what 
was hither to unknown and denied by not less than them-
selves in Shivakant Shukla. It was this loss done to the 
personal liberty by Y.V. Chandrachud and P.W. Bhagwati.jj. 
in the company of A.N. Ray, G.J. and M.H. Beg, J. was to be 
retrieved, it is this loss of the personal liberty which 
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might have motivated Justice y,li» Bnagwati to adopt 
•Judicial offensive approach' towards personal liberty 
guaranteed by /irticle 21 of the Constitution so as to 
enable the court to give multi dimensional, extensive 
and expansive direction to it in Maneka Gandhi. With 
this liberal, progressive and dynamic judicial approach, 
the supreme Court has been able to take out the personal 
liberty out of the narrow, pedantic and conservative 
judicial approach adopted by the court in Gopalan. 
rts cne Constitutional guardian of the citizens' 
rignt and the final interpreter of the constitution the 
Supreme Court has displayed its dynamic judicial activism 
by protecting the life and liberty of the citizens from 
the arbitrary encroachment by the government. The oupreme 
Court has shown tne tremendous zeal, anxiety and over-
enthuasm in safeguarding the life and liberty of the ^ oor, 
illiterate and ignorant Indian masses. 
Having generated the confidence and faith by 
displaying its judicial activist role as a catalyst. The 
people have considered the Supreme Court as the only 
guardian of their rights. Everyboay in this country looks 
towards Supreme Court as a last resort for the redressal 
Of thej/i, grievances. 
su 
We hope, the Supreme Court, unlike, the executive 
and the legislature will not fail the Indian masses in 
translating tne dreams, hopes and aspirations of the 
founding fathers of the Indian Constitution, The 
liberty, alongwith justice and fraternity, is a must 
for ensuring 'the dignity of the individual' for which 
tne freedom fignters have made unparallel sacrifices 
under the benign leadership of Gandhi iviehru-Azad. 
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